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According to a widely-accepted interpretation, Romantic literature is characterised 
by a particular conception of the self. For the Romantics, the self was deep and 
developmental. We are not born with a stable sense of identity, but have to discover 
or create one through a course of reflective experience. To explore this form of 
selfhood, the Romantics developed new forms of literature. They wrote lyrical 
poems and plays depicting the formation of consciousness in nature, 
Bildungsromane depicting the formation of people in society, and autobiographies 
depicting the formation of the author in the world. The self-formation interpretation 
of Romanticism remains influential today, even though decades of historicist 
scholarship have uncovered numerous unfamiliar texts, and new aspects of familiar 
texts, which the concept of self-formation cannot explain. 
 The biggest, yet frequently disregarded problem with the self-formation 
interpretation is that so many Romantic texts seem to be about exactly the opposite. 
The most famous example is Frankenstein (1818). Victor and his creature, far from 
forming coherent senses of identity, are deformed by their experience. In this thesis, 
I consider a range of other deformed selves in British Romanticism, from the sad 
protagonist of Amelia Opie’s Adeline Mowbray (1805) to the speaker of John Clare’s 
sonnets and the heroes of Joanna Baillie’s tragedies. I describe the different kinds 
of self-deformation these authors portray, and show how they shaped their texts in 
order to portray it. While other scholars—most recently Alan Richardson, Andrea 
Henderson, Jacques Khalip and Michael Gamer—have considered neglected 
varieties of selfhood in Romantic literature, this is the first study which 
systematically considers the relationship between deformed selfhood and the 
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different forms of Romantic writing. I am thus able to provide wider and more 
powerful descriptions of the major Romantic genres. 
The self-formation interpretation has affected how scholars define and 
evaluate every genre of Romantic literature. In each chapter, I tackle a different one, 
showing how our received understanding of the genre is challenged by texts of self-
deformation. Chapter 1 lays the philosophical groundwork. In it, I show how 
eighteenth-century ideas about self-deformation survived into Romantic-era 
thought. In Chapter 2, on fiction, I compare Amelia Opie’s Adeline Mowbray to 
Maria Edgeworth’s Vivian (1812). In these tragic anti-Bildungsromane, the very 
possibility of self-formation is questioned, as the protagonists are ensnared in social 
conventions. In Chapter 3, on poetry, I analyse the sonnets of Charlotte Smith and 
John Clare, which resist the synthesis of mind and nature usually held to be typical 
of Romantic lyric. In Chapter 4, on life-writing, I focus on Moore’s Letters and 
Journals of Lord Byron, With Notices of his Life (1830-31), whose baggy form 
mirrors its subject’s “multiform” personality, and embodies its author’s sceptical, 
Humean philosophy of self. In Chapter 5, on drama, I compare the gothic tragedies 
of Joanna Baillie and Charles Harpur, which reveal the frightening and 
metaphysical aspects of Romantic self-deformation. 
As I argue throughout this thesis, it is no coincidence that readers have often 
found these texts ugly and banished them from the canon. They challenge our 
received notions of genre, and so can appear deformed, when in fact their apparent 
deformities are sound aesthetic strategies for portraying self-deformation. To show 
how well-formed they are for this purpose, I employ a range of digital techniques, 
such as text analysis, sentiment analysis and character networks. Not only can these 
techniques uncover hidden aspects of a text’s structure, but they also allow precise, 
large-scale comparisons of many texts, allowing me to demonstrate for the first time 
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that these apparently marginal books about misfits and failures are actually central 
to Romantic debates about aesthetics and selfhood. 
The Romantic self, I argue, is mysterious and complex, and its deep and 
developmental aspects are often in conflict. The self can be deformed by deep inner 
forces, as in Opie, Smith and Baillie, and grow into a monstrous, malformed self. Or 
it can be deformed by excessive openness to external influence, as in Edgeworth, 
Clare and Harpur, and crumble into a formless self. Moore’s multiform Byron is 
malformed and formless all at once, and indeed the two paradigms of self-
deformation mix in complex ways in all these texts. These are Frankenstein’s 
siblings, the agonised villains, quivering victims and self-annihilating mystics who 
stalked the darker byways of the Romantic mind, shedding new light on the 
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A GALLERY OF GOTHICK 
GROTESQUERIES 
 
The man of the world is whole in his mask. … What he is, is nothing; what he appears 
to be is everything for him. 
 —Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1762 
No; to th’embattled foe I will presentġ
This hated form—and welcome be the sabre 
That leaves no atom of it undefiled! 
 —Horace Walpole, 1791 
He contemplated his picture—he shrunk from it, but he could change its deformity 
only by an effort too nobly daring for a mind already effeminated by vice. 
 —Ann Radcliffe, 1791 
Fix not thy steadfast gaze on me, 
Shrunk atom of mortality! 
—Mary Robinson, 1791 
Does not slavery itself depress the mind, and extinguish all its fire, and every noble 
sentiment? 
—Olaudah Equiano, 1794 
My soul’s an atom in the world of mind, 
Hurl’d from its centre by some adverse storm … 
 —Charles Lloyd, 1794 
  I now am nothing. 
I am a man, of holy claims bereft; 
Out of the pale of social kindred cast; 
Nameless and horrible. 
 —Joanna Baillie, 1798 
By allowing women but one way of rising in the world, … society makes monsters of 
them …  
 —Mary Wollstonecraft, 1798 
  [He] never gains 
   One energy of will, that does not rise 
   From some external cause, to which he hies 
From his own blank inanity. 
—Anna Seward, 1799 
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… my mind is eaten away like my body by incurable disease—inveterate remorse—
remorse for a life of folly … 
 —Maria Edgeworth, 1800 
Her mind, alas, was an eternal night, which the broad beam of virtue never 
illumined. 
 —Charlotte Dacre, 1806 
   … his very soul  
Unmoulds its essence, hopelessly deformed  
By sights of evermore deformity! 
—Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 1813 
    I became 
A loathsome thing, all pestilence, all flame! 
 —Thomas Moore, 1817 
The opium-eater loses none of his moral sensibilities or aspirations; … but his 
intellectual apprehension of what is possible infinitely outruns his power, not of 
execution only, but even of proposing or willing. 
 —Thomas De Quincey, 1821 
’Tis but one devil ever tempts a man,ġ
And his name’s Self. 
—Thomas Lovell Beddoes, 1822 
   O’er my soulġ
Lightening hath pass’d—and seared it. 
—Felicia Hemans, 1823 
’Tis done! and I am now a lonely blot 
Upon the face of nature! 
 —Catherine Gore, 1824 
The heat o’ the sun brain’d you that time methinks, for you talk extremely wild! 
 —Charles Harpur, 1835 
In this strange death of life to be, 
To live in death and be the same, 
Without this life or home or name, 
At once to be and not to be … 







N 2013, I visited a touring exhibition at the National Gallery in Canberra: 
Turner from the Tate: The Making of a Master. Visitors were invited to 
accompany William Turner on his quest for mastery. In the first room were 
his teenage canvasses, already shining with prodigious talent despite the clichéd 
subject-matter. Then came the academic painter of early adulthood. Then the 
sojourn to Italy, and the discovery of light. Finally, the sea. Massy, sublime breakers 
smashing across the canvas. Great deep skies reflecting eternity in them. And those 
enigmatic final canvasses—sketches, drafts, abandoned? Presages of something 
grander? The painter we met in these rooms was the Turner of Mike Leigh’s 2014 
biopic, played by the stupendous curmudgeon Timothy Spall—Turner the 
uncompromising genius, the eccentric, the radical with a keen eye and a 
revolutionary paintbrush, the Turner who strove for a new vision of the world, and 
found it. 
In the gift shop, visitors were invited to delve deeper into Turner’s Romantic 
genius. Among a number of books about Turner himself, two were on offer that that 
put him in historical context: Timothy Blanning’s The Romantic Revolution (2011) 
and Michael Ferber’s Romanticism: A Very Short Introduction (2010). In these 
books, visitors would learn that Turner was not the only visionary quest-hero of the 
period. Blanning argues that the Romantic Revolution was as important as the 
American, French and Industrial ones. Its prophet was Rousseau, whose great deed 
was “[to place] the creator, not the created, at the centre of aesthetic activity.” The 
I 
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old “mimetic” theory of art was out, and the “expressive” one was in.1 From now on, 
art was autobiography. A purchaser of Ferber’s book would find that Romanticism 
laid the stress on the struggle to achieve self-expression more than on the expression 
itself. The Romantics “found a symbolic and internalised romance plot a vehicle for 
exploring one’s self and its relationship to others and to nature.”2 For Ferber, 
Blanning, and the curators of the exhibition, Romanticism was characterised by a 
particular ideal of self-formation. The Romantics explored the world to explore 
themselves, seeking a source of meaning deep within. They shaped new and more 
complete visions of themselves in their imaginations. Then they used their art to 
express their hard-won senses of self, or to portray other people who achieved self-
formation. 
This is a beautiful ideal, but an incomplete description of Romanticism. Not 
every work of Romantic art depicts self-formation. Even a canonical Romantic like 
Turner, whose subjective style of painting seems to fit Ferber’s and Blanning’s 
theories, could produce artworks like War. The Exile and the Rock Limpet (1842) 
(Figure 0.1). Napoleon stands by a muddy pool, his back to the world. He wears a 
uniform, but the army it represents is no more. He is a soldier, but he is unarmed, 
and watched by the quiet foe. He is contemplative, but he does not gaze on the glory 
of the setting sun, nor on the beautiful city atop the hill, nor on the birds that wing 
their way into the infinite sky. Instead, he stares at a shallow pool, which contains 
his cross-armed self, his guard, and the puny, nearly invisible rock limpet. Napoleon 
is not a well-formed but a deformed self. He has lost what defined him, and become 
a shadowy reflection, lit only by the reddening light of a setting sun. 
                                                   
1 Tim Blanning, The Romantic Revolution (London: Phoenix, 2011), 17. 
2 Michael Ferber, Romanticism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 10. 
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Figure 0.1 
J.M.W. Turner, War. The Exile and the Rock Limpet 
 
1842, oil on canvas, 79.4 × 79.4 cm. Tate Britain, London. http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks 
/turner-war-the-exile-and-the-rock-limpet-n00529 (accessed June 6 2017) Photo © Tate. Licensed 
under Creative Commons Licence CC-BY-NC-ND 3.0 (Unported). 
Turner’s Napoleon has many fellows in Romantic literature: Joanna Baillie’s 
De Monfort, with his cry of “I now am nothing;” Olaudah Equiano’s slave, whose 
mental “fire” is extinguished; Catherine Gore’s Falkenstiern, a “lonely blot | Upon 
the face of nature;” or the aging John Clare, living his “strange death of life” in the 
Northampton General Asylum. These are all examples of self-deformation, of men 
and women whose experience destroys or misshapes their self, rather than enriching 
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or completing it. This thesis investigates the deformed selves of Romantic literature, 
showing how our conceptions of the Romantic self and the Romantic style change if 
we include them in the picture. 
*** 
Since the 1980s, many scholars have sought to widen our picture of Romantic 
literature, in the name of a more “open literary history.”3 This trend has brought 
many more authors, texts and genres into view. Unlike 20 years ago, it is now quite 
usual to encounter discussion of fiction, women writers or scientific texts in books, 
courses, and conferences on Romantic literature. These texts are so various, that 
their rediscovery has led many scholars over the last two decades to doubt whether 
Romanticism can be coherently defined at all.4 Others, like Jerome McGann, claim 
that the old concept of Romanticism remains useful, but that it does not apply to 
every text from the period.5 But neither of these is today the dominant view. Instead 
of rejecting the concept of Romanticism, or limiting its scope, most scholars have 
set about redefining the Romantic concept of self-formation, the concept at the heart 
of most definitions of “Romanticism,” so that it can explain an ever-wider selection 
of texts. The best example of this redefinition is Jane Austen. 
Austen was once considered to be thoroughly non-Romantic.6 Indeed, 
visitors to the Turner exhibition could have learnt from Ferber that attempts to 
                                                   
3 Marilyn Butler, “Repossessing the Past: The Case for an Open Literary History,” in Rethinking 
Historicism: Critical Readings in Romantic History, ed. Marjorie Levinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1989). 
4 For example, Butler herself: Romantics, Rebels, and Reactionaries (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1981), 178-87. Of course such arguments go back at least as far as Arthur O. Lovejoy’s famous 
paper, “On the Discrimination of Romanticisms,” PMLA 39, no. 2 (1924). 
5 Jerome J McGann, The Romantic Ideology: A Critical Investigation (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1985), 17-20. 
6 See Northrop Frye, “The Drunken Boat: The Revolutionary Element in Romanticism,” in 
Romanticism Reconsidered: Selected Papers from the English Institute, ed. Northrop Frye (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 2, 11-12; A Study of English Romanticism (New York: 
Random House, 1968), 45-46; McGann, 18-19; Stephen C. Behrendt, “Questioning the Romantic 
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prove she is Romantic are “strained.”7 The problem with Austen is her social 
comedy. Romantic literature is supposed to take “imagination for the view of poetry, 
nature for the view of the world, and symbol and myth for the poetic style,” 
according to René Wellek’s influential definition.8 But Austen’s novels concern 
rationality, not imagination, take place in society, not nature, and are realistic, not 
symbolic or mythical—or so the argument used to go. It has been turned on its head, 
however, by historicists like Deidre Lynch and Clifford Siskin, who raise the 
discussion to a higher level of abstraction. All Wellek’s keywords—imagination, 
nature, symbol, and myth—have a feature in common. They all point towards the 
deep, self-developing parts of the human psyche. Lynch observes that psychological 
depth is a key feature of Austen’s novels. Her heroines may spend a lot of time 
stitching and discussing the news in fashionable drawing rooms, but they are 
complex, have “inner meanings and psychological depths,” and embark on epic 
voyages of “self-discovery.”9 For Siskin, Austen is as Romantic as William 
Wordsworth, because both share the idea that “the self [is] a mind that grows.”10 
As Figure 0.2 shows, arguments like Lynch’s and Siskin’s have transformed 
the study of Romanticism. The graph shows the relative frequency of the words 
“Wordsworth,” “Byron” and “Austen” in a sample of 1000 literature articles about 
Romanticism downloaded from JSTOR Data for Research.11 The data has been 
                                                   
Novel,” Studies in the Novel 26, no. 2 (1994): passim. 
7 Ferber, 12. 
8 René Wellek, “The Concept of ‘Romanticism’ in Literary History II. The Unity of European 
Romanticism,” Comparative Literature 1, no. 2 (1949): 147. 
9 Deidre Shauna Lynch, The Economy of Character: Novels, Market Culture, and the Business of 
Inner Meaning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 6, 17. Ironically, the sceptical Marilyn 
Butler makes just this kind of argument about Austen, and her forebear Maria Edgeworth, in Marilyn 
Butler, Jane Austen and the War of Ideas, 2 ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 299. 
10 Clifford Siskin, The Historicity of Romantic Discourse (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), 3. See also Clifford Siskin and William Warner, “If This Is Enlightenment Then What 
Is Romanticism?,” European Romantic Review 22, no. 3 (2011). 
11 The computer uses a tf-idf algorithm to determine which articles are about Romanticism. This 
stands for “term frequency-inverse document frequency.” It measures how distinctive a particular 
word is in a particular text. For instance, one article might use the term “romanticism” 20 times. This 
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smoothed with a five-year rolling window, meaning each point on the line represents 
the average of that year and the two either side. Though the JSTOR data can be 
messy, and simply counting the frequency of these three words has obvious 
problems,12 the graph still gives a good overall picture.  
Figure 0.2 
Three Big Names in Romantic Literature 
 
Source: JSTOR Data for Research, retrieved June 2015. 
From the 1980s, Austen’s name has become far more frequent in discussions of 
Romanticism, sometimes even outstripping Byron’s and Wordsworth’s. Another 
trend is equally important: the divergence of Wordsworth’s and Byron’s names since 
the 1970s.13 At this time, the “Yale School” of Wordsworthian scholars were in 
                                                   
is the term frequency. In a massive corpus like JSTOR, however, perhaps only 1/1000 articles have 
the word “romanticism” in them. This is the document frequency. To calculate the tf-idf of 
“romanticism” in this particular article, you simply multiply the term frequency by the inverse 
document frequency: 20 × 1000/1 = 20,000. Since this article uses this rare word “romanticism” so 
many times, it must be important to the subject-matter. If the word “romanticism” appears among 
an article’s most distinctive words by tf-idf, then it is included in the sample. JSTOR’s metadata is 
not perfect, however, so some of the 1000 “articles” were removed from the sample—e.g. the annual 
bibliographies of the Keats-Shelley Journal, which are not actually articles, and significantly skewed 
the numbers. 
12 For instance, it will count mentions of “Wordsworth” even if the Wordsworths in question are 
Dorothy or Johnathan. 
13 The large peak in the frequency of Byron’s name around 1950 is a statistical anomaly, caused by a 
single article that mentions Byron 216 times: Daniel G. Samuels, “Critical Appreciations of Byron in 
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ascendance. Since then, Wordsworth has been mentioned at least twice as often as 
Byron in articles about Romanticism, a ratio that persisted even when Wordsworth’s 
frequency plummeted in the 1990s. His and Byron’s names have also tended to move 
in lockstep, increasing and decreasing in frequency at the same time, suggesting that 
he and Byron are often mentioned alongside one another, the club-footed Lord a 
constant point of contrast to the philosophical Distributor of Stamps. 
Byron has always held a strange place in the Romantic canon. He was 
undoubtedly a titanic figure in European Romanticism, yet British scholars from 
Maurice Bowra to Timothy Blanning have denied him full Romantic status.14 The 
problem is that self-deformation is his major preoccupation. If Wordsworth’s poems 
and Austen’s novels tend to portray the growth and development of the self, Byron’s 
works tend to describe its decay: 
For the sword outwears its sheath,  
 And the soul wears out the breast,  
And the heart must pause to breathe,  
 And love itself have rest.15 
Time misshapes Byron’s characters, turning them into remorseful criminals like 
Manfred, Conrad or Lara. Or it erodes the self into nothing: “I steal | From all I may 
be, or have been before, | To mingle with the universe,” he writes at the end of Childe 
Harold’s Pilgrimage (1812-18) (251). In Don Juan (1819-24), he finds himself 
wondering whether he even exists: 
‘To be or not to be?’ Ere I decide, 
 I should be glad to know that which is being. 
’Tis true we speculate both far and wide 
 And deem because we see, we are all-seeing. 
                                                   
14 Maurice Bowra, The Romantic Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 149; 
Blanning, 167. See in particular Wellek’s classic comment: Wellek,  165. 
15 George Gordon Byron, Lord, Poetical Works (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 101, ll. 9-
12. All future reference to Byron’s poetry will be to this edition, indicated by BW with a page number, 
and line numbers for shorter poems. 
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For my part, I’ll enlist on neither side 
 Until I see both sides for once agreeing. 
For me, I sometimes think that life is death, 
Rather than life a mere affair of breath. (771) 
The Romanticism of self-deformation has always been something of an 
embarrassment for scholars who place Wordsworth, and now Austen, at the centre 
of the Romantic canon. They have developed various approaches to deal with it. The 
oldest solution is that of great nineteenth-century critics such as William Hazlitt and 
Matthew Arnold, who simply held that Byron was a lesser poet than Wordsworth 
because of his less perfect self-cultivation. Wordsworth forsook the world and took 
to nature, discovering in the humble affections of the heart a cure for the ills of 
civilisation. This was a great discovery, argued Hazlitt: “It partakes of, and is carried 
along with, the revolutionary movement of our age.”16 Byron also forsook the world, 
but in a different way: “By hating and despising others, he does not learn to be 
satisfied with himself.”17 His poetry was thus a giant self-falsification: “he sets up for 
what he is not.”18 Arnold made a similar point: “The way out of the false state of 
things which enraged him he did not see,—the slow and laborious way upward; he 
had not the patience, knowledge, self-discipline, virtue, requisite for seeing it.”19 
Byron deformed himself, and in so doing, deformed his poetry. 
In the twentieth century, a different approach became more popular. 
According to this approach, Byron and his kin espoused a kind of “negative”20 or 
“secondary”21 Romanticism. Byron’s greatest poems are “parodies of the Romantic 
                                                   
16 William Hazlitt, “Mr. Wordsworth,” in William Hazlitt, The Complete Works, 21 vols. (London and 
Toronto: Dent, 1930-1934), XI.87. 
17 “Lord Byron,” in ibid., XI.77. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Matthew Arnold, Essays in Criticism: Second Series (London and New York: Macmillan, 1888), 
198. 
20 Morse Peckham, “Toward a Theory of Romanticism,” PMLA 66, no. 2 (1951), 14-15. 
21 McGann, 107-18; Roger Cardinal, “Romantic Travel,” in Rewriting the Self : Histories from the 
Middle Ages to the Present, ed. Roy Porter (London: Taylor and Francis, 2002), 150. 
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completed quest,” as Northrop Frye put it.22 For critics of this school, the 
Romanticism of self-formation remained central, and the Romanticism of self-
deformation was best understood as a sceptical movement of writers who 
questioned the core tenets of the Romantic faith. Perversely, this meant that texts of 
self-deformation helped to prove that self-formation was central to Romanticism: 
for Stuart Curran, Percy Shelley’s Alastor (1816) demonstrates that in Romanticism 
“the quest is always for a completed self,” even though the quest in that poem ends 
in self-destruction.23 A closely related approach was to study the Romanticism of 
self-deformation under another heading, the Gothic. In Robert Miles’s influential 
definition, the Gothic is essentially “a series of … forms, devices, codes, figurations, 
for the expression of the ‘fragmented subject’.”24 Thus the healthy Romantic self 
could be insulated from the pathological Gothic one. 
Recently, a third, more flexible approach has taken hold, stressing that there 
was no single idea of self-formation in Romantic Britain. In a series of books on 
Romantic conceptions of the mind, Alan Richardson revealed the sheer variety of 
Romantic-era ideas about human development. It may be true to say that the idea 
of “mental growth” defined the “romantic ethos,” but the nature of growth was hotly 
debated in the period—there were, for instance, at least seven competing views 
about how children become adults.25 Andrea Henderson tackles the “depth model” 
of Romantic subjectivity head-on, showing how Walter Scott, Ann Radcliffe, Percy 
Shelley, Byron, and even Wordsworth explored different kinds of selves in their 
writing, shallow selves without mysterious inner depths pushing them on to grow. 
                                                   
22 Frye, A Study of English Romanticism, 59. 
23 Stuart Curran, Poetic Form and British Romanticism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1986), 148. 
24 Robert Miles, Gothic Writing, 1750-1830: A Genealogy, 2nd ed. (Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 2002), 3. 
25 Alan Richardson, Literature, Education and Romanticism: Reading as Social Practice, 1780-1832 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 6, 11-12. 
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She concludes that it is impossible to provide “any monolithic account of Romantic 
subjectivity.”26 Michael Gamer, meanwhile, has shown how thoroughly “Gothicised” 
even the most quintessentially Romantic writers of the period were.27 Nonetheless, 
although all three of these writers argue for a more flexible approach, they all still 
use the term “Romantic” to refer to the classic ideal of Romantic self-formation, and 
see it as the dominant ideal of the period.28 
All of these approaches push texts of self-deformation to the margins of the 
Romantic canon. Such texts are at best rare and different, at worst ugly and 
imperfect. I take a different approach. How would Romanticism look if we put the 
loners and misfits at the centre of it? How would we understand the Romantic self 
if we focussed on examples of its collapse? Such questions have been posed before. 
When “les romantiques” began to flex their muscles in the Paris of the 1820s, M. 
Auger, director of the Académie Française, knew what they threatened: 
Ayez horreur de cette littérature de cannibales, qui se repaît de lambeaux de chair 
humaine, et s’abreuve du sang de femmes et des enfants ; elle ferait calomnier votre 
cœur, sans donner une meilleure idée de votre esprit. Ayez horreur ; avant tout, de 
cette poésie misanthropique, ou plutôt infernale, qui semble avoir reçu sa mission de 
Satan même, pour pousser au crime, en le montrant toujours sublime et triomphant ; 
pour dégoûter et décourager la vertu, en la peignant toujours faible, pusillanime et 
opprimée.29 
                                                   
26 Andrea Henderson, Romantic Identities: Varieties of Subjectivity, 1774-1830 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 166. Jacques Khalip takes a similar approach in Anonymous Life: 
Romanticism and Dispossession (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). 
27 Michael Gamer, Romanticism and the Gothic: Genre, Reception, and Canon Formation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); “Gothic Fictions and Romantic Writing in Britain,” 
in The Cambridge Companion to Gothic Fiction, ed. Jerrold E. Hogle (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). Fred Botting tries to break down the distinction between “gothic” and 
“romance” in Gothic Romanced: Consumption, Gender and Technology in Contemporary Fictions 
(London: Routledge, 2008), 9-10, 19-21. 
28 In Gamer’s defence, he argues that the canonical Romantics invented the distinction between 
Gothicism and Romanticism themselves, to buttress their reputations: Romanticism and the Gothic: 
Genre, Reception, and Canon Formation, chap. 1. His argument is obviously indebted to McGann’s.  
29 “Recoil from this literature of cannibals, which feeds on ribbons of human flesh, and drinks the 
blood of women and children; it would calumniate your heart, without giving a greater idea to your 
spirit. Recoil, first of all, from this misanthropic, or better, infernal poetry, that seems to have 
received its mission from Satan himself, to encourage crime by showing it always as sublime and 
triumphant, to disgust and discourage virtue by portraying it always as feeble, pusillanimous, and 
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According to Auger, the Romantics promoted a vision of self-deformation. They saw 
the heart as a reservoir of satanic passions that tear apart the body and render virtue 
weak. Auger found this vision of humankind’s inherent deformity repulsive, and he 
found the Romantic style repulsive too, when it brought the old rules of neoclassical 
decorum crashing down. A century later, T. E. Hulme calumniated Romanticism on 
different grounds: 
They had been taught by Rousseau that man was by nature good, that it was only bad 
laws and customs that had suppressed him. … Here is the root of all romanticism: 
that man, the individual, is an infinite reservoir of possibilities; and if you can so 
rearrange society by the destruction of oppressive order then these possibilities will 
have a chance and you will get Progress.30 
Hulme had a different conception of Romantic self-deformation. The Romantics 
were all naïve Rousseauans, who blamed society for the deformity of the self. 
Although he disagreed with Auger about the nature of Romantic self-deformation, 
he agreed about the remedy: Romantic poetry, disordered, explosive and free, 
needed to be reduced to a more harmonious and civilised form by a sense of classical 
order. 
It is not only Romanticism’s enemies who have seen self-deformation as its 
core feature. In The Romantic Agony (1933), Mario Praz argues that the “essence of 
Romanticism” is the attempt to describe “that which cannot be described.”31 To 
express the inexpressible is of course futile, and it is this inevitable failure that leads 
to the agony of the Romantics, to their obsession with “the uncontrolled, the 
macabre, the terrible, the strange.”32 Hannah Arendt argues that the Romantics 
                                                   
oppressed.” “Le manifeste d’Auger contre le romantisme,” in Stendhal, Racine et Shakespeare, ed. 
Bernard Leuillot (Paris: Éditions Kimé, 1994), 123. 
30 T. E. Hulme, The Collected Writings of T. E. Hulme, ed. Karen Csengeri (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1994), 61. 
31 Mario Praz, The Romantic Agony, trans. Angus Davidson, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1970), 14. 
32 Ibid., 38. 
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believed in a formless self. Their “unlimited idolization of the ‘personality’” made 
personal identity essentially arbitrary,33 and led to their “morbid lust for the exotic, 
abnormal, and different as such.”34 In his history of the modern self, Roy Porter 
agrees with Praz and Arendt that the Romantic yearning for a more perfect self 
contains the seeds of its own demise: 
Romanticism dramatised the struggles of the individual – typically male – portrayed 
as forming and forging himself over and against the oppressions of power and the 
stale conventions and numbing constraints of polite society. The Romantic psyche 
declared war upon the ‘world’ as colloquially understood, and also grappled with its 
own lower elements. Inner conflict, self-destructiveness even, were integral to the 
Romantic agony.35 
These writers raise three deep unanswered questions about self-deformation 
in Romantic literature. First, what did the Romantics think were the nature and 
causes of self-deformation? Was it society that deformed people, or dark inner 
passions? Second, what was the Romantic attitude towards deformed selves? Did 
they find all self-deformity repulsive, or were there kinds of self-deformity they 
advocated? Third, what was the relationship between the deformity of the Romantic 
self and the forms of Romantic writing? Were Auger and Hulme right to see a link 
between the Romantics’ rejection of neoclassical formal conventions and their 
interest in the oppression or monstrosity of the self? 
A good starting-point for answering these questions is Frankenstein (1818), 
one of the archetypal texts of Romantic self-deformation. Mary Shelley presents two 
main paradigms of self-deformation in the novel. Victor is the victim of “enthusiastic 
frenzy,”36 driven by solitude and quixotic scholarship into the dark byways of the 
                                                   
33 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, rev. ed. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1967), 
168. 
34 Ibid., 68. 
35 Roy Porter, Flesh in the Age of Reason (London: Allen Lane, 2005), 448. 
36 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein; or the Modern Prometheus, 3 vols. (London: Lackington, Hughes, 
Harding, Mavor and Jones, 1818), I.39.  
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mind. He gives his passion flesh in the form of his Creature, and it destroys him. The 
Creature himself is the victim of society, “spurned at, and kicked, and trampled 
on,”37 reduced to a vicious nothing by an unjust social order. Shelley’s attitude 
towards self-deformation is complex. Both Victor and his Creature display the moral 
ambiguity of her friend Byron’s great antiheroes, being simultaneously sympathetic 
and terrible in their deformity. And the novel they star in is as deformed as they, 
with three narrators vying for moral authority, their narratives stitched together like 
the hewn members of the Creature’s body. In this the book resembles the first great 
classic of Romantic self-deformation, The Sorrows of Young Werther (1774), an 
epistolary novel whose stream of letters is brought to an abrupt end by the 
protagonist’s madness and death, requiring the intervention of a humble “editor” to 
try and sort out the mess. 
In each chapter that follows, I consider a different genre of Romantic writing. 
I show how nearly every major Romantic genre has been defined in terms of self-
formation, and present texts of self-deformation which challenge these definitions. 
In Chapter 1, on philosophy, I lay the groundwork for this analysis, defining the key 
concepts of “self” and “form.” I trace different ideas about self-deformation through 
eighteenth-century philosophy, showing how thinkers from Mary Astell to Jean-
Jacques Rousseau developed a range of theories about how the self can be deformed, 
and how these theories were taken up by Romantic writers. I conclude by 
considering how prominent British Romantic philosophers understood the process 
of self-deformation. In Chapter 2, on fiction, I compare two realist novels from the 
period, Amelia Opie’s Adeline Mowbray (1805) and Maria Edgeworth’s Vivian 
(1812). Romantic novels are usually understood as Bildungsromane or historical 
                                                   
37 Ibid., III.189.  
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novels, whose protagonists grow into marriage, reconciling their personal 
aspirations with their social duties, healing the rifts in their evolving societies. Opie 
and Edgeworth bring this ideal into doubt, Opie by revealing the tragic 
contradictions of feminist rebellion, and Edgeworth by portraying a morally weak 
hero overborne by vicious social conventions. In Chapter 3, on poetry, I compare the 
sonnets of Charlotte Smith and John Clare, which have obtained classic status while 
also being seen as dubious examples of the Romantic sonnet. In our Wordsworth-
centred histories, the Romantic sonnet is defined in terms of organic unity. The 
concise form of the sonnet mimics a moment of self-formation in the poet’s 
consciousness. Smith’s harsh sonnets, with their brutal twists, and Clare’s mystical 
sonnets, with their blurred edges, both break this model apart. In Chapter 4, on life-
writing, I consider Thomas Moore’s monumental Letters and Journals of Lord 
Byron, With Notices of his Life (1830-31). Romantic biographies are often derided 
for their massive size and lack of proportion. Moore turns these supposed 
weaknesses of Romantic biography into strengths, using his mass of detail to 
present a coherent account of Byron as a “multiform” personality, whose character 
was deformed by alienation from society even as his titanic genius shattered social 
conventions. Finally, in Chapter 5, on drama, I turn to Gothic tragedy, comparing 
Charles Harpur’s The Bushrangers (1853, org. 1835) to Joanna Baillie’s Orra (1812) 
and The Dream (1812). Anglo-American scholars have often argued that the 
Romantics were too optimistic to write tragedy, even though tragedy is seen as the 
central Romantic genre in other European literatures. Close analysis reveals that 
Harpur and Baillie’s plays, in spite of their popular Gothic conventions, are thrilling 
explorations of the deepest metaphysical aspects of the Romantic self. 
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In each chapter, I use digital methods to quantify and visualise the form of 
the texts. Franco Moretti suggests that methods like this have two key advantages. 
First, by transforming a text into numbers and graphs, we can reveal subtle patterns 
not visible to the naked eye of the reader.38 Sentiment analysis reveals the latent plot 
structure of Moore’s massive and unwieldy biography. Character network analysis 
reveals hidden patterns in the way Harpur and Baillie’s characters interact. By 
examining the often unexpected output of an algorithm, we are forced to rethink our 
understanding of the structure of the text. Second, since computers can process 
large numbers with ease, when we turn texts into data we can conduct large-scale 
analysis, or so-called “distant reading.”39 Collocation analysis reveals the shared 
vocabulary of self-formation in 50 or so realist novels of the Romantic period, and 
allows us to drill down to see how Opie and Edgeworth used this vocabulary in 
comparison with their contemporaries. Meanwhile, text analysis shows how 
differently Clare, Smith and Wordsworth handled couplets, alexandrines or 
keywords like “I” to shape their sonnets. Distant reading can help us determine what 
is typical and what is atypical about the way these texts are formed. 
Since these texts challenge our received definitions of Romantic genres, they 
give us the chance to redefine them. Opie and Edgeworth’s novels lack the optimistic 
plot arc of the classical Bildungsroman, but draw on many of the same motifs, 
                                                   
38 Or, as Moretti puts it, we create an “abstract” model of the text which “will possess ‘emerging’ 
qualities, which were not visible at the lower level.” Franco Moretti, Graphs, Maps, Trees (London 
and New York: Verso, 2005), 53. See also McCarty’s discussion of “interactive modelling” in Willard 
McCarty, Humanities Computing (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), chap. 1, Stephen Ramsay’s 
discussion of “algorithmic criticism” in Stephen Ramsay, Reading Machines: Towards and 
Algorithmic Criticism (Urbana, Chicago and Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 2011), passim, 
and Jerome McGann and Lisa Samuel’s essay on “Deformance and Interpretation,” in Jerome J 
McGann, Radiant Textuality: Literature after the World Wide Web (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 
chap. 4. 
39 Moretti’s most famous version of this argument was a Faustian provocation: “… what we really 
need is a little pact with the devil: we know how to read texts, now let’s learn how not to read them.” 
Franco Moretti, Distant Reading (London and New York: Verso, 2013), 48.  
INTRODUCTION: ROMANTICISM AND SELF-FORMATION 
18 
themes, and vocabulary, twisting or adding to them in original ways. Instead of 
defining the Bildungsroman by its plot, we could define it by its main concerns: 
history, freedom, privacy. Seen in this way, Adeline Mowbray and Vivian are not 
ugly or boring, but instead enrich our sense of the possibilities of this venerable 
genre. Conversely, Gothic tragedy is typically defined by a narrow set of clichéd 
Gothic motifs, but when seen in the broader context of Romantic self-deformation, 
it becomes clear that Gothic tragedy raises some of the deepest possible questions 
about the nature of the self. Perhaps we find these plays bombastic or overblown 
because these questions are so frightening. 
These texts don’t just raise literary issues, about what kind of books the 
Romantics wrote. They also raise deep and pertinent questions about the fragility of 
our personal identity. The dichotomy of Victor and his Creature, of the arrogant 
individual deformed from within, and the stigmatised victim deformed from 
without, recurs again and again in these texts. But because these texts all draw on 
different generic conventions to explore these issues, they explore them in very 
different ways. Opie and Edgeworth explore the fragility of the social self, the self of 
work and love and friendship. Smith and Clare explore the fragility of the natural 
self, the self of meditation and introspection. Moore explores the fragility of the 
historical self, the real person who has to grapple with the particular circumstances 
of his world and his epoch. Baillie and Harpur explore the fragility of a self that many 
claim no longer exists in the modern world—the metaphysical self, the soul caught 
on the threshold of another world. These texts confront us with a sad and difficult 










HE SELF—or the soul, as it once was known—is one of the most intractable 
problems in world philosophy. There are those for whom the self is the 
central concept of human life, and those who contend that the self does 
not exist. There are those for whom the self is singular, indivisible, and irreducible, 
and those for whom it is a compound of different traits, ideas and activities all 
stuffed into the same container of the body. There are those who think the soul more 
valuable than the body, those who think “the soul is the prison of the body,”1 and 
those who think there is no distinction between soul and body at all. Into this hazy 
realm of dispute and confusion steps Anna Barbauld with her habitual clarity of 
thought and imagery: 
Life! I know not what thou art, 
 But know that thou and I must part;  
 And when, or how, or where we met,  
 I own to me’s a secret yet.  
 But this I know, when thou art fled,  
 Where’er they lay these limbs, this head,  
 No clod so valueless shall be,  
 As all that then remains of me.  
 O whither, whither dost thou fly,  
 Where bend unseen thy trackless course,  
                                                   
1 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Allan Sheridan (London: 
Allen Lane, 1977), 30. 
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  And in this strange divorce,  
Ah tell where I must seek this compound I?2 
The poem may seem at first glance to be a common-sense musing on the mystery of 
death. But it is really a thoughtful inquiry into the form of the self, into the nature 
of “this compound I.” Barbauld finds that when she contemplates death she runs 
not simply into ignorance but into paradox. Are she and her Life one and the same 
entity, or are they two different ones? At first the answer seems simple. Life and she 
are “thou and I,” and at death these two friends will “part.” Life (“thou”) will “fly” 
away, leaving “these limbs, this head” (“me”) behind. But as the poem continues, the 
pronouns start to become confused. In the final line of the first stanza, “I” takes on 
two contradictory meanings. The first “I” is Barbauld, addressing “Life,” but the 
second is “this compound I,” a mysterious unity that is her and her Life in one. In 
the next stanza, “thou” becomes equally confused: 
Yet canst thou without thought or feeling be?  
O say what art thou, when no more thou’rt thee?3 
Life is now “thought or feeling”—that is, it is the very mind or consciousness that is 
asking these questions. It becomes difficult to distinguish the poem’s “I” from its 
“thee.” When Barbauld dies, her Life will cease to be itself because she will cease to 
think. But does this not imply she is her Life? Who is addressing whom when 
Barbauld asks “what art thou”? 
Barbauld neatly illustrates the connection between the two key concepts of 
this study, “self” and “form.” In this little poem, she attempts to discern the form of 
her self. How does it fit together? What are its components, and what makes them 
into a single entity? She fails to answer these questions. Her self is deformed, in the 
                                                   
2 Anna Letitia Barbauld, Works, ed. Lucy Aikin, 2 vols. (London: Longman et al, 1825), I.262. 
3 Ibid., I.263. 
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sense that it has no form, or at least none she can know. There is a link between this 
self-deformity and the form of Barbauld’s poem. The poem is structured around a 
series of apostrophes to “Life,” but as we have seen, these apostrophes become 
paradoxical when Barbauld fails to sort out what “I” and “thou” mean. A tortured 
and confused form of poetic language corresponds to this tortured and confused 
form of self. In the end, Barbauld tires of self-inquiry, and resigns herself to 
ignorance. “Choose thine own time,” she tells Life, and hopes for a pleasant death. 
Coleridge reaches an analogous conclusion in “E Cœlo Descendit, Γνωθι Σεαυτoν:” 
What hast thou, Man, that thou dar’st call thine own?— 
What is there in thee, Man, that can be known?— 
Dark fluxion, all unfixable by thought,  
A phantom dim of past and future wrought,  
Vain sister of the worm,—life, death, soul, clod— 
Ignore thyself, and strive to know thy God!4 
We may want the self to have a form, but it is “unfixable.” And again this sense of 
deformed selfhood results in an intriguingly deformed poem. Coleridge describes 
the self in visceral detail, its “fluxion,” its “phantom,” its vulnerability to the “worm” 
in the grave—and then abruptly tells us to “ignore” everything he has just written. 
Barbauld and Coleridge may be surprised to learn that in fact they and their 
contemporaries developed a coherent account of the form and significance of the 
self. In his influential Sources of the Self (1989), Charles Taylor argues that three 
strands came together in eighteenth-century literature and philosophy to create the 
“modern identity:” (1) the discovery of “inner depths” in the human mind, (2) the 
“affirmation of ordinary life” and (3) the idea of “nature as a source” of meaning. 
These three strands, he claims, were apparent in the writings of the “philosophical 
                                                   
4 The title is from Juvenal, and means “It came from heaven, ‘Know thyself’.” Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, The Collected Works, ed. Kathleen Coburn, 16 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1971-2001), XVI.1154. All future references to Coleridge will be to this edition, indicated by the 
abbreviation CW. 
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and spiritual elite” of Western Europe by the beginning of the eighteenth century,5 
and reached their culmination in “the expressivist turn” of the Romantic period at 
its end.6 In The Making of the Modern Self (2006), Dror Wahrman comes to a 
similar conclusion. The eighteenth century had a playful attitude towards selfhood, 
when suddenly, in the 1780s, ideas about the self became “essentialised.”7 The 
eighteenth century had felt there were flexible and blurry boundaries between 
genders, races, classes and sexualities. Now these boundaries hardened and became 
set in stone. The idea arose that we each have an inner, true self, a “stable inner core 
of meaning.”8 Jerrold Seigel focusses less on the deep aspects of the modern self, 
and more on the developmental ones. In the past, people viewed the self as a “cosmic 
given,” a soul implanted in the body from birth; but modern thinkers believe that 
people must “participate in forming their selves.”9 Roy Porter agrees. The soul was 
“naturalised” by the end of the eighteenth century, being replaced by the concept of 
the mind.10 The link between soul and body had hitherto been a hot topic, but now 
it was irrelevant because only the mind mattered: “In many departments of life, 
emphasis was shifted from the physical to the psychological. The true object of the 
perfection of man became the cultivation of mind or sensibility.”11 
                                                   
5 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 185. 
6 Ibid., chap. 21. 
7 Dror Wahrman, The Making of the Modern Self: Identity and Culture in Eighteenth-Century 
England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), see especially chap. 6. Among others, Lionel 
Trilling and Deidre Lynch make similar points, Trilling with his argument that Romanticism replaced 
an older ideal of “sincerity” with a new ideal of “authenticity,” Lynch with her argument that 
Romantic novelists replaced the older “typographical” style of characterisation with one based on 
representing the “inner depths” of their fictional creations: Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and 
Authenticity (London: Oxford University Press, 1972); Lynch, Economy of Character, esp. 5-6. 
8 Wahrman, Making of the Modern Self, 161. 
9 Jerrold Seigel, The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe since the 
Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 43. 
10 Porter, Flesh in the Age of Reason, 471. See also Raymond Martin and John Barresi, Naturalization 
of the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the Eighteenth Century (London and New York: Routledge, 
2000), esp. chap. 5. 
11 Porter, 472. See also Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World (London: 
Penguin, 2000), 70-71. 
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A shadow lies on all these scholars, the shadow of Michel Foucault. In several 
of his works, but most particularly in Discipline and Punish (1975), Foucault 
challenged the classic liberal interpretation of Romantic or Enlightenment culture. 
He argued that there was indeed a decisive break between the “Classic” mode of 
selfhood which predominated at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and the 
“Modern” mode of selfhood which predominated by the end. Taylor, Wahrman and 
Seigel all take issue with Foucault in various ways, because all three argue that in 
some way the modern self is free.12 Indeed, the ability to form or make yourself in 
accordance with your inner natural impulses can seem to be the very definition of 
freedom. In Discipline and Punish, however, Foucault argues that this new ability 
to make ourselves is not a liberation, but a new kind of enslavement. Romantic self-
making is really a kind of “discipline,” a “specific technique of power” by which 
society dominates people.13 Romantics may dream they are turning themselves into 
free “individuals,” but really the “individual” is a “fictitious atom” fabricated by 
society.14 Romantics may promote individualism and the free development of 
personality, but really self-formation “normalises” people, making everybody 
conform to a prefabricated model of the properly-formed person.15 These 
disagreements about the moral value of Romantic self-formation mask a deeper 
agreement, however. Both Foucault and his liberal opponents agree that there was 
a great shift in ideas of the self sometime in the eighteenth century. Gone was the 
idea that the individual was defined by their position in a social or cosmic hierarchy, 
and in was the new idea that each person was an individual, with their own mind 
that could develop in its own way. 
                                                   
12 See especially Charles Taylor, “Foucault on Freedom and Truth,” Political Theory 12, no. 2 (1984). 
13 Discipline and Punish, 170. 
14 Ibid, 194. 
15 Ibid, 183. 
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Thus we arrive at the classic notion of the form of the Romantic self. The self 
is the mind, and it is part of nature. It is structured according to two principles: 
depth and development. Your identity is a secret, spontaneous impulse hidden deep 
within you, and it is something won, through the struggle to form yourself. You 
should make this struggle because your earthly happiness depends on it, not because 
it will get you into heaven. And since your self is natural, and nature is good, the 
proper attitude is to affirm, celebrate, and express your self once you have 
successfully found it. For many of these scholars, Wahrman and Foucault in 
particular, there was a hard break somewhere at the end of the eighteenth century, 
when suddenly the old views of the self were replaced with this new one. We will see 
whether such a hard break occurred in ideas about self-deformation. 
It was not only the self that the Romantics interpreted as a natural, rooted, 
growing thing. They “interpret[ed] … everything as being only a stage of some 
further development,” argues Arendt.16 She cites Marxist economics and Darwinian 
biology as examples. Foucault agrees, adding the third example of linguistics.17 Erich 
Auerbach claims that “historism” is the defining feature of Romantic discourse,18 
and scholars continue to demonstrate that things like childbirth,19 life,20 and 
aesthetics21 all came to be viewed in historicist or developmental terms during the 
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period. It was an age, it seems, when everyone felt that everything was changing 
through time, and they simply extended this feeling of change to the self. 
This theory of self-formation would seem to imply a certain theory of self-
deformation.22 A person might fail to discover their inner depths, or they may 
succeed, but find something repulsive at their core instead of attractive. A person’s 
self-cultivation might be stunted, or go in the wrong direction and lead to a 
malformed rather than a well-formed self. But our standard histories of the self do 
not describe this implicit theory of self-deformation in any great detail. This is not 
surprising. Our language lacks obvious antonyms for “self-development,” “self-
cultivation” or “self-formation,” hence my introduction of the neologism “self-
deformation.”23 It is difficult to tell the history of something for which we have no 
name. 
This points to a deeper philosophical problem with the notion of form itself. 
When we describe the form of something, we nearly always describe that form as a 
positive ideal. Plato held that the form of a thing is what defines it—something is 
beautiful because it “shares in” Beauty24—but this form is also a perfect ideal to 
which particular things can only aspire. Aristotle also held that a thing’s form is its 
“essence,” and stressed that an essential part of each form’s definition is its 
purpose.25 The self is the form of the person. It is what makes a person a person, as 
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opposed to a tree, and what makes this person this person, rather than another one. 
The self is an ideal: each person ought to have one. It has a purpose: providing unity 
and meaning to our lives.26 Now, we know that different cultures have understood 
selfhood differently. If we want to describe a particular culture’s view of the self, it 
makes sense to do so by describing the ideal self against which people measured 
themselves in that time and place. This is exactly what Foucault, Taylor, Wahrman, 
Seigel and Porter have done. And it is what our literary historians do when they 
define Romantic literature as particular form of literature which portrays a 
particular form of self. 
In what follows, I take a different approach. I survey some of the major 
eighteenth-century philosophers of self—John Locke, Mary Astell, David Hume, 
Adam Smith, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant—and compare their 
ideas about what makes the self fragile or malign. What did it mean to lack a self, or 
to have the wrong kind of self? What were the forces that could corrupt the self, or 
destroy it? In each case I demonstrate how these thinkers raised anxieties about 
deformed selfhood which continued to plague Romantic novelists and poets at the 
end of the century. In the final section of the chapter, I arrive at the Romantic period 
itself, and examine the range of ideas about self-deformation in the writings of 
Edmund Burke, Mary Wollstonecraft and William Hazlitt. Seen this way, the self is 
not an ideal form but a set of anxieties about possible personal failures. Many of 
these anxieties persisted from the beginning of the century right into the Romantic 
period, suggesting there was no sudden revolution when a new kind of selfhood 
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emerged. And it becomes clear that great Romantic writers were not only inspired 
by a creed of self-affirmation, but also by fears of the malignity or fragility of the self. 
1.1 Locke and Astell: When Reason Sleeps 
For John Locke and Mary Astell, a person was essentially a rational creature. Locke 
imagined the self as consciousness. We are like roaming film cameras, our minds 
flooded with images from the outside world, and it is the task of reason to impose 
order and connect these images into a logical whole. If we form ourselves correctly, 
then we obtain absolute rational control of our own minds:27 
… at the last [a man] may have a full power over his own mind, and be so fully master 
of his own thoughts as to be able to transfer them from one subject to another, with 
the same ease that he can lay by anything he has in his hand, and take something else 
that he has a mind to in the room of it.28 
But everywhere he saw people whose understandings were ill-developed, and whose 
powers of mental control were weak. Astell saw the self as a soul, implanted by God 
with an innate “desire to advance and perfect its Being.”29 We are like flowers, 
destined to unfold ourselves from the seed and drink the sunlight.  But everywhere 
she saw women with “deformed Souls,”30 who had failed to achieve the rational self-
control, the “Empire of our Passions,” which God intended for them.31 Locke and 
Astell shared a conception of the deformed self: we are deformed if we are not 
governed by reason. But they had different ideas about the causes of self-
deformation. Locke thought the only cure for self-deformation was wide experience 
and open-mindedness about the world. Astell thought worldly experience was the 
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most likely thing of all to denude one’s reason, and promoted a monastic course of 
self-reflection. 
Locke propounded most of his ideas about self-deformation in the 
posthumously published Of the Conduct of the Understanding (1706). He had 
intended to make this work into Book V of his famous Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1694), to illustrate how his abstruse philosophy applied to everyday 
life. Conduct is a self-help book, describing the errors people make when they think, 
and suggesting practical remedies. Astell described self-deformation at length in 
both of her major works: A Serious Proposal to the Ladies (1694-97) and Some 
Reflections Upon Marriage (1700). These were feminist tracts, designed to describe 
the various causes of women’s “non-Improvement” and to suggest a cure.32 
In Conduct, Locke lays out five major kinds of self-deformation. First, people 
can deform themselves by lacking “determined ideas.” 33 Since all knowledge is 
simply “the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and 
repugnancy of any of our Ideas,” if our ideas are unclear, we will be unable to 
connect them properly with our reason.34 In the Essay, Locke describes many ways 
we can obtain woolly notions,35 but the worst way of all is “the Association of Ideas,” 
which is indeed “a sort of Madness.”36 Such “Association” occurs when the mind 
incorrectly glues two or more ideas together, and reason is powerless to separate 
them. It is the main source of the prejudices that warp our judgment.37 Locke 
worried that falsely associated ideas could proliferate among children and the ill-
educated, maddening the population. In Harrington (1817), Maria Edgeworth 
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confronted just this fear, drawing on Locke to attack anti-Semitic stereotypes. Locke 
had used the example of a servant telling a child stories of “Goblines and Sprights,” 
which become so associated with the ideas of “Darkness and Light” in the child’s 
mind that they can never see a sunset without a shudder of fear.38 This is exactly 
what happens to Harrington, when his nurse tries to put him to bed one night: 
“If you don’t come quietly this minute, Master Harrington,” said she, “I’ll call to 
Simon the Jew there,” pointing to him, “and he shall come up and carry you away in 
his great bag.” 
The old man’s eyes were upon me; to my fancy the look of his eyes and his whole 
face had changed in an instant. I was struck with terror—39 
Harrington’s false notions make him querulous and irrational, and they point to 
wider social ills. While the child Harrington is quivering at the mere sight of Jews, 
Parliament is passing anti-Semitic legislation. As an adult, when he has recovered 
his reason, he witnesses terrible anti-Semitic violence during the Gordon Riots. For 
Edgeworth as for Locke, prejudices can indeed be a kind of madness. 
Astell also feared that prejudices weakened the power of reason, though her 
theory of their operation was different: prejudices “Contract our Souls and shorten 
our views, hinder the free range of our Thoughts and confine them only to that 
particular track which these have been taken; and in a word, erect a Tyranny over 
our free born Souls.”40 Locke feared that prejudices trigger mad behaviour. Astell 
feared that they make people into dull non-entities, unable to perform anything 
beyond a narrow range of action. The final symptom of prejudice, for Astell, was 
cynicism. Once the victim of prejudice realises how hollow their ideas are, they are 
likely to conclude that all ideas are prejudices, and turn atheist.41 William 
                                                   
38 Essay, 387-98. 
39 Maria Edgeworth, Harrington, a Tale; and Ormond, a Tale, 3 vols. (London: R. Hunter, 1817), 
I.3. 
40 Astell, Serious Proposal, II.41-42. 
41 Ibid., II.42. 
SELF-DEFORMATION IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY THOUGHT 
30 
Wordsworth had similar anxieties, when he complained that “The world is too much 
with us,” that the bustling world of everyday opinion had made us “out of tune” with 
nature.42 Percy Shelley meanwhile condemned the “man of ease” who “confines | 
The struggling nature of his human heart” to the “bare fulfilment of the common 
laws | Of decency and prejudice …”43 For Astell, Shelley and Wordsworth, false ideas 
reduce, rather than enrage us. 
Prejudice is not Astell’s greatest enemy, however. “Custom” was the real 
“Tyrant,” the “grand motive to all those irrational choices we daily see made in the 
World[.]”44 It arises because of our natural tendency to imitate one another: “As 
Prejudice fetters the Understanding so does Custom manacle the Will, which scarce 
knows how to divert from a Track which the generality around it take, and to which 
it has it self been habituated.”45 It is customary for men to flatter women that they 
are perfect and divine, for instance, and this saps women’s will to improve.46 The 
dead hand of custom is everywhere in Romantic literature. It lies on the child in 
Wordsworth’s great ode: “Full soon thy soul shall have her earthly fright, | And 
custom like upon thee with a weight | Heavy as frost, and deep almost as life!” (WW, 
461) It lies on Mr and Mrs Elton in Emma (1816), and on Lady Clonbrony in The 
Absentee (1812), characters who are anxious simply to act as others do, and make 
themselves absurd.  
Locke also feared the power of mere imitation. Some people are afflicted with 
“implicit faith” that leads them to “do and think according to the example of others” 
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instead of deciding for themselves.47 Locke’s main example is the person of a 
“school,” “party” or “sect,” who implicitly believes that their team is the right one. 
Such people “perplex themselves with words, according to the way of speaking to 
the several schools or sects they have been bred up in,” involving themselves in 
“endless dispute, wrangling, and jargon.”48 The canting party-man became a stock 
figure of Jacobin fiction in the 1790s, exemplified by figures like Dr Blick, “a man 
perfectly orthodox in matters of church and state.”49 Perhaps the classic Romantic 
example of a person deformed by imitated speech is Mary Bennet, from Pride and 
Prejudice (1813), who is cramped and made shallow by the words she has absorbed 
from conduct books, applying sententious phrases with comic ineptitude to real 
situations. The brilliant satires of Thomas Love Peacock are filled with Dr Blicks and 
Mary Bennets. William Keach has also shown how Coleridge, Wordsworth and Percy 
Shelley shared Locke’s anxiety about customary speech, fearing that it would make 
poetry impossible.50 Custom remained a fearful adversary in the Romantic period. 
Locke’s third class of deformed self is the person who has clear enough ideas, 
but lacks “sagacity and exercise in finding out and laying in order intermediate 
ideas.”51 Locke held that mental faculties are like muscles. We are all born with 
them, and if ours are weak it is simply due to lack of exercise.52 He criticised the idea 
of natural genius, and claimed that the dull-witted are usually deformed simply by 
lack of practice: “Many a good poetic vein is buried under a trade, and never 
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produces anything for want of improvement.”53 The eighteenth century gave rise to 
a cult of genius rather at odds with Locke’s notion. Labouring-class poets like 
Stephen Duck, Ann Yearsley, Robert Burns and John Clare were celebrated as 
natural geniuses. James Beattie mythologised such poets in his influential The 
Minstrel (1771-74). But there was a contradiction at the heart of this cult, as Alan 
Richardson shows. Labouring-class poets were seen as intuitive and irrational, and 
their middle-class readers held that education, while bestowing them with reason, 
also destroyed the particular beauties of their primitive verse.54 Locke’s notion of 
the ill-exercised mind survived in a more straightforward way in fiction—witness Mr 
Woodhouse, who “without activity of mind or body” has prematurely aged himself.55 
He is a rather different person from his active and intelligent daughter Emma. Astell 
agreed with Locke that many people deform themselves by failing to exercise their 
reason, though she also argued that a person’s individual “Genius” played a role in 
limiting the “Capacity of the Understanding.”56 
The self-deformation of ill-exercise was closely related to Locke’s fourth type 
of self-deformation: the self-deformation of narrow experience. A person may have 
great powers of reasoning, yet lack the “large, sound, roundabout sense,” of things 
that wide experience gives you.57 Reasoning requires ideas, and for Locke ideas 
could only come from experience. The narrower the range of a person’s experience, 
therefore, the narrower their store of ideas and the poorer their thinking.58 Locke 
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gives a range of examples, from the “day-labourer,” with his “small pittance of 
knowledge” at the bottom, to the truly wise and tolerant gentleman at the top.59 
Again, it may seem like later writers rejected Locke’s theory in favour of the cult of 
natural genius. But it is striking how the “natural” heroes of novels like Robert 
Bage’s Hermsprong (1796) and Elizabeth Inchbald’s Nature and Art (1796) gain 
their natural genius by extensive travel in Africa or the Americas, while their 
civilised adversaries never leave the sheltered confines of polite society. Likewise the 
wise peasants of Edgeworth, Walter Scott, Lady Morgan and Wordsworth are nearly 
always observed through the eyes of a better-travelled, more sophisticated 
consciousness. In Biographia Literaria (1817), Coleridge re-stated Locke’s 
arguments about ill-exercise and narrow experience with forceful concision:  
… the rustic, from the more imperfect development of his faculties, and from the 
lower state of their cultivation, aims almost solely to convey insulated facts, either those 
of his scanty experience or his traditional belief; while the educated man chiefly seeks 
to discover and express those connections of things, or those relative bearings of fact to 
fact, from which some more or less general law is deducible. (CW, VII.52-53) 
No amount of genius could make up for scanty experience or the imperfect 
development of the faculties. 
Astell flatly contradicted Locke’s arguments about breadth of experience. The 
most important ideas came not from the senses, but from self-reflection. The real 
problem was that people have too much experience of the world. Obsessed with the 
ideas they derived from “sensation,” people were neglecting “those more excellent 
ones which arise from [the mind’s] own operations and a serious reflection on them, 
and which are necessary to correct the mistakes and supply the defects of 
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[sensation].”60 The world was busy, rushing people from place to place without 
giving them time for introspection, and dazzling them with appearances when they 
should be inquiring into the essence of things. Gothic writers would draw on this 
anxiety, in novels where appearances are deceptive and the senses delusive. As we 
will see in Chapter 5, Joanna Baillie’s Orra is driven incurably insane by the 
appearance of a man dressed as a ghost. Ann Radcliffe’s heroines also faint and 
tremble at sights and sounds they wrongly deem supernatural. The villain of James 
Hogg’s The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner (1824), 
meanwhile, is driven to murder when he sees and hears a divine messenger 
command him to evil. For Locke, the active life of seeing the world was essential. 
For Astell, as for these Gothic writers, sound self-reflection was the only guard 
against the delusion of the senses.  
Astell and Locke’s final fear was that passion would usurp reason. There are 
those, says Locke, “who put passion in the place of reason.”61 There was really no 
place for the emotions in Locke’s theory of mind, since for him the “mind” and the 
“understanding” were virtually synonymous.62 Passions came from somewhere else. 
They might motivate us, but they could also “[possess] the whole Mind,” and enslave 
us.63 In the Essay, he gives a vivid example of a person whose mind is overborne: 
the “enthusiast,” whose “warmed or over-weening Brain” deceives them into 
thinking they are divinely inspired.64 Such passionate people think they are “above” 
reason: “they see the Light infused into their Understandings, and cannot be 
mistaken.”65 The “enthusiast” continued to worry writers throughout the Romantic 
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period. In her anti-Jacobin novel, Memoirs of Modern Philosophers (1800), 
Elizabeth Hamilton condemns Mr Myope’s conversion to the “new philosophy” of 
the French Revolution as a species of “enthusiasm.”66 Meanwhile Victor 
Frankenstein is driven “by an almost supernatural enthusiasm,”67 and the heroine 
of Mary Hays’s Memoirs of Emma Courtney (1796) is destroyed by her enthusiastic 
love for an uninterested man. As we will see in Chapter 5, enthusiastic passions blast 
the destinies of many a tragic hero on the Romantic stage, from Friedrich Schiller’s 
Karl Moor and Baillie’s Count Osterloo to Byron’s Manfred and Adam Mickiewicz’s 
Konrad. 
In Some Thoughts Upon Marriage, Astell gives a different example of the 
slave of passion. The ill-educated Madam Mazarine is no enthusiast, but is rendered 
capricious and imprudent by her emotions: 
Had Madam Mazarine’s Education made a right improvement of her Wit and Sense, 
we should not have found her seeking Relief by such imprudent, not to say 
Scandalous Methods, as the running away in Disguise with a spruce Cavalier, and 
rambling to so many Courts and Places, nor diverting her self with such Childish, 
Ridiculous or Ill-natur’d Amusements, as the greatest part of the Adventures of her 
Memoirs are made up of.68 
The miserable, ill-educated woman, blown about on the winds of desire, seeking 
consolation in scandal and riot, remained a crucial figure at the end of the century. 
The unreformed Lady Delacour, from Edgeworth’s Belinda (1801), is a particularly 
resplendent example. She has her own “spruce Cavalier” to run away with, and is 
fond of such “Ill-natur’d Amusements” as duelling, visiting quack doctors, and 
purloining poor gardeners’ precious aloes. 
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For Locke and Astell, the self was essentially the understanding. We are born 
with the power of reason, and we deform ourselves when we fail to exercise and 
expand this power, allowing half-baked ideas or mere emotions to govern our 
actions. The world is populated by thoughtless peasants, flattered women, sectarian 
men, violent enthusiasts and cynical atheists who have failed to realise their innate 
capabilities. Locke thought the main problem was that people lacked an active life 
of broad experience. Astell thought the main problem was that people lacked a 
contemplative life of self-examination. But their anxieties were fundamentally 
similar, and Romantic writers continued to worry about weakness of the 
understanding even as reason ceased to be the uncontested emperor of the self. By 
then, a new generation of philosophers, who believed in the “centrality of sentiment 
and pathos,” had contributed a new set of anxieties.69 Locke and Astell, for all their 
fears, had felt that the self was simple, indivisible, and innate. We all had reason and 
self-reflection, and self-formation was simply a matter of realising what we are 
already capable of doing. For the new philosophers, the very idea of an integral self, 
governed by any conscious faculty, would begin to seem like a vanishing dream. 
1.2 Hume and Smith: When the Wolf Eats the Dove 
For David Hume and Adam Smith, a person was essentially a creature of emotion. 
Unlike reason, which is singular and binds things together, emotions are diffuse and 
contradictory. Neither Hume nor Smith was fully convinced that we have a singular 
self. For Hume, the self was a sea of thoughts and feelings on which the boat of 
reason tossed. When he looked within, he could never “catch” his self, but only a 
“bundle or collection of different perceptions.”70 For Smith, the self was a hall of 
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mirrors, in which we see our own feelings reflected in the feelings of other people, 
and begin to develop an image of who we are. The self was accordingly split: “When 
I endeavour to examine my own conduct … I divide myself, as it were, into two 
persons; and … I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that 
other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of.”71 Astell and 
Locke had seen the self as integral and individual. For Hume and Smith, the self was 
porous. Humans were social creatures, bound to one another by the feelings that 
rushed between them.  
Hume and Smith were therefore optimists about human nature. Benevolence 
was an inherent part of our being. There is “some particle of the dove kneaded into 
our frame, along with the elements of the wolf and serpent,” wrote Hume.72 Smith, 
meanwhile, was sure “that man, who can subsist only in society, was fitted by nature 
to that situation for which he was made.”73 Even the most selfish person feels the 
tug of sympathy.74 Nonetheless, there were forces that they feared could pervert our 
natural social impulses. Three of these forces were anti-social behaviour, self-love, 
and the structure of society itself. 
For the sociable Hume and Smith, solitude was a sure road to self-
deformation. Smith feared that solitude only led to melancholy self-loathing: 
Are you in adversity? Do not mourn in the darkness of solitude, do not regulate your 
sorrow according to the indulgent sympathy of your intimate friends; return, as soon 
as possible, to the daylight of the world and of society. 75 
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Hume agreed. In a marvellous passage from An Enquiry Concerning the Principles 
of Morals (1751), he introduced a classic example of solitary self-deformation, the 
monk: 
Celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and 
the whole train of monkish virtues; for what reason are they everywhere rejected by 
men of sense, but because they serve no manner of purpose; neither advance a man’s 
fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither 
qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor increase his power of self-
enjoyment? We observe, on the contrary, that they cross all these desirable ends; 
stupify the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the 
temper. ... A gloomy, hair-brained enthusiast, after his death, may have a place in the 
calendar; but will scarcely ever be admitted, when alive, into intimacy and society, 
except by those who are as delirious and dismal as himself.76 
Like Astell and Locke, Hume and Smith recalled the religious violence of the 
seventeenth century with dread, and thought enthusiasm was largely to blame. But 
they had a new conception of the problem. Astell had thought that the passions must 
be controlled, and had advocated a monastery in which women might learn to deny 
them. Locke had thought that enthusiasm was due to excessive self-affirmation, the 
“Conceit” of an “over-weening brain.” For Hume and Smith it was not the 
indulgence of feelings which led to dangerous enthusiasm, but the denial of them. 
The fanatic was deformed not by conceit but by “humility.” 
 Readers of Gothic fiction must find Hume’s description familiar. There are 
only too many self-denying, self-mortifying monks driven to fanaticism in classic 
Gothic novels: the self-loathing Father Ambrosio in Matthew Lewis’s The Monk 
(1795) was perhaps the most infamous example. Ambrosio himself argues that “Man 
was born for society,” and condemns the misanthropic “Hermit,” who “buries 
himself in the cavern of some gloomy rock.”77 He is joined by Father Schedoni, from 
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The Italian (1796), the evil monks who oppress Alonzo Monçada in Melmoth the 
Wanderer (1820), and the hypocritical bishop Hexulf in Joanna Baillie’s play 
Ethwald (1802). Looking further afield, we can find a similar image in Charlotte 
Smith’s Beachy Head (1807), where she imagines the defeated Spanish “wrapp’d in 
Superstition’s monkish weed.”78 William Blake, meanwhile, castigated monkish 
self-denial throughout his writings, from the “Priests in Black Gowns” in “The 
Garden of Love” (1789), who are “binding with briars, my joys & desires,” through 
to Theotormon, in Visions of the Daughters of Albion (1793), who sits alone on a 
“desart shore” weeping in jealousy and “hypocrite modesty.”79 (It is surprising to 
find Blake agreeing with Hume on this front. Elsewhere he condemned Hume’s “all-
unhinging wit,” and could not conceive “how a Monk or a Methodist either, can be 
a Hypocrite.”)80 If our feelings are fundamentally good and social, as Hume and 
Smith suppose, we deform ourselves to deny them in solitude. As the century wore 
on, arguments like this became more persuasive, until in the Romantic period, a 
certain kind of enthusiast was seen as virtuous. Even the conservative Elizabeth 
Hamilton, who had condemned left-wing enthusiasm in her character of Mr Myope, 
wrote that there was a second kind of enthusiasm, “born of reason and directed by 
judgment,” which is “noble, discriminating, and effective.”81 
The second force of self-deformation in Hume and Smith is selfishness. This 
was a complex area of their thought, for they both famously held that certain kinds 
of self-interest were good and important. As Smith explained, we only sympathise 
with others because we understand their self-interest, and when we feel self-
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interest, we likewise crave their sympathy.82 Nonetheless, both Hume and Smith 
imagined that self-interest (or “self-love”) could overcome sympathy, and stunt 
moral development. Smith gives a surprising example in The Wealth of Nations 
(1776), which is usually remembered as a defence of selfish individualism. The 
merchant class, he claims, is driven by the “spirit of monopoly,” the desire to acquire 
wealth by squeezing out their competitors. For Smith, this spirit was the source of 
Britain’s protectionist trade system, with its bounties, drawbacks, tariffs and 
embargos, as well as the mercantilist theory of political economy that justified it.83 
He contrasts Merchants with “Country gentlemen, and farmers [who] are, to their 
great honour, of all people the least subject to the wretched spirit of monopoly.”84 
Merchants are rootless traders chasing gold across the seas, heedless of the people 
they trample. Farmers, rooted to their land and countrymen, as less likely to lose 
their innate sociable instincts. Smith was reviving an ancient idea about the virtues 
of rural life, but one that was absent from Astell and Locke’s more individualistic 
outlook.85 The narrow-minded city-dweller, deformed by their self-interest, was a 
staple of Romantic fiction and poetry. The Crawfords in Mansfield Park (1814) and 
Jason Quirk in Castle Rackrent (1800) betray family ties and the agrarian social 
order under the influence of the new selfish ideology. Wordsworth also excoriated 
the commercial worldview: “Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers” (WW, 
206). Hume and Smith’s moral psychology gave a sound philosophical basis to this 
old fear of heartless urban life. 
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The final key force of self-deformation in Hume and Smith is the social order. 
Since we are inherently social, we will absorb whatever is good or whatever is evil in 
the atmosphere of society. Hume suggested that societies achieve their greatest 
culture and science when the right “spirit” is “diffused throughout the people.” This 
spirit is not “supernatural.” It is a feeling, “caught from one breast to another.”86 A 
free and lawful society is essential to the diffusion of such a spirit: “From law arises 
security; from security curiosity; and from curiosity knowledge.”87 By making us 
insecure, therefore, a tyrannical government inevitably debases us all. Smith made 
a similar argument about economic inequality. Smith showed how “wealth and 
greatness” could delude the mind into thinking wealth was happiness, and pervert 
our moral instincts.88 At the other end of the scale, he argued that the increasing 
division of labour would degrade the minds of the labouring classes if they were not 
educated: a labourer reduced to one or two simple tasks in a factory “generally 
becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become.”89 
Locke and Astell had commented on how fashions and customs might pervert us, 
but Hume and Smith took a sociological approach. Each society had an overarching 
order, a particular spirit or structure, and had predictable—often negative—effects 
on the cultivation of each individual’s moral sensibility. Romantic novels like Caleb 
Williams (1794) and Maria; or the Wrongs of Woman (1798) painted a vivid picture 
of a malign social order twisting and perverting good human nature. Society in these 
novels is represented as a giant prison enforcing an unjust law, imagery Beethoven 
would draw on in his liberal opera Fidelio (1805). Less radically, the novels of Sir 
Walter Scott are littered with figures like Flora MacIvor and Rob Roy who, however 
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admirable they are, have been formed under an antiquated social order and are unfit 
for the new conditions of life. As we will see in Chapter 2, the risk of social self-
deformation was perhaps the major anxiety of realist novelists in the Romantic 
period. It was thinkers like Smith, Hume and their contemporaries Montesquieu 
and Adam Ferguson who provided the theoretical basis for this anxiety.90 
Smith and Hume were content with their porous social selves, however 
anxious they were about self-denial, self-love and the social order. But as these new 
ideas about our feelings began to circulate, they generated other anxieties. Medical 
and literary writers feared that “sensibility” could easily morph into “melancholy,” 
“hypochondria” or “hysteria.”91 Novels, poems and plays began to depict characters 
of such exquisite sensibility they were virtually debilitated by life. Perhaps the most 
famous of these was Henry Mackenzie’s The Man of Feeling (1771). The novel’s title 
character, Harley, weeps and blushes his way to London, weeps over injured 
soldiers, virtuous prostitutes, conniving wretches and the tortured inmates of 
Bedlam, weeps as he loves, and finally weeps himself to death. His problem is not 
the energetic enthusiasm castigated by Locke and cautiously endorsed by Hamilton. 
Harley’s problem is the opposite: he is far too “susceptible,” his mind too open to 
external influence.92 However much we admire his sympathy for others, his 
excessive sensitivity to everything going on around him prevents him from acting 
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and ends his life before he can achieve any of his aspirations. It is left to a fictional 
editor to patch together his story from the fragmented manuscript. Characters like 
Harley seem to confirm Hume’s doubts about the existence of the self. If we are 
really just a bundle of perceptions and the feelings they provoke, what is the 
difference between our mind and the world that floods into it through the senses?  
As we will see, some Romantic writers like John Clare (Chapter 3) and 
Thomas Moore (Chapter 4) actually embraced this extremely porous kind of 
selfhood. But these anxieties eventually produced a backlash against the moral 
psychology of writers like Smith and Hume, at least in its extremer forms. Such 
tragic sentimental figures went out of fashion in the 1780s and ’90s, and political 
pamphleteers on the right and left began to accuse their opponents of being misled 
by extreme sensibility.93 The sentimental hero or heroine became more obviously a 
figure of parody, ridicule or panic. Harley himself, so admired when he appeared in 
1771, was a laughing-stock by the end of the century, as Walter Scott among others 
attested.94 Nonetheless, a good but hapless character like Sir Condy in Castle 
Rackrent has something of Harley about him. More commonly, however, Romantic 
writers attacked the extreme sensibility of a Harley as impossible and therefore 
inevitably insincere. Olivia in Leonora (1806), Isabella Thorpe in Northanger 
Abbey (1817) and the Countess de Villefort in The Mysteries of Udolpho (1794) 
might claim to have exquisite sensibilities but they are actually egoists. The 
Romantics were less likely than Hume to find absolute selflessness possible. 
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Philosophers early in the century, like Locke and Astell, had proposed that 
the self was essentially rational. Reason and understanding were essential, and they 
feared anything that might endanger them. Mid-century philosophers like Smith 
and Hume had proposed that the self was essentially emotional. Sympathy was 
essential to our being, and they feared whatever would break the chains of feeling 
that bind us to one another, be it solitude, selfishness or the divisions of the social 
order. A third group of philosophers proposed that a different aspect of the self was 
most important: the will. We are by nature free, and these philosophers feared 
anything that would rob us of this freedom. The two most famous thinkers of this 
school are Rousseau and Immanuel Kant. 
1.3 Rousseau and Kant: When the Will Is Shackled 
Rousseau and his disciple Kant espoused a new kind of moral philosophy, based on 
fundamentally different premises to the thinkers we have considered so far. For 
Astell, Locke, Smith and Hume, the decisions we make were essentially the result of 
our thoughts and feelings. Locke, for instance, claimed that the will is determined 
by “some … uneasiness a Man is at present under.”95 An idea enters the mind, and 
if it succeeds in making us uneasy, it prompts us to act. Thus it is our ideas (which 
for Locke included perceptions, thoughts and feelings) which are the root causes of 
self-deformation, not a bad will. For Rousseau and Kant, this was putting the cart 
before the horse. What makes each of us a person is our freedom. Before we can 
think and feel correctly, we must have the courage and independence to act, think 
and feel for ourselves alone. Kant and Rousseau shared a “will to the 
‘unconditioned’.”96 The self was like a monarch, which must rule its country without 
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conditions imposed from outside. The deformed self was like a slave, under external 
control. Rousseau’s impact on the politics and culture of the later eighteenth century 
was enormous. Kant’s direct influence in Britain during the Romantic period was 
minute, though several of his disciples, including Goethe and Schiller, were well 
known there.97 It is worth considering him anyhow, because of the radical way he 
developed and clarified Rousseau’s conception of the will. 
If the will is the main principle of selfhood, then there are two main ways you 
can deform yourself: by willing a contradiction, or by submitting to be ruled by 
someone else. Willing a contradiction deforms us because it makes the notion of 
freedom absurd, argued Kant. If we have free will, this must mean that our will 
determines itself, rather than being determined by an external force. If one thing 
determines another, it always does so according to a law of causation. The earth 
makes the apple fall by the law of gravity. If all determination is lawful, and the will 
is self-determined, “what, then, can freedom of the will be other than autonomy, 
that is, the will’s property of being a law to itself?”98 If we allow our will to be ruled 
by another other than its own consistent (or “categorical”) laws, then we falsify our 
own freedom. In The Social Contract (1762), Rousseau described how self-
contradiction arises in modern society. Society requires laws to regulate the conduct 
of its citizens, and when we become citizens we implicitly agree to obey these laws. 
In the ideal society, the “particular will” of each individual would coincide with the 
“general will” of society.99 Seeing ourselves as citizens, we would perceive society’s 
laws to be expressions of our own will. But we have split ourselves from one another: 
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“An individual may be a devout priest, a brave soldier, or a zealous senator, and yet 
a bad citizen.”100 We identify more with our particular “association” than with 
society as a whole. So do our rulers, who are “seduced by private interests” and 
impose their particular wills upon the rest of the population.101 We contradict 
ourselves. We simultaneously resolve to form a society and to pursue our factional 
interests. We come to see society’s dictates as foreign commands, and turn ourselves 
into “debased slaves.”102 Kant gives a stark example of the person who chooses to 
contradict their own freedom in his provocative essay, “On a supposed right to lie 
from philanthropy” (1797). Some argue that if a murderer were to knock at your door 
and ask if their potential victim were within, then it would be morally correct to lie. 
Kant disagrees. It may be permissible to “evade” the question,103 but an active lie 
would undermine one of the key foundations of our freedom. By lying, “I bring it 
about, as far as I can, that statements … in general are not believed, and so too that 
all rights which are based on contracts come to nothing and lose their force …”104 It 
is only possible to enter a contract if you believe what your counterparty promises 
you. By choosing to lie to the murderer, we chip away at this belief, and so remove 
our own freedom to associate with other people. 
Romantic writers were fascinated by people with a will to self-contradiction. 
In Chapter 2, we will meet Amelia Opie’s Adeline Mowbray, who chooses to be free 
from marriage, and so enslaves herself to the prejudices of her conservative 
compatriots. In Chapter 5, we will meet Charles Harpur’s antiheroic bushranger, 
Stalwart, who chooses freedom in exile at the price of his humanity: “I cursed my 
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kind—and fled, | Outlawed but free, into the woods …”105 They are joined by figures 
like Byron’s Manfred, Felicia Hemans’s Count di Procida, and Alfred de Musset’s 
Lorenzaccio. An oppressive society may drive some characters like these to revolt, 
but their will to liberation strikes the ground out from under them, bringing only 
the liberty of death. 
We can deform ourselves by willing a contradiction, but we can also deform 
ourselves by lacking a will. Kant argued that the masses are in a state of “self-
incurred minority” because they lack the “resolution and courage” to think and act 
for themselves.106 In his educational magnum opus, Émile (1761), Rousseau revived 
Locke and Astell’s arguments about custom, showing how “dispositions,” “habits” 
and “opinions” rob us of willpower.107 We contract habits through our innate 
“laziness.”108  We talk endlessly, parroting the words of authority figures, when we 
should be freely engaging with the reality of things: “Things, things! I shall never 
repeat enough that we attribute too much power to words. With our babbling 
education we produce only babblers.”109 We are enslaved by amour-propre, our 
desire to compete with our fellows, to beat them and to stand high in their opinion.110 
By relying on the words of others for our thoughts, and on the opinions of others for 
our own self-esteem, we become weak and dependent. This is the root of evil, for 
“All wickedness comes from weakness.”111 Unable to fulfil our own desires, we come 
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to see other people as our tools, envy the wealthy and crave power. It is these 
Willenlose, these “will-less” people, who paradoxically cause greatest havoc. 
Later Romantics agreed that moral weakness was a crucial cause of self-
deformation. In Heinrich von Ofterdingen, Novalis’s protagonist learns that “Es 
gibt nur eine Ursache des Übels—die allgemeine Schwäche—und diese Schwäche ist 
nichts als geringe Sittliche Empfänglichkeit und Mangel an Reiz der Freiheit.”112 
Percy Shelley conjured the figure of the will-less tyrant in The Triumph of Life 
(1822). He imagines standing by Rousseau, while the great philosopher describes  
The great, the unforgotten,—they who wore 
Mitres and helms and crowns, or wreathes of light, 
Signs of thought’s empire over thought—their lore 
 
Taught them not this, to know themselves; their might 
Could not repress the mystery within, 
And for the morn of truth they feigned, deep night 
 
Caught them ere evening. (SW, 512, ll. 209-15) 
Here is Rousseau’s critique of modern society in compact, poetic form: conventional 
forms of life alienate people. Thoughts rule over thoughts, the powerful know not 
themselves, and life is ultimately “feigned.” In Chapter 2, we will encounter 
Edgeworth’s Vivian, a man whose mind is filled with others’ words, and whose 
resultant will-less-ness robs him of love and life. He is like De Quincey’s opium-
eater, who can still think and feel, but loses the power “even of proposing or 
willing.”113 In Chapter 3, in the sonnets of Charlotte Smith, we will see the problem 
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turned on its head. Society takes her freedom from her, and this tyranny inflicts on 
her the gravest mental anguish. 
There is a painful footnote to Rousseau’s theory of the dignity of man: the 
theory of women’s freedom he presented in Book 5 of Émile. He argued that women 
obtain freedom of the will not through pride, courage, and resolution, as men do, 
but through guile and deceit: “… her orders are caresses, her threats are tears. She 
ought to reign in the home as the minister does in a state—by getting herself 
commanded to do what she wants to do.”114  A woman should dress with virginal 
seductiveness: “… one would say that all this very simple attire was put on only to 
be taken off piece by piece in the imagination.”115 She should not show off any 
intellectual abilities, for “[a] brilliant wife is a plague to her husband.”116 Her 
freedom is a “species of dissimulation.”117 He seemed to think that this course of 
action would make women more free. Others have not been so sure. 
There were some in Romantic Britain who agreed with Rousseau that a 
courageously enlightened woman is a deformed self. In Adeline Mowbray, as we 
shall see, the opinionated Editha Mowbray is a good philosopher but a bad mother. 
But others resisted his claim, arguing that his ideas about male freedom applied 
equally to women. Edgeworth lampooned his arguments about women’s education 
in Letters for Literary Ladies (1795).118 Her novels teem with characters, like Mrs 
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Beaumont, Mrs Falconer or Cecilia Davenant, whose guile, however well- or ill-
meant, explodes in their faces, while her rational and sincere heroines succeed in 
finding happiness. Austen’s scheming Emma Woodhouse seems to cut both ways. 
Her guile is her bane, but her brilliance, on several occasions, also brings her to grief. 
A more forthright critic was Mary Wollstonecraft, who argued that “all the writers 
who have written on the subject of female education and manners, from Rousseau 
to Dr. Gregory, have contributed to render women more artificial, weak characters 
than they would otherwise have been.”119 Astell had long before posed the question, 
“since GOD has given Women as well as Men intelligent Souls, why should they be 
forbidden to improve them?”120 Rousseau and Kant developed a new and powerful 
notion of the “intelligent Soul,” and many of Rousseau’s British disciples insisted 
that this intelligence be extended to women. 
By the end of the century, these philosophers from Locke to Rousseau had 
been fused into a new philosophical canon, sometimes called the “new philosophy” 
or “modern philosophy.” Together they provoked a set of anxieties about the fragility 
or dissolution of the self, and provided a set of tools for thinking about them. There 
were three weak points in the self. The first was reason (or understanding), which 
could be weak, deluded, overborne by emotions or clouded with foggy notions. The 
second was sensibility, which could be strangled by solitude or perverted by an 
unjust society. Finally there was the will, vulnerable to tyranny, cowardice or self-
contradiction. These thinkers not only introduced new concepts of the ideal self—
they also introduced a range of deformed selves, from the capricious woman of the 
world to the masochistic monk to the liar who beggars his own freedom. This 
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tradition continued to develop among Romantic-era philosophers themselves, as we 
will see in the final section of this chapter. 
1.4 Three Romantic Thinkers 
We have now seen how the anxieties of Locke, Astell, Hume, Smith, Rousseau and 
Kant made their way into British Romantic literature, belying those historians who 
claim that there was a clean break between eighteenth-century and Romantic 
notions of the self. From this perspective, it seems absurd to claim that the 
eighteenth-century self was “a well-tuned, visible mechanism,” while the Romantics 
“granted space to mystery and imbalance.”121 It is true, however, that many British 
Romantic philosophers did consider the mysterious and imbalanced aspects of the 
self, and made original contributions to the theory of self-deformation. Three of the 
greatest were Edmund Burke, Mary Wollstonecraft and William Hazlitt. Each of 
them responded to their eighteenth-century inheritance in a different way, 
demonstrating the variety of Romantic approaches to self-deformation. 
Burke’s central contribution was to propose an historical, cultural self. All the 
philosophers we have considered so far fretted about the relationship between 
human nature and human society. Burke flipped the debate by proposing that our 
self is “second nature,” a set of ideas we inherit from our forebears.122 Far from 
limiting our freedom, custom defines our “rights and franchises,” therefore enabling 
us to be free at all.123 We deform ourselves when we fail to revere our inheritance. If 
we prefer reason to custom, we may lose our sense of self, becoming prey to 
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“inconstancy and versatility.”124 If we fall prey to the “disorderly appetites” that 
haunt the human frame, then we may cease to really understand our customs, 
turning them into “pretexts” for violence and fanaticism.125 Burke’s greatest 
example of the deformed self was the quixotic young intellectual, equipped with “the 
metaphysics of an undergraduate, and the mathematics and arithmetic of an 
exciseman,” who eschews custom, arrogantly measuring the world according to his 
own simplistic ideas.126 This self-deformity was brilliantly depicted by William Blake 
in his image of Newton on the sea-floor, trying to measure the universe with a pair 
of compasses. 
Of these three writers, Wollstonecraft is the one who most obviously fits the 
classic mould of the Romantic thinker. In her Letters Written During a Short 
Residence in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark (1796), she presented herself as a 
quest-hero in the dark hallways of the self, eradicating her prejudices by observing 
men and manners, feeling superior to her ill-educated Scandinavian 
contemporaries, and discovering the movements of her soul through deep 
communion with nature. Like Burke, she argued that people can only improve as 
part of a shared culture that improves, and that abstract reason and utopian 
schemes are bound to fail.127 She is most famous, however, for her scathing critique 
of inequality, the way it deforms women and the poor. Astell had argued that women 
are degraded by misogynistic customs, but Wollstonecraft drew on eighteenth-
century social theory to make a more radical point: it is “the very constitution of civil 
society” that makes women “weak, if not vicious.”128 Astell thought that reforms to 
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women’s education would allow them to cultivate their virtue and learn to weather 
the hardihood of a woman’s fate. Wollstonecraft despaired that no education could 
form a woman for morality or happiness till society is transformed: 
I feel more than a mother’s fondness and anxiety, when I reflect on the dependent 
and oppressed state of [her daughter Fanny’s] sex. I dread lest she should be forced 
to sacrifice her heart to her principles, or principles to her heart. With trembling hand 
I shall cultivate sensibility, and cherish delicacy of sentiment, lest, whilst I lend fresh 
blushes to the rose, I sharpen the thorns that will wound the breast I would fain 
guard—I dread to unfold her mind, lest it should render her unfit for the world she 
is to inhabit—Hapless woman! what a fate is thine!129 
Either Fanny will be deformed by the necessity to seduce a husband for herself, or 
she will achieve self-formation at the cost of alienation. This second fear is a new 
anxiety among our philosophers. Our other thinkers held that proper self-
cultivation allows the individual to achieve happiness, but Wollstonecraft feared 
that for a woman, forming a perfect self might make you miserably “unfit” for the 
world as it is.130 We will see how similar feminist anxieties run through the works of 
Opie and Smith. 
Hazlitt has come to be recognised in recent years as one of the great 
philosophers of self, credited with propounding a novel theory of developmental 
psychology.131 He is unique among the thinkers in this chapter, because he is the 
only one to argue that we actually deform ourselves by forming a sense of self. He 
propounded this idea in his first major work, the Essay on the Principles of Human 
Action (1805), whose poor sales led him to give up on philosophy and become a 
literary critic. He begins by distinguishing our past, present and future selves. We 
know our past experience through memory, and are aware of our present self at any 
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moment. But our future self is something we can only ever imagine. Of course, we 
can also imagine other people’s future selves, and this leads Hazlitt to make a 
startling claim: when we consider future events, they “must naturally affect [the 
imagination] in the same manner, whether they are thought of in connection with 
our own future being, or that of others.”132 We are born benevolent, drawing no 
distinction between our own future selves and those of other people. But we 
gradually construct an “imaginary” or “ideal” self in our own mind, and become 
habituated to thinking that our own future is the most important one: 
Every sensation that I feel, or that afterwards recurs vividly to my memory 
strengthens the sense of self, which increased strength in the mechanical feeling is 
transferred to the general idea, and to my remote, future, imaginary interest: whereas 
our sympathy with the feelings of others being always imaginary, … the interest we 
take in their welfare seems to be something foreign to our own bosoms, to be 
transient, arbitrary, and directly opposite to the necessary, absolute, permanent 
interest which we have in the pursuit of our own welfare.133 
Self-formation narrows the mind. As we form a self, we fall away from the beauty of 
our nature, becoming selfish and cruel. For Hazlitt, explains Jacques Khalip, we are 
really “nonpersons,” and the very idea of self-formation (or “self-induced Bildung”) 
is merely an “inspired fantasy.”134 Hazlitt implicitly argues that we should extinguish 
or abolish ourselves, and we will see in Chapters 3 and 4 how Clare and Moore 
largely agree with him. 
The self was a fearful thing for all these thinkers. Any attempt to define it 
inevitably conjured images of its destruction or malformation. These images 
provoked anxiety because they threatened to bring ethics and society tumbling 
down. Society is made of selves. Acts are performed by selves. We have seen what a 
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store of deformed selves Romantic writers had to pick from. We have seen how each 
proposed principle of selfhood—reason, sensibility, will, culture, and imagination—
bred its own anxieties. We have seen how Wollstonecraft and Hazlitt raised serious 
questions about the merits of self-formation, blurring the distinction between a 
well-formed and a deformed self. The idea that the Romantics celebrated a new kind 
of deep and developmental self has become harder to sustain. Instead, two questions 
present themselves, which the following chapters will attempt to answer: (1) How 
did Romantic writers understand the process of self-deformation? What were its 
nature and causes? (2) What attitude did they take to self-deformation? Was it right 
or wrong to make yourself “unfit”? Was losing your sense of self desirable or 
undesirable? We will see how, by posing these questions, our writers transformed 






FICTION: MARIA EDGEWORTH’S 
AND AMELIA OPIE’S ANTI-
BILDUNGSROMANE 
 
“And the marriage was solemnized with much pomp and magnificence, and every 
demonstration of joy.”—— 
Novellists and novel readers are usually satisfied when they arrive at this happy 
catastrophe; their interest and curiosity seldom go any farther: but in real life marriage 
is but the beginning of domestic happiness or misery.1 
O WRITES Maria Edgeworth, at the beginning of Chapter 14 of Vivian, 
quoting the final sentence of her previous chapter with sly irony. Perhaps 
those “demonstrations of joy” weren’t as authentic as they appeared. 
Perhaps this marriage was not a “happy” catastrophe but an actual one. There is no 
perhaps about how the reader should feel. Whatever satisfaction they hoped for, 
they must postpone. There are two more chapters to go, and Charles Vivian’s 
marriage to Lady Sarah Lidhurst will not survive them. 
Readers are in fact quite well prepared for Vivian’s shameful death and the 
stillbirth of his son. In preceding chapters, he has beggared himself on garish 
renovations and contested elections, destroyed his engagement to the virtuous 
Selina Sidney by running off with a married woman, and ruined his friendship with 
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dear Mr Russell by impulsively divulging important secrets. He is one of the many 
self-annihilating youths of Romantic fiction, joining other tragic figures like the 
suicidal hero of The Sorrows of Young Werther, the ill-educated Miss Milner of A 
Simple Story (1791), the self-loathing Coke Clifton of Anna St. Ives (1792), the 
deranged Falkland of Caleb Williams (1793), the lonely and forlorn protagonist of 
Memoirs of Emma Courtney (1796), the shattered Maria (1798), the feckless 
owners of Castle Rackrent (1800), the short-lived exile René (1802), the diminished 
Corinne (1807), the dismal Lucy and Edgar of The Bride of Lammermoor (1819) 
and the sad lonely poet whose mind is unspooled in Lenz (1836), not to mention the 
host of ill-married or vicious characters in Austen’s famous novels, from Isabella 
Thorpe and the Eltons to the Wickhams and Lucy Crawford. Vivian’s starkest 
contemporary is Adeline Mowbray (1804), the other major case study in this 
chapter, who has the singular distinction of destroying her marriage and her life by 
choosing on principle to abjure the institution of marriage altogether. 
Despite the popularity of such characters from the beginning of the Romantic 
period to its end, Edgeworth was right to predict that readers might not be 
“satisfied” by Vivian’s tragic fate. Both Vivian and Adeline attempt to form 
themselves, and fail. Readers have often found these protagonists deform not only 
themselves, but the novels in which they appear. Marilyn Butler, Edgeworth’s 
greatest modern critic, finds Vivian wanting, because a novel whose protagonist 
fails to learn is inevitably “repetitive and discontinuous.”2 Since then, it appears that 
the book has been the subject of only a single academic article.3 Interest in Adeline 
Mowbray is increasing as feminist scholars have taught us to see its complexities, 
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but it was not long ago that one critic dismissed it as a “travesty,” since it depicts 
Adeline’s attempted self-formation in such a negative light.4 For such a critic, 
Adeline starts out with the noble impulse to live according to her conscience, but her 
slow passage towards self-condemnation and an ecstatic early death is an ugly 
affirmation of repressive ideas about women’s conduct. To their detractors, Vivian 
is formless, while Adeline Mowbray is a malformed piece of conservative 
propaganda. 
If critics find these novels difficult, they do so for good reason. In most 
accounts of Romantic-era fiction, the Bildungsroman is the central genre. The 
Bildungsroman, at least in its “classical” or Romantic form, is the novel of successful 
self-formation. We have constructed a canon around a core of optimistic novels—
Belinda (1801), The Absentee (1812), Pride and Prejudice (1813), Emma (1815), 
Waverley (1814), Ivanhoe (1820)—whose protagonists successfully form 
themselves. They curb their enthusiasm without losing it, marry the right person, 
and find a way to maintain their freedom while being part of society. The 
protagonist’s successful self-formation is what makes these novels beautiful. 
“[S]olving problems is useful and sweet,” argues Franco Moretti. Such novels fill us 
with “aesthetic pleasure” because they solve the problem of fitting in.5 Neither 
Vivian nor Adeline Mowbray can offer us this pleasure. Not only does this make 
these texts seem deformed, it makes it difficult even to say what sort of novels they 
are. They aren’t gothic novels, despite their tragedy, because they lack the requisite 
dungeons, forests, castles and bandits. They aren’t “Jacobin” novels, despite their 
interest in the failure of education, because the last one of those was Thomas 
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Holcroft’s Bryan Perdue (1805).6 Opie’s novel has been called “anti-Jacobin,”7 but 
anti-Jacobin fiction is defined by its political conservatism, and we will see that the 
novel’s apparent conservatism is only a part of the picture. They don’t fit easily into 
the fictional genres of the later Romantic period either, lacking the harp-strumming 
bards and non-British cultural politics of the National Tale or the small-scale 
settings and clear conservative didacticism of the Evangelical Novel.8 
Like Joanna Baillie’s De Monfort, these novels are “nameless and horrible.” 
There are two obvious ways we could incorporate them into our histories of the 
period. We could define a new genre, the anti-Bildungsroman, which would include 
them, along with most Jacobin, anti-Jacobin and gothic novels. We could create a 
new German word for this genre, “Verbildungsroman,” from the German 
Verbildung (“deformity,” “miseducation”), Bildung’s antonym. Or we could widen 
our definition of the Bildungsroman to include all novels that explore social self-
formation, whether it succeeds or fails. In either case, as I hope to show in this 
chapter, these pessimistic novels explore the same themes of self-cultivation and 
social integration as the classical Bildungsroman. To prove this, I use text analysis 
to compare Vivian and Adeline Mowbray to a set of other Romantic novels, 
revealing new aspects of their shared vocabulary and plot structures. These are 
confronting novels, which put the progressive ideal of the Bildungsroman under 
stress, asking difficult and disturbing questions about the possibility of individual 
fulfilment in modern society. Claudia Johnson suggests that the novels of the early 
nineteenth century were “novels of crisis,” complex books that breathed the febrile 
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and paranoid atmosphere of wartime Britain.9 In this context, the discontinuous or 
oppressive aspects of Vivian and Adeline Mowbray may seem less like aesthetic 
flaws, and more like artistic triumphs. 
I have claimed there is a scholarly consensus that the Bildungsroman was the 
central genre of realist fiction in the Romantic period, but there are three big 
objections to such a claim. First objection: scholars have argued that many other 
genres were more central, including the “historical novel,”10 the “domestic novel,”11 
and the “novel of manners, sentiment, and emulation.”12 Second objection: different 
scholars argue that the Bildungsroman was invented long before or long after the 
period. Was David Copperfield (1850) the first Bildungsroman in English?13 Was it 
Pride and Prejudice?14 Was it “Rosamond” (1796-1821)?15 Was it Betsy Thoughtless 
(1751)?16 Or was it Tom Jones (1749)?17 Third objection: some scholars argue that 
there was no central genre at all. Romantic novelists had no “unifying artistic 
sensibility,” argue the editors of the recent Cambridge Companion to Fiction in the 
Romantic Period (2010). Instead there was simply “a spirit of experimentation,” 
perhaps fostered by the persistent “civic unrest.”18 These disagreements are more 
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apparent than real. Literary historians tell a substantially similar story about the 
evolution of the realist novel between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a 
story with the emergence of the Bildungsroman at its core. There are four key 
strands to the narrative: 
1. The reconciliation of individual and society. When Karl Morgenstern 
coined the term Bildungsroman in 1820, he argued that the goal of the protagonist’s 
education “ist ein vollendetes Gleichgewicht, Harmonie mit Freyheit.”19 Since then, 
nearly every scholar has agreed that the Bildungsroman portrays a protagonist who 
manages to reconcile their individual freedom with the dictates of society.20 
Historians of the novel have often argued that Romantic novelists—particularly 
Austen—were the first to portray such reconciliation. In The Rise of the Novel 
(1957), Ian Watt argues that at the end of the eighteenth century, Austen synthesised 
the psychological realism of Samuel Richardson with the social realism of Henry 
Fielding, giving “a sense of the social order which is not achieved at the expense of 
the individuality of her characters.”21 In one stroke, Austen reconciled not only the 
individual and society, but the whole tradition of English fiction, setting the course 
for the great classics of the nineteenth century. Marilyn Butler argues that Austen’s 
novels culminate in “a moment of self-discovery that is the necessary condition for 
[the protagonist’s] maturity and happiness.”22 Johnson agrees, but stresses the 
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freedom Austen’s protagonists achieve.23 Gary Kelly broadens the focus from 
Austen, arguing that nearly all Romantic novels are “manuals for the formation of 
self-identity,” in which “subjective merit and social status … become congruent.”24 
2. Psychological depth and free indirect discourse. Another key feature of 
the Bildungsroman is psychological depth, or a “tendency toward the inner life,” to 
cite one critic’s understatement.25 A crucial technique for portraying this inner life 
is free indirect discourse, which allows the novelist to shuttle between the minds of 
the narrator and characters, helping to create the genre’s characteristic irony. It is 
no surprise that Goethe and Austen, often seen as the genre’s inventors, are often 
also seen as the inventors of free indirect discourse.26 Scholars of Romantic fiction 
have often seen psychological depth and free indirect discourse as key trends in the 
period. Deidre Lynch argues that “literature took an inward turn at the close of the 
eighteenth century: that is how it got ‘romantic’.”27 The turning point came with the 
publication of Frances Burney’s Evelina in 1778.28 Burney and her followers created 
characters from the same social class as their readers: the gentry, the lower 
aristocracy, the professional middle classes. This made it easier for readers to 
identify with characters, and think of them as “real” people with complex minds.29  
Meanwhile, narratologists like Roy Pascal, Dorrit Cohn, Alan Palmer and Monika 
Fludernik have shown how Romantic novelists used vastly more “psycho-narration” 
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than their forebears,30 and developed free indirect discourse from a tool for 
portraying speech into one for portraying thought.31 
3. Ordinary or domestic setting. Classic theories of the Bildungsroman often 
stress the genre’s focus on “ordinary” domestic life, and note the importance of the 
marriages. When Goethe wrote Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, writes Moretti, he 
“‘activated’—made narratively interesting—the bland rhythm of everyday reality.”32 
In the classical Bildungsroman, the protagonist undergoes self-formation simply by 
having ordinary experiences with the right attitude. It is a commonplace of literary 
history that English novelists became more interested in ordinary, domestic life as 
the eighteenth-century wore on. Walter Scott himself felt that a new kind of novel 
had arisen since 1800, describing the “common walks of life,” and that Austen 
excelled even Edgeworth in her description “of such common occurrences as may 
fall under the observation of most folks.”33 In the last century, Watt argued that 
novelists’ increasing interest in private life was linked to their increasing interest in 
psychological depth.34 Nancy Armstrong agrees. As domestic fiction started to 
predominate, novelists became more interested in their characters’ “qualities of 
mind.”35 It was only by restricting their narratives to the “private framework” of 
ordinary life that novelists could credibly show their characters achieving happiness 
despite the “vast inequities of the age.”36 Butler also argues that it was the very 
“small scale and intimacy” of Austen’s novels that allowed them to “reach from the 
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commonplace to high and permanent moral concerns.”37 Really, the “domestic 
novel” described by Armstrong and the Bildungsroman of Moretti are synonymous, 
both being novels where the protagonist discovers inner qualities through ordinary 
experience, capping off their self-formation with an ideal marriage. 
4. Historical consciousness. In the Bildungsroman, the protagonist’s self-
formation is a symbol of the progress or reformation of their society. As Mikhail 
Bakhtin puts it, in the Bildungsroman “human emergence is … no longer man’s own 
private affair. [The protagonist] emerges along with the world and he reflects the 
historical emergence of the world itself.”38 When they marry at the novel’s end, it 
represents not just a private contract between husband and wife, but a new “social 
contract” that will ensure peaceful progress.39 There is a historical dimension to the 
Bildungsroman. It is not surprising to find that many scholars argue that the 
Romantic period gave rise to the first true “historical novels.” According to György 
Lukács, Scott turned his characters into historical “types,” whose speech, manners 
and actions “always represent social trends and historical forces.”40 Kelly argues that 
the Jacobin novelists, in particular Robert Bage, Thomas Holcroft, Elizabeth 
Inchbald and William Godwin, introduced a new kind of “psychological realism” 
into the novel.41 Believing strongly in the philosophical doctrine of “necessity,” they 
portrayed their characters as the product of social forces, pawns in the service of 
history.42 Walter Allen argues that Castle Rackrent was the watershed novel in 
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which characters were first shown to be products of their societies.43 Butler argues 
that in Edgeworth and Scott, “[a]n individual grows from irresponsibility to a sense 
of himself as Civil Man, just as a community has advanced from barbarous disunity 
to its modern ordered complexity.”44 The progress of one is the progress of all. The 
Bildungsroman and historical novel are essentially identical. And if, like Erich 
Auerbach or Michel Foucault, you believe that “historism” or “historicity” is the 
defining feature of Romanticism, then the Bildungsroman must be its defining 
fictional genre. 
Anglo-American scholars all tell a similar story about modern fiction. By the 
end of the eighteenth century, a new form of fiction had emerged and come to 
predominate. The new novels portrayed young protagonists, who sought and found 
a place in society. They portrayed characters of psychological depth, whose 
experiences were of ordinary life, and who formed themselves at the same time a 
new society was forming around them. For some critics, in fact, the story of the novel 
is itself a Bildungsroman: according to James Raven, in 1800 the English novel 
finally “came of age.”45 
It should now be clear why Vivian and Adeline Mowbray have not been seen 
as part of this “coming of age.” They are the black sheep of the novel family. In some 
respects, it must be said, they meet the criteria of the classical Bildungsroman. Both 
portray young protagonists trying to form themselves, both are full of psychological 
depths and free indirect discourse, both take place largely in domestic settings, and 
                                                   
43 Walter Allen, The English Novel: A Short Critical History (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1958), 103. 
44 Butler, Maria Edgeworth, 486. 
45 James Raven, “Historical Introduction: The Novel Comes of Age,” in The English Novel 1770-1829: 
A Bibliographical Survey of Prose Fiction Published in the British Isles, ed. Peter Garside, James 
Raven, and Rainer Schöwerling (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Richard Barney attacks 
this kind of argument in his Plots of Enlightenment: Education and the Novel in Eighteenth-Century 
England (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 31. 
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both have a strong sense of history, of how things have changed now “our feudal 
times are done away with” (Vivian, 364), of what “hope” we may have “to see society 
enlightened and improved” in the future (Adeline Mowbray, 127). But in crucial 
respects they challenge the received model of the Bildungsroman. Here there is no 
reconciliation of individual and society. The protagonists’ minds may occasionally 
be deep, but if so they are incoherent. They may live in a domestic setting, but the 
wide world keeps bursting in, as Vivian’s political career wraps its tentacles around 
his family life, and a prejudiced public keeps invading Adeline’s privacy. And history 
in these novels is a bleak process, which shatters individuals rather than reforming 
society to accommodate them. 
In what follows, I show how Opie and Edgeworth achieved this tragic vision 
in their novels. In §2.1, I compare their implicit theories of self-deformation. In 
some ways, they are starkly opposed: Vivian is weak and easily led, where Adeline is 
stubborn. But both Opie and Edgeworth were avid Rousseauans, and see an 
imperfection of the will as the source of their protagonist’s downfall. To put their 
ideas in context, I use collocation analysis to compare their vocabulary with that of 
other canonical novels of the period. Romantic novelists had a shared arsenal of 
keywords, such as “honour,” “virtue” and “character,” which they deployed in subtly 
different ways to reveal different aspects of self-formation and deformation. In §2.2, 
I compare the plot structures of the two books. Both Edgeworth and Opie rewrite 
the traditional marriage plot to show how difficult it can be to create a truly private 
space. Digital text analysis allows us to see how their plot structures resemble or 
depart from those of canonical Bildungsromane. Finally, in §2.3, I discuss one of 
the most striking aesthetic deformities of these novels. Both Vivian and Adeline 
become aware that language is conventional, entwining or imprisoning the mind. 
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By questioning language’s power to communicate truth, they undermine the 
language of the novels in which they appear. Readers have often claimed that these 
novels have simplistic morals. But it is not clear that either of them has a moral at 
all. 
2.1 Defects of the Will  
Why are Vivian and Adeline such failures? At the beginning of each novel, we 
discover that their education was defective. Vivian’s mother, Lady Mary, was an 
“over-anxious” parent (2). She never gave him a chance to work things out for 
himself, says Vivian, so he “grew up seeing with her eyes, hearing with her ears, and 
judging with her understanding, till, at length, it was found out that I had not eyes, 
ears, or understanding of my own.” (4) Unable to judge or decide for himself, he is 
easily corrupted by the wiles of London when he comes of age and enters parliament. 
His debts pile up. He becomes a party-man, the lover of his friend’s wife, the subject 
of oppressive rumours and ultimately the dead victim of a duel. Adeline was also a 
victim of early education, though she suffered the opposite problem. Her 
philosophical mother spent so much time concocting utopian schemes of education, 
she never got around to giving one to her daughter: 
But while Mrs Mowbray was busying herself in plans for Adeline’s education, she 
reached the age of fifteen, and was in a manner educated; not, however, by her,—
though Mrs Mowbray would, no doubt, have been surprised to have heard this 
assertion. (8) 
Left to her own devices, the intelligent Adeline becomes far too enamoured of her 
own judgment. Wanting to be a “genius” like her mother (14), she imbibes radical 
philosophy, becomes convinced that marriage is a contemptible and antiquated 
practice, and makes the fatal decision to live with her partner unmarried. Eventually 
she realises her arrogance, and dies hoping that her daughter will be taught to be 
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more “humble” and “slow to call the experience of ages contemptible prejudices.” 
(259) 
These novels thus appear to be morally rather simple. They are cautionary 
tales to parents and young people: don’t be weak and irresolute, don’t be arrogant 
and presumptuous. The implication seems to be that if Vivian and Adeline were 
properly educated, or had made a concerted early effort to remedy the defects of 
their education, they might never have destroyed themselves. It was a hallmark of 
conservative fiction in this period to blame social ills on dangerous individuals, 
rather than on the institutions of society.46 We could interpret these as comforting, 
conservative novels. Parliamentary corruption is the fault of a few feckless Vivians, 
rather than a problem with the institution itself: “Weakness, weakness of mind! the 
cause of all my errours!” Vivian cries on his deathbed (457-58). The terrible things 
Adeline suffers at the hands of her compatriots are her own fault, not the fault of 
widespread prejudice: “society was right,” she says, “in making, and in seeing, no 
distinction between me and any other woman living in an unsanctioned 
connection.” (239) These novels are comforting because they absolve us of 
responsibility for people like Adeline and Vivian. We don’t need to change, they do. 
The more we dig into these novels, however, the less and less comforting they 
seem to be. Neither Vivian nor Adeline is cruel or stupid. Vivian makes many of his 
mistakes by obeying the impulses of his “good nature” (313, 375). He is intelligent. 
His friend Russell can find “no fault either with the logical or the mathematical part 
of [his] understanding” (1), and when he does pull it together, he becomes one of 
parliament’s best debaters (182-83, 386-87). Vivian’s earnest desire to do good sets 
him apart from the rest of the political class. All the other politicians in the novel—
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Lord Glistonbury, Mr Wharton and Marmaduke Lidhurst—are in it purely for 
themselves. Adeline is likewise intelligent and virtuous, impressing every character 
who isn’t already prejudiced against her. In one chapter, she meets the mean and 
jealous Maynards, who are all-too-pleased to call her a harlot. In the next, she meets 
the virtuous Douglases, who “admire” her despite her “ill-judging” ways, and desire 
to know her better (83, 79). When Adeline finally decides that “society was right” to 
be prejudiced against her, she is mistaken. At the time, she believes that her example 
corrupted her erstwhile servant, Mary Warner, into becoming a prostitute. Her 
foolish philosophy was helping vice spread through society. It later transpires that 
Adeline’s example did not corrupt Mary. The virtuous Mrs Beauclerc and Rachel 
Pemberton insist that Adeline’s story could do nothing but inculcate virtue, and they 
condemn society for shutting her out (see §2.3). Shelley King is quite right to say 
that Adeline “poses a challenge for the conservative reader.”47 She is the very model 
of conservative femininity—meek, selfless, dedicated to serving her lover and later 
her husband in the household—but she disagrees with a core plank of conservative 
philosophy, the sanctity of marriage. 
Like Kant and Rousseau, Edgeworth and Opie think that neither reason nor 
sensibility are enough to ensure proper self-formation. Both Adeline and Vivian 
have great powers of reason and sensibility, but to no avail. Their real problem is a 
defect of the will, as Vivian himself notes with an apt quotation from Rousseau’s 
Émile: “And how true it is, Russell, that ‘all wickedness is weakness!’” (163)  As we 
saw in chapter 1, for Kant and Rousseau the will is only perfect when it determines 
itself. It can only be perfect if it is free, and it can only be free if it binds itself by the 
correct principles, principles which are themselves the foundations of freedom. In 
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the classical Bildungsroman, the protagonist is supposed to reach a moment of 
decision, where they make the right choice, and do so for the right reasons: “It is 
indeed the paradigm of modern socialization: I desire to do what in any case I should 
have done.”48 Or as Vivian’s tutor Russell puts it: “there are not two honours—two 
honesties—it is all one virtue—integrity!” (168) Neither Vivian nor Adeline achieves 
integrity, the set of principles that would enable them to act for society and for 
themselves at the same time. 
Vivian often makes the right decision, but on the wrong principles. One 
reason he marries Lady Sarah is that he fears her mother will have a second stroke 
if he turns her down. In the event, her mother is so joyful at the wedding that it 
brings on the deadly palsy, and “the very event, which Vivian had dreaded, as the 
probable consequence of his refusal to marry her daughter, was, in fact, accelerated 
by the full accomplishment of her wishes.” (371-72) Adeline has the opposite 
problem, making the wrong decision on the right principles. Her disastrous 
marriage with Berrendale is a good example. Her lover Glenmurray has died, and 
she has been resisting Berrendale’s proposals for years. She is frequently accosted 
on the street by lecherous men, when one day, to escape them, she says she has a 
fiancé. The ploy works, and the men immediately back down. Adeline finds that her 
integrity leaves her only one option: “the die is cast;—I have used the sacred name 
of wife to shield me from insult; and I am therefore pledged to assume it directly.” 
(179) She accepts Berrendale’s proposal. She converts her lie about being engaged 
into a truth. She turns society’s command—get married!—into a self-command. She 
maintains her self-respect. But the marriage is catastrophic. Berrendale turns out to 
be a narcissist, misogynist and bigamist. 
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Examples like these raise a crucial question. Vivian and Adeline see the 
consequences of their mistakes, so why do they not learn from them? Many a 
Bildungsroman-protagonist overcomes a defective early education. All of Austen’s 
heroines have hopeless parents. Edgeworth’s own Ormond (1817) is an impulsive 
orphan brought up by a corrupt MP, who nonetheless manages to become happy 
and moral. Experience is a good tutor in the classical Bildungsroman, but not for 
Vivian and Adeline. “My experience can be of no use to me,” laments Vivian on his 
deathbed (458). Adeline has learnt nothing from her “own experience,” she says, 
“for the painful situations in which I have been placed, I might attribute, not to the 
fallacy of the system on which I have acted, but to those existing prejudices in 
society which I wish to see destroyed.” (217) There is some difference in the structure 
of Vivian and Adeline’s experience, which means they cannot learn from it as Emma 
Woodhouse, Harry Ormond or Wilhelm Meister do. 
Digital humanities offers a powerful tool to uncover this difference: 
collocation analysis. Collocation analysis rests on a fundamental observation that 
words are never used in isolation. Roland Barthes explains the basic idea: 
… reading is absorbed in a kind of metonymic skid, each synonym adding to its 
neighbor some new trait, some new departure: the old man who was first connoted 
as fragile is soon said to be ‘of glass’: an image containing signifieds of rigidity, 
immobility, and dry, cutting frangibility. This expansion is the very movement of 
meaning: the meaning skids, recovers itself, and advances simultaneously; far from 
analyzing it, we should rather describe it through its expansions, lexical 
transcendence, the generic word it continually attempts to join …49 
The old man in Sarrasine (the story Barthes is analysing) is said to be “fragile,” and 
a few words later he is “of glass.” These words are “neighbours.” They form part of a 
cluster of related words that hover around a central concept, or “generic word.” The 
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point is that words with related meanings tend to appear near one another in the 
text. They are collocates. Collocates let us work backwards. By seeing which words 
collocate with one another, we can reconstruct the central concept that lies behind 
them.  
I focus on two keywords, “character” and “society.” As we will see, these 
keywords and their collocates were crucial for Edgeworth, Opie and their 
contemporaries when they set out to describe self-formation or deformation. To see 
how Edgeworth and Opie used these words in comparison to their contemporaries, 
I have assembled a corpus of 54 other Romantic-era realist novels.50 These texts 
have been accessed on widely-available databases, like the Chadwyck-Healey 
collection, Oxford Text Archive and Project Gutenberg. They are high-quality digital 
texts, which scholars have taken the effort to correct by hand. They thus give a good 
sense of what specialists consider to be the major novels of the period. Most portray 
successful self-formation (or purport to), though several, such as Caleb Williams, A 
Simple Story and The Banished Man are sad tales of self-deformation, while others, 
like Annals of the Parish and Castle Rackrent barely focus on the individual self at 
                                                   
50 These are: Jane Austen’s Lady Susan (1794), Sense and Sensibility (1811), Pride and Prejudice 
(1813), Mansfield Park (1814), Emma (1816), Northanger Abbey (1818) and Persuasion (1818); 
Robert Bage’s Man As He Is (1792) and Hermsprong (1796); Eaton Barrett’s The Heroine (1813); 
Mary Brunton’s Self-Control (1811) and Discipline (1814); Frances Burney’s Evelina (1772), Cecilia 
(1782), Camilla (1798) and The Wanderer (1814); Richard Cumberland’s Henry (1795); Edgeworth’s 
Castle Rackrent (1800), Belinda (1801), Leonora (1806), Ennui (1809), The Absentee (1812), 
Patronage (1814), Harrington (1817) and Ormond (1817); Susan Ferrier’s Marriage (1818); John 
Galt’s The Ayreshire Legatees (1820), Annals of the Parish (1822), The Provost (1822) and The 
Entail (1823); William Godwin’s Caleb Williams (1793); Mary Hays’s Memoirs of Emma Courtney 
(1796); Thomas Holcroft’s Anna St. Ives (1792) and Hugh Trevor (1797); Elizabeth Inchbald’s A 
Simple Story (1791) and Nature and Art (1796); Lady Caroline Lamb’s Glenarvon (1816); Lady 
Morgan’s The Wild Irish Girl (1806); Mary Robinson’s Walsingham (1797); Sir Walter Scott’s 
Waverley (1814), Guy Mannering (1815), The Antiquary (1816), Old Mortality (1816), Rob Roy 
(1817), The Heart of Mid-Lothian (1818), The Bride of Lammermoor (1819) and Ivanhoe (1820); 
Charlotte Smith’s Emmeline (1788), Celestina (1791), The Old Manor House (1793) and The 
Banished Man (1794); Helen Maria Williams’s Julia (1790); and Mary Wollstonecraft’s Mary, A 
Fiction (1788) and Maria, or the Wrongs of Woman (1798).  
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all. This mixture of novels provides a rich linguistic context for Vivian and Adeline 
Mowbray. 
Since we are trying to reconstruct the central concepts shared by these 
novelists, two kinds of words need to be excluded from the analysis. The 150 most 
common words in the corpus as a whole are excluded. These words, such as “to,” 
“with” or “Lord,” are so common that they collocate with every other word. This 
clouds the results, when what we seek are the words which collocate especially with 
“character” and “society.” Likewise, the 30 most distinctive word of each novel, as 
measured by tf-idf, have been removed.51 These words include the names of 
characters and locations, and quirky technical or dialect words that mark the 
language of a particular novel. Since we want to find the concepts these novelists 
share with one another, these highly individual words are a distraction. Such 
removal of “stopwords” is standard practice in text analysis. 
None of these novelists ever writes of “self-formation.” But they do describe 
formation of “character.” “[T]hat sentiment formed my character,” writes Emma 
Courtney, “and, but for the obstacles which gave it force, though I might have 
suffered less misery, I should, I suspect, have gained less improvement …”52 The 
ingenuous Harry Ormond has many experiences that help in “forming his 
character.”53 Character is a fiendish concept in these novels. On the one hand, you 
have your private character, your personality. This is partly unique, made up of your 
particular traits, and partly generic—a moral person must have traits of consistency, 
integrity, self-command. On the other hand, you have your public character, which 
                                                   
51 See above, n. 11.  
52 Mary Hays, Memoirs of Emma Courtney, 2 vols. (London: G.G. and J.J. Robinson, 1796), II.87-
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is what people perceive you to be. It is your reputation, the figure you cut in the 
world. Vivian and Adeline both suffer from a split between their private and public 
characters. Vivian acquires a great reputation for political integrity, despite his 
inherent fecklessness. Before she suffers the stigma of being Glenmurray’s mistress, 
Adeline is “not aware how much the perfection of the female character depends on 
respect even to what may be called the prejudices of others.” (78) One aspect of 
Vivian and Adeline’s self-deformation is their inability to bring these two characters 
into alignment. 
Table 2.1 shows the collocates for “character” in Vivian, Adeline Mowbray 
and the corpus as a whole. Collocates have been calculated within a 20-word 
window—these are the most frequent terms 10 words either side of the word 
“character,” after stopwords have been removed. There are some crucial themes that 
link Vivian and Adeline Mowbray to all the other novels of the corpus. Self-
knowledge is one: “knew” and “known” are key words in the table. The people in 
these novels are constantly trying to know their own characters and the characters 
of others. It is no easy task. At the time of his proposal to Selina Sidney, Vivian “had 
laid open his whole character to her, as far as he knew it himself …” (34). It turns 
out later that he did not know his mercurial temper well enough. A subtler problem 
is the relationship between mind and body, between our character and our 
“manner” (behaviour) or “person” (appearance). There is also the grave problem of 
gender. Even in Vivian, with its male hero, “woman” is a stronger collocate for 
“character” than “men.” Adeline’s terrible death is proof of the power of reputation—
or its lack—to destroy a woman’s life. 
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Table 2.1 





Frequency of “character” per 1000 words (2 d.p.) 
3.38 0.86 1.23 
Top 20 collocates (20-word window) 
love replied whose 
mother age person 
public indeed indeed 
woman known seemed 
manner long love 
affection brother general 
hope conduct world 
wife gone woman 
knew knew knew 
disposition mistaken once 
son nor opinion 
two real manner 
feel surely nor 
hear terms manners 
just truth part 
ladies attribute many 
men call cannot 
others candid known 
power capable therefore 
proper consistency long 
 
Looking now at the differences between the lists, we can get some insight into 
what causes Vivian and Adeline to deform rather than form their characters. Adeline 
lives in a world where the individual has little control over their own character. The 
close collocates of “character” in the novel fall roughly into two groups: terms for 
strength of character, like “candid,” “capable” and “consistency,” and terms 
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indicating the way people talk about the characters of others, like “replied,” 
“indeed,” “surely” and “mistaken.” Adeline Mowbray is the only novel in the corpus 
where “gone” is a top collocate with “character.” This is due to only two scenes in the 
novel, but crucial ones: 
 “Surely, surely,” cried the kind and candid Emma Douglas, “I must grossly have 
mistaken Miss Mowbray’s character, if she was capable of the conduct which you 
attribute to her!” 
“My dear creature!” replied Mrs Wallington, “how should you know any thing of her 
character, when it was gone long before you knew her?—Character, indeed! you 
remind me of my brother… Mr Davenport,” continued she to a gentleman present, 
“did you ever hear the story of my brother and an angel of purity whom he met with 
abroad?” (p. 229) 
This passage contains three of the novel’s 34 instances of the word “character.” It 
illustrates one quirk of the method of collocation analysis. Since there are three 
“characters” in quick succession in the passage, many of these words have been 
counted three times as collocates of the word. This is appropriate, however, since 
the repetition of “character” in this scene is emphatic and intentional. Emma and 
Mrs Wallington disagree utterly as to the meaning of the word, and it affects the 
meaning of all the other words in the passage. Emma thinks she must have 
“mistaken” Adeline’s private, or real character, while Mrs Wallington thinks she 
mistook Adeline’s character as a kept woman. Emma thinks that character is an 
innate quality of the soul, Mrs Wallington something that can be lost—“gone”—due 
to one scandalous decision. The meek and virtuous Emma is powerless to hold Mrs 
Wallington’s tongue, and the older lady immediately grabs a new conversational 
partner to tell Adeline’s story and assert her own definition of character. We will see 
how brilliantly Opie explores this social aspect of language below (§2.3). 
The other instance of “gone” and “character” in close proximity in the novel 
is also instructive. Sitting one evening in Lisbon, Adeline and Glenmurray meet “Mr 
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Maynard, an amiable man, who had gone to seek his fortune in India, and was 
returned a nabob, but with an irreproachable character.” (67) His situation is the 
opposite of Adeline’s. His public character as an English gentleman is gone, as is 
Adeline’s public character as a virtuous woman. But Mr Maynard’s new public 
character—“nabob”—has not robbed him of respect for his “irreproachable” private 
character. Opie’s narrator clearly agrees with Emma Douglas that it is the private 
character that counts, though Mr Maynard is also a man, so he doesn’t suffer the 
burden of gossip and repressive expectations that Adeline does.54 
Adeline Mowbray might be the only novel in the corpus where “character” 
and “gone” are collocates, but in Vivian we also encounter a protagonist who loses 
their character. It is the Della Cruscan wit, Rosamunda, who accuses him of being 
characterless, when he arrives at a masquerade with no costume: 
“Such a capital Tancred as you would have made! And now you are no character at 
all! But then, you are only on a par with certain ladies. Comfort yourself with the great 
Pope’s (I fear, too true,) reflection, that— 
 ‘Most women have no characters at all.’” (238) 
This short speech is coiled round with ironies. Ranting Rosamunda is the most 
superficial person in the novel, and she is accusing Vivian of lacking character 
because he has appeared as his own true self. His decision to appear without a 
costume was one of his rare good ones. The plan had been for he and Lady Julia to 
appear as Tancred and Sigismunda, lovers from a tale in The Decameron, but they 
decided against it when Lady Julia was struck with fear of the gossips’ tongues. The 
scene thus plays again on anxieties about women’s public character, and also plays 
on stereotypes about women’s lack of inner, private character. It is of course 
                                                   
54 See Shelley King, “The ‘Double Sense’ of Honor: Revising Gendered Social Codes in Amelia Opie's 
Adeline Mowbray,” in Enlightening Romanticism, Romancing the Enlightenment: British Novels 
from 1750 to 1832, ed. Miriam L. Wallace (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). 
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Rosamunda, the terrible poet and over-applier of makeup, who lives up to Pope’s 
misogynistic witticism—but she is nonetheless right that lack of character is 
precisely Vivian’s problem. 
 Vivian is one of the three novels in the corpus where “public” is among the 
top collocates with “character.” The others are Edgeworth’s own Patronage and 
John Galt’s The Provost. All these novels are about ambitious political men trying 
to win themselves a public eminence. In Vivian—as in Patronage—parliament is 
portrayed as a sink of corruption, but nonetheless Edgeworth suggests that Vivian’s 
ambition is one of the few forces that lend him some integrity. After running off with 
Mrs Wharton and destroying his engagement, he remorsefully hopes that “if he 
distinguished himself in public life, and if he there displayed steadiness of character, 
he might win back Selina’s esteem and affection.” (182) Later, after his loveless 
marriage to Lady Sarah, he finds solace in the thought of his reputation: 
In this wreck of his happiness, one saving chance, however, yet remained. He had 
still a public character; he was conscious of having preserved unblemished integrity, 
as a member of the senate; and this integrity, still more than his oratorical talents, 
raised him far above most of his competitors, and preserved him not only in the 
opinion of others, but in his own. (385) 
As we saw in Chapter 1, Hazlitt argued that we form an imaginary or ideal self by 
constantly noticing our own thoughts, feelings and perceptions, and that developing 
this sense of self reduces our natural disinterestedness. Edgeworth suggests just the 
opposite. Vivian derives his ideal self in large part from other people—he is 
“conscious” of their opinions. And this sense of self does not make him self-
interested, but instead raises him to meet his duties on behalf of the public. Those 
critics who claim that Vivian does not change or develop over the course of the novel 
have not noticed this element of his self-conception. At first, he has political 
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integrity because he desires Selina’s esteem; in the end, his integrity is based on the 
sounder Rousseauan footing of his citizenship. 
But in the end Vivian, like Adeline, has a fatal flaw at the foundation of his 
selfhood. Since his self-respect is built on his reputation, when he loses his 
reputation he loses his identity. His father-in-law and patron Lord Glistonbury 
makes a corrupt deal which Vivian feels powerless to reject, and the dishonour leads 
directly to the duel that ends his life. Like Adeline’s, Vivian’s destiny rests on other 
people, on the society that discusses and defines who he is. 
This brings us to the second key term of our discussion, “society.” Table 2.2 
shows the collocations for the word. Vivian, as we have seen, swirls ironically 
around the word “character”—it has the highest frequency of the word in the corpus. 
Adeline Mowbray’s keyword is “society,” of which it has the third-highest frequency 
after Wollstonecraft’s Maria; or the Wrongs of Woman and Edgeworth’s Leonora, 
two other tales of sexually free women battling against a prejudiced world. 
Strangely, many novels we might think of as social rather than psychological, such 
as Castle Rackrent, Old Mortality, and Annals of the Parish, have very low 
frequencies of the word “society” (0.10, 0.09 and 0.04 per 1000 words respectively). 
Table 2.2 helps us to explain this fact. In Vivian, as in the corpus as a whole, “society” 
has predominately positive collocations: “pleasure,” “company,” “happiness,” 
“consolation.” For the poor rebel Adeline, society is a bleak world of relentless 
opposition. It is not made up of “company” or “people,” as in Vivian, but of 
“opinions,” “prejudices” and “painful” “things.” In novels of rebellion, like Maria, 
Leonora and Adeline Mowbray, society solidifies, becomes a single forceful entity, 
crushing the will of the reprobate woman who refuses to obey. In a more social 
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novel, like Annals of the Parish, society is not a named entity, but a tissue of social 
relations permeating the novel as a whole. 
Table 2.2 





Frequency of “society” per 1000 words (2 d.p.) 
0.70 1.54 0.50 
Top 20 collocates (20-word window) 
company opinions world 
people mother pleasure 
son replied found 
felt few men 
hero happiness happiness 
justice prejudices therefore 
often act perhaps 
pleasure example general 
proof knew whose 
saw lived felt 
actually order rank 
agreeable wife woman 
cannot women family 
certain world nor 
college become company 
common found same 
conceal general find 
consolation nor manners 
continuing painful always 
country things many 
 
Vivian and Adeline experience society very differently, and their self-
deformation therefore comes about differently. Vivian is constantly rushed into 
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society, absorbing its prejudices unthinkingly. When he first visits Glistonbury 
Castle, he finds himself afflicted with the Rousseauan disease of amour-propre: “… 
now that he was a possessor of an estate in the vicinity, he considered Glistonbury 
Castle as a point of comparison, which made him dissatisfied with his own 
mansion.” (38) The moment he has property, is of age, and sees himself as a man of 
the world, he begins to compare and compete with the rich and powerful. Wanting 
to have a great castle instead of his comfortable modern house, he involves himself 
in expensive renovations which will later make him vulnerable to the financial 
temptations that destroy his honour. Society acts on him “insensibly” (80, 121, 126), 
robbing him of self-consciousness—we will see in §2.3 how subtly its conventional 
language penetrates his mind. 
Adeline’s combat with society could not be more different. She is acutely 
conscious of its opinions and prejudices, as are many of the other characters. The 
fact that “replied” is a top collocate of “society” indicates how thoroughly the 
characters debate these opinions. Everything is debatable in the novel. Johnson 
finds it “positively dizzying in the degree to which it invalidates all answers, 
conservative and radical.”55 It is this “dizzying” atmosphere of debate that presents 
the gravest challenge to Adeline’s moral will. If we cannot agree on the proper 
principles of action, how can I know which principles it is proper to enact? At one 
extreme is Adeline’s mother, who argues that rational principles should have no 
place in moral action: “Little did I think that you were so romantic as to see no 
difference between amusing one’s imagination with new theories and new systems, 
and acting upon them in defiance of common custom …” (40-41). Glenmurray offers 
a more moderate point of view. Rebels like he and Adeline ought to make a little pact 
                                                   
55 Johnson, Jane Austen, 22. 
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with the devil for the sake of their own happiness: even if their radical principles are 
“right in theory,” since 
the mass of society could never at once adopt them, they had better remain unacted 
upon, than that a few lonely individuals should expose themselves to certain distress, 
by making them the rules of their conduct. (150) 
The most contradictory solution of all is offered by Rachel Pemberton, the virtuous 
Quaker. At first she lashes Adeline for enacting her sincerely-held principles: 
Thou art one of the enlightened, as they call themselves—Thou art one of those wise 
in their own conceit, who, disregarding the customs of ages, and the dictates of 
experience, set up their own opinions against the hallowed institutions of men and 
the will of the Most High. (122) 
But later in the novel we find her arguing exactly the opposite point. Adeline is a 
hero, who “set … the virtuous example of acting up to the dictates of conscience.” 
(252) Adeline herself never forsakes her right to act exclusively according to her own 
conscience, only obeying society if her reason enjoins it. When her reason finally 
sanctions marriage, however, it leads her to marry the vicious Berrendale, and she 
is filled with a powerful self-loathing that seems to cause her premature death. 
Society is a swirling tempest of opinions and prejudices, and the poor lonely 
individual seems powerless to hold back the storm by any effort of will. 
This discussion gives us a new sense of the Bildungsroman. Its fundamental 
theme is the perfection of the will, or to use Romantic language, the formation of a 
character consistent with itself and with society. Table 2.3 demonstrates how central 
is the will in this corpus. The ultimate aim in these novels is “self-command,” which 
is both freedom—the sovereignty of the will—and conformity—the self-denial 
necessary to living in society. 
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Table 2.3 

























Vivian and Adeline Mowbray are central examples of the Romantic 
Bildungsroman, because they are profound explorations of this central theme of 
self-command. Adeline’s self-command is perfect, but her will is mired in the 
insuperable contradictions of society. Vivian’s nature is good, his aims good, his 
reason good, his friends good, but his will is undermined by society’s insidious 
temptations and his all-too-human weakness. Both novels bring the very ideal of 
self-command into disrepute. The ideal’s victims, Adeline and Vivian, are punished 
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far beyond their deserts. Its main spokespeople, the self-contradicting Rachel 
Pemberton and the ineffectual Mr Russell, are inadequate. The narrators blame 
Lady Mary and Mrs Mowbray for educating their children ill, but neither of these 
poor bereft widows is a villain either. The free will of Kant and Rousseau might be 
beautiful, even necessary. These novels suggest it is impossible. 
Thus Vivian and Adeline question the Bildungsroman’s core ideal. It remains 
to be seen how they alter its form. Novels are prose narratives, and we will see how 
Edgeworth and Opie deform their narratives by reworking the traditional marriage 
plot (§2.2), and deform the prose in which they write, by suggesting that the English 
language itself has been debased by society (§2.3). 
2.2 Deforming the Marriage Plot 
To portray the perfection of the will, Romantic novelists drew on the ancient 
conventions of the marriage plot. Marilyn Butler gives a vivid description of the 
typical narrative of the Romantic Bildungsroman: 
A young woman is to marry ... and the whole action impels her towards that marriage 
as apparently the fulfillment of her own desire, certainly the enactment of her social 
destiny. Wedding bells resolve all the difficulties raised in the plot, with a degree of 
completeness attainable not in the life of outward event but in the life of fantasy. And 
yet the long series of obstacles, trials, and perhaps terrors the heroine confronts on 
the road to marriage also suggests contrarily that permanent happiness is not so easily 
attained.56 
It isn’t always a young woman—in Hugh Trevor, The Old Manor House and 
Ormond it’s a young man. But Butler nonetheless makes some crucial observations. 
The “whole action” of the plot heads towards marriage. The whole action is a 
courtship, or series of courtships, which lead eventually to a final decision and a 
good marriage. The action raises contradictions that the wedding bells “resolve.” 
                                                   
56 Butler, Jane Austen and the War of Ideas, xxxii. 
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Self-deformation is a constant risk. Those “obstacles, trials and perhaps terrors” 
threaten to turn the Elizabeth Bennets and Wilhelm Meisters of the world into 
Adelines and Vivians. Numerous scholars, from Watt to Ruth Perry, have agreed 
with Butler that the marriage plot was the central trope of Romantic fiction, offering 
various sociological explanations for why this should be so.57  
Edgeworth and Opie deform the marriage plot. They compress and reorder 
their protagonists’ courtships, so there is no obvious marriage the whole action 
heads for. They indeed throw obstacles, trials and terrors in the way of their 
protagonists, but Vivian and Adeline cannot overcome them, and when the wedding 
bells ring, the contradictions remain unresolved. Adeline’s legal husband, 
Berrendale, is vicious, selfish, narcissistic, and a bigamist. Vivian’s wife, Lady Sarah, 
is a good person—“There cannot be a better woman!” (453)—but he neither loves 
nor listens to her, and she cannot arrest his decline. It is not merely the case that 
Vivian and Adeline are individual failures. These novels bring the very idea of a free, 
companionate, all-resolving marriage into question. 
In both novels, the traditional courtship plot is compressed into the first few 
chapters. In Vivian the compression is particularly extreme. In Chapter 1, Vivian 
returns home from Oxford with his new friend Russell. His mother, Lady Mary, is 
initially delighted with the “improvements” of his character (10-11), and there is an 
                                                   
57 Watt and Lawrence Stone argue that the rise of “companionate marriage” was an essential 
component of the rise of individualism, which is the novel’s core ideology: Lawrence Stone, The 
Family, Sex and Marriage, 1500-1800 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1977); Watt, Rise of the 
Novel, 135-51. Perry criticises Watt and Stone’s argument that love-marriage made women more free, 
but agrees it was the central trope of late eighteenth-century fiction: Ruth Perry, Novel Relations: 
The Transformation of Kinship in English Literature and Culture, 1748-1818 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), chap. 5, passim and esp. 193, n. 8. Armstrong and Moretti agree 
that the rise of individualism meant that novelists preferred to write about political issues in terms 
of the individual. These marriages are thus both “personal” or “sexual” contracts, and “social” ones: 
Armstrong, Desire and Domestic Fiction, chap. 1; Moretti, The Way of the World, 22. See above, n. 
39. 
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“accord of reason and will” between them (12). But then comes the first obstacle and 
the first contradiction: Vivian falls in love with Selina Sidney, his mother’s 
financially inadequate young friend, and his “romantic” will crosses his mother’s 
“worldly” one (27). After several arguments, and the intervention of the reasonable 
Mr Russell, a compromise is finally reached. If Vivian will travel for a year, and prove 
his constancy to Selina, his mother will yield her consent. Vivian travels. He returns. 
His constancy is proved—he appears to have overcome his congenital weakness of 
will—and by the end of Chapter 1, a whole year of dissension and strife and struggle 
for self-worth has ended. The happy characters wait only the wedding bells that will 
ring in their marital felicity. The entire action of Emma takes nine months, the time 
of Mrs Weston’s pregnancy. Here a similar history of perplexity and self-
examination takes place over 35 pacy octavo pages. Vivian’s engagement solves 
nothing. A year’s travel has not been enough to cure his infirmity of will, and his 
wedding is delayed and delayed by his political career and financial shenanigans, 
until in Chapter 5 he lets slip that he’s been flirting with a friend’s wife and Selina 
calls the whole thing off. He still has 10 more chapters and two more courtships to 
stumble through before tumbling into his early grave. 
Adeline’s courtship is not as compressed as Vivian’s, but she still enters the 
world, meets and “marries” her ideal spouse sometime before the end of Volume 1. 
By the end of Chapter 3, Adeline has completed her education. Despite her 
quixotism, she “unite[s] various and opposing excellencies” (17)—reason, 
imagination, usefulness—and she seems, like Vivian, ready to take on the world. 
That she accordingly does in Chapter 4, when she and her mother go to Bath. There 
she is first attracted to the rakish Colonel Mordaunt, who despite his cultivated mind 
is not a “marrying man” (21). Then she meets Frederic Glenmurray, “a man of 
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family, and of a small independent fortune” (20), a man of sublime virtue, and a 
man who quickly falls passionately in love with her. Like Lady Mary, Mrs Mowbray 
opposes this “romantic” match (40), though it is not romantic in the same way as 
Vivian’s. Glenmurray does not share Selina’s poverty and low station, as he points 
out to Mrs Mowbray in a letter (45-56). The problem is, of course, Adeline’s 
“romantic” resolution to live with him unmarried. When her new father-in-law, Sir 
Patrick O’Carrol, tries to rape her (60), she runs away and enacts this resolution, 
though Glenmurray hopes he can persuade her to marry down the track (62). It 
takes Emma an entire novel to reject Mr Elton and Frank Churchill, and to unite 
herself to Mr Knightley. It takes Adeline only nine chapters to reject the wrong man 
and choose the right, and the ensuing two volumes of the novel reveal how utterly 
her union with Glenmurray fails to secure her happiness. 
The compression of the marriage plot breaks the link between courtship and 
self-formation. In most canonical Romantic novels, to use Magee’s attractive phrase, 
courtship is an “instrument of growth.”58 The protagonist forms their self by 
meeting a series of flawed suitors, judging their moral failings, and finally choosing 
the suitor whose character is ideal. In Bage’s Hermsprong (1796), Caroline must 
choose between the mysterious outsider Hermsprong and the tubercular insider Sir 
Phillip Chestrum. Thomas Holcroft’s Anna St. Ives has to choose between the 
talented but depraved Coke Clifton and the poor but sturdy Frank Henley. Even 
when there is only one suitor, the protagonist must still form their self by working 
through the contradictions of their love. In Charlotte Smith’s The Old Manor House, 
Orlando and Monimia are certain of their love for one another, but if Orlando 
marries her, he will lose all chance of inheriting Rayland Hall (the house of the title), 
                                                   
58 William H. Magee, “Instrument of Growth: The Courtship and Marriage Plot in Jane Austen's 
Novels,” Journal of Narrative Technique 17, no. 2 (1987). 
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and will cross his parents’ wishes. He endlessly deprecates these “distracting 
contests between love and duty.”59 It is only after a long odyssey across England and 
revolutionary America that he can resolve this conflict, marrying Monimia and 
converting the Rayland Hall into a symbol of continuity and progress: “… without 
spoiling that look of venerable antiquity for which it was so remarkable, he collected 
within it every comfort and every elegance of modern life.”60 Edgeworth and Opie 
bring this whole “instrument of growth” idea into question. Vivian and Adeline 
choose the correct spouses. Vivian works through the conflicts of love and duty. 
Adeline rejects the morally inadequate suitors. But both of their courtships are so 
compressed that they become empty and artificial conventions. Emma’s nine-
month courtship might seem a compelling symbol of her moral growth when it is 
narrated in detail over three volumes. Reduced to a few chapters, like Vivian’s or 
Adeline’s, it would seem totally unreal. 
This time-compression continues throughout Vivian and Adeline Mowbray. 
Time flies by in these novels. Vivian travels for a year in Chapter 1. By Chapter 5, 
another year has passed. By Chapter 13, another year has elapsed, and he finds 
himself espousing Lady Sarah Glistonbury. Their marriage may not last quite nine 
months, but long enough for Lady Sarah to deliver a stillborn child in the novel’s 
penultimate paragraph (460). Adeline Mowbray has an even longer timespan. Time 
is vague before she leaves with Glenmurray, but by the beginning of Volume 2, they 
have spent some months on the continent and the pregnant Adeline is showing. 
Three chapters later, and three months have passed. Adeline miscarries, and 
Glenmurray dies. By the beginning of Volume 3, she has experienced two years of 
solitude and persecution. She finally accedes to Glenmurray’s dying wish and 
                                                   
59 Charlotte Turner Smith, The Old Manor House, 4 vols. (London: J. Bell, 1793), III.226. 
60 Ibid., IV.359. 
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marries Berrendale. By the next chapter, nearly three years have passed (their 
daughter, Editha, is two), and Berrendale departs for the West Indies, where he will 
contract another marriage and die in the tortures of remorse. Nearly another year 
elapses before the final chapter of the novel, and Adeline’s tearful death in the 
bosom of her estranged mother. 
It is not simply that a great quantity of time passes. Time itself has a peculiar 
quality in these novels. Moretti claims that time is pleasant in the Bildungsroman: 
“It is an elastic, elusive present, the exact opposite of the definitive ‘here and now’ 
of tragedy.”61 It is malleable: “… there is no irreversible moment in which everything, 
in one fell swoop, is decided.”62 In this elastic, elusive, reversible time, each moment 
is “a sort of ‘experiment’ performed with one’s self.”63 The protagonist tries out 
different ideas and behaviours, and doesn’t settle on a final course of action until the 
final decision, the marriage that completes their self-formation. This is 
Wordsworth’s “fair seed-time” (WW, 498). It is the “evolutive” time Foucault says is 
essential to modern self-discipline.64 It is the time Clarence Harvey experiences in 
Belinda, when he argues that the unthinking masses “must depend for their 
progress on the experiments that we brave volunteers, at whose expense they are to 
live and learn, are pleased to try.”65 
This is not Adeline’s time. At first she agrees with Clarence Harvey: “We are 
answerable to no one for our conduct; and we can make any experiments in morals 
that we choose.” (112) Almost immediately after saying this, however, she goes for a 
                                                   
61 Moretti, The Way of the World, 44. 
62 Ibid., 45. 
63 Ibid., 46. 
64 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 160. 
65 Maria Edgeworth, Belinda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 276. See James Chandler, 
“Edgeworth and the Lunar Enlightenment,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 45, no. 1 (2011), 100-01. 
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walk and finds it is not the case. Colonel Mordaunt appears, and having heard she 
is now Glenmurray’s mistress, treats her as a woman open to seduction: 
“And suppose I am not his wife,” cried Adeline, “is it then given to a wife only to be 
secure from being insulted by offers horrible to the delicacy, and wounding to the 
sensibility, like those which I have heard from you?” (115) 
Cruel time is irreversible. Even after she becomes Berrendale’s wife, she finds that 
the stain of her life with Glenmurray will not be erased. Berrendale finds it all too 
easy to persuade the world they are not really married, exposing Adeline to the 
insults of Mr Langley, an unscrupulous lawyer. Colonel Mordaunt, by this time a 
reformed libertine, cannot forget Adeline’s past behaviour, however much he 
admires her character: “… nor could he for a moment hesitate to prefer as a wife, 
Emma Douglas who had never erred, to Adeline who had.” (235) Time in Adeline 
Mowbray is not elastic, elusive and reversible. It is quite brutally the opposite. 
Vivian weaves subtler nets of time for himself. To some extent, indeed, he 
finds time reversible. When he elopes with Mrs Wharton to the continent, he finds 
he can return to London with his character unimpeached. It was all a stitch-up. Mr 
and Mrs Wharton had conspired to seduce him and elope so they could divorce. 
Russell writes Vivian a glowing letter to assure him he can reverse everything: 
“Return to your country, your friends, and yourself, Vivian! Your day is not yet over! 
Your sun is not yet set!” (167) Gender must play a role here: Colonel Mordaunt can 
also reverse his libertine past in a way that Adeline cannot. Russell and Lady Mary 
in fact spend most of the novel assuring Vivian that if he only shows a little spine, 
he can turn back the clock. Their advice is disproven by events, however. Selina 
assures him that she will never change her mind about their blasted engagement: 
“the possibility of my being united to you is past” (179). He makes mistakes from the 
first that haunt him to the end of the novel. He begins his quixotic home renovations 
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in Chapter 2, and when costs start to balloon, finds he cannot go back: “… but now, 
as lady Mary observed, it was too late to repent; and it was, at any rate, best to go on 
and finish it with spirit—since it was impossible (nobody knows why) to stop.” (54) 
The debts he incurs to pay for these renovations, and for his two contested elections, 
ultimately pressurise him to make the shameful political compromise that ends his 
life, as we saw in §2.1. Likewise, when he starts to spend time with the Glistonburys, 
rumours immediately begin to swirl that an engagement between him and Lady 
Sarah is imminent. Russell warns him that if he does not cease his visits and kill the 
rumours, it will become dishonourable for him not to marry the lady (83-84). Two 
years later, the rumours are still circulating, and when the crunch point comes, 
Vivian feels he no longer has a choice (367; see §2.3). For Adeline, the past is a 
sledgehammer, crushing her every time she tries to rise. For Vivian, it is a spider’s 
web, entangling and finally suffocating him. Perversely, though much more time 
passes in these novels than in Emma, much less changes. 
In a sick irony, Adeline winds up defending the irreversibility of experience. 
After being persecuted unfairly for her choices for years, her character maligned, her 
virtue misjudged, she decides that “society was right in making, and in seeing, no 
distinction between me and any other woman living in an unsanctioned connexion.” 
(239) She also claims divorce is wrong: 
To BEAR and FOREBEAR I believe to be the grand secret of happiness … therefore, 
whatever would enable married persons to separate on the slightest quarrel or disgust, 
would make it so much the less necessary for us to learn this important lesson … 
(217) 
We should not be able to reverse miserable decisions, because only if we live with 
our misery can we be happy. Adeline’s opinions are not necessarily Opie’s, of course. 
Numerous virtuous characters disagree with Adeline, and find that society was 
wrong to shun her: Savanna, Glenmurray, Emma Douglas, Mrs Beauclerc, Rachel 
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Pemberton, Dr Norberry. And for all Adeline’s high-minded talk about divorce, Opie 
is quite happy to use her power as a novelist to break up a marriage. Adeline, twice 
widowed (if we count Glenmurray), dies in the company of her four best friends: her 
mother (twice widowed), Rachel Pemberton and Savanna (each once a widow), and 
Dr Norberry (who has just come from burying his wife). It seems that, even without 
divorce, one only has to “BEAR and FORBEAR” for so long. 
Vivian and Adeline develop different senses of time in response to the 
irreversibility of experience. As we saw in the Old Manor House, in the classical 
Bildungsroman the protagonist discovers a way to shape time into a whole, weaving 
past, present and future together. Orlando inherits Rayland Hall, full of gothic 
features, heraldry and Civil War memorabilia. He makes tasteful renovations to 
bring it into the present, and hopes for children to secure its future. Vivian’s solution 
to the crueller time of his world is to forget past and future. Having found that “the 
present, the vulgar present” constantly intrudes to derail his life plans (327), he 
ceases to try and shape his life, and finally thinks “only of avoiding to give or to feel 
present pain” (385). Adeline develops a more tragic sense of time as ineluctable fate: 
“She fancied all the sufferings she underwent were trials which she was doomed to 
undergo, as punishments for the crime she had committed in leaving her mother 
and living with Glenmurray; and expiations also.” (185) Neither Vivian’s nor 
Adeline’s attempts to escape social time succeed. In other novels of the period, like 
Smith’s The Banished Man or Inchbald’s Nature and Art, rebellious characters end 
up forming utopian communities far from English society. Vivian tries to escape by 
relinquishing agency and going with the flow, but this only allows London’s 
tentacular corruption to drag him down faster. Adeline’s Keatsian sense of social 
time as a vale of soul-making seems to bring on the mysterious disease that kills her, 
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orphaning her daughter and killing her mother’s only child at the very moment 
when the reconciliation of her shattered family is finally possible. 
There is one respect in which Adeline and Vivian’s compressed courtships 
resemble those of their luckier contemporaries. Like Edward Waverley or Orlando 
Somerive, Vivian and Adeline are youths, and time turns them into adults. For 
Romantic writers, the distinguishing feature of youth was enthusiasm, that bugbear 
of eighteenth-century thought. Growing up is largely a matter of moderating one’s 
“Great Expectations” (1861) and accumulating “Lost Illusions” (1843). Figure 2.1 
shows the uses of “enthusiasm,” “enthusiast” and “enthusiastic” in seven novels 
from our corpus. In both Vivian and Adeline Mowbray, these words appear more 
often in the first half of the novel than the second, suggesting its slow decline 
through painful experience. The pattern in Vivian is particularly subtle. The six uses 
of “enthusias*”66 in the first quarter of the novel all refer to Vivian, fired up with his 
high ideals. But as the first year of his adult life draws to a close, he is already 
chastened. The next six uses of the term (mostly around the halfway mark) refer not 
to Vivian but to the vivacious Lady Julia Glistonbury, a far more impressive young 
person than our hero. She deforms herself in Adeline’s, rather than Vivian’s, way: 
It has been my misfortune, that the very desire I felt to improve myself; the best 
dispositions of my heart; the perception of what was excellent; the enthusiasm for all 
that was wise and good, from the circumstances in which I was placed, and from the 
errours of my education, operated against me—decided and accelerated my ruin—
Ruin?—Yes! (292) 
The final use of “enthusiasm” in the novel is tragic. When Vivian ponders the 
political deal that will wreck his honour, “the enthusiasm of his patriotism [is] 
appalled” (414)—but as we already know, he succumbs nonetheless. 
                                                   
66 The asterisk is a wild-card, indicating that any of the endings, “-m,” “-t” and “-tic” are acceptable. 
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Figure 2.1 
“Enthusias*” in seven Romantic novels 
 
Various characters are enthusiastic in Adeline Mowbray, but it is Adeline, 
the “enthusiast for virtue” (119), who incarnates the quality. She loses it at the end 
of Volume 2, the last time the narrator mentions her “enthusiasm” (162). The two 
final uses of the term refer not to her, but to the reformed Colonel Mordaunt, when 
he falls in love first with Adeline (216) and then with Emma Douglas (233). 
As Figure 2.1 shows, there are various patterns of enthusiasm in these 
Romantic novels. Enthusiasm runs all the way through Memoirs of Emma 
Courtney, a novel of self-deformation with a failed courtship plot. Waverley’s 
enthusiasm peaks a third of the way in, when he is deep in the highlands. Sense and 
Sensibility and The Old Manor House barely feature the term, despite the manifest 
enthusiasm of their central characters. In fact, the three Austen novels whose 
protagonists are arguably the most enthusiastic are also the three in which she never 
once uses the word: Northanger Abbey, Pride and Prejudice, and Emma. As Table 
2.4 shows, however, it is fair to say that declining enthusiasm is a paradigm in the 
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novels of our corpus. In the corpus of 56, there are 27 where “enthuias*” is more 
frequent in the first half of the book, and only 15 where it is more frequent in the 
second. There are 8 novels that do not use the word, and 6 where the first and second 
half are equal. 
Table 2.4 






Adeline Mowbray 12 6 
Vivian 10 5 
The Absentee 6 3 
Annals of the Parish 0 0 
Anna St. Ives 6 6 
The Antiquary 4 0 
The Ayreshire Legatees 2 1 
The Banished Man 2 5 
Belinda 7 15 
The Bride of Lammermoor 5 3 
Caleb Williams 6 4 
Camilla 7 7 
Castle Rackrent 0 0 
Cecilia 2 6 
Celestina 3 3 
Discipline 5 8 
Emma 0 0 
Emmeline 3 2 
Ennui 2 1 
The Entail 3 8 
Evelina 2 0 
Glenarvon 28 7 
Guy Mannering 6 3 
Harrington 32 7 
Henry 10 4 
Hermsprong 1 0 
The Heroine 2 3 
The Adventures of Hugh Trevor 8 3 
Ivanhoe 1 1 
Julia 8 3 







Lady Susan 0 0 
Leonora 8 4 
Man As He Is 1 2 
Mansfield Park 1 3 
Maria; Or, The Wrongs of 
Woman 
4 0 
Marriage 3 7 
Mary, A Fiction 1 4 
Memoirs of Emma Courtney 9 10 
The Heart of Mid-Lothian 13 3 
Nature and Art 1 0 
Northanger Abbey 0 0 
The Old Manor House 3 0 
Old Mortality 19 23 
Ormond 4 11 
Patronage 11 19 
Persuasion 1 3 
Pride and Prejudice 0 0 
The Provost 0 0 
Rob Roy 4 4 
Self-Control 14 4 
Sense and Sensibility 3 1 
A Simple Story 0 0 
Walsingham 12 7 
The Wanderer 14 6 
Waverley 15 8 
The Wild Irish Girl 12 12 
 
We saw in §2.1 how Vivian and Adeline Mowbray share a fundamental theme 
with the other novels of the corpus: the perfection of the will. Here we can see that 
they also share a structure: the protagonist enters the world, and is chastened by the 
process of trying to find a partner. Edgeworth and Opie twist and contort this plot, 
however, undermining the idea that courtship leads to successful self-formation. 
Vivian himself has little to say in favour of prevailing modes of courtship. If he 
cannot spend time with a lady without being suspected of being engaged to her, it 
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“must absolutely preclude one sex from obtaining any real knowledge of the 
characters and dispositions of the other” (86). Russell agrees. It should then be no 
surprise that in the end, not only Vivian misjudges the wisdom of marrying Lady 
Sarah, but so do Russell, Lady Mary and Sarah’s own sister Julia. The classic novel 
of courtship makes little sense when prevailing modes of courtship virtually forbid 
learning. And indeed, a cursory reflection on any of Austen’s novels reveals how 
extremely lucky the heroines are to know a thing about their future husbands. If 
Lydia Bennet had never eloped, if the Crofts had never leased Kellynch, if Knightley 
had not been her brother-in-law and neighbour, then Elizabeth, Anne and Emma 
would have had virtually no chance to see and decide for themselves. 
Edgeworth and Opie’s experiments with plot and time reveal new and 
disturbing potentialities of the Romantic Bildungsroman. It is simply not true to 
argue, as Foucault, Armstrong and Moretti do in their various ways, that Romantic 
writers had a complacent attitude towards the emerging ideas of self-discipline or 
socialisation. Even Edgeworth, who wrote many optimistic novels, could produce 
pessimistic books like Vivian, Castle Rackrent, Patronage and Helen (1834). 
Moreover, as Moretti himself observes, even the period’s most optimistic novels of 
self-formation are littered with minor characters who deform or destroy themselves. 
When he claims it is “most uncommon” for the protagonist to do so, however, we 
must demur.67 Vivian and Adeline’s fatal courtships are not the only ones, even in 
our little corpus of 56 relatively well-known novels of the period. Those critics we 
met in the Introduction, who claim that books like Vivian or Adeline Mowbray are 
somehow “secondary” or “negative,” must confront the fact that extremely 
compressed or extremely drawn-out courtships narrated in tragic time were a 
                                                   
67 Moretti, The Way of the World, 47. 
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feature of Romantic fiction from the start—unless we simply choose to ignore La 
Nouvelle Héloïse, Die Leiden des Jungen Werthers, Mary; A Fiction and Corinne. 
Novels like Vivian and Adeline Mowbray reveal how anxious and uncertain 
Romantic readers and writers were about courtship and self-formation. And they 
might just help us to explain those novels, like Cecilia, Belinda and Sense and 
Sensibility, whose supposedly neat-and-tidy marriage plots invariably strike readers 
as either disappointing or unreal.68 Edgeworth and Opie were not the only ones 
wondering what took place after THE END. As we will now see, their sense of the 
artificiality of the courtship plot is only one part of a broader phenomenon: their 
sense of the artificiality of all things in society, particularly its language. 
2.3 The Prison-House of Language 
The Bildungsroman does not only have a characteristic theme and story: self-
formation and the marriage plot. It has a characteristic language. Gary Kelly argues 
that Romantic writers were anxious about national identity, and used standard 
English as a way of presenting a standard British identity in their novels: 
… the fact that the ‘serious’ characters in such novels tend to ‘speak’ in the same 
standard English used by the narrator only reinforces the implicit argument of such 
novels: full selfhood is shown in standard written English; marginal or merely social 
selfhood is shown in non-standard or ‘deviant’ forms of English.69 
Part of self-formation is learning to speak properly. At the end of the 
Bildungsroman, the protagonist and the narrator should speak the same language. 
The protagonist will have acquired the correct self-definition, a way of describing 
themself which is true to their identity. In his brilliant stylometric study of Austen, 
John Burrows presents some compelling evidence that this is exactly what happens 
                                                   
68 Perry gives a nice analysis of the “ambivalence” of Cecilia in Perry, Novel Relations, 235. 
69 Gary Kelly, English Fiction of the Romantic Period, 1789-1830 (London: Longman, 1989), 17. 
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in her novels. He carefully tagged all the words in every Austen novel, marking 
whether they were uttered by the narrator or a particular character, and then 
performed statistical analysis on the most common words in her vocabulary—the 
sort of words we excluded from the analysis in §2.1. As Burrows has shown in his 
work on authorship attribution, each individual has a kind of stylistic fingerprint 
inscribed in these invisible common words.70 So, it turns out, do Austen’s 
characters. In a remarkable analysis of Emma, he shows how Emma’s distinctive 
speech and Knightley’s become more similar over the course of the novel (Figure 
2.2). He concludes that both Emma and Knightley end the novel “rather more ‘like 
themselves’ than they were at the beginning.”71  This is of course exactly what doesn’t 
happen to Vivian and Adeline. Both of them speak the “standard” English which 
Kelly claims was the vehicle of “full selfhood” in novels of the period. But both end 
up defining themselves inadequately, resulting in their tragic deaths. 
Figure 2.2 
The similarity of Emma and Knightley’s language72 
 
In Volume 3, Chapter 8, Adeline makes her final confession, her final attempt 
to define herself. She regrets her life, in which she “became in the eyes of the world 
                                                   
70 John Burrows, “‘Delta’: A Measure of Stylistic Difference and a Guide to Likely Authorship,” 
Literary and Linguistic Computing 17, no. 3 (2002). 
71 Burrows, 192. 
72 Ibid., 196.  
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an example of vice, when I believed myself the champion of virtue.” (238) With this 
realisation, she longs for her onrushing death. In a particularly heartrending 
moment, she decides it would be better for her daughter Editha if she died: 
… if I lived, I should be most probably a dangerous example to her; for I should be 
(on my death-bed I think I may be allowed to boast) respected and esteemed; while 
the society around me would forget my past errors, in the sincerity of my repentance. 
If then a strong temptation should assail my child, might she not yield to it from an 
idea that ‘one false step may be retrieved’, and cite her mother as an example of this 
truth? (238-39) 
As Meghan Hattaway observes, the problem with Adeline’s self-description is that it 
is incorrect. At no point in the novel is she an “example of vice” who corrupts those 
around her. She nurses Glenmurray during his final illness. She keeps Berrendale in 
control (his extra-marital affairs only occur when he is apart from her). She reforms 
the profligate Colonel Mordaunt of his bad habits.73 She saves Savanna and her son 
from penury (135-37). She keeps two pensioners in Richmond (266). She might 
think that her example corrupted Mary Warner, but Rachel Pemberton assures her 
it did not (ibid.). Indeed, the corruption runs the other way—at one point, Mary 
infects Adeline with smallpox (206).74 To cap it off, Adeline is an exemplary 
schoolmistress after Glenmurray dies, and her students’ “improvement [is] rapid in 
proportion to the love which they b[ear] her.” (165) Adeline may or may not be right 
to decide that marriage is an important institution. She is certainly wrong to define 
herself as an “example of vice” and long for her own death. 
Vivian also allows the “eyes of the world” to define him, precipitating his own 
death. We have already seen (§2.1) how after his marriage to Lady Sarah, he lets his 
self-worth rest on his reputation for integrity. This is what makes his final political 
                                                   
73 Meghan Burke Hattaway, “Amelia Opie's Fiction: Contagious and Recuperative Texts,” European 
Romantic Review 24, no. 5 (2013): 562-64.  
74 Ibid., 564-65.  
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deal such a calamity. Lord Glistonbury has been angling for a marquisate his entire 
political career. He has been in the opposition for some years, believing he could 
thus pressure the government to make terms with him. Vivian’s great eloquence for 
the opposition has made the government keener to bring Glistonbury’s men to their 
side, and they finally offer him the new rank on condition that Vivian come over as 
well. Vivian will be offered a lucrative ministerial place—something the impecunious 
young man could well afford. After a miserable internal struggle, Vivian succumbs. 
The next day in parliament, he is accosted by his quondam friend Wharton, who is 
enraged that Glistonbury misled him over the deal—something of which Vivian was 
unaware. Despite his true innocence, Vivian is stung by Wharton’s insults: 
“Public vice!—we all know where that would end, in these days—in public honours; 
but none of you would believe me, when I told you that public virtue would end—in 
private treachery!—” 
“That’s neat!—that’s strong!—faith, that’s home!” whispered someone. (434) 
Vivian agrees it’s “home,” and issues the challenge that will lodge a bullet in his 
chest. Like Adeline, he has allowed others to define who and what he is. The irony is 
that Wharton does not insult Vivian for what he has actually done—betray his 
principles—but for what he actually has not—betray Wharton in the back-room 
negotiations. As always in these novels, things are irreversible. Wharton also allows 
his honour to be defined by society, and will not forsake “the glorious name of 
COURAGE” he has obtained by “taking up the matter immediately in such a spirited 
way” (435-46). He refuses to parley, and the duel must go ahead. One of Vivian’s 
last acts before the duel is to “[execute] his will” (453). This is his first successful 
exertion of will—and like Adeline’s final exertion, it is a will to self-destruction. 
Vivian and Adeline’s self-deformations culminate in the same way. They 
allow others to define them according to the standard language of society, and these 
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definitions result in their premature deaths. Kelly argues that Romantic novels erect 
a barrier between the narrator’s proper language and the “sociolect,” “jargon” or 
“cant” of flawed minor characters.75 In Vivian and Adeline Mowbray, this barrier is 
constantly breaking down, and it becomes unclear whether there is any language 
that is not a debased sociolect. Edgeworth and Opie worry, much like Astell or 
Rousseau before them, that society as a whole is ensnared in customary language.    
In Adeline Mowbray, for example, Adeline, Glenmurray and Sir Patrick 
debate the meaning of the “life of honour:” 
“… the life of honour appears to me a very excellent name for the pure and 
honourable union which it is my wish to form; and—” 
“There; I told you so;” triumphantly interrupted Sir Patrick: “and I never was better 
pleased in life:—sweet creature! at once so lovely, so wise, and so liberal!” 
 “Sir,” cried Glenmurray, “this is a mistake: your life of honour and Miss Mowbray’s 
are as different as possible; you are talking of what you are grossly ignorant of.” 
 “Ignorant! I ignorant! Look you, Mr Glenmurray, do you pretend to tell me I know 
not what the life of honour is, when I have led it so many times with so many different 
women?” 
 “How, Sir!” replied Adeline: “many times? and with many different women? My life 
of honour can be led with one only.” 
 “Well, my dear soul, I only led it with one at a time.” (29) 
The same problem of self-expression occurs later in the novel, when Adeline is 
speaking with Mary about her situation with Glenmurray. Mary calls her a “kept 
lady.” Adeline finds this offensive, and asks Mary to define such a person: 
 “Why, a lady who lives with a man without being married to him, I take it; and that 
I take to be your case, an’t it, I pray?” 
Adeline blushed and was silent:—it certainly was her case. (117) 
                                                   
75 Kelly, English Fiction of the Romantic Period, 15. 
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Adeline tries another tack. She sees herself as Glenmurray’s “wife in the sight of 
God.” He would marry her in a moment if she chose. Mary cannot understand 
Adeline’s position: 
“Well, if master is inclined to make an honest woman of you, you had better take him 
at his word, I think.” 
“Gracious heaven!” cried Adeline, “what an expression!” (ibid.) 
Adeline is crushed by the weight of the dictionary: she does not get to choose the 
definitions of words. It is not the virtuous, educated, thoughtful Adeline whose 
language prevails. It is the simple-minded, ill-educated Mary whose words have 
power. When Adeline is working as a schoolmistress in a small village, all it takes is 
for Mary to claim she once was “kept,” and she loses her job (166). If Adeline wishes 
to express herself, she must use a language that has no good words for her. 
Vivian’s actions are also misconstrued according to a debased language, and 
he quite rightly resents the “Absurd, troublesome, ridiculous signs” by which society 
interprets his actions (85). But the novel also makes a subtler point about the 
conventionality of language. The language of society is constantly creeping into 
Vivian’s mind, robbing him of volition and self-consciousness. Mrs Wharton, for 
example, seduces him by appealing to his vanity: he is “the only man in the world 
to whom she would open her heart” (117). His mother tries to tell him to stop seeing 
her so often, but he has grown “ashamed of being kept in awe by his mamma,” and 
has come to resent “female government” (125). He thus rejects her “lecture” (130). 
Edgeworth fills the novel with such italicised phrases, or what Bakhtin calls 
“intonational quotation marks.”76 Quite often, Vivian will hear some italics, only for 
them to reappear later in his internal monologue. Lady Mary tells him he must 
                                                   
76 Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael 
Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 76. 
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marry for “connexion” (25), he hears the word whispered when the rumours about 
Lady Sarah first start to circulate (79), Lady Mary uses the word with him twice more 
(343-44), and it is no surprise to find it rushing to mind when Lord Glistonbury 
proposes that he marry Lady Sarah to protect their political alliance: 
Whilst his lordship had been speaking, palsy, compassion, gratitude, vanity, rivalship, 
honour, lady Mary Vivian’s conversation, lady Julia’s letter, then again the connexion, 
the earldom in future, the present triumph or disappointment about the election, the 
insolent intrusion of Mr. Lidhurst, the cruelty of abandoning a lady, who was in love 
with him, the dishonour, the impossibility of receding after certain reports; all these 
ideas, in rapid succession, pressed on Vivian’s mind: and his decision was in 
consequence of the feelings and of the embarrassment of the moment. (367) 
The narrator is unduly harsh to Vivian in this paragraph. These ideas in his mind 
are not “of the moment.” They have been weaving themselves slowly into his 
consciousness over the last 350 pages. 
Some characters, like Wharton and Selina, are clearly aware of language’s 
power. When Vivian fears that he is acting like a “villain,” Wharton convinces him 
the word is merely conventional: “… villains, though they were very common in the 
time of Clarissa Harlowe, and of all the tragedy queens of the last century, are not to 
be heard of these days” (143). Later, when Vivian writes a desperate letter to Selina, 
who has just terminated their engagement, she responds in muted tones: “In spite 
of the word adored, which has usually such power to confound female judgment, 
Selina perceived, that all he said was merely a repetition of his former arguments…” 
(181). Wharton manipulates conventional language. Selina is immune to it. When 
Vivian’s mother tries to persuade Vivian that language has such power, he refuses 
to accept it. All this talk of “Platonics,” she says, is dangerous: “Many a married 
woman, who would have started with horror at the idea of beginning an intrigue, 
has been drawn in to admit of a Platonic attachment.” (128) It is just an 
“expression,” replies Vivian, mere pages before his “Platonic attachment” to Mrs 
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Wharton turns sexual. “But you know language is conventional,” says Russell 
elsewhere (85). 
Ultimately, these supposedly realist novels are sceptical of reality. After 
Vivian’s death, the narrator tells us, “lady Sarah survived, but has never since 
appeared in what is called the WORLD.” (460) What does it mean to say she merely 
“survived”? What is the difference between the world and “what is called the 
WORLD”? Edgeworth implies answers to these questions, but it is not clear whether 
the story we have just read took place in the real or the artificial world, or whether 
Vivian was living or merely surviving in it. Adeline’s existence in the world is also 
complicated. The narrator says that when she reads Glenmurray’s radical essays on 
marriage, she is “conveyed by his bewitching pen from the world as it is, into a world 
as it ought to be.” (14) But as we have seen, no-one in the novel can agree how “is” 
and “ought” fit together. Adeline, we have seen, claims that her experience has only 
taught her that society is prejudiced. Prejudice, annoyingly, is both real and false at 
the same time, and if this is what the world is, it makes “is” and “ought” an 
intractable question. It is no wonder that when Adeline dies, her cheeks are 
“flushed” with “joy” (268). Her dying ecstasy suggests either that reality has driven 
her mad, or that the real reality lies beyond the grave. Like Frankenstein’s monster, 
neither she nor Vivian in the end can be sure whether they are man or monster. 
*** 
Scholars have become accustomed to a certain story of the realist novel in English, 
according to which, sometime in the late eighteenth century, novelists began to 
depict characters who grow and change. Vivian and Adeline Mowbray challenge 
this story. For these protagonists, time does not always bring change, and what 
change does occur is not always growth. These are only two of the many tragic novels 
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of self-deformation penned in the period, and their aesthetic achievement should 
make us doubt whether all the great novels of the period were Bildungsromane in 
the usual sense. 
 We can expand the traditional definition of the Bildungsroman to 
accommodate novels like Vivian and Adeline Mowbray. They share a fundamental 
theme with classical Bildungsromane: the perfection or imperfection of the will in 
society. They share a set of tropes: courtship, the end of youthful enthusiasm. They 
share a concern with language: the search for a common tongue that can unite the 
community. If we define the Bildungsroman according to these shared themes, 
tropes and concerns, then Vivian, Adeline Mowbray, and indeed The Bride of 
Lammermoor or The Memoirs of Emma Courtney will seem as central to prose 
fiction of the period as Emma or Waverley. Nonetheless, Vivian and Adeline 
Mowbray only invoke these shared themes, tropes and concerns in order to 
question the possibility of self-formation in modern society. They suggest that the 
classical Bildungsroman as we usually understand it is an impossible ideal. Seen 
this way, their contortions and contradictions, Vivian’s shallowness and Adeline’s 
self-loathing, are not aesthetic flaws but artistic triumphs. These are difficult books 
because they succeed in posing difficult questions. 
Vivian and Adeline Mowbray raise anxieties that go back to Locke and Astell, 
with their fear of jargon and the dead weight of custom. These anxieties continued 
to plague the Romantic generations. Several Romantic poets felt they had found a 
way out, by discovering a natural, poetic language that was closer to the truth. At 
one moment, it seems that Vivian is tantalisingly close to this poetical solution. 
When he first moves to London, he is caught by his new pals with pen, ink, 
parchment—and the draft of a sonnet to Selina Sidney: 
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“Poetry!” cried Wharton, carelessly looking at what he had been writing, “Poetry, I 
protest!—Aye, I know this poor fellow’s in love; and every man who is in love is a 
poet, ‘with a woeful ditty to his mistress’s eyebrow’.  Pray, what colour may Miss 
Sidney’s eyebrows be? …” (92) 
To protect Vivian from the dangerous forces of love and nature, Wharton gives him 
an unconventional suit of armour: 
“… Look! Here is an impenetrable shield!” added he, wrapping round him a thick 
printed copy of an act of parliament. “Come, Vivian, you must come along with us 
to the house, 
 ‘And, mix’d with men, a man you must appear.’” (ibid.) 
The sonnet is a powerful symbol for everything Vivian and Adeline fail to achieve. A 
sonnet is integral. The wills of Vivian and Adeline are hopelessly imperfect and 
contradictory. A sonnet imposes a 14-line form on experience, giving it order and 
meaning. Vivian and Adeline fail to form their lives into a proper courtship and 
marriage—the “form” of marriage is anyway “contemptible,” cries Adeline (28). A 
sonnet is poetry, the purest and most beautiful kind of language. Neither Vivian nor 
Adeline can find such a language. Instead, they find only the rough paper and black 
ink of an act of parliament, words imposed from above by a society that does not 
love them. If only things were so simple. As we will shortly discover, for some 
Romantic poets, sonnets were bastards, or they had no form at all. Perhaps Vivian 





POETRY: THE SELF-ABNEGATING 
SONNETS OF CHARLOTTE SMITH 
AND JOHN CLARE 
 
The partial Muse, has from my earliest hours  
 Smiled on the rugged path I’m doom’d to tread,  
And still with sportive hand has snatch’d wild flowers,  
 To weave fantastic garlands for my head:  
But far, far happier is the lot of those  
 Who never learn’d her dear delusive art;  
Which, while it decks the head with many a rose,  
 Reserves the thorn, to fester in the heart.  
For still she bids soft Pity’s melting eye  
 Stream o’er the ills she knows not to remove,  
Points every pang, and deepens every sigh  
 Of mourning friendship, or unhappy love.  
Ah! then, how dear the Muse’s favours cost,  
If those paint sorrow best—who feel it most!1 
HUS BEGINS Charlotte Smith’s Elegiac Sonnets, and Other Essays (1784), 
the book that kicked off the Romantic sonnet revival. The poem was a 
manifesto,2 announcing a fresh approach to an old and often reviled form 
of lyric poetry. Samuel Johnson had defined the “sonnet” as a type of poetry “not 
very suitable to the English language,” and the “sonnetteer” as “A small poet, in 
contempt.”3 But this sonneteer claimed to be no small poet. Her sonnets were the 
                                                   
1 Charlotte Smith, “Sonnet I,” in Smith, The Poems, 13. All references to Smith’s poetry will be to this 
edition, abbreviated CSP, indicated by sonnet and line numbers. 
2 See Paula Backscheider, Eighteenth-Century Women Poets and Their Poetry: Inventing Agency, 
Inventing Genre (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 327. 
3 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, 2 vols. (London: Knapton et al, 1755), II. 
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gift of the “Muse,” who had been especially “partial” to her since her birth, dooming 
her to a “rugged path” of poetic composition few others are forced to tread. Smith 
underscored her special identity as a great poet in the final line of her manifesto-
sonnet, quoting the master-poet of eighteenth-century Britain, Alexander Pope. 
This was no arrogant ambition. Elegiac Sonnets opened the floodgates, and by the 
end of the 1790s, the bookshops and magazines of Britain were drowning in a sea of 
elegiac poems, 14 lines in length. Even Samuel Taylor Coleridge, a keen imitator of 
Smith, was provoked to pen weary parodies of the sonnets she had inspired: 
   Mine eye perus’d  
With tearful vacancy the dampy grass,  
Which wept and glitter’d in the paly ray:  
And I did pause me on my lonely way,  
And mused me on those wretched ones, who pass  
O’er the black heath of SORROW. (CW, XVI.356, ll. 4-9) 
On closer inspection, however, Smith’s poem is a strange manifesto. Despite 
claiming to be a great poet, she also seems to find poetry strange and alien. She 
claims that her poetry is the expression of her own emotions: she can “paint sorrow” 
because she feels it. These “elegiac” sonnets are confessions of her “every pang,” 
“mourning friendship” and “unhappy love.” But on the other hand, poetry is the 
“Muse,” whom Smith portrays as capricious and sadistic. It is “delusive” and 
“sportive,” evading Smith’s attempts to control or understand it, and it appears to 
have cruel motives, heightening all Smith’s woes and bathing her in tears rather than 
solving her problems. The “fantastic garlands” of the Muse may seem beautiful, but 
they are really a crown of thorns, bound about Smith’s head without her will and 
pouring blood down her unhappy face. Smith has walked a rugged path to form 
herself into a poet. This has not given her a coherent sense of self, but instead the 
contradictory sense that however much she may be a poet, poetry and she are foes. 
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In the eighth edition, she added a frontispiece. Under her engraved portrait are the 
lines: 
Oh! Time has Changed me since you saw me last, 
And heavy Hours with Time’s deforming Hand, 
Have written strange Defeatures on my Face.4 
Time may have made her a poet. It may have formed her experiences into beautiful 
sonnets. But she herself has only accumulated “Defeatures,” deformities of 
emptiness. 
Smith raises difficult questions about how the form of the sonnet relates to 
the form of her self. Some 30 years later, another poet, inspired by her example and 
penning sonnets of his own, would raise similar questions in a strikingly different 
way. John Clare claimed it was reading Smith that first made him think of publishing 
verse.5 In 638 sonnets of startling originality, he would break apart and reassemble 
this venerable genre of lyric poetry in an attempt to represent a distinctive kind of 
subjectivity. As in Smith’s, in Clare’s sonnets there is often a complicated 
relationship between the poet and the form of their poem: 
Yon hall how fine that glorious long has been 
Gilt wi’ the spangles of declining day ġ
That darkens as the suns beams leave the scene ġ
Who like my sonnet slinks abrupt away6 
Clare’s sonnet is disobedient, fleeing the scene before he is done with it. If he was 
trying to form himself through experience, poetry has frustrated his aim. As we will 
                                                   
4 Charlotte Smith, Elegiac Sonnets, and Other Poems. 8th ed. 2 vols. (London: Cadell and Davies, 
1797), II.[frontispiece]. 
5 Jonathan Bate, John Clare: A Biography (London: Picador, 2003), 119. 
6 John Clare, The Early Poems of John Clare, 1804-1822, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 
i.118, ll. 11-14. All other references will be to the Oxford editions of Clare’s poetry, marked by volume 
and page numbers: EP for the Early Poems, MP for The Poems of the Middle Period, 1822-1837, 5 
vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996-2003), and LP for The Later Poems, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984). I lightly regularise Clare’s punctuation from time to time for readability. This is a 
controversial matter: see Bate, 563-76. 
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see, this is not the only sonnet of Clare’s that ends abruptly, apparently contradicting 
the poet’s intention. In other sonnets, he does not attempt to form himself at all, but 
instead aims to be formless, to dissolve his self into the chaos of reality: 
The cowboys dog will bite his hide and lie 
For days and keep the herd from going by 
The crust of bread upon his nose is hid 
To cuck it up and catch it when he’s bid (MP V.385, ll. 1-4) 
In his later couplet-sonnets like this one, Clare would largely eliminate self-
reference, and denude the structure of his poems by replacing the complex rhyme-
schemes of traditional sonnets with simple rhyming couplets. 
Literary historians now give Clare and Smith prominent roles in the story of 
the Romantic sonnet, but they still tend to put Wordsworth at the centre, and Smith 
and Clare on the margins. Some scholars, like Stuart Curran and Jacqueline Labbe, 
argue that Smith’s sonnets are fully and typically Romantic, exemplifying central 
trends in the poetry of the era. But the most influential recent historians of the 
Romantic and nineteenth-century sonnet, Jenny Wagner and Joseph Phelan, both 
argue that Smith’s “private” and “feminine” sonnets of “sensibility” are best 
understood as precursors to Wordsworth’s “public” and “masculine” sonnets of 
Romanticism.7 Paula Backscheider has presented powerful arguments that Smith’s 
sonnets do in fact have a “public” and political character,8 but there are deeper 
reasons to question Wagner and Phelan’s arguments. Both are slaves to the self-
formation idea. Wordsworth was the greater and more typical poet, they suggest, 
because his sonnets are well-formed and self-consistent. Each records a precious 
moment of self-formation, in which the “unitary” form of the sonnet exactly 
                                                   
7 Jennifer Ann Wagner, A Moment's Monument: Revisionary Poetics and the Nineteenth-Century 
English Sonnet (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996); J. P. Phelan, The Nineteenth-
Century Sonnet (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2005). 
8 Backscheider, Eighteenth-Century Women Poets,  320-25. 
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replicates the “unitary” form of Wordsworth’s self.9 Smith might have revived the 
sonnet, and filled it with the high feeling and natural description we have come to 
associate with Romantic poetry, but her sonnets are studies in self-deformation. She 
uses them to describe irresolvable emotional contradictions, and uses strange and 
contradictory poetic forms. 
Self-formation also thrusts Clare to the margins of the story. It is true that 
several scholars argue that Clare’s sonnets are central examples of the form in the 
Romantic period.10 But others more-or-less exclude him with a simple argument: 
“Clare’s later sonnets are, in some senses, not real sonnets at all.”11 The problem is 
their lack of structure. They lack “reflexive moments” where they tie themselves 
together.12 Without a sense of unfolding structure, Clare cannot portray the 
evolution of poetic consciousness in his sonnets. Clare’s champions typically 
respond to arguments like this in two ways. They either claim that the sonnets are 
structured, for instance by narrative,13 or they implicitly accept Phelan’s argument, 
and praise the very formlessness of the poems.14 William Kerrigan argues that 
Wordsworth’s great sonnets are about “building” a “home” in the world as well as in 
the “homely, rooted” form of the sonnet itself.15 Neither Smith nor Clare can build a 
                                                   
9 Wagner, Moment’s Monument, 13-16. Phelan says it was Wordsworth’s “masculine self-discipline” 
that allowed him to surpass earlier sonneteers like Smith: Phelan, Nineteenth-Century Sonnet, 12.  
10 See Michael O’Neill, “The Romantic Sonnet,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Sonnet, ed. A. 
D. Cousins and Peter Howarth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 186-87; Sara Lodge, 
“Contested Bounds: John Clare, John Keats, and the Sonnet,” Studies in Romanticism 51, no. 4 
(2012): 534-35; Stephanie Kuduk Weiner, Clare’s Lyric: John Clare and Three Modern Poets 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 51-56. His sonnets also appear in Paula R. Feldman and 
Daniel Robinson, eds., A Century of Sonnets: The Romantic-Era Revival (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999). 
11 Phelan, 41. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See Ben Hickman, “John Clare and the End of Description,” John Clare Society Journal  (2011). 
14 Eric Robinson, David Powell and P.M.S. Dawson, “Introduction,” in John Clare, Northborough 
Sonnets (Ashington and Manchester: Mid Northumberland Arts Group and Carcanet, 1995), ix. 
15 John Kerrigan, “Wordsworth and the Sonnet: Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” Essays in Criticism 
35, no. 1 (1985): 57. It should be noted that nowhere does Kerrigan make a claim like Wagner or 
Phelan’s, that Wordsworthian and Romantic sonnets are one and the same. 
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home in the sonnet. Smith’s sonnets are too rickety and misshapen to protect her 
from bad weather, and many of Clare’s sonnets lack walls, roof and chimney. 
These criticisms go back to the Romantic period itself. Smith was often 
accused of an Adeline-like excess of subjectivity. Anna Barbauld found that “Her 
later publications would have been more pleasing, if the author, in the exertions of 
fancy, could have forgotten herself …”16 Her endless inner torment could be tiring. 
By contrast, Clare’s poems were sometimes derided for their Vivian-like lack of 
subjectivity. His publisher, John Taylor, once passed on a friendly piece of criticism 
from John Keats: 
… [Keats] wishes to say to you that your Images from Nature are too much 
introduced without being called for by a particular Sentiment. … he feels as if the 
Description overlaid and stifled that which ought to be the prevailing Idea.17 
Keats only ever had the chance to read Clare’s earlier, and comparatively more 
conventional poems. One can only imagine how he might have responded to the 
austere and experimental poems Clare wrote in the late 1820s and early ’30s. 
The sonnet is only one genre of lyric poetry, but Smith’s and Clare’s sonnets 
raise issues which go to the heart of Romantic poetry in general. Like the Romantic 
novel, the Romantic lyric has long been defined in terms of self-formation. In his 
influential study of Poetic Form and British Romanticism (1986), Curran argues 
that the central poem in British Romanticism is The Prelude, a composite text which 
mixes all the major poetic genres of the period. This “mixture of genres” is not 
merely a matter of style; it is the means by which Wordsworth represents “a 
dialectical progression towards a oneness of personality.”18 Percy Shelley’s “Alastor” 
                                                   
16 Anna Letitia Barbauld, “Mrs Charlotte Smith,” in The British Novelists, ed. Anna Letitia Barbauld 
(London: Rivington et al, 1810), XXXVI.viii. 
17 Quoted in Bate, John Clare, 189. 
18 Curran, Poetic Form, 190. 
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(1816), meanwhile, is the crucial romance of the period because it demonstrates that 
“the [Romantic] quest is always for a completed self.”19 These poems have a coherent 
literary form which expresses a coherent form of selfhood. This “oneness of 
personality” or “completed self” is different from the kind of self that characters 
strive for in the Bildungsroman. Vivian and Adeline tried to develop a social self 
with a place in a social world: to find a house, an income, a profession, a partner and 
a role. The self portrayed in Romantic poetry is typically more abstract, general and 
philosophical, even when it raises social issues. In his influential description of the 
“Greater Romantic Lyric,” M.H. Abrams argues that the Romantic lyric is typically 
a “meditation on a landscape.”20 The poet gazes on nature, not society, and 
recognises deep facts about their own human nature, rather than about their social 
role. This generalisation may or may not be true for Romantic poetry as a whole, but 
it is accurate as regards Smith and Clare’s sonnets. Smith’s “painful consciousness” 
(XC, l. 3) and Clare’s absent consciousness typically appear in natural or abstract 
settings, and typically raise general philosophical problems of existence and 
cognition, rather than the more practical problems of money and happiness raised 
by Vivian and Adeline. 
Smith and Clare raise profound questions about the nature of consciousness 
in their sonnets of self-deformation. Their approaches to the sonnet are often starkly 
opposed, but there are also striking similarities between them. To study their 
sonnets precisely and comprehensively, I have prepared a database of all 93 of 
Smith’s sonnets and all 638 of Clare’s. As a point of comparison, I have also included 
Wordsworth’s 514 sonnets. In §3.1 I use this database to compare Smith, Clare and 
                                                   
19 Ibid., 148. 
20 M.H. Abrams, “Stucture and Style in the Greater Romantic Lyric,” in Romanticism and 
Consciousness, ed. Harold Bloom (New York: Norton, 1970), 223.  
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Wordsworth’s use of rhyme and metre. Unlike Wordsworth, both Smith and Clare 
had a taste for loose, experimental rhyme-schemes, and tended to end their sonnets 
abruptly. Smith did this to give her poems a harsh and cruel sense of structure, 
treating the form of the sonnet like a prison.21 Clare, however, used his flexible 
rhyme and metre to strip his sonnets of any sense of structure at all. In §3.2, I 
consider a broader structuring principle of their sonnets: sequencing. Smith strung 
nearly all her sonnets into a continuous sequence of woeful poems, while Clare 
avoided sequences of more than a few sonnets in length. Smith carefully ordered her 
sonnets to construct a vast history of her own self-deformation, while Clare’s short 
sequences avoid giving the sense of an unfolding self-narrative. In §3.3 I turn to the 
texture of Smith and Clare’s language. Observing the frequency of basic words like 
“and,” “this” and “that” reveals deep patterns in the way Smith, Clare and 
Wordsworth describe the natural world in their sonnets. Smith, like Wordsworth, 
tends to describe particular experiences in the history of her own self (though many 
of these experiences are fabricated), while Clare structures his poems to throw the 
emphasis on objective facts. But both Smith and Clare share a sense of nature’s 
objectivity, which is linked to their sense of the self as small and impotent. Finally, 
in §3.4, I turn to the most crucial words of self-exploration: the first person 
pronouns. Surprising patterns emerge in the use of words like “I,” “we” and “my,” 
showing that although Smith, Clare and Wordsworth are all equally interested in the 
heart, they highlight strikingly different aspects of it when they write. They take 
different attitudes to the self. Smith longs to be rid of her malformed identity, Clare 
finds it easy and sweet to shuffle off his selfhood, and Wordsworth revels in his 
                                                   
21 Stokes puts this nicely: “…the very enunciation of feeling in [her] poetry seems to bind and 
imprison the self.” Christopher Stokes, “Lorn Subjects: Haunting, Fracture and Ascesis in Charlotte 
Smith’s Elegiac Sonnets,” Women’s Writing 16, no. 1 (2009): 146. 
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mind’s great power. But all three use the sonnet to explore the complexities of the 
mind’s experience of nature. 
3.1 Enclosing the Self (1): Rhyme and Metre 
In the Romantic period, there was heated debate about which kind of sonnet was 
superior: the Shakespearean or the Petrarchan.22 The perception was that the 
“illegitimate” Shakespearean sonnet was easier to write and therefore freer than the 
“legitimate” Petrarchan sonnet, which requires the poet to find more rhymes for 
each word. Not only this, but the Shakespearean sonnet was felt to be an English 
invention, cut off from the wider European tradition. Smith took on both these 
claims in the original preface to Elegiac Sonnets. Her sonnets all have either 
Shakespearean or experimental rhyme-schemes. They may have “no very just claim” 
to the title of sonnet, but “they consist of fourteen lines,” and anyway “the legitimate 
sonnet is ill-calculated for our language.” (CSP, 3) Even at this early stage, her 
defence of her poems was tinged with uncertainty. Later in life, she would express a 
deeper alienation from the form of poetry that made her name: “I am tired of 
Sonnets, & mine you know are almost all illegitimate and must go to the foundling 
Hospital.”23 This was more than a joke. As we have already seen, one of the 
paradoxes of Smith’s poems is the way they express her alienation from poetry itself. 
Readers agreed with Smith that her sonnets were rule-breakers simply by 
being Shakespearean. For some, like the radical John Thelwall, this was a good 
thing: 
 … they are condemned, you know, by the critics as illegitimate: though, according 
to my opinion, they owe much of their beauty to the glorious crime—if such it be to 
                                                   
22 See Daniel Robinson, “Reviving the Sonnet: Women Romantic Poets and the Sonnet Claim,” 
European Romantic Review 6, no. 1 (1995); Lodge, “Contested Bounds,” 533-35. 
23 To Sarah Rose, 26 April 1806, in The Collected Letters, ed. Judith Phillips Stanton (Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), 731. 
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burst the unnatural fetters of arbitrary authority, and exert the free-born energies of 
the soul.24 
In an earlier essay, he had claimed that the freedom of Smith’s form made her the 
greatest sonneteer in the language, “and I certainly do not mean to except the 
sonnets of Milton.”25 For Thelwall, Smith’s free, English rhymes were an expression 
of political liberty. These sonnets were “free-born” rather than “illegitimate” 
offspring. Others attacked Smith’s laxity. Two years after the first edition of Elegiac 
Sonnets, Henry Kirk White cried out that “Little elegies, consisting of [three] stanzas 
and a couplet, are no more Sonnets than they are Epic-poems. The sonnet partakes 
of a particular and arbitrary construction …”26 In the preface to her own brilliant 
Original Sonnets (1799), Anna Seward quoted White’s argument in full, and claimed 
full Petrarchan legitimacy for her own properly-rhyming creations.27 Her opening 
sonnet parodies Smith’s great manifesto. The muse decks the poet with “the 
thornless rose,” the poet walks “gay paths,” and the “orient lamp” of “IMAGINATION” 
can “with recompensing ray, | Shine on the Mind, and pierce its gathering gloom, | 
With all the fires of intellectual Day!”28 Seward paradoxically claims that adhering 
to old rules makes her sonnets Original, and feels that these rules give poetry the 
power to heal rather than aggravate her wounds. This is precisely what Wordsworth 
would claim in his own “Prefatory Sonnet” of 1807, the first of a great series of 
Petrarchan sonnets:29 “In truth the prison, unto which we doom | Ourselves, no 
                                                   
24 John Thelwall, The Peripatetic; or, Sketches of the Heart, of Nature and Society; in a Series of 
Politico-Sentimental Journals, in Verse and Prose, of the Eccentric Excursions of Sylvanus 
Theophrastus; Supposed to Be Written by Himself, 3 vols. (London: Thelwall, 1793), I.123. 
25 “An Essay on the English Sonnet; Illustrated by a Comparison between the Sonnets of Milton and 
Those of Charlotte Smith,” Universal Magazine 91 (1792): 409. 
26 Henry Kirk White, “Letter,” Gentleman's Magazine 56 (Supplement) (1786): 1110. 
27 Anna Seward, Original Sonnets on Various Subjects; and Odes Paraphrased from Horace 
(London: Sael, 1799), iv-v. 
28 Ibid., 3. 
29 This sonnet later became the first sonnet in Part 1 of his Miscellaneous Sonnets, and had the title 
removed. Hence it is now usually known by its first line, “Nuns fret not at their convent’s narrow 
room.” 
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prison is …” (WW, 199). White, Seward and Wordsworth all felt at home in the 
legitimate sonnet. Smith wanted to break free, but could not feel fully at home even 
in her customised, illegitimate creations. 
Clare, as Lodge argues, was thoroughly of Smith’s mind when it came to the 
sonnet and its rules.30 He was inspired by her to write his first sonnets.31 Like her 
and like Thelwall, he found the old rules of the Petrachan sonnet repressive: if only 
“those cursd critics could be shovd out of the fashion wi their rule & compass & cease 
from making readers believe a Sonnet cannot be a Sonnet unless it be precisly 14 
lines.”32 As Figure 3.1 shows, he was even more of a rule-breaker than Smith: most 
of his sonnets are either couplet-sonnets or experimental hybrids.33 But like Smith, 
if he did write a traditional sonnet, then it was nearly always Shakespearean. The 
graph classes all “other” sonnets together, but they are extremely various. They may 
have as few as four rhyme-sounds (abaabaccacacdd), or as many as nine 
(ababcdedcfghih). Even Wordsworth’s stricter Petrarchan sonnets can range from 
four (abbaabbaccdada) to six (abbaabbacdfdfc). Thus it is also useful to consider 
the poets’ average number of rhyme-sounds (Table 3.1). If we agree with the 
Romantics that you can measure the freedom of a sonnet by the number of its 
rhymes, then Smith and Clare are considerably “freer” than Wordsworth. 
                                                   
30 Lodge,  537. 
31 John Clare, Autobiographical Writings (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 
103. 
32 To James Augustus Hessey, 4 July 1820, in The Letters of John Clare (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1985), 80. 
33 For clarity: I have classed sonnets as “couplet” sonnets only if they consist of seven couplets. I have 
classed them as “Shakespearean” only if they consist of three alternately-rhyming quatrains (abab) 
and end in a couplet. I have classed them as “Petrarchan” only if the octet consists of two envelope-
rhymed quatrains (abba abba) containing no more than three rhyme-sounds (so, following Seward’s 
dicta and Wordsworth’s practice, abba acca, abba bccb and abba cbbc are also acceptable Petrarchan 
octets). I have allowed the re-use of rhyme-sounds, so aaaabbccddeeff is a good couplet-sonnet 
despite the repetition of the a-rhyme, and abab cbcb dede bb is a good Shakespearean one despite 
the repetition of the b-rhyme. 




The Rhyme-Schemes of Clare, Smith and Wordsworth 
 
Clare, n=638; Smith, n=83; Wordsworth, n=514.34 
Table 3.1 
Mean No. of Rhyme-Sounds (2 d.p.) 
Clare Smith Wordsworth 
6.22 6.34 5.10 
 
This debate is crucial to our understanding of selfhood in Smith and Clare’s 
sonnets, because the rhyme-scheme of the sonnet traditionally represents a 
structure of thought. The sonnet raises intellectual or emotional tensions in its 
opening lines, which are resolved after the volta, which can be placed either between 
octet and sestet of a Petrarchan sonnet or in the final couplet of a Shakespearean 
one. According to Wagner, Wordsworth avoided the volta because it smacked of 
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POETRY: SMITH’S AND CLARE’S SELF-ABNEGATING SONNETS 
120 
“self-division.”35 Using extensive enjambment, he de-emphasised the divisions 
implied by the Petrarchan rhyme-scheme, and “offer[ed] the possibility of a unitary 
model that allows for an opposition or turn but subordinates that opposition to a 
final assertion of completeness.”36 For Wordsworth, the interleaved rhymes of the 
sonnet represent the integrity of the self. When the final line ends, both the poem 
and the self ring with completion. This was the effect that Felicia Hemans aimed for 
in her Wordsworthian devotional sonnets, such as “Mountain Sanctuaries:” 
           No minsters rise 
Like them in pure communion with the skies, 
Vast, silent, open unto night and day; 
 So might the o’erburden’d Son of Man have felt, 
 When, turning where inviolate stillness dwelt, 
He sought high mountains, there apart to pray.37 
 Needless to say, this is not how all Romantic sonnets end. Wagner herself 
argues that Shelley saw “closure as form’s most tyrannical element,” and aimed for 
a radical “open-endedness.”38 Keats meanwhile aimed not for “closure and 
repetition” in his sonnets, but “a principle of continuity.”39 When the final rhyme 
chimes, it might symbolise an incomplete, future-oriented self:  
    O Wind, 
If Winter comes, can Spring be far behind? (SW, 579, ll. 69-70) 
 He star’d at the Pacific—and all his men 
Look’d at each other with a wild surmise— 
 Silent, upon a peak in Darien.40 
Or the completion of the sonnet might represent the eradication of the lonely self 
altogether: 
                                                   
35 Wagner, Moment’s Monument, 13. 
36 Ibid., 14. 
37 Felicia Hemans, Works of Mrs Hemans, with a Memoir by Her Sister, 7 vols. (Edinburgh: 
Blackwood, 1839), VII.247. 
38 Wagner, Moment’s Monument, 64. 
39 Ibid., 83. 
40 John Keats, The Poetical Works (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), 45.  
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   … boundless and bare, 
The lone and level sands stretch far away. (SW, 550, ll. 13-14) 
   —then on the shore 
Of the wide world I stand alone, and think  
Till Love and Fame to nothingness do sink.41 
The rhyme-scheme encloses the sonnet, defining its beginning and end. But 
Keats and Shelley demonstrate how right Barbara Herrnstein Smith is, when she 
argues that the completion of a poem may not necessarily betoken the completion 
of the self.42 The poem may end definitively, even though the poet has not achieved 
a complete and integrated sense of identity. Herrnstein Smith also makes a second, 
subtler point: “A poem may be gently though firmly closed, or slammed shut, locked, 
and bolted.”43 Not only are poetic closure and psychological closure different, but 
poetic closure comes in a great variety of forms. This raises two questions about 
Smith and Clare’s sonnets: (1) How do they close their sonnets? (2) What is the 
relationship between this closure and the speaker’s self-deformation? 
Smith felt that the last line of a sonnet should be “forcible and correct.”44 
Contemporary readers certainly found that Smith’s poems ended forcibly. In the 
preface to her Sappho and Phaon: In a Series of Legitimate Sonnets (1796), Mary 
Robinson argued that 
the modern [i.e. Shakespearean] sonnet, concluding with two lines, winding up the 
sentiment of the whole, confines the poet’s fancy, and frequently occasions an abrupt 
termination of a beautiful and interesting picture …45 
                                                   
41 Ibid., 462. 
42 Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Poetic Closure: A Study of How Poems End (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1968), 34. 
43 Ibid., 196. 
44 To Thomas Cadell Snr., 22 Jun 1794, in Smith, Letters, 128. 
45 Quoted in Feldman and Robinson, A Century of Sonnets, 233. 
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Smith might have been quite pleased with this criticism: “abrupt termination” and 
“confinement of the fancy” were exactly what she was trying to achieve in her 
sonnets. Consider the ending of “Sonnet VIII. To Spring:” 
 Ah! season of delight!—could aught be found 
  To sooth awhile the tortured bosom’s pain, 
 Of Sorrow’s rankling shaft to cure the wound, 
  And bring life’s first delusions once again, 
’Twere surely met in thee!—thy prospect fair, 
Thy sounds of harmony, thy balmy air, 
Have power to cure all sadness—but despair. (VIII, ll. 8-14) 
Smith spends seven lines accumulating imagery of spring’s beauty and restorative 
power. She apostrophises the spring at great length, unleashing some of her most 
fabulous syntactic music—a long, five-line sentence followed by three punchy 
invocations of spring’s beauties, its “prospect fair,” “sounds of harmony” and “balmy 
air.” After the phrase “Have power to cure all sadness,” the iambic pentameter leaves 
us with the expectation of two more feet to complete the poem—and these two feet 
abruptly contradict all the beauties of the preceding lines. The severity of the ending 
is further enhanced by a common technique discussed by Herrnstein Smith: 
“unqualified assertion.”46 Smith’s final thought is general and grave: spring can cure 
all ailments, with only one exception. This thought brings the poem up short, 
confining Smith’s imagination which had been revelling in the spring. The sonnet is 
like a prison cell, in which Smith can let her imagination loose but in which she is 
also inevitably reminded of her imprisonment in her own sad consciousness. 
Clare takes the opposite approach. If Smith ends her sonnets as forcibly as 
possible, Clare does his utmost to blur the edges of his poems. One obvious 
difference between them lies in their use of couplets (Figure 3.2). Smith ends more 
                                                   
46 Smith, Poetic Closure, 182-86. 
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than three-quarters of her sonnets with a rhyming couplet. These final couplets are 
an example of what Herrnstein Smith calls “terminal modification.”47 Since this 
couplet is the first in the poem, its appearance changes the sound of the rhymes and 
indicates that the poem is at an end. Wordsworth emphases his concluding sestet, 
by confining his rare couplets to the final six lines of his sonnets. Clare achieves a 
different effect by peppering his sonnets with couplets throughout. By “positioning 
the couplet(s) before the end of the poem,” observes Lodge, Clare “creat[es] a 
movement in the sonnet’s progression that breathes in and then out again.”48 Smith 
prefers an abrupt final couplet, Wordsworth a concluding sestet and Clare a fuzzy 
border between the poem’s beginning and end. 
Figure 3.2 
 
Couplets in Clare, Smith and Wordsworth 
 
Clare, n=401; Smith, n=93, Wordsworth, n=513. 
(Excluding couplet-sonnets, and sonnets of more or fewer than 14 lines) 
Lodge is right to claim that in general Clare’s medial couplets reduce his 
sonnets’ sense of closure. In his early sonnets, such as “Day Break,” this was not 
always the case: 
                                                   
47 Ibid., 53. 
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As thy first anthem breathes its melody  
I’ve stood and paused the varied cloud to see  
& warmed in extacy and looked and warmed  
The far hill top when day’s first rays ’gan dawning  
& blue clouds fringd wi’ gold—O doubly charmed  
I hung in raptures on thee early morning (EP, 311-12, ll. 9-14) 
In this case, the couplet at lines 9-10 demarcate the beginning of the sestet, and 
introduces the lesson he has learned from his experience. This sonnet is a little 
nugget of Wordsworthian self-formation. But Lodge’s argument holds for the 
sonnets of Clare’s maturity. In “Shepherd’s Fire,” for instance, he uses the couplet 
at lines 9-10 to break the flow of the sonnet, giving the sense that it fades away rather 
than ending conclusively: 
On the rude heath yclad in furze and ling  
& oddling thorn that thick and prickly grows  
Shielding the shepherd when the rude wind blows  
& boys that sit right merry in a ring  
Round fires upon a molehill toasting sloes  
& crabs that froth and frizzle on the coals  
Loud is the gabble and the laughter loud.  
The rabbits scarce dare peep from out their holes,  
Unwont to mix with such a noisey crowd. 
Some run to eke the fire—while many a cloud  
Of smoke curls up. Some on their haunches squat  
With mouth for bellows puffing till it flares,  
Or if that fail one fans his napless hat  
& when the feast is done they squabble for their shares (MP, IV.194-95) 
The medial couplet coincides with a number of other techniques that break the flow 
of the poem. The couplet rhymes with the word “loud,” the word in line seven that 
ends the poem’s first long sentence. The couplet itself is split up by the poem’s 
syntax. Its first line ends a sentence, while the next begins one. The second line 
contains the poem’s first caesura, and its first enjambed line. The effect is to create 
a complicated pause in the centre of the poem when Clare introduces the rabbits, 
who stare at their human compatriots enigmatically. The poem is a film camera, 
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which slowly zooms in till it lingers on a hidden detail, then zooms out again till the 
scene loses focus. The final line of the poem is actually an alexandrine—we will see 
how effectively Smith used terminal alexandrines to enforce a sense of closure. But 
in this case, the final line gestures not towards the end of the action, or a lesson 
learnt, but simply towards a continuation. The feast may be “done,” but it is not 
eaten. There is no resolution, but instead the ordinary “squabbling” of a family meal. 
Clare gives no sense of an observing mind that processes or absorbs. This is raw 
experience, and the rhyme-scheme underscores the sense of its unending variety. 
Smith uses couplets in a completely different way. Her final couplets are 
nearly always terse, aphoristic and decisive, full of caesurae and antitheses: 
Another May new buds and flowers shall bring; 
Ah! why has happiness—no second Spring? (II) 
Ah! no!—when  all, e’en Hope’s last ray is gone, 
There’s no oblivion—but in death alone! (VI) 
So round the flame the giddy insect flies, 
And courts the fatal fire by which it dies! (XXII) 
Ah! Reason little o’er the soul prevails, 
When, from ideal ill, the enfeebled spirit fails! (LXI) 
And veil’d in shadows Nature’s face appears 
To hearts o’erwhelm’d with grief, to eyes suffused with tears. (LXVIII) 
These ringing assertions and balanced antitheses reinforce the sense of self-
contradiction and self-confinement. Similarly, even when the final couplet does not 
form a self-enclosed epigram, Smith might use epigrammatic elements. The final 
couplet of Sonnet LXII is not a generalised epigram, for example, but in the final 
line Smith uses caesura and antithesis to give it an air of finality and contradiction: 
“I only fly from doubt—to meet despair!” The antithesis here is cruelly ironic, since 
although “fly from” and “meet” are opposites, “doubt” and “despair” are merely 
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different degrees of the same thing. Wherever she turns, Smith can find no 
resolution of the self’s contradictions. Coleridge recorded a similar experience in a 
great elegiac sonnet of his later years, “Work Without Hope” (1825), whose final 
couplet is as self-riven and epigrammatic as any of Smith’s: “WORK without Hope 
draws nectar in a sieve; | And HOPE without an object cannot live.” (CW, XVI.1033) 
Like Smith, Coleridge feels the wholeness and rejuvenation of nature, as amaranths 
bloom and the winter presages spring. But inner contradictions, and the absence of 
the integrating principle of hope, leave the self as multiple and divided as the 
balanced antitheses of the couplet. 
Another of Smith’s distinctive techniques is to end her sonnets with an 
alexandrine. Neither Wordsworth nor Clare do so as often as she (Figure 3.3). The 
last two examples in the previous paragraph both end in alexandrines. In both cases, 
the line is divided neatly into two three-beat units by a caesura: 
When, from ideal ill, | the enfeebled spirit fails! 
To hearts o’erwhelm’d with grief, | to eyes suffused with tears. 
14 of the 24 alexandrines follow this pattern. Sometimes, the effect is antithesis, as 
when the speaker’s heart, “… trembling at the past, recoils at future woe” (LII). This 
resembles other antitheses we have seen at the end of Smith’s sonnets, suggesting 
that the speaker is trapped on both sides: neither the “past” nor the “future” gives 
any reason to hope. In other cases, the second half of the alexandrine can intensify 
the first half, as when Reason “bids the truth recur—with aggravated pain” 
(XXXVIII); or the second half might complete the syntax of the first, as when 
accumulated evils “shut my languid sense—to Hope’s dear voice and thine!” (LV). 
Coleridge mocked these aspects of Smith’s final lines in his wickedly accurate 
parodies: 
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As when thro’ broken clouds at night’s high noon  
Peeps in fair fragments forth the full-orb’d harvest-moon! (CW, XVI.357) 
Here are Smith’s antitheses: “night’s high noon,” a moon simultaneously 
fragmentary and “full-orb’d.” Here is Smith’s alliteration, her terminal alexandrine, 
and her sense of melancholy. Of course, this parody—an elegiac reworking of The 
House that Jack Built—does not end with the severe philosophical sense of self-
contradiction which is really Smith’s hallmark. 
Figure 3.3 
 
Sonnets ending in Alexandrines 
 


































POETRY: SMITH’S AND CLARE’S SELF-ABNEGATING SONNETS 
128 
When Clare ends with an alexandrine, it can seem accidental. When Smith 
ends with one, it is obviously intentional. This intentionality turned off some early 
readers: “The forced inversions, the unnatural conceits, the remote allusions, the 
splendid metaphors, and pompous epithets, have convinced us that the head, 
instead of the heart, has been the parent of most of our whining productions.”49 But 
such criticism actually gets at the core of Smith’s poetics. There is a conflict of heart 
and head in her sonnets, as they summon up great images of nature’s grandeur and 
power, but end with a crushing sense of the self’s unfitness to participate in nature’s 
harmony. 
We have already seen how Clare avoided giving his sonnets this crushing 
form by putting couplets in the middle of them. In 200 of his sonnets, he adopted a 
more radical technique, and simply made every rhyme a couplet: 
The mower tramples on the wild bee’s nest  
& hears the busy noise and stops the rest 
Who carless proggle out the mossy ball 
& gather up the honey comb and all. 
The boy that seeks dewberrys from the sedge  
& trys the poison berrys on the hedge 
Will often find them in the meadow hay 
& take his bough and drive the bees away.  
But when the maiden goes to turn the hay 
She whips her apron up and runs away 
The schoolboy eats the honey comb and all 
& often knocks his hat agen the wall 
& progs a stick in every hole he sees 
To steal the honey bag of black-nosed bees (MP, V.257) 
This is a striking innovation. Wordsworth wrote a single sonnet in couplets.50 Smith 
wrote none. As we have seen, Smith’s final couplets slam her sonnets shut. But these 
                                                   
49 “[Review Of:] Elegiac Sonnets, and Other Poems, by Charlotte Smith,” Critical Review, 21 (1797): 
151. 
50 “Extract. From The Conclusion of a Poem, Composed in Anticipation of Leaving School,” WW, 1. 
This poem is uncharacteristically written in iambic tetrameter. 
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couplets have the opposite effect. Weiner observes that Clare’s couplet-sonnets give 
the sense of “arbitrariness” rather than unfolding structure.51 Herrnstein Smith 
explains why: any “systematic repetition of formal elements” tends to “[maintain] 
the reader’s expectation of continuation.”52 Each time we hear a couplet in a sonnet 
like this, it simply repeats the same structure we have heard before, and creates the 
expectation of another couplet to come. The end of the poem does not sound like the 
end. It ends abruptly simply because it ends. 
Clare uses a number of other techniques to enhance the poem’s sense of 
arbitrariness. He randomly recycles rhyme-sounds: the poem rhymes 
aabbccddddbbee. In all but one case, the recycled rhyme is also a rich rhyme, where 
the very same word is repeated: “ball,” “all,” “all,” “wall;” and “hay,” “away,” “hay,” 
“away.” This use of rich rhyme sets Clare apart (Figure 3.4). Like his rhyme words, 
events and actions randomly repeat. The mower happens upon a group of 
unspecified people who “gather up the honey comb and all” in line 4, and then in 
line 11 the schoolboy “eats the honey comb and all.” Nothing has happened. Nothing 
has changed. Honeycomb continues to exist, and the intrepid continue to gobble it 
up despite the danger of the bees. We can contrast this with the way Wordsworth 
occasionally uses rich rhyme (he does so in four of his sonnets): 
How clear, how keen, how marvellously bright  
The effluence from yon distant mountain’s head,  
Which, strewn with snow smooth as the sky can shed,  
Shines like another sun—on mortal sight ġ
Uprisen, as if to check approaching Night,  
And all her twinkling stars. Who now would tread,  
If so he might, yon mountain’s glittering head— ġ
Terrestrial, but a surface, by the flight ġ
                                                   
51 Weiner, Clare’s Lyric, 69. 
52 Smith, Poetic Closure, 73. 
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Of sad mortality’s earth-sullying wing, ġ
Unswept, unstained?    (WW, 209) 
The repetition of “head” highlights the poet’s shifting ideas of the mountain. When 
Wordsworth repeats the word “head,” he does so to refer to this particular peak. 
Clare’s “honey comb and all,” by contrast, is generic (see §3.3). Wordsworth first 
sees the “head” as it is, “strewn with snow.” The second time he sees the “head” in 
his imagination. He imagines stepping on the mountain, creating a conflict between 
his sense of its beauty, and his sense of his own “sad mortality.” He resolves this 
conflict in the sonnet’s third and final sentence: 
   Nor shall the aërial Powers ġ
Dissolve that beauty, destined to endure, ġ
White, radiant, spotless, exquisitely pure, ġ
Through all vicissitudes, till genial Spring ġ
Has filled the laughing vales with welcome flowers. 
The sonnet illustrates the mastery of Wordsworth’s well-formed mind over the 
world. His imagination transforms the mountain into an image of immortality. The 
“head” of the mountain dissolves into a more general apprehension of its springtime 
“beauty.” This mental mastery is impossible in the buzzing, various world of Clare’s 
sonnets, with their unstructured rhymes. Nor is it possible in the cruel sonnets of 
Smith, that snap shut like a guillotine on the poor poet’s neck. 
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We have seen how many devices Smith and Clare combine to create their 
distinctive senses of the sonnet form. Smith does not merely adopt the 
Shakespearean style, with its terminal couplet, but avoids medial couplets and 
deploys alexandrines, antitheses, and alliteration to strengthen her poems’ 
impression of abrupt termination. Clare does not merely strew his couplets with 
medial couplets, but strews them with rich rhyme and clever patterns of syntax and 
imagery to give them a blurry, open-ended form. Scholars have long noted that the 
couplet-sonnets he wrote in Northborough are particularly “resistant to rhetorical 
closure.”54 As Figure 3.4 demonstrates, when Clare wrote couplet-sonnets, he also 
increased his use of rich rhyme. When he adopts the arbitrary rhyme-scheme of the 
                                                   
53 Since the machine cannot discern homophones like “piece” and “peace,” it may underestimate the 
number of rich rhymes. 
54 Simon J. White, “John Clare’s Sonnets and the Northborough Fens,” John Clare Society Journal 
28 (2009): 64. 
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couplet-sonnet, his individual rhyme-words also become more arbitrary. We will see 
a similar pattern below (Figure 3.5), when we turn to examine his syntax, which 
becomes more paratactic when he adopts the form of the couplet-sonnet. It is easy 
to see why so many scholars—even those, like Simon White, who praises Clare’s 
work in the form—find it hard to call such poems “sonnets” at all.55 But it is the very 
fact that they are sonnets which gives them such a sense of open-endedness, because 
they contrast so strongly with the tradition. 
Smith and Clare both took a radical approach to the form of the sonnet. Smith 
adopted the derided “illegitimate” sonnet to express her sense of poetic form as a 
prison for the malformed self. Clare denuded the sonnet with his couplets and rich 
rhymes, creating poems that seem unstructured by contrast with those of his great 
forebears. In both cases, rhyme and metre are used to portray a particular sense of 
self-deformation: Smith’s sense of the self as a malformed prisoner, and Clare’s 
sense of the self as a formless diffusion through reality. 
3.2 Enclosing the Self (2): Sequencing 
Smith’s and Clare’s sonnets are not only structured on an individual level. Both 
poets also string their sonnets into sequences. There is a long tradition of sonnet 
sequences, and this has important implications for the representation of selfhood. 
As Jonathan Culler observes, individual lyric poems are often ritualistic, cryptic, and 
iterable, and do not give a strong sense of an individual self who utters them. But 
when we read lyrics in a sequence, “we put together a speaker,” and the poems 
acquire a “fictional aspect” of plot and character.56 Smith’s and Clare’s approaches 
                                                   
55 He argues that they are strictly just “sonnet-like poems:” ibid., 56. 
56 Jonathan D. Culler, Theory of the Lyric (Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 
2015), 19, 318. 
POETRY: SMITH’S AND CLARE’S SELF-ABNEGATING SONNETS 
133 
to the sonnet sequence were characteristically opposed. All but one of Smith’s 
published sonnets appeared in Elegiac Sonnets, which from the third edition 
onward put all the sonnets in a numbered order. The result was a long and ever-
expanding sequence, growing from 16 sonnets in 1784 to 92 by 1800. Clare preferred 
much shorter sequences. It is impossible to be definitive about how many sequences 
he wrote, since most of his poems exist only in manuscript and were never edited by 
him for publication.57 In some cases, however, for instance in the manuscript of The 
Midsummer Cushion, Clare entitled his sonnets and arranged several into 
sequences. In other cases, it is apparent from the poems’ position in the manuscript, 
or their contents, to guess that some fall into a sequence. The editors of the standard 
Oxford edition print 134 of Clare’s 638 sonnets (21%) in 53 sequences. These 
sequences range from 2 to 6 sonnets in length, with a mean of 2.53. Smith courted 
the “fictional aspect” of the sonnet sequence, stringing her sonnets into a long 
chronological autobiography. Clare seems to have avoided this effect. 
We can compare the effects of these different approaches to sonnet 
sequencing by examining how Clare’s and Smith’s sequences conclude. Under the 
self-formation model, we should expect the final sonnet of the sequence to enclose 
all the preceding sonnets in a coherent whole. And indeed, this is how the most 
famous sequences of the period end. Robinson’s Sappho and Phaon might chart 
Sappho’s sufferings and end with her death, but the final sonnet ringingly asserts 
that the result of her suffering is immortality: 
 O! Sky-born Virtue! sacred is thy name! 
And though mysterious Fate, with frown severe, 
 Oft decorates thy brows with wreaths of Fame, 
Bespangled o’er with sorrow’s chilling tear! 
                                                   
57 This can pose some acute problems when it comes to Clare’s longer poems. According to Jonathan 
Bate, not one edition of Clare’s Child Harold prints the stanzas in the same order! Bate, John Clare, 
572. 
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 Yet shall thou more than mortal raptures claim, 
The brightest planet of the ETERNAL SPHERE!58 
Wordsworth’s most beautiful and tightly-structured sequence, The River Duddon 
(1820), likewise ends with an evocation of eternity. The sequence tells the story of a 
walk from the source of the river to the sea. When he reaches the end of the river, he 
casts back his eye—not only on the river itself, but on the sonnets that memorialise 
it: “I see what was, and is, and will abide; | Still glides the stream, and shall forever 
glide” (WW, 303). The river pours into the sea like humans into death, and the end 
of the sequence is the end of another chapter in Wordsworth’s mortal life. But 
nonetheless Wordsworth feels an intimation of immortality: 
We men, who in our morn of youth defied 
The elements, must vanish;—be it so! 
Enough, if something from our hands have power 
To live, and act, and serve the future hour; 
And if, as toward the silent tomb we go, 
Through love, through hope, and faith’s transcendent dower, 
We feel that we are greater than we know. 
For Wordsworth and Robinson, the reward of self-formation is eternal life. All the 
former moments, all the sonnets which preserve them, all the chilling tears of 
Sappho, all the youth and defiance of Wordsworth, are preserved for all time. The 
self is forever at home. 
Clare’s short sequences resist this sublime, synthesising view. Indeed, some 
of his sequences end on precisely the opposite note: “& no one cares & still the strife 
goes on” (MP, V.364). He does sometimes gesture at immortality in the manner of 
Robinson or Wordsworth, as in his lovely sequence commemorating Robert 
Bloomfield: “& seasons round thy humble grave shall be | Fond lingering pilgrims 
to remember thee” (MP, IV.398). But his most distinctive manner is different. 
                                                   
58 Feldman and Robinson, A Century of Sonnets, 89. 
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Probably his most famous sequence today is his four-sonnet series about badger-
baiting. It ends on the harrowing note of a badger’s death: 
He falls as dead & kicked by boys & men 
Then starts & grins & drives the crowd again 
Till kicked & torn and beaten out he lies 
& leaves his hold & cackles groans & dies (MP, V.362) 
There is no evocation of immortality for the poor badger, no attempt to make his 
death meaningful. As many have noticed, this final sonnet is only 12 lines long, its 
shortness emphasising the shortness of the badger’s life.59 This is yet another abrupt 
termination. The story of the badger simply continues till it doesn’t. The badger, 
unlike Sappho or Wordsworth, has no moment of recollection and summation 
before he leaps into eternity. Clare’s short sequences are only a small part of his 
sonnet output. Most of his sonnets are free-floating, individual poems. They do not 
describe a chain of events in the formation of a self, but random events in the life of 
the world.  
Smith’s approach is different. Six sonnets served the role of final sonnet as 
Elegiac Sonnets expanded. All record moments of recollection and summation, but 
none gestures towards an eternal synthesis in the manner of Robinson or 
Wordsworth. Three of her concluding sonnets simply assert that Smith is too 
miserable and exhausted to write any longer: 
3rd and 4th editions, 1786: 
Her pencil sickening Fancy throws away, 
 And weary Hope reclines upon the tomb; 
And points my wishes to that tranquil shore, 
Where the pale spectre Care pursues no more. (XXXVI, ll 11-14) 
5th edition, 1789: 
For of Calamity so long the prey, 
                                                   
59 Andrew Hodgson, “Form and Feeling in John Clare’s Sonnets,” John Clare Society Journal 31 
(2012): 54; Chris Washington, “John Clare and Biopolitics,” European Romantic Review 25, no. 6 
(2014): 666. 
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 Imagination now has lost her power, 
Nor will her fairy loom again essay 
 To dress Affliction in a robe of flowers. (XLVIII, ll. 5-8) 
Volume 2, 1st edition, 1797: 
Crush’d to earth, by bitterest anguish prest, 
 From my faint eyes thy [the Muse’s] graceful form recedes; 
 Thou canst not heal a heart like mine that bleeds … (LXXXIV, ll. 9-11) 
In each case, the sequence ends because Smith can write no more, not because she 
has achieved a pinnacle of vision. In fact, these sonnets flatly contradict the claim in 
Sonnet I, that the sorrowful write the best poetry, for in all of them sorrow drives 
Fancy, Imagination or the Muse away. Realising this, in each case she longs for 
death—not because it brings immorality or fame, but merely “Pity and 
Remembrance” (LXXXIV, l. 14), and the “tranquil shore” of oblivion. The result of 
her long self-deformation is the sense that selfhood is a burden of which she would 
rather be rid. Clare expresses a similar sense of self in his most famous lyric, “I Am:” 
I long for scenes, where man hath never trod 
 A place where woman never smiled or wept  
There to abide with my Creator, God;  
 And sleep as I in childhood, sweetly slept,  
Untroubling, and untroubled where I lie,  
The grass below—above the vaulted sky. (LP, I.397, ll. 13-18) 
For Smith in her sonnets, and Clare in his asylum poems, life is “trouble,” and the 
self is something to be shuffled off in the peace of the grave. 
Oblivion is also a theme of Smith’s original final sonnet, later renumbered 
XXIV. This is perhaps her strangest ending. It is a dramatic monologue in the voice 
of Werther, the tragic hero of Goethe’s famous novel. He is lying in his grave: 
1st and 2nd editions, 1784: 
The tears shall tremble in my CHARLOTTE’S eyes; 
 Dear, precious drops!—they shall embalm the dead! 
Yes—CHARLOTTE o’er the mournful spot shall weep, 
Where her poor WERTER—and his sorrows sleep! (XXIV, ll. 11-14) 
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Labbe argues that this sonnet “threatens an implosion of identity,” but that is surely 
an understatement.60 Smith shatters herself into multiple shards. She has adopted 
Werther’s voice, identifying with his tragic fate. But she adopts this perspective 
simply to imagine her own non-existence in the grave, and she also shares her 
gender and first name with Charlotte, Werther’s distraught lover, with whose misery 
Smith also seems to identify. Smith’s identity is riven by contradictions: she is 
Werther and Charlotte, she is alive and dead, she is miserable and unconscious. The 
fact that the poem is a dramatic monologue in the voice of another person introduces 
another contradiction. As Culler observes, when we read dramatic monologues, we 
typically attribute the content to the fictional speaker, but the form—the metre, the 
rhyme, the rhetoric, the poetry—to the poet.61 There is thus another divide between 
Smith the writer of the poem and Werther the speaker whose voice she adopts to 
portray herself. In its original form, Elegiac Sonnets ended in a mire of self-
contradiction and intractable problems of interpretation. 
Smith’s original ending is the starkest. But the endings she finally wrote for 
Volume 1 and its eventual sequel were her subtlest. In both, Smith gazes on nature, 
and feels a complex mixture of identification and repulsion. In Sonnet LIX, Smith 
sees the moon, which shines brightly above a swirling mass of storm clouds: 
6th edition, 1792: 
—So, in unsullied dignity elate, 
 A spirit conscious of superior worth, 
In placid elevation firmly great, 
 Scorns the vain cares that give Contention birth; 
And blest with peace above the shocks of Fate, 
 Smiles at the tumult of the troubled earth. (ll. 9-14) 
                                                   
60 Jacqueline Labbe, Charlotte Smith: Romanticism, Poetry and the Culture of Gender (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2003), 108. 
61 Culler, Theory of the Lyric, 269. 
POETRY: SMITH’S AND CLARE’S SELF-ABNEGATING SONNETS 
138 
This is one of Smith’s most powerful images because of its ambiguity. Smith seems 
on the one hand to identify with the moon. Smith is a poet, and her ability to 
comprehend the moon’s superiority is evidence of her own spirit’s “superior worth.” 
But though her imagination can take her to the moon, Smith herself is still trapped 
beneath the storm clouds. Her vision of the moon cannot help her to understand her 
sufferings on earth, which remain “vain” and meaningless. Again, her self is split, 
and remains opposed to the stormy world that torments her. 
Smith achieves a similar multiplicity of consciousness in the sonnet with 
which she ended the final version of her great book: 
Volume 2, 2nd edition (1800): 
    Lo! the radiant start of day 
Lights up this lovely scene anew.—My fate 
 Nor hope nor joy illumines—Nor for me 
 Return those rosy hours which here I used to see! (XCII, ll. 11-14) 
This is her finest descriptive sonnet, and we will return to it in §3.3. All we need to 
note here is the contradiction in Smith’s experience of time. As it passes, she sees it 
renew the world and leave herself unchanged. Her “scene” is “lovely” and bright, but 
her “fate” is dark. Labbe is half-right to say that time is a “deforming process” in 
these sonnets.62 It deforms Smith by eroding her, reducing her to a stump of pain, 
even though Smith retains her power to see and appreciate how time regenerates 
the natural world. “One lives only to lose,” Smith once wrote.63 A couplet and a fine 
alexandrine close her sonnet, and the sequence that made her as a poet. 
Smith’s erstwhile friend, William Hayley, once accused her of “querulous 
egotism.”64 His unkind stroke hit on a certain truth. Smith’s sense of self is indeed 
                                                   
62 Labbe, Charlotte Smith, 1. 
63 To Sarah Rose, 26 April 1806, in Smith, Letters, 730. 
64 Smith quotes Hayley’s remark in a letter to Sara Rose, 4 July 1804, ibid., 630. 
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“querulous.” It is painful and quivering. Her great sonnet sequence is a story of 
sparagmos, in which her mind is progressively torn to pieces while the world around 
her goes on indifferently growing and dying. Clare himself often expressed a similar 
sense of dismembered identity, but in his sonnets he appears to have found a 
solution to it. He allows himself to be dismembered, as his consciousness flows out 
into hundreds of little unconnected fragments of reality. We have seen how these 
different approaches affected Smith’s and Clare’s rhyme, metre and sequencing. As 
we will now see, it also altered the way they describe the world. 
3.3 The Function of Description 
Smith and Clare shared a fascination with natural history. They loved birds, flowers, 
insects, animals and trees. They observed things keenly, and were well read in 
botany, ornithology, entomology and zoology. They fed this love and knowledge into 
their sonnets, which abound in precise descriptions. This was something Clare 
prized in Smith’s poetry: 
I have never read one [poet] that mentions [the nightjar] except Mrs Smith in her 
Sonnets, which I had the pleasure to meet with last summer in a friend’s book case. 
Her poems may be only pretty but I felt much pleased with them because she wrote 
more from what she had seen of nature than from what she had read of it. Therefore 
those that read her poems find new images which they had not read of before though 
they have often felt them, & from these associations poetry derives the power of 
pleasing in the happiest manner.65 
Clare might seem to be damning “pretty” Smith with faint praise, but elsewhere he 
puts her in his “catalogue” of truly descriptive poets.66  And his praise is doubly 
striking, because it so closely resembles the praise he himself would receive in the 
twentieth century, for the “accuracy,” “richness” and “completeness” of his own 
                                                   
65 John Clare, The Natural History Prose Writings of John Clare, ed. Margaret Grainger (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1983), 34. Punctuation and spelling lightly regularised. 
66 Ibid., 41. 
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descriptions.67 The nightjar Clare refers to appears in Sonnet XLII, “Composed 
During a Walk on the Downs in November 1787:” 
 O’er the tall brow of yonder chalky bourn, 
The evening shades their gather’d darkness fling, 
 While, by the lingering light, I scarce discern 
The shrieking night-jar sail on heavy wing. (ll. 4-7) 
Smith had a lower opinion of her originality than Clare. She believed herself the 
second nightjar poet in English, after Gilbert White.68 She also later admitted that 
she had been playing fast and loose with the truth, because there are never nightjars 
on the downs in November.69 Clare nonetheless makes a salient point: this nightjar 
is a new image and it is this novelty that gives it power to please. It is a new image 
because it is unfamiliar from the poetic tradition. It is not loaded with literary 
“associations,” but with associations from lived experience. Poets have 
apostrophised lovely roses and pretty nightingales since time immemorial. Smith 
has opened a new terrain of feeling by describing the strange croaking nightjar 
instead. 
Smith and Clare shared an aesthetic of variety, a desire to describe nature in 
all its forms, even if, like the nightjar, they do not seem made for poetry.70 In 1796, 
Smith requested the loan of a book, John Aikin’s Essay on the Application of 
Natural History to Poetry (1777).71 Long before Wordsworth, Aikin complained that 
“descriptive poetry has degenerated into a kind of phraseology,” and advocated 
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poets getting back to nature.72 Contemporary poetry constantly falls into 
“uninteresting sameness,” but nature shows such “variety” that a poet who merely 
describes it as it is will not suffer this flaw to their beauty.73 Seeing nature properly 
is an innate skill, possessed by “every one who surveys natural objects with a 
searching and distinguishing eye; whether he consider them singly, or as parts of a 
system, whether he call them by their trivial or learned applications.”74 
In their prose, both Clare and Smith advocated just this kind of “searching 
and distinguishing eye.” In Smith’s Conversations Introducing Poetry (1804), Mrs 
Talbot tells her children George and Emily that they must learn to draw, because 
drawing will “[awaken them] to a thousand beauties which common observers do 
not see, or see without pleasure…”75 Mrs Talbot wanders the countryside with her 
children, gives them lessons in Natural History, and asks them to repeat little poems 
to the animals, plants and landscapes they see around them. The aim of the poems 
is “to excite [the children’s] curiosity,”76 and they are so accurate and beautiful that 
the children collect them as though they were the things they describe.77 In his 
fragment on “Taste,” Clare recapitulated Aikin’s and Smith’s arguments: “the man 
of taste feels excessive rapture in contemplating the rich scenery of an autumn 
Landscape which the rude man passes unnoticed.”78 Such taste can only be 
cultivated by kneeling down and seeing things close up: “… there is happiness in 
examining minutely into the wild flowers as we wander amongst them, to 
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distinguish their characters & find out to what orders they belong in the artificial & 
natural systems of botany.”79 Clare was interested in the “characters” of things, in 
the qualities that make them what they are. As we will see, Smith had a different 
sense of things’ individuality in the world.  
Smith, Aikin and Clare all argued that poetic imagery should be more 
objective, more attuned to facts. This is not how Romantic imagery is usually 
understood. Critics during the Romantic period frequently argued that the purpose 
of description was not to portray the world but to express the poet’s feelings. 
Germaine de Staël argued that in Romantic poetry, “outward facts and 
circumstances” display “that which is passing in the soul.”80 Francis Jeffrey agreed: 
the very essence of poetry … consists in the fine perception and vivid expression of 
that subtle and mysterious analogy which exists between the physical and the moral 
world—which makes outward things and qualities the natural types and emblems of 
inward gifts and emotions …81 
In our own time, scholars have repeated similar arguments. M.H. Abrams famously 
argued that the Romantics saw the mind not as a mirror of the external world, but 
as a lamp that actually creates it.82 If this is the case, the very idea of an objective 
external world to describe becomes problematic. As Timothy Brownlow puts it, 
there is no “Landscape” in Romantic poetry, but “Moodscape.”83 Jonathan Bate 
makes the remarkable argument that the Romantics actually invented the pathetic 
fallacy.84 But for Aikin, Smith and Clare, natural description is not a lamp, 
Moodscape or pathetic fallacy, because their theories are directed at the reader. 
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Descriptive poems describe not the poet, but the world. They enable the reader to 
see things as though they were there, evoking their wonder or their curiosity. 
Moodscape relies on the “self-conscious identification between mood and 
environment.”85 But Clare’s sonnets usually aim to be un-self-conscious, while 
Smith self-consciously alienates herself from nature, rather than identifying with it.  
It was while living in Northborough that Clare wrote his most objective 
sonnets, such as this stunning evocation of birdlife: 
The tame hedge sparrow hops about for seed 
& painted red cap feeds on grunsel weeds 
The blackbirds [forage] where [the] scarecrows was 
& pecking linnet green as is the grass  
Eats at the cabbage seed till all is gone 
& thrushes fetch the cherries every one 
The pink flies in the bushes all the day  
& pecks about the leaves & goes away 
The yellow hammer hops about the beds 
& the young blue cap pecks the poppy heads 
The wagtail wades the sink, & willow wren  
Peeps round the currant trees & hides again 
& sparrows feeding with the hens all day 
Hears the maids shoo & scarcely flies away (MP V.378) 
This is a remarkable poem in the history of the English sonnet: a rhyming list of 10 
bird species, their little actions precisely described, with nary a reflection or poetic 
insight in view. We could try to read this poem as an exploration of Clare’s emotions, 
of his love for nature, perhaps, or his sense of alienation in his new surroundings at 
Northborough. There are no adverbs or personal pronouns or even subordinating 
conjunctions, however, to indicate the emotional charge of the images. The sonnet 
does not form part of a sequence with a recognisable narrative. It is really just a 
catalogue of beautiful birds, described purely by their appearance and behaviour. 
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We see how they move: “hops,” “pecking,” “fetch,” “flies,” “pecks,” “peeps.” We learn 
what different things they eat: “seed,” “grunsel weeds,” “cabbage seed,” “poppy 
heads,” chook feed. We learn where they live, and what colour they are. And we 
glimpse how these birds cohabit with humans, as the sparrows “Hear the maids shoo 
& scarcely flies away.” The poem is a list of realities, things you might see yourself if 
you sat or rode or walked or lay somewhere in the country. Weiner argues that 
Clare’s imagery is often “exemplary” in this way.86 These birds are not particular 
birds that Clare sees at a particular time with a particular set of feelings. They are 
kinds of birds that exist, wonderful examples of nature’s teeming variety. 
Many modern readers disagree with readings like this, and try to prove that 
Clare’s poems are in fact full of self-reflection. Hickman argues that “Clare’s 
encounter with the world is mediated by story …”87 His sonnets portray self-
consciousness, in other words, because they tell little stories about the mind 
grappling with the world. This approach works well for Hickman’s example (“I 
found a ball of grass among the hay,” MP V.246), which narrates a connected series 
of events in the past tense, using four “when”s and two “again”s to indicate the 
passage of time. It also contains several uses of the word “I” and one moment of 
explicit self-reflection: “I … wondered what the thing could be.” But there is no story 
or temporal sequence in our example. It is not even clear these birds exist at the 
same time or in the same place. Nonetheless, a critic such as Bate would argue, the 
poem is self-reflexive because poetry is always self-reflexive. A poem like “The tame 
hedge sparrow hops about for seed,” is a conscious piece of literary artifice. 
Whenever Clare writes a poem, he “separates himself from the land,” and, “as a 
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writer he inhabits the environment of imagination.”88 In other words, he shapes 
what he sees into a poem, imposing order on his experience, and when we read the 
poem we become aware of Clare’s mind, putting these birds into rhyming couplets. 
There is some merit to this argument, but it confuses two separate ideas: Clare’s self-
conscious artistry, and the self-consciousness (if any) actually portrayed in his 
poems.89 He was certainly a self-conscious artist, but might he not have tried to 
describe un-self-consciousness in his verse, in the manner of Rumi, Keats or St John 
of the Cross?90 
In “The tame hedge sparrow hops about for seed,” Clare makes use of one of 
his most distinctive words, “and.” The poem is paratactic.91 Like the couplets that 
describe them, these birds appear next to one another in no apparent order, only 
disappearing when the maid appears in the final couplet to shoo them away. Clare 
uses “and” far more often than either Smith or Wordsworth (Figure 3.5), and is 
particularly likely to use it in his couplet-sonnets. These statistics complement the 
thoughtful analysis of Barrell, who has shown that even when Clare uses hypotactic 
conjunctions (e.g. “while” or “when”), he uses them in a paratactic way.92 
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Clare, n=638; Smith, n=83; Wordsworth, n=514. 
Barrell argues that Clare’s paratactic style prevents the emergence of a 
“transcendent subject.” Instead of representing a self, who looks at the landscape 
and struggles to idealise and unify it, Clare’s most distinctive sonnets represent a 
“manifold of impressions.” There is still a “perceiving subject,” but for Clare the 
subject is identical to the things it perceives. For Clare, “being is perceiving.” 93 
Can we call this consciousness, reduced to its perceptions, a “self”? This 
raises a philosophical debate which has raged for at least the last three hundred 
years. Locke argued that the moment we are conscious, we are self-conscious: for it 
is “impossible for anyone to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive.”94 
Someone must be watching all the birds in Clare’s sonnet, so that someone must 
exist. Hume demurred. If we do have a simple, unitary self, he argued, we should be 
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able to perceive it—but all we can perceive are all the different things in the world: 
“I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe 
any thing but the perception.”95 Hume might have seen Clare’s poem as a 
vindication: the mind “is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, 
united together by certain relations, and suppos’d, though falsely, to be endow’d 
with a perfect simplicity and identity.”96 There is no person or voice or “identity” 
that unites all the perceptions in “The tame hedge sparrow hops about for seed.” 
These birds are united only by “and,” by what Hume calls “constant conjunction.”97  
 However we resolve this philosophical dispute, it is clear that Clare’s style of 
description eliminates the self from the frame as much as possible. Smith is always 
conscious of her anguish. Wordsworth is always conscious of his spiritual being. 
Clare is often conscious of nothing but the beautiful things of the world. His writing 
has a quality Erich Auerbach identifies in all paratactic writing: it is “fraught with 
background.”98 Perhaps there is some powerful force linking all Clare’s birds 
together, but it lurks behind this mysterious word “and.” Clare practises what Bate 
calls “the magic of naming.”99 A name identifies a thing, conjuring it from reality. 
Clare’s naming is magical because he merely names. He evokes the reality of things, 
leaving their meanings and associations for others to decide. There is something 
democratic in this outlook, argues Simon Kövesi, in which everything is “muffled by 
the wonder and blurred boundaries of a levelling nature.”100 There is no hierarchy 
in Clare. Nothing is above or below anything else. Everything is with or beside. 
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In her children’s poetry, Smith often evokes a similar wonder. These poems 
can be as paratactic or list-like as Clare’s—and just as full of species’ names: 
In the lone copse or shadowy dale, 
Wild cluster’d knots of Harebells blow, 
And droops the Lily of the vale 
O’er Vinca’s matted leaves below, 
The Orchis race with varied beauty charm, 
And mock the exploring bee, or fly’s aerial form. (“Wild Flowers,” 191, ll. 19-24) 
Though Smith rounds her children’s poems off with a moral, Mrs Talbot argues that 
this is simply to encourage the child reader to draw analogies between natural and 
human kind.101 It is a different matter in the sonnets. In these, Smith can usually 
perceive the intrinsic meaning of nature, but her “painful consciousness” prevents 
her from identifying with it (XC.3). The greatest of her sonnets of “painful 
consciousness” was her last: 
SONNET XCII. WRITTEN AT BIGNOR PARK IN SUSSEX, IN AUGUST, 1799. 
Low murmurs creep along the woody vale, 
 The tremulous Aspens shudder in the breeze,  
Slow o’er the downs the leaden vapours sail, 
 While I, beneath these old paternal trees,  
Mark the dark shadows of the threaten’d storm, 
 As gathering clouds o’erveil the morning sun;  
They pass!—But oh! ye visions bright and warm 
 With which even here my sanguine youth begun,  
Ye are obscured for ever!—And too late  
 The poor Slave shakes the unworthy bonds away 
 Which crush’d her!—Lo! the radiant star of day  
Lights up this lovely scene anew—My fate  
 Nor hope nor joy illumines—Nor for me 
 Return those rosy hours which here I used to see! 
The first three lines, with their lack of conjunctions, might give the sense of Clarean 
parataxis: each line introduces a different, precisely observed fact about the external 
world, with no subordinating conjunctions to join them into a reflective whole. But 
                                                   
101 Smith, Conversations, 55-56. 
POETRY: SMITH’S AND CLARE’S SELF-ABNEGATING SONNETS 
149 
then in line four, the hypotaxis comes, with its inevitable note of self-reflection: 
“While I, beneath these old paternal trees.” Smith makes her identity explicit. All 
these things are happening at the very moment that she sits at her “paternal” seat, a 
place linked to her through family. They are linked not only by family but by her 
emotions. Smith “marks” the “threaten’d storm,” and sees the sun is “o’erveiled.” 
This Moodscape is as sad as Smith herself. As the poem progresses, however, these 
links of family and emotion are severed. 
The volta comes in line seven. It is at this moment that the poem’s secret 
process is unveiled like the sun, and Smith’s self-identity begins to unspool: “They 
pass!” The clouds do not live up to their threats, the storm recedes, the sun re-
emerges. This corresponds to an improvement in Smith’s worldly condition, as she, 
the “Slave,” is released from “the bonds … | Which crush’d her.” (In 1799, Smith 
believed that the long-running dispute over her father-in-law’s complex will had 
finally come to an end, and that she and her children might finally have financial 
security.) But strangely, as the world alters around her it fails to change her state of 
mind. The clouds might recede, but the resolution of her legal troubles has come 
“too late,” and the beautiful memories of her childhood at Bignor remain “obscured 
for ever.” She becomes self-conscious and self-alienated, referring to herself in the 
third person as a “Slave,” and feeling the split between her own past and present.  
The final movement of the poem introduces a new and powerful element to 
Smith’s description: “Lo! the radiant star of day | Lights up this lovely scene anew!” 
This image is objective in an important sense. Smith turns the sun into a symbol of 
happiness and renewal—it is “radiant” and the things it illuminates are “lovely.” But 
Smith is neither radiant nor lovely in herself. The sun is not inert matter, given a 
meaning by the mind of the poet, nor is it a mystical symbol of the deep union of the 
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poet’s soul and the soul of the world. It is itself something good and happy, and when 
Smith sees this it only accentuates her own sense of misery and isolation, of her 
slave-like position in society, of the scars left on her soul by time. Wordsworth 
himself sometimes describes a similar state of mind: 
So once it would have been,—’tis so no more;  
I have submitted to a new control:  
A power is gone, which nothing can restore;  
A deep distress hath humanised my Soul.  
Not for a moment could I now behold  
A smiling sea, and be what I have been:  
The feeling of my loss will ne’er be old;  
This, which I know, I speak with mind serene. (“Elegiac Stanzas,” WW, 453) 
Wordsworth writes serenely of what agonises Smith, but he has a similar sense of 
nature’s objective meaning—the possibility of a “smiling sea”—and of time’s ability 
to rob us of our ability to commune with it. In a way, the conclusion of Smith’s poem 
brings her back to the Clarean parataxis of its opening lines. Smith might be highly 
conscious of her self, but her self does not dominate the scene. It is only a single 
dweller in a vast and busy world, which it shares with a million other things. 
In Smith and Clare’s sonnets, the nonhuman parts of the world—the animals, 
the trees, the clouds—are “unfailingly meaningful.”102 For them, the force and 
meaning of things is independent of the human mind. In this they anticipate an 
interesting strain of contemporary philosophy. Thinkers like Bruno Latour and Jane 
Bennett advocate a post-Cartesian account of reality, arguing that a third-person 
approach can explain important aspects of reality overlooked by the first-person 
perspective popular in modern philosophy. Latour argues that our lives are filled 
with things like Smith’s sun, “quasi-objects” that are a tissue of mere facts and rich 
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meanings.103 We tend to assume that objects are created by humans when we define 
and describe them, but Latour argues that really we share the world with such quasi-
objects, and that they define us as much as we define them.104  This is just what 
Smith experiences in her final sonnet, as she slowly comes to recognise the existence 
of her tiny wounded self in a vast world of moving things. Bennett, meanwhile, 
argues that the things of the world act together to form “assemblages.”105 
Everything, from a lump of garbage to a cheetah to a hydrogen atom, has its own 
“vital impetus,” but each thing’s “efficacy or agency always depends on the 
collaboration, cooperation, or interactive interference of many bodies and forces.”106 
As things come together, they spontaneously develop “shi,” a “style, energy, 
propensity, trajectory or élan …”107 This is just what Clare recognises in “The tame 
hedge sparrow hops about for seed.” Each individual bird is a citizen in the 
democratic republic of the universe, with its own actions and energies. But when 
Clare packs eleven birds into the assemblage of his sonnet, we get a sense of the vital 
energy or shi that ripples through the bird-world. 
There is a crucial difference between Smith and Clare’s styles of description. 
We noted earlier how “exemplary” Clare’s descriptions are. He is mostly interested 
in the characters of things, the kinds of birds or flowers or trees or people that exist. 
Smith is more interested the quiddity of things, the particular people and creatures 
and times and places she encounters. One way we can see this is to compare our 
poets’ use of demonstrative pronouns (Figure 3.6). 
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Figure 3.6 
Three demonstrative pronouns: “this,” “these” and “those” 108 
 
Clare, n=638; Smith, n=83; Wordsworth, n=514. 
Like Wordsworth, Smith often refers to “these” things and “those” things, particular 
things at moments of experience. We can see what differences this makes by 
comparing Smith and Clare on the nightingale: 
Poor melancholy bird—that all night long ġ
 Tell’st to the Moon thy tale of tender woe;  
 From what sad cause can such sweet sorrow flow,  
And whence this mournful melody of song? (CSP, III, ll. 1-4) 
When first we hear the shy come nightingales 
They seem to mutter o’er their songs in fearġ
& climbing e’er so soft the spinney rails 
All stops as if no bird was any where (MP V.222) 
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Smith describes a particular experience of listening to a particular nightingale at a 
particular time. Clare describes what it is like when the nightingales return in April. 
Thus Smith refers to “this mournful melody of song,” the very song she hears, while 
Clare refers more generally to “their songs.” The this brings the lonely nightingale 
close to Smith’s lonely person, while a this might have spoilt Clare’s democratic 
evocation of peasant life among the birds. It is not simply a matter of this single 
word, of course. Smith highlights her close personal connection to this particular 
nightingale by addressing it, while Clare uses plurals, the third person and a when-
construction to indicate the generality of his own birds. 
Clare and Smith have both earned their reputations as poets of precise and 
original description. Scholars have frequently suggested that Smith’s gender and 
Clare’s class drove them to their innovative, close-up style of description. Barrell has 
argued that Clare rejected the genteel conventions of eighteenth-century landscape. 
While a gentleman-poet like James Thomson looks down on the landscape from 
above, the peasant-poet Clare looks around it from within.109 Similarly, Judith 
Pascoe argues that gender partly explains why Smith showed a more “intimate 
acquaintance” with nature than her canonical male contemporaries. Robbed of 
independence by her marriage, she could not travel to judge and compare different 
landscapes in the manner of a Thomson or a Wordsworth, but could only wander 
through the countryside with her children in the manner of her own Mrs Talbot.110 
We should not distinguish Smith and Clare too starkly from their 
gentlemanly contemporaries, however. Percy Shelley argued that to the true poet 
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“the self appears as what it is, an atom to a universe.”111 Is this not precisely how the 
forlorn Smith presents herself in the implacable world of regenerative nature? Keats 
claimed that true poets have “no self,” and instead have the “negative capability” of 
limitless sensitivity to the passage of the world.112 Clare’s descriptive sonnets are 
surely masterpieces of such negative capability, much like Keats’s own descriptive 
masterpiece, “To Autumn.” Wordsworth too sometimes describes losing his sense 
of self in his sonnets:  
    Verily I think, 
Such place to me is sometimes like a dream 
Or map of the whole world: thoughts, link by link, 
Enter through ears and eyesight, with such gleam 
Of all things, that at last in fear I shrink, 
And leap at once from the delicious stream. (WW, 207) 
This is a Wordsworth of openness to the world, of Smithian or Clarean humility, 
whose self is only a small part of the richness that surrounds it. There is, however, 
still an important difference. Wordsworth claims that each thing shines with the 
“gleam | Of all things.” There is a single spirit pervading all. Smith and Clare do not 
usually share this monism, stressing instead the variety of things. As Clare puts it in 
“Shadows of Taste:” 
Not mind alone the instinctive mood declares 
But birds and flowers and insects are its heirs 
Taste is their joyous heritage and they 
All choose for joy in a peculiar way (MP, III.303, ll. 3-6, my emphasis) 
He goes on to describe the different joys of nature, and the different minds that enjoy 
them. Smith, in “Studies by the Sea,” takes an image of something singular and 
deep—the ocean—and reveals its variety: 
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He who with more enquiring eyes  
Doth this extensive scene survey,  
Beholds innumerous changes rise,  
As various winds its surface sway … (289, ll. 11-14) 
The primary function of description in Smith and Clare’s sonnets is to evoke the 
world, rather than to symbolise the self. But the world constantly reminds Smith of 
her own emotional and social deformities, even when she describes its beauties with 
clarity. And describing the world allows Clare to rid himself of the form of selfhood 
altogether. It only remains to consider what Smith and Clare write when they do 
refer to their selves. What does the word “I” mean in these poems of teeming nature? 
3.4 The Meaning of “I” 
So far, we have seen how Smith and Clare portray self-deformation in their sonnets: 
through self-contradictory or highly open form, and through precise and varied 
natural description. And yet they will insist on using the word “I” to denote an 
individual whose experiences we read about: 
I feel I am;—I only know I am,  
And plod upon the earth, as dull and void:  
Earth’s prison chilled my body with its dram  
Of dullness, and my soaring thoughts destroyed,  
I fled to solitudes from passions dream,  
But strife persued—I only know, I am,  
I was a being created in the race  
Of men disdaining bounds of place and time:— 
A spirit that could travel o’er the space  
Of earth and heaven,—like a thought sublime,  
Tracing creation, like my maker, free,—  
A soul unshackled—like eternity,  
Spurning earth’s vain and soul debasing thrall  
But now I only know I am,—that’s all. (Clare, LP, I.397-98) 
With transport, once, sweet bird! I hail’d thy lay, 
 And bade thee welcome to our shades again, 
To charm the wandering poet’s pensive way 
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 And soothe the solitary lover’s pain: 
But now!—such evils in my lot combine, 
As shut my languid sense—to Hope’s dear voice and thine! 
 (Smith, SP, “LV. The return of the nightingale. Written in May 1791,” ll. 9-14) 
There is a strange contradiction in the “I”s of these poems. Both are showpieces, in 
which Clare and Smith display their imaginative powers. Clare spends seven lines 
describing in sublime tones the power of his mind to encompass the universe. Smith 
spends the first eight lines of her sonnet describing with a poet’s sensitivity the 
“prelusive note” of the nightingale (l. 4). But the “I” of Clare’s sonnet insists he can 
no longer imagine these eternal spaces, and the “I” of Smith’s sonnet insists that her 
“sense” is now shut to the nightingale’s song. Both poets try to resolve this 
contradiction by contrasting their past and future selves. It was Clare’s former self 
that could “trace creation,” but “now” he is reduced to a mere rump of existence. It 
was Smith’s former self that “hail’d” the nightingale, but “now” she is deaf. These 
solutions do not resolve the contradiction, however, because it is Clare’s present “I” 
that imagines his former powers, and it is Smith’s present “I” that hears the 
nightingale’s “soft voice of young and present Love” (l. 7). We have encountered a 
similarly contradictory “I” already, in Barbauld’s poem “Life,” when the poet’s 
reflections on death lead her into a thicket of paradoxes: who am “I” without life, 
and what is my life without “me”? When the self is deformed, self-reference becomes 
complicated. 
Linguists call the self-referential aspect of language “deixis,” of which there 
are three main kinds: person, place, and time.113 When I speak or write, I can refer 
to myself personally (“I,” “me,” “mine”), spatially (“here,” “there”) or temporally 
(“now,” “then”). All these words put the things of the world in relation to me. As 
                                                   
113 Yan Huang, Pragmatics, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 173. 
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Culler observes, we usually read poems deictically, imagining a “speaker” or 
“persona” who utters the words of the poems in a more-or-less specific time and 
place.114 He is right to criticise this approach—even the straightforwardly 
autobiographical sonnets we have just considered are problematic if we assume a 
singular speaker utters them. The better approach is Käte Hamburger’s: “for the 
behaviour of the lyric ‘I’, no norm or aesthetic definition can be given. … In a 
hundredfold nuances it appears or does not appear.”115 As we will see, the deformed 





Clare, n=638; Smith, n=83; Wordsworth, n=514. 
                                                   
114 Culler, Theory of the Lyric, 77. This is precisely Abrams’s approach in Abrams, “Stucture and Style 
in the Greater Romantic Lyric.” 
115 “Es klärt letztlich darüber auf, daß für das Verhalten des lyrischen Ich keine Norm, keine 
ästhetische Definition zu geben ist. … In hunderfältigen Nuancen erscheint es oder erscheint es 
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The first surprise is shown in Figure 3.7. It may not be surprising to learn that 
Smith uses the word “I” more frequently than either Clare or Wordsworth, but it 
may come as a shock that Wordsworth, whom Keats described as a poet of the 
“egotistical sublime,” uses “I” the least often of all three. If we include all first-person 
pronouns and possessives, a more complex pattern emerges (Figure 3.8). This graph 
does suggest what we might originally have suspected, that Clare uses the least 
person-deixis. When singular and plural are added together, Wordsworth uses 15.21 
first-person words per 1000, while Clare uses only 13.93. The lonely Smith is the 
least likely of the three to use the plural first-person. What causes these different 





*Singular: I, me, my, mine, myself. Plural: we, us, our, ours, ourselves. 
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A good place to start is with place and time deixis, with where and when the 
“I”s of these poets are. We can get a good overall picture of place and time in these 
sonnets by considering their titles. Titles are often integral to lyric poems, observes 
Hamburger. Lyrics are usually cryptic and concise, and their titles can indicate their 
“Sinnzusammenhang,” the way their meaning hangs together.116 Smith usually uses 
her titles to specify the place and time of composition: “Written on the Sea-Shore.—
October 1784,” “Written on Farm Wood, South Downs, in May 1784.” Bishop Hunt 
argues that these titles were themselves a great innovation. Not only did they add a 
new confessional dimension to lyric poetry, but they made “the activity of writing, 
of artistic creation, … an inseparable part of the complex experience which [the poet] 
describes.”117 Smith also used the title pages, frontispieces, epigraphs and prefaces 
to her poems to re-emphasise this autobiographical element.118 As we know, Smith 
also wrote sonnets in the voices of fictional characters, such as Werther or her own 
Orlando and Celestina. But in these cases too her titles typically specify the place 
and time of supposed composition: “Supposed to have been written in a church-
yard, over the grave of a young woman of nineteen.” “Supposed to have been written 
in America.” Wordsworth copied Smith’s technique,119 giving his sonnets titles like 
“London, 1802” and “At Applethwaite, Near Keswick, 1804.” He would also add 
datelines to some of his sonnets: “At the head of Glencoe,” “(Landing at the mouth 
of the Derwent, Workington.),” “(During an Eclipse of the Sun, July 17.)” 
Clare’s titles are normally of a different kind: “Nature,” “The Pismire,” “A 
Prayer,” “Wood Pictures in Winter.” These shorter titles usually just identify the 
things Clare describes in the poem, rather than identifying the time and place of 
                                                   
116 Ibid., 179. 
117 C. Hunt, “Wordsworth and Charlotte Smith,” Wordsworth Circle 1 (1970): 88. 
118 Labbe, Charlotte Smith, 24-49. 
119 Hunt, “Wordsworth and Smith,” 89. 
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composition. Thirty of his sonnets are simply called “Sonnet.” As we have seen, 
Clare’s rhyme and syntax make it difficult to read many of his sonnets as records of 
particular moments. Usually he describes typical or repeatable experiences. If you 
go for a walk, you might see “The Gipsy Camp” or “The Mock Bird” or “The Last of 
April.” But you certainly won’t see Smith’s “the Sea-Shore.—October 1784” or 
Wordsworth’s “Applethwaite, Near Keswick, 1804.” 
Clare’s unspecific titles are accordingly shorter than Smith’s and 
Wordsworth’s. Figure 3.9 is a box-and-whisker plot of the length in words of their 
titles. Each segment of a box, and each line extending from it, represents one quarter 
of the poet’s titles. The line in the middle of each box is the median. The dots 
represent outliers, whose distance from the upper quartile is more than 1.5 times 
the length of the box. Half of Smith’s titles are 3 to 8 words long, so the box length 
is 5, and the upper quartile is 8. Any title longer than 15.5 words is therefore an 
outlier. Smith’s titles are longer in general, and she also wrote the longest in the 
corpus: “Written Sept. 1791, during a remarkable thunder storm, in which the moon 
was perfectly clear, while the tempest gathered in various directions near the earth.” 





Clare n=339; Smith n=85; Wordsworth n=387. 
(Sonnets without title excluded.) 
Another distinguishing feature is Smith’s and Wordsworth’s use of dates. 
Smith includes the date in 11 of her titles, Wordsworth does so in 45 of his titles and 
12 of his datelines. Clare only includes dates in two of his titles: “1830” and “The 
Hail Storm in June 1831.” In neither case does he use the date to specify the time of 
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These vague allusions to a country’s wrongs  
Where one says ‘aye’ and others answer ‘no’ 
In contradictions from a thousand tongues  
Till like to prison cells her freedoms grow  
Becobwebed with these oft repeated songs (MP IV.506, ll. 1-5) 
This poem refers to the time of composition, only to entreat poets to eschew topical 
references and avoid the “vague allusions” of all poetry on contemporary themes. 
His other dated sonnet is different. It refers to an event in 1831, but contains no 
reference to the time of writing: 
Darkness came o’er like chaos—& the sun  
As startled with the terror seemed to run  
With quickened dread behind the beetling cloud  
The old wood sung like nature in her shroud  
& each old rifted oak tree’s mossy arm  
Seemed shrinking from the presence of the storm  
& as it nearer came they shook beyond  
Their former fears—as if to burst the bond  
Of earth that bound them to that ancient place  
Where danger seemed to threaten all their race  
Who had withstood all tempests since their birth  
Yet now seemed bowing to the very earth  
Like reeds they bent like drunken men they reeled  
Till man from shelter ran & sought the open field (MP, IV.226-27) 
The sonnet reads like a newspaper article rather than an autobiography. There is 
some deixis: words like “came,” “seemed,” “behind,” “nearer” and “now” indicate 
that the storm is seen from a human perspective, below the clouds and among the 
trees. But the only human mentioned is “man” in the abstract, and it is not clear 
whether the poem describes the speaker’s own experience of the storm, or is a third-
person account. The effect is to generalise the experience. This is what it is like to 
experience a storm. It is not a record of how a particular mind experienced a 
particular storm at a particular time. This makes the very concept of a speaker or 
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self in these poems paradoxical. To Clare’s formless self, there seems to be no 
difference between his own experience and anyone else’s. 
This contrast becomes even clearer if we compare the words these poets use 
to write their titles (Table 3.2). Wordsworth and Smith use words like “written,” 
“composed,” “on” and “at,” to draw attention to the time and place of composition. 
The most common deictic markers in Clare’s titles are different: “spring,” “summer,” 
“autumn” and “morning” are cycles of nature. Time in Clare’s sonnets is not personal 
and autobiographical, but cyclical and common. 
Table 3.2 
Top ten title words 
Clare Smith Wordsworth 
Word Freq* Word Freq* Word Freq* 
the 108.24 the 122.22 the 111.30 
sonnet 48.24 to 83.33 of 80.00 
to 45.88 of 51.85 to 27.25 
a 41.18 written 44.44 in 24.93 
of 34.12 a 37.04 a 22.03 
in 27.06 in 35.19 on 22.03 
spring 16.47 on 31.48 at 19.71 
summer 16.47 from 25.93 and 13.33 
autumn 12.94 at 16.67 composed 11.59 
morning 12.94 by 12.96 by 11.01 
*Per 1000 words 
Two more words in this table raise a fiendish problem in Smith scholarship: 
“from” and “by.” Smith uses these words to indicate a translation—“From 
Petrarch”—or to indicate that the sonnet comes from one of her novels—“… from the 
novel Celestina.” And although Smith twice uses “by” to describe the location of her 
sonnet, her other five uses of the word indicate sonnets supposedly written “by 
Werter.” This raises the old problem of how autobiographical Smith’s sonnets really 
are. As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, Smith admitted that at least one of 
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her apparently autobiographical poems—her nightjar sonnet—described an 
experience that never happened. Yet we have seen how she refers to events in her 
life, gives the date of composition, and sequences her sonnets to give them an 
autobiographical dimension. Scholars have spilt much ink over the balance of 
autobiography and artifice in Elegiac Sonnets. Claire Knowles argues that the most 
important aspect of Smith’s sensibility was sincerity, especially when compared to 
the make-believe performances of the Della Cruscans.120 Labbe and Andrews argue 
that the Sonnets comprise a “constructed” or “fictional” autobiography.121 
Backscheider argues that they include too much “artifice and performance” to be 
really autobiographical.122 Contrasting Smith with Clare indicates that this whole 
debate is on the wrong footing. All autobiography is artificial. The fact that 
Wordsworth turned his real romance with Annette Vallon into the fake story of Julia 
and Vaudracour does not make The Prelude any less autobiographical. Indeed, post-
structuralists argue that every autobiography is artificial to the core. Our 
autobiographies are always framed by literary conventions, which decide in advance 
what sort of structure and significance our lives may have.123 What really makes a 
text autobiographical is not its authenticity but its deixis. Does it refer to the author, 
to somebody else or to no-one at all? Clare tried to eliminate autobiographical 
references from his sonnets by generalising them. Smith and Wordsworth did their 
best to convince the reader that the “I” of each sonnet was a particular person in a 
particular place. This person either was the author, or resembled them closely (in 
the case of Smith’s translated sonnets and dramatic monologues). Smith might play 
                                                   
120 Claire Knowles, Sensibility and Female Poetic Tradition, 1780–1860: The Legacy of Charlotte 
Smith (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 49. 
121 Labbe, 8; Kerri Andrews, “‘Herself […] Fills the Foreground’: Negotiating Autobiography in the 
Elegiac Sonnets and The Emigrants," in Charlotte Smith in British Romanticism, ed. Jacqueline 
Labbe (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2008), 14. 
122 Backscheider, 325-26. 
123 See Paul de Man, The Rhetoric of Romanticism (New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), chap. 
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fast and loose with the truth, but she presents her sonnets as the history of her own 
particular life. 
So far I’ve been drawing a contrast between the “I”s of Smith and 
Wordsworth, which wander the world and write sonnets about what they see and 
do, and the “I” of Clare, which is a kind of self-annihilating mystic, a Christian who 
has achieved self-annihilation, or a Sufi who has achieved fanaa, and who no longer 
has particular experiences of their own. But there are also important contrasts 
between Smith and Wordsworth. Smith uses the first-person singular three times 
more than Wordsworth, and he frequently uses the first-person plural, which Smith 
avoids (Figure 3.8, above). To get to the bottom of this difference, we must examine 
exactly what Smith, Clare and Wordsworth use the first person singular to do. Figure 
3.10 shows literally what “I” does in Clare, Smith and Wordsworth’s sonnets. 
Probably the most striking single pattern is the frequency of “I love” in Smith and 
Clare. In 9.5% of cases, Clare’s “I” loves in the present tense. Smith’s “I” loves only 
4.1% of the time, but “I love” is still the most common I-phrase in her sonnets, tying 
with “I mark.” Wordsworth, by contrast, never once writes “I love” in a sonnet, 
though twice he writes “I loved” and once “I have loved.”124 
                                                   
124 Strictly speaking, he only writes “I loved” once: “For she was one I loved exceedingly” (WW, 346, 
my emphasis) In the other instance, he writes: “I, who accompanied with faithful pace | Cerulean 
Duddon …, | And loved with spirit …” (WW, 329, my emphasis). This example demonstrates my 
method. I have in each case found every finite verb whose subject is “I.” I have treated periphrastic 
forms such as “have been brought up” or “cannot see” as a single verb. But I have not included to-
forms in the verb: “I love to see” has simply been counted as an instance of “I love.” 





Scholars have often noted Clare’s tendency to write “I love.” Referring to 
“Emmonsails Heath in Winter,” Barrell suggests that “the words at the beginning of 
the sentence, ‘I love to see’, are mainly used as a peg on which to hang a continuum 
of images and events, united primarily in that they are all things that the speaker 
claims he loves to see.”125 Like so many mystical poets, Clare claims to achieve self-
annihilation through love. His “I” flows out into things, and his self dissolves into 
“images and events.” The effect is particularly clear in one of his last sonnets: 
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I love to see the summer beaming forth  
And white wool rock clouds sailing to the north  
I love to see the wild flowers come again  
And Mare blobs stain with gold the meadow drain  
And water lilies whiten on the flood  
Where reed clumps rustle like a wind shook wood  
Where from her hiding place the Moor Hen pushes  
And seeks her flag nest floating in bull rushes  
I like the willow leaning half way o’er  
The clear deep lake to stand upon its shore  
I love the hay grass when the flower head swings  
To summer winds and insects happy wings  
That sport about the meadow the bright day  
And see bright beetles in the clear lake play (LP, II.1024) 
All this “I” does is revel in the existence of what surrounds it. Its sole activity is to 
“love” or “like” whatever strikes its senses. It is disembodied, a roving eye or ear 
flitting from place to place—although we will see below that Clare actually weaves a 
certain kind of embodiment into many of his sonnets. 
Of the five times Smith’s “I” loves, three are similar to Clare’s. Impersonating 
Werther, she tells the North Star: “I love to see thy sudden light appear” (XXIII, l. 
7). Speaking in her own voice of the river Arun, she says “I love to listen to the hollow 
sighs, | Thro’ the half-leafless wood that breathes the gale.” (XXII, ll. 3-4) And in 
one of her finest sonnets, she addresses the night: 
SONNET XXXIX. TO NIGHT. 
I love thee, mournful, sober-suited Night!  
 When the faint Moon, yet lingering in her wane,  
And veil’d in clouds, with pale uncertain light  
 Hangs o’er the waters of the restless main.  
In deep depression sunk, the enfeebled mind  
 Will to the deaf cold elements complain,  
 And tell the embosom’d grief, however vain,  
To sullen surges and the viewless wind.  
Tho’ no repose on thy dark breast I find,  
 I still enjoy thee—cheerless as thou art;  
 For in thy quiet gloom the exhausted heart  
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Is calm, tho’ wretched; hopeless, yet resign’d.  
While to the winds and waves its sorrows given,  
May reach—tho’ lost on earth—the ear of Heaven! 
In this poem, as in Clare’s, love is a means of self-forgetfulness. Just as the calm 
moon hangs over the “restless main,” loving the night lightens the weight of Smith’s 
sad destiny—she is “calm” and “resign’d” despite her wretchedness and despair. Of 
course Smith refers the night to her own particular experience. She implies that she, 
“in deep depression sunk,” is particularly fit to love this “mournful” and “cheerless” 
time of day. Her “I,” however, does not analyse or comprehend. It simply gives itself 
to the night, loving and “enjoying” it, and in so doing strives for communion with 
God. The aim of this loving “I” is to dissolve itself, but unlike Clare’s “I” it never quite 
achieves it. This unfulfilled longing is a distinctive feature of Smith’s sonnets: her 
“I” constantly “would” that things were different. It pursues, wishes, mourns, is 
doomed, resigns and deplores. Clare’s “I” does few of these things. When it isn’t 
loving, it mostly interacts with the landscape, reclining, stooping, standing, and 
plucking. It feels and thinks and wonders, but in general terms. Wordsworth’s “I” is 
similar to Smith and Clare’s, in that it spends time seeing things in nature. But where 
Smith’s “I” simply marks what appears, Wordsworth’s is more likely to gaze on them 
intentionally. And where Smith and Clare’s “I”s abandon themselves through love, 
Wordsworth’s is more certain that “I am.” 
Smith’s sense of lonely yearning helps to explain why she uses the first-
person singular so much less often than Clare and Wordsworth. “We” is a complex 
pronoun, because of whom it can include. Sometimes it includes everyone in Britain 
or perhaps on earth: 
Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers (Wordsworth, WW, 206) 
    But a time  
Like this we live in, when the abject chime  
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Of echoing Parasite is best approved,  
 Was not for thee. (CSP, “To the shade of Burns,” LXXXII, ll. 7-9) 
Or it might refer to the speaker and their addressee: 
Turnill, we toiled together all the day 
& lived like hermits from the boys at play (Clare, MP V.248, ll. 1-2) 
Or simply to the speaker and some of their friends at a particular place in time: 
Hark from amid the corn that happy brawl 
’Tis village childern running after flowers 
To this void bosom how the sounds recall  
Memories again of childhood’s merry hours, 
When through the garden pails or o’er the wall  
We reached at garden flowers with eager hands, 
Or boldly sought the field flowers free for all (Clare, MP II.303, ll. 1-7) 
When Clare and Wordsworth evoke rural life, the “we” is quite effective at creating 
a sense of community, of shared experience. Clare frequently evokes the collective 
life of Northamptonshire—particularly the Helpston of his youth—while 
Wordsworth frequently evokes the communities of humanity, Christendom or 
Britain. Clare dissolves himself into these communities. Wordsworth asserts his 
membership. Smith rarely expresses such solidarity with a human community. She 
is far more likely to express solidarity with a lonely refugee (LXIX), wandering 
madman (LXX) or pile of bones washed out of a graveyard in a spring tide (XLIV). 
Analysis of “my” brings out some different features of Smith, Clare and 
Wordsworth’s person-deixis (Figure 3.11). All three poets have the same main use 
for “my”—to refer to their own hearts, minds or souls. It is not surprising to find 
three great Romantic poets musing on the nature of consciousness. But here the 
similarities end. “My” asserts possession. We use it to identify what things are ours, 
what the constituent parts of our selves are. For Clare, life is largely a physical affair. 
He is the only one of our sonneteers who refers repeatedly to his feet, staff, stool, 
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limbs, nourishment, clothes, crutch or door. Wordsworth refers repeatedly to “my 
sight.” Clare is more likely to refer to “my eye.” Scott Hess argues that Clare is more 
“embodied” than other Romantic poets.126 This seems like a perverse argument 
when we consider how little Clare refers to himself in his poems, but it is true that 
he seems more interested in his breathing, sweating, fleshly body than Smith and 
Wordsworth are in their own. He is in fact the only one of our sonneteers to refer to 
“my body” at all. Clare lives in a world of things, and from this perspective he too is 
often just a bunch of things. 
Smith has a more abstract sense of what belongs to her, and she tends to 
brood on her place in the universe’s providential scheme. Her intense sense of 
alienation leads her to brood on her fate, lot, destiny and tomb. Clare tends to talk 
about his journey or his walks. Smith is more likely to refer to her “way,” a broader 
and more abstract concept: “… my weary way | Ends but in sad vicissitudes of care” 
(LXII, ll. 12-13). As we might expect, Smith uses the word “my” 1.5 times more 
frequently than Clare, and twice as often as Wordsworth. Experience constantly 
throws her back on herself. The patriotic Wordsworth refers to his country, and the 
domestic Wordsworth refers to his nurslings, child or parents. When Smith refers 
to her others, they are always individuals that participate in her misery: her dead 
daughter Anna, her sympathising friend Harriet, Werther’s desolate Charlotte or 
Emmeline, the distant lover of the forlorn Godolphin from Smith’s novel Emmeline, 
The Orphan of the Castle (1788). Smith’s life is both abstract and particular. She is 
trapped in a painful corner of an implacable universe, and surrounded by things 
which press on her mind and recall her isolation. 
                                                   
126 Scott Hess, “John Clare, William Wordsworth, and the (Un)Framing of Nature,” John Clare 
Society Journal 27 (2008): 33. 
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Figure 3.11 




Smith and Clare share much in common as sonneteers. They both experimented 
with the traditional rhymes and metres of the sonnet to destabilise its usual feeling 
of closure and resolution. They also experimented with the form of the sonnet 
sequence, though for different purposes: Smith strung nearly all her sonnets into a 
long chronology of her own life, while Clare created short, enigmatic and impersonal 
sequences. They share a sense of nature’s variety and objectivity, and an “I” that tries 
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shared sense of the self as a small, fragile, lonely thing fit for little but the feeling of 
pain. They had different solutions to this feeling of lonely isolation. Clare deformed 
his sonnets till they had no form at all, revelled in nature’s variety till it eliminated 
his self, and turned his “I” into a slot for the world to pour through. Smith shaped 
her sonnets into prison cells that snap shut, described nature’s objectivity to assert 
her own alienation from it, and turned her “I” into an inky wound. Clare wrote some 
sonnets of Wordsworthian contentment, and others of Smithian dejection, but the 
bulk of them express a mystical self-abandonment. Though Smith’s love of nature 
and longing for death present her with the possibility of self-abandonment in her 
sonnets, she never successfully shuffles of her wounded self in any of them. It was 
only in her beautiful children’s poems, and in her final masterpiece, “Beachy Head” 
(1807), that she would approach Clare’s formless mode of being: 
An early worshipper at Nature’s shrine,ġ
I loved her rudest scenes—warrens, and heaths,ġ
And yellow commons, and birch-shaded hollows, 
And hedge rows, bordering unfrequented lanes 
Bowered with wild roses, and the clasping woodbine 
Where purple tassels of the tangling vetch 
With bittersweet, and bryony inweave, 
And the dew fills the silver bindweed’s cups—ġ
I loved to trace the brooks whose humid banksġ
Nourish the harebell, and the freckled pagil;ġ
And stroll among o’ershadowing woods of beech,ġ
Lending in Summer, from the heats of noon 
A whispering shade; while haply there reclines 
Some pensive lover of uncultur’d flowers … (SP, 231, ll. 346-59) 
Even here, however, her self-annihilation is expressed in the past tense. 
In their autobiographical prose, Smith and Clare explained the concepts of 
self-deformation which inspired their sonnets. Smith deformed herself through a 
hard battle with marriage, property and the law, which taught her that women, 
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particularly women of spirit and rationality, had no place in the England of her day. 
Motherhood was her defining struggle, and she fought in vain for years to secure her 
children the lives she felt they deserved as members of their class. But as a married 
women, she was a femme couverte, a non-person subsumed by her husband’s 
identity. She feared he would expropriate her royalties.127 She lamented the 
marriage articles that gave him her fortune and made no provision for a 
separation.128 Her long struggle to settle her father-in-law’s will left her with a 
Kafkaesque notion of society: 
My whole time has been occupied in attending to the affairs of my family, on which 
I begin to think a spell certainly rests which will for the small remainder of my life 
render my endeavours after peace & competence as fruitless as those attempts have 
been in which I have consumed the best of my days.129 
Like Adeline Mowbray, Smith was tempted to believe that some secret universal 
force, some “spell,” was tormenting her for mysterious reasons. Of course, had she 
been less genteel, she might have led quite a pleasant life on her income—as her 
friend Joseph Johnson pointed out.130 Had she been meeker, the rich men who 
patronised her might not have abandoned her in her hour of need. Instead she wrote 
her heroic poetry. The deformed selfhood it portrays, Stokes rightly points out, 
corresponds to the “actual condition of being female” in the society she knew.131 
Clare also lost himself in the legal and economic system of his society. 
Enclosure transformed the landscape of his youth, changing its look and awakening 
within him the ancient traditions of rural protest. Literacy separated him from his 
own class. Madness and fame took him first to London and then to Northborough, 
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and finally the asylum. In most of his sonnets, his elimination of self is a beautiful 
thing, an openness to a universe of fine and wonderful objects. But in a late fragment 
on “Self-Identity,” Clare revealed the darker side of this worldview. He argues that 
the sense of self is essential to happiness and morality: “Self Identity is one of the 
finest principles in everybody’s life and fills up the outline of honest truth in the 
decision of character—a person who denies himself must either be a mad man or a 
coward.” This is a surprising argument from a man whose poetry can be read as one 
great act of self-denial. But he goes on to clarify his sense of what the self is: 
… there are two impossibilities which can never happen—I shall never be in three 
places at once nor ever change to a woman and that ought to be some comfort amid 
this moral or immoral ‘changing’ in life …132 
For Clare, the self is ultimately nothing but a location in space and time, and the fact 
of his own maleness. In the asylum he is reduced to a rump of self. All the beautiful 
buzzing things in his sonnets are vulnerable to “changing.” They come and go 
indifferently, and in the end Clare is left with only the tattiest shreds of a personality. 
His sense of the smallness and vulnerability of his self helps to explain the sheer joy 
with which he lives when, like Vivian, he abandons himself and occupies the present. 
Smith’s and Clare’s self-abnegating sonnets challenge our received narrative 
of the Romantic sonnet, and of Romantic poetry generally. It is simply not the case 
that Wordsworth introduced a new paradigm of the sonnet, informed by a new sense 
of self-formation, which replaced the paradigm introduced by Smith. Her sonnets 
and sense of deformed selfhood were emulated throughout the Romantic period, 
not only by Clare, but also by sonneteers such as Keats and Shelley and the later 
Coleridge. She had her opponents, such as Seward, Robinson, Hemans and 
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Wordsworth himself.133 All these sonneteers shared similar concerns, most of which 
Smith first raised: the self’s place in nature, the relationship between the form of the 
sonnet and the form of the self, the “legitimacy” or “illegitimacy” of different kinds 
of sonnet, the relationship between poetry and the poet’s actual experiences. Smith 
and Clare’s quest for self-abandonment, hers a failure, his often a success, was one 
response to these concerns. 
Their sonnets have implications for our understanding of Romantic poetry as 
a whole. Curran claims that poetic form is “always a ground for self-mirroring and 
self-creation” in Romantic poetry,134 but we have seen how for Smith and Clare, 
poetic form could equally be a weapon of self-destruction. We should not discount 
by any means the organic forms of poems like Wordsworth’s sonnets, but simply 
note that the quintessential Romantic themes of confession, natural description and 
formal experimentation could also lead to the self-deformation of a Smith or a Clare. 
We should not be surprised that Smith and Clare had similar attitudes about 
the form of the self and the form of poetry. Clare was influenced directly by the older 
Smith, inspired by the “spontaneity and immediacy” of her sonnets.135 There were 
also important similarities in their circumstances. Bate points out that women and 
the labouring classes faced similar challenges in becoming poets, and breaking into 
“a literary world dominated by well-to-do, well-educated, well-connected men.”136 
Curran has argued that the kind of detailed description we usually associate with 
                                                   
133 Though Wordsworth emulated and praised her poetry as late as 1833, as evidenced by his oft-cited 
footnote to “Stanzas Suggested in a Steamboat off Saint Bees’ Heads:” “The form of stanza of this 
poem, and something of the style of versification, are adopted from … Charlotte Smith: a lady to 
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Clare was actually a common feature of women’s poetry in the period, and that such 
detailed description usually “suggest[s] a decentered mind or a society compounded 
of incongruities.”137 Clare and Smith both portrayed the decentred mind of the 
outsider in their poems, even if their brilliant experiments with poetry earn them a 
place at the centre of the Romantic canon. 
They were not the only outsiders prone to detailed description and a 
decentred view of the self. William Hazlitt made just the same point about another 
interloper trying to make their mark on literary London: 
The graceful ease with which he lends himself to every subject, the genial spirit with 
which he indulges in every sentiment, prevents him from giving their full force to the 
masses of things, from connecting them into a whole. He wants intensity, strength, 
and grandeur. His mind does not brood over the great and permanent; it glances over 
the surfaces, the first impressions of things, instead of grappling with the deep-rooted 
prejudices of the mind, its inveterate habits, and that ‘perilous stuff that weighs upon 
the heart.’ His pen, as it is rapid and fanciful, wants momentum and passion. It 
requires the same principle to make us thoroughly like poetry, that makes us like 
ourselves so well, the feeling of continued identity.138 
The poet is Thomas Moore, Irishman, and the first Catholic ever admitted to Trinity 
College Dublin. As we saw in Chapter 1, Hazlitt began his writing career with his 
Essay on the Principles of Human Action (1804), in which he claimed the self was 
purely imaginary and ought to be eradicated through benevolence. By the time he 
published this lecture in 1818, he clearly had a different opinion. Now he felt that a 
“feeling of continued identity” was essential not only to our own happiness, but to 
poetry, and Moore’s various and detailed poems simply did not give this sense of a 
well-formed self. 
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Moore was not simply a poet. He was also one of the greatest biographers of 
the Romantic period. In his best biography, he tackled the most Romantic life of all, 
that of his friend, Lord Byron, a man of titanic genius as well as physical and moral 
deformity. In that great work, Moore would not only detail the causes of his friend’s 
moral derangement, but would come to express a deep scepticism about the very 





LIFE: THOMAS MOORE’S 
MULTIFORM BYRON 
 
One of my earliest recollections is gazing on the bright blue sky as I lay in my little 
bed, before my hour of rising came, and listening with delighted attention to the 
ringing of a peal of bells. I had heard that heaven was beyond those blue skies, and I 
had been taught that there was the home of the good, and I fancied that those sweet 
bells were ringing in heaven. What a happy error! Neither illusion nor reality, at any 
subsequent period of my life, ever gave me such a sensation of pure, heartfelt delight, 
as I experienced when morning after morning I looked on that blue sky, and listened 
to those bells, and fancied that I heard the music of the home of the blest, pealing 
from the dwelling of the most high. Well do I remember the excessive mortification 
I felt when I was told the truth, and had the nature of bells explained to me; and, 
though I have since had to awake often from illusions that were dear to my heart, I 
am sure that I never woke from one with more pain than I experienced when forced 
to forego this sweet illusion of my imaginative childhood.1 
O GENRE is more Romantic than life. Nothing is more Romantic than 
the struggling artist or poet, “pursued from exile to exile,” whose 
banishment is the price of their vision.2 In Blackadder, Percy Shelley 
is suicidal, Byron tubercular, and Coleridge unconscious from drug use—the myth 
of the Romantic life endures. Amelia Opie, lying in her bed as a child, thought she 
could hear the music of heaven. She awoke to the Truth, but at what price? She is a 
secular Eve, who must lose her innocence to obtain knowledge. Hearing the music 
of heaven was a precious experience, but has become a tarnished memory. In many 
                                                   
1 Amelia Opie, quoted in Cecilia Lucy Brightwell, Memorials of the Life of Amelia Opie, 2 ed. 
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Romantic lives, a youth of promise gives way to an adulthood of sadness and 
compromise.3 This brings the question of self-deformation to the fore. Did Opie 
advance or regress in her growth, when she ceased to hear heaven sing? 
It may be objected that life is no genre. Surely it is the raw material of 
literature, not its finished product? But the Life is a literary form, which has evolved 
as society and culture have changed. Romantic autobiography has long been 
recognised as a crucial genre of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. 
Not only were many of the most famous and enduring autobiographies of European 
literature written or published in the Romantic period, but—it is commonly 
argued—this is also when literature itself became autobiographical.4 The two poets 
who, by the 1830s, were widely considered the masters of their art in English were 
William Wordsworth and Lord Byron, two of the most self-obsessed writers in the 
English tradition. We have already noted the autobiographical strains in Smith’s 
sonnets. In the twentieth century, it was M.H. Abrams who drew most attention to 
the centrality of autobiography in Romanticism. It was during the Romantic period, 
he claims, that readers began to judge art “in terms of the relation of art to the 
artist.”5 All art was self-expression, and so was in some sense autobiographical. 
If the Romantics were great autobiographers, one might assume they were 
also great biographers. Strange to say, scholars have rarely held this to be true. In 
the last 50 years, a number of scholars have devoted attention to Romantic-era 
biographies, but their research has yet to spill over into mainstream accounts of the 
period.6 Opening the Encyclopedia of Life Writing (2001), and turning to the article 
                                                   
3 Kenneth R. Johnston, “The Unromantic Lives of Others: The Lost Generation of the 1790s,” 
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4 See above, pp. 3-4.  
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on “Britain: Romanticism and Life Writing,” one would be forgiven for thinking that 
not a single biography of note had been published between 1798 and 1850. The 
author discusses Lyrical Ballads (1798), The Prelude (1805-50) and Confessions of 
an English Opium-Eater (1821); they mention Dorothy Wordsworth’s journals and 
the travel writing of Mary Wollstonecraft, Mary Shelley and Ann Radcliffe; but they 
spare no ink for a single biography.7 A glance at the index to the latest Cambridge 
Companion to British Romanticism (2010) reveals numerous references to great 
autobiographies of the period, but even when great biographers like Anna Barbauld, 
Robert Southey, Mary Hays, William Godwin, Thomas Moore or John Gibson 
Lockhart appear in the index, their great biographies do not. 
Why is this the case? Scholars have given various answers. Leon Edel, 
Richard Holmes and Paula Backscheider all complain that literary criticism has yet 
to come to grips with biography as an art form. Biographies are typically read and 
reviewed as non-fiction titles about their subjects, rather than works of literary art. 
They are sorted by the subject’s surname on bookshop shelves, not the author’s.8 
They are poorly reviewed in newspapers and magazines, with reviewers rarely 
taking note of how a biography is actually structured.9 These arguments apply to all 
                                                   
“Boswell and the Romantics: A Chapter in the History of Biographical Theory,” ELH 27, no. 1 (1960); 
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biographies, but Romantic biographies may be at especially high risk of under-
appreciation. Joseph Reed, who wrote the first major study of Romantic biography, 
assigned virtually all the period’s biographies to the dustbin. The Romantic period 
was not a “golden age” for biography,10 and whatever good biographies were written 
in the period, they were not really Romantic.11 What exactly would constitute a truly 
Romantic biography he never explains. 
Reed represents one extreme of opinion. Later scholars have argued that the 
Romantics did have a coherent concept of the form. The “paradigm of romantic 
biography,” writes Mitzi Myers, was subjective, focussing on the “internal and 
private aspects” of the self.12 Francis Hart claims that between 1791 and 1831, James 
Boswell was the dominant influence.13 His The Life of Samuel Johnson (1791) was 
considered exemplary, and great biographers like Moore and Lockhart imitated it in 
their own works. They tried to bring biography close to autobiography, by quoting 
their subjects at extreme length and keeping their own narration to a minimum. 
Annette Cafarelli disagrees with Hart, arguing that a different tradition was more 
important: it was Samuel Johnson’s brief Lives of the Poets (1779-81) that 
influenced the really great Romantic biographers. When William Hazlitt and 
Thomas De Quincey turned to biography, they wrote pithy essays, not Boswellian 
epics.14 Holmes takes a more balanced view: the Romantics were influenced by both 
these great biographers. Johnson’s brief Life of Richard Savage (1744) provided the 
Romantics with a model of the Outcast Poet,15 while Boswell’s Johnson was an “epic” 
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of “common humanity,” demonstrating biography’s potential to vividly describe the 
whole personality.16 Both examples nourished the Romantic generation. 
With Myers and Holmes, we can see the familiar model of Romantic self-
formation rearing its head again. In the Romantic biography, the subject is an 
outcast, whose personality develops as they struggle with themselves and with the 
world. Later scholars have built on this model. Elinor Shaffer claims that 
nineteenth-century biographies developed alongside the Bildungsroman.17 Jane 
Darcy claims that Romantic biographers were innovative because they portrayed the 
“gradual development of an individual.”18 These scholars believe that Romantic 
Lives had optimistic plots of self-formation. Others argue that Romantic 
biographies tended to be more tragic. Julian North argues that the Romantic poets 
were portrayed as “inherently immature” in their first biographies.19 Alan 
Richardson argues that Romantic biographies of labouring-class poets tended to be 
supercilious, depicting their subjects as children of nature whose attempts to 
cultivate themselves led only to “poetic decline.”20 For all these scholars self-
formation is the key to Romantic biography. Romantic biographers saw it as their 
task to explain how their subjects became the people they became. Romantic 
theorists of biography agreed, according to Reed. Theorists held that a person was 
shaped by their society, and that a good biographer should show how a person 
developed within the prevailing social order.21 For Thomas Carlyle, for example, life 
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was a “Combat” between “Self” and “Environment,” and a good biography must tell 
the story of his combat.22 
Thus there seems to be an emerging consensus that Romantic biographers 
portrayed the self-formation of their subjects in much the same way, supposedly, 
that Romantic novelists portrayed that of their protagonists, or Romantic poets of 
themselves. Scholars have unearthed examples of both self-formation and self-
deformation in biographies of the period, but none has tackled the question of self-
deformation head on. North and Richardson have considered the concept, but on a 
narrow basis. North argues that in Romantic biography, self-formation was a matter 
of “domestication.” If a person developed successfully, they would be able to marry 
their successful public life to a successful private life. She leaves unanswered the 
question of how the Romantics thought public or private success might be achieved, 
and of how such success or failure might bear on a person’s personality. Richardson, 
meanwhile, is more interested in the political aspects of labouring-class biographies, 
rather than in what they say about the self. Thus the question remains: how did 
Romantic biographers write about self-deformation? What shape would a Romantic 
biography take if the biographer thought their subject had deformed themself? 
To answer these questions, let us turn to the most Romantic life of all: Lord 
Byron’s. He was, says Cafarelli, “the greatest biographical phenomenon of his age.”23 
He led a life of incredible achievement, of extraordinary combat between Self and 
Environment, of quest and high feeling—and, for his contemporaries at least, of self-
deformation. His marriage collapsed, his daughter Allegra died, he never saw his 
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other daughter Ada after her first months of life. His poetry was replete with the 
cynicism of premature age: 
My days are in the yellow leaf; 
 The flowers and fruits of love are gone; 
The worm, the canker, and the grief 
  Are mine alone! (BW, 112, ll. 5-8) 
His suppressed bisexuality and sexual love for his half-sister drove him across the 
seas—first to Italy where he felt his tongue lose its English, and then to Greece, 
where he died fortifying Missolonghi, only for the Ottomans to sack it the year he 
was gone. His failures added to his glamour: the scandal, the moral opprobrium, the 
death and the broken hearts. But they also brought his poetry into question. The 
literary critic Isaac D’Israeli felt Byron had never reached his potential: 
Lord BYRON has run but an unfinished course. … I consider that had he lived, the 
complete development of his powerful capacity, the elevation of his generous temper, 
in a word, the perfect formation of his character, would have been the necessary 
consequence of his nature.24 
Matthew Arnold took a dimmer view, as we saw in the Introduction: Byron lacked 
the “patience, knowledge, self-discipline, [and] virtue” required to form himself 
properly.25 He may have been one of the greatest poets of the nineteenth century, 
but he was flawed. As we have seen, it is this apparent failure in Byron’s self-
formation that has led many scholars to claim his poetry is not really Romantic. He 
was a cynic, whose failed quest for meaning locked him out of the true visionary 
strain of British Romantic poetry. He was a Charles Vivian or a Charlotte Smith, 
rather than a William Wordsworth. 
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There are over 200 biographies of Byron,26 but one stands out above the rest:  
Thomas Moore’s Letters and Journals of Lord Byron: with Notices of His Life 
(1830-31). It is written in the full Boswellian mode, comprising a huge bulk of 
Byron’s letters and journals, with Moore’s narrative woven among them. For many 
scholars of biography, it is a classic. George Saintsbury, Harold Nicholson, Francis 
Hart, Richard Altick, Joseph Reed, Richard Holmes, and Julian North all treat it as 
a major work in the history of the genre. A fellow Byron biographer, Fiona 
MacCarthy, finds Moore’s book a “remarkable production,” and says it became “the 
standard work” on Byron’s life in the nineteenth century.27 Moore was one of Byron’s 
closest friends, and had already written one popular biography, his Memoirs of the 
Life of Richard Brinsley Sheridan (1825), before tackling his noble friend’s 
explosive history. He would go on to write The Life and Death of Lord Edward 
Fitzgerald (1831), the great Irish revolutionary, completing a trilogy of radical, 
controversial lives. At the beginning of his Byron, Moore explained why the book 
was necessary. In Byron’s life, “the literary and the personal character were so 
closely interwoven” that neither could be understood without the other.28 He aimed 
to strip away the rumours and the slander, to penetrate the deep recesses of Byron’s 
character, and explain how that man, lying broken on the shores of Greece with wife, 
child and lovers abandoned behind him, could have written that poetry, sweeping 
Europe with its incredible power. As we will see, his assessment of Byron’s self-
deformation was extremely complex. He did not deny Byron’s “moral 
derangement,” and tried to explain its causes in Byron’s heredity and experience. 
But he also tried to do justice to the “variety” of Byron’s genius and the 
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changeableness of his “multiform” character. The result was a massive, 
philosophical biography, over the course of which Moore himself became sceptical 
of the concept of the self. Moore’s Byron is a tale of a man trying to form himself, 
failing, and disintegrating—but it was this very disintegration which allowed his 
genius to be so various and far-reaching. 
Moore’s immensely complex, indeed formless Byron was not the Byron the 
public encountered elsewhere. Hazlitt accused him of the same “querulous” egotism 
of which Hayley accused Smith.29 “Lord Byron shuts himself up too much in the 
impenetrable gloom of his own thoughts,” thought Hazlitt, and “There is nothing 
less poetical than this sort of unaccommodating selfishness.”30 Where Moore saw a 
complex personality impossible to tie down, John Galt made a simple diagnosis of 
“morbid sensibility.”31 In Glenarvon (1816), her bitter roman à clef, Caroline Lamb 
depicted her former lover as the Tempter himself: 
O better had it been to die than to see and hear Glenarvon [i.e. Byron]. … he would 
speak home to the heart; for he knew it in all its turnings and windings; and, at his 
will, he could rouse or tame the varying passions of those over whom he sought to 
exercise dominion. Yet, when by every art and talent he had raised the flames of love, 
tearing himself from his victim, he would leave her, and then weep for the agony of 
grief by which he saw her destroyed.32 
Moore included these aspects in his Byron, the misanthropy, the melancholy, the 
lasciviousness, but let none of these traits define his friend, whose personality he 
held to be indefinable. 
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Byron’s failed self-formation is not the only failure of Moore’s Byron. A 
biography is always to some extent also an autobiography, the story of the author’s 
quest to understand their subject.33 Many readers have argued that Moore himself 
failed in this quest. Nicholson thought Moore insufficiently “brave” to have really 
succeeded.34 Reed lurches between calling Moore’s Byron a “glorious failure” and “a 
sprawling, unselective agglomeration” which hardly manages to give even a “faint 
light of Byron’s personality.”35 Cafarelli simply claims it “did not fare well” and was 
“widely regarded as disappointing.”36 A large part of this dislike has surely to do with 
external factors: the sheer length of Moore’s biography (it is more than 500,000 
words long) and the fact that it was impossible he could reveal Byron’s incest or 
discuss his bisexuality with family members still living in 1830. But as we will see, 
there is a certain truth to the idea that Moore failed in his own quest. Moore is ever-
present in the book. The biography includes 143 letters Byron wrote to Moore, and 
a handful that Moore wrote back. Moore witnessed several key scenes of Byron’s life 
and narrates them in the first person. And as we shall see in §4.1, Moore’s 
philosophical, speculative style of writing lays bare his reasoning process as he 
analyses the written remains of his friend’s life. We accompany Moore on his quest 
for Byron’s personality, and we see him, in the end, unable to locate a “pivot of 
character” that ties the whole together (II.782). As we will see in §4.4, this leads him, 
like Maria Edgeworth and John Clare, to question the very concept of an integral 
self. 
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35 Reed, Early Nineteenth-Century Biography, vii, 102, 04. 
36 Cafarelli, Prose in the Age of Poets, 15. She includes Lockhart’s Scott in this damnation—a bold 
move, considering that previous scholars of biography, like Nicholson and Reed, have extolled it as 
the best or second-best biography in the language! 
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This chapter falls into four main sections. In §4.1, I discuss the philosophical 
style of Moore’s biography, showing how he derived his complex theory of self-
deformation from David Hume and D’Israeli, and developed a delightful, 
intellectual prose style to communicate it to his readers. In §§4.2-3, I use the novel 
technique of sentiment analysis to model the structure of the biography’s plot. 
Critics have often accused the book of being shapeless, but in §4.2 I use sentiment 
analysis to show how Moore gave Byron’s life the dual structure of a courtship plot 
(Volume 1) followed by a Smithian or Clarean tale of exile (Volume 2). In §4.3 I use 
the technique to compare Moore’s biography to several others from the period, 
revealing his distinctive sense of how self-deformation unfolds in time. Finally, in 
§4.4 I consider the autobiographical element in Moore’s Byron, and Moore’s 
ultimately sceptical realisations about the nature of selfhood. 
4.1 Moore’s Theory of Self-Deformation 
Charles Babbage was impressed when he read Moore’s book. Its “analysis” of Byron 
came “nearer to the clearness of science than any thing he had ever read.”37 And 
Babbage would know, being the greatest computer scientist of the nineteenth 
century (alongside, incidentally, Byron’s own daughter Ada). What was it about 
Moore’s method that drew this compliment from Babbage? After all, many of 
Moore’s more recent readers have found his analysis crude rather than scientific. 
Moore was a hero-worshipper, his critics say, who shielded Byron from critique by 
arguing that genius is above the moral judgement of mere mortals.38 There is a grain 
of truth to this argument. Moore did suggest that “such a character” as Lord Byron’s 
                                                   
37 14 February 1830, Thomas Moore, The Journal of Thomas Moore, ed. Wilfred S. Dowden, 6 vols. 
(Newark: University of Delware Press, 1983-1991), III.1290. 
38 Reed, Early Nineteenth-Century Biography, 112-14; Andrew Elfenbein, Byron and the Victorians 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 79; North, Melancholy and Literary Biography, 
74; Darcy, Domestication of Genius, 207. 
LIFE: MOORE’S MULTIFORM BYRON 
189 
cannot be judged “by ordinary standards” (I.656). But he did not take 1,493 quarto 
pages to make such a simple point. Instead, he developed a complex philosophy of 
selfhood, which he applied to the evidence of Byron’s letters and journals to uncover 
the truth of Byron’s genius and character. 
Moore had a clear sense of his biographical method: “Biography … is like dot 
engraving, made up of little minute points, which must be attended to, or the effect 
is lost.”39 He wanted to break Byron down into his elements, and see how they 
interacted. To do so, he had to collect, print and interpret every available scrap of 
detail—though much of it could not be published with decency. This preponderance 
of detail has sometimes distracted readers from Moore’s presence in the book. 
Moore’s Notices “might easily be comprised in a small duodecimo,” said the 
reviewer of Volume 1 in the Monthly Review.40 In fact, though Byron’s 561 letters 
and two journals do occupy most of the biography’s pages, Moore’s Notices are 
themselves a substantial literary work. The book is 568,000 words long, of which 
320,000 comprise Byron’s letters and journals, and 233,000 Moore’s Notices—
making the Notices about as long as Moby Dick (1851). The remaining 15,000 words 
include 18 other letters and the lengthy appendix. Moore’s Notices were no 
minnows—they were in fact more than twice as long as their nearest competitor, 
Galt’s Life of Lord Byron (1830) (Figure 4.1). 
                                                   
39 Quoted in Ronan Kelly, Bard of Erin: The Life of Thomas Moore (Dublin: Penguin, 2008), 4. 
40 “[Review of Moore's Byron, Volume 1],” Monthly Review NS 13 (1830): 219. 




Who Has Mo[o]re Words?  
 
What did Moore use all these words to say? Babbage was right to call his style 
scientific. It is necessary to quote at some length, in order to show how Moore 
expands and buttresses his analysis of Byron’s character. In this passage, he explains 
why the young Byron was a poor student of classics: 
But, notwithstanding his backwardness in the mere verbal scholarship, on which so 
large and precious a portion of life is wasted*, in all that general and miscellaneous 
knowledge, which is alone useful in the world, he was making rapid and even 
wonderful progress. With a mind too inquisitive and excursive to be imprisoned 
within statutable limits, he flew to subjects that interested his already manly tastes, 
with a zest which it is in vain to expect that the mere pedantries of school could 
inspire; and the irregular, but ardent, snatches of study which he caught in this way 
gave to a mind like his an impulse forwards, which left more disciplined and plodding 
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* “It is deplorable to consider the loss which children make of their time at most 
schools, employing, or rather casting away, six or seven years in the learning of words 
only, and that very imperfectly.”—COWLEY, Essays. 
“Would not a Chinese, who took notice of our way of breeding, be apt to imagine 
that all our young gentlemen were designed to be teachers and professors of the dead 
languages of foreign countries, and not to be men of business in their own?”—
LOCKE on Education. (I.60-61) 
This passage gives a good example of Moore’s analytical style. Presented with the 
evidence of Byron’s poor results at school, Moore is prompted to inquire what 
significance school results might have in a person’s life. What did it mean for Byron 
to have “a mind like his”? What qualities did his mind possess which barred him 
from success in “verbal scholarship”? Moore distinguishes “mere” schoolwork from 
real “progress” of mind, and like a proud parent insists that Byron’s bad grades were 
the result not of dullness, but of the “inquisitive” and “excursive” aspects of his mind 
that ensured his real improvement. Moore’s style is effusive. He writes long 
sentences and is clearly enthusiastic about the growth of his fellow-poet’s mind. But 
he is also intellectual and analytic, drawing distinctions and making arguments. 
Moore buttresses this analysis with a scholarly footnote, something he does 
constantly throughout the biography. He cites the great poet, Abraham Cowley, to 
show that Byron’s dislike of school was poetical. He cites the great philosopher, John 
Locke, to show that his own theory of Byron’s education has the sanction of a great 
thinker. Nearly all of Moore’s footnotes are like one of these two. He either cites 
another genius similar to Byron, or he cites a philosopher to justify his own analysis. 
In both cases, the footnotes evidence his own erudition, and give an intellectual cast 
to his style. 
Moore’s effusive, intellectual, scholarly style is the polar opposite of his great 
rival, Galt’s: 
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At Harrow [Byron] acquired no distinction as a student; indeed, at no period was he 
remarkable for steady application. Under Dr. Glennie he had made but little progress; 
and it was chiefly in consequence of his backwardness that he was removed from his 
academy. When placed with Dr. Drury, it was with an intimation that he had a 
cleverness about him, but that his education had been neglected. (31) 
Both Galt’s conclusion and his psychological method are different to Moore’s. Moore 
makes careful distinctions. For Galt, a spade is a spade: “backwardness” is 
backwardness, and “progress” is progress. Moore tries to discern the inner 
motivation behind Byron’s outward actions. Galt simply judges him: the man who 
wrote 16½ cantos of Don Juan (1819-24) and learnt Armenian in six months was 
“at no period … remarkable for steady application.” Moore explains his theory of 
education with footnotes. Galt never explains why academic progress is reliable 
evidence of mental progress. Moore distinguishes the poetic Byron from his 
“disciplined and plodding” classmates. Galt leaves the contrast between Byron and 
his schoolmates implicit. Moore aims at expansion, scholarship, and precise 
philosophical explanation, Galt at force and concision. 
Moore is a highly self-conscious biographer, constantly drawing attention to 
his own theories and methods. This is a risky style, argues Backscheider: 
“[s]ometimes biographers have such well-developed theories of personality that 
readers perceive them; at that point, the readers’ opinion of that theory becomes an 
element in the judgement of the credibility and quality of the biography.”41 So it has 
been for Moore. The Gentlemen’s Magazine thought he had thrown a “cunning web 
of sophistry” over Byron’s vices.42 Saintsbury felt that the “genial” Moore was “very 
badly equipped” for such “abstract discussions,” which anyway have no place in 
                                                   
41 Backscheider, Reflections on Biography, 113. 
42 “[Review of Moore's Byron, Volume 1],” Gentleman's Magazine 100 (1830): 146. 
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biography.43 Andrew Elfenbein finds Moore’s explanations to be “bland pieties.”44 
On closer inspection, however, Moore’s theory of self-deformation is not sophistical 
or shallow, but has deep philosophical roots.  
There are two writers whom Moore cites with especial frequency in his 
footnotes: David Hume and Isaac D’Israeli. He drew on these two thinkers to frame 
a complex theory of self-deformation, based on the key concepts of “character” and 
“genius.” Hume is mentioned a dozen times in the book, but two of Moore’s 
footnotes to him in particular give a sense of what he drew from the sceptical 
Scotsman. The first describes Byron’s youthful flirtation with atheism in 1808:  
If exemption from the checks of religion be, as infidels themselves allow*, a state of 
freedom from responsibility dangerous at all times, it must be peculiarly so in that 
season of temptation, youth, when the passions are sufficiently disposed to usurp a 
latitude for themselves, without taking a licence also from infidelity to enlarge their 
range. It is, therefore, fortunate that, for the causes just stated, the inroads of 
scepticism and disbelief should be seldom felt in the mind till a period of life, when 
the character, already formed, is out of the reach of their disturbing influence … 
* “Look out for a people entirely destitute of religion: if you find them at all, be 
assured that they are but few degrees removed from brutes.”—Hume. … (I.122-3) 
Moore quotes Hume’s Natural History of Religion (1757) to provide support for his 
theory that atheism is a kind of self-deformation, but there is an interesting twist to 
the way he applies Hume’s argument to Byron’s case. Byron is both like and unlike 
ordinary people. On the one hand, Byron showed the great “prematurity of 
development” which sets the genius apart from everyone else: as such a young 
infidel, he was a “rare and melancholy spectacle” (I.124). On the other hand, atheism 
had the same effect on him that it has on any person, and he lost moral “control” 
(ibid). Byron is both a human and a genius, both ordinary and extraordinary. 
                                                   
43 George Saintsbury, The Collected Essays and Papers of George Saintsbury, 1875-1920, 3 vols. 
(London and Toronto: Dent, 1923), I.418. 
44 Elfenbein, Byron and the Victorians, 79. 
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Moore takes an argument from Hume, and applies it carefully to Byron’s case. 
On a deeper level, he takes concepts from Hume’s philosophy, and uses them to 
weave his whole analysis. Two especially important concepts in this passage are 
“passions” and “character.” We have seen that Hume held passions to be the 
foundation of ethics, and that morality is “more properly felt than judg’d of.”45 It is 
no surprise, then, to find Moore describing the moral effects of atheism in terms of 
passions. The concept of character was also an essential part of Hume’s moral 
philosophy, because it underpinned his notion of moral responsibility. People’s 
passions are in constant flux, shifting and changing from moment to moment, so 
they are a poor basis on which to judge people. Our judgement instead “must depend 
upon durable principles of the mind, which extend over the whole conduct, and 
enter into the personal character.”46 Moore uses “character” in just this sense: had 
Byron already matured and formed a durable character, he could have withstood the 
shocks of scepticism—“it being impossible for the mind to change its character in 
any considerable article…”47 But, Moore suggests, we ought not to judge Byron too 
harshly. He was a sceptic because he was an impressionable youth with shifting 
feelings, not because he had the character of a hardened infidel. 
In a second footnote to Hume, Moore develops another crucial idea about 
human character: its contradictory nature. Byron has just read the mocking review 
of Hours of Idleness (1807) in the Edinburgh Review: 
His pride had been wounded to the quick, and his ambition humbled:—but this 
feeling of humiliation lasted but for a moment. The very reaction of his spirit against 
aggression roused him to a full consciousness of his own powers;* and the pain and 
the shame of the injury were forgotten, in the proud certainty of revenge. 
                                                   
45 Hume, Treatise, 470. 
46 Ibid., 575.  
47 Ibid., 608. 
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* “’Tis a quality very observable in human nature, that any opposition which does not 
entirely discourage and intimidate us has rather a contrary effect, and inspires us with 
a more than ordinary grandeur and magnanimity. …”—HUME, Treatise of Human 
Nature. (I.144) 
There is a drama of emotions in the young lord’s heart, as “pride,” “ambition,” 
“humiliation,” “pain,” “shame” and “certainty of revenge” battle it out for control of 
his will. This is an unconscious process, over which Byron has no control. He is not 
self-consistent. This interplay of emotions never ceases, as the “reaction of his spirit” 
thrusts him from feeling to feeling, one minute provoking him to write his bilious 
English Bards and Scotch Reviewers (1811), the next filling him with remorse for 
doing so (I.158). Though Moore does suggest that Byron’s “powers” were 
extraordinary, his reference to Hume underlines the fact that for all his genius, 
Byron’s passionate self-contradiction was a part of his “human nature.” The notion 
that he explained all Byron’s qualities according to a simple notion of genius is false. 
Moore expresses what is probably Hume’s most fundamental claim: “… what 
is man but a heap of contradictions!”48 The great length and detail of Moore’s 
biography is justified by his sense that Byron’s character is so complex.49 Jeffery Vail 
praises Moore for respecting the “disorderliness of human life” in Byron, but it is 
truer to say that Moore respected the disorderliness of Byron’s life in particular.50 
His Life and Death of Lord Edward Fitzgerald is less than a quarter the length of 
his Byron. Moore justifies the briskness and psychological shallowness of the book 
by arguing that “simplicity” was Fitzgerald’s “predominant feature.”51 This 
                                                   
48 Hume, “Of Polygamy and Divorce,” Essays, 193. Boswell is also insistent on this point: “Man is, in 
general, made up of contradictory qualities.” James Boswell, Life of Johnson, ed. R. W. Chapman 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), 1399. 
49 Darcy finds the same philosophical outlook in Boswell’s Johnson: Darcy, Melancholy and Liteary 
Biography, 94. 
50 Jeffery W. Vail, The Literary Relationship of Lord Byron and Thomas Moore (Baltimore and 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 181. 
51 Thomas Moore, The Life and Death of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, 2 vols. (London: Longman, 1831), 
II.186. 
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simplicity was his great strength, says Moore, because it made him a man of action. 
Geniuses are seldom men of action, distracted as they are “by the versatility of [their] 
own powers.”52 Here was a shorter, simpler biography to portray a shorter, simpler 
mind—or so Moore claimed. Fitzgerald is really a disappointing book, despite its 
moments of brilliant political analysis (buttressed with scholarly footnotes to 
Aristotle). But it does indicate that Moore’s decision to write such a long and effusive 
biography of Byron was intentional. He was attempting to do justice to both the 
contradictions of Byron’s human character, and the “versatility” of his genius.   
If Hume helped Moore explain Byron’s character, D’Israeli helped him 
explain Byron’s genius. How did Byron produce “those dazzling miracles of poesy, 
with which he afterwards astonished and enchanted the world”? (I.142) Moore 
found his answers in D’Israeli’s eccentric works of literary scholarship, principally 
The Literary Character, released in four expanding editions between 1795 and 
1828. D’Israeli described this book as “a course of experimental philosophy,” which 
would describe the innate qualities of genius.53 It is “experimental” not because 
D’Israeli conducted his research in a laboratory, but because his claims are rooted 
in experience.54 In his first book, A Dissertation on Anecdotes (1793), he had 
claimed that only anecdotes can provide good evidence of “the history of 
manners.”55 In accordance with this principle, he harvested literary history for 
anecdotes of authors, and then submitted them to the reader to prove his theories. 
Nearly every page of Literary Character bristles with authors’ names: young 
geniuses are frequently misunderstood by their parents, like Jean Racine, Blaise 
                                                   
52 Ibid., II.187. 
53 D’Israeli, I.xii. Future reference indicated in the body of the text. 
54 See the entries for “Empirical” and “Experience” in Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary 
of Culture and Society (London: Fontana, 1983), 115-17,26-29. Hart rather aptly calls D’Israeli’s 
approach “neo-Baconian,” as he also does Boswell’s: Hart, “Boswell and the Romantics,” 47. 
55 Isaac D'Israeli, A Dissertation on Anecdotes (London: Kearsley and Murray, 1793), 6. 
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Pascal, Petrarch and Vittorio Alfieri (I.57); geniuses are precocious, and conceive 
their grand designs even in youth, like Francis Bacon, John Milton, François De 
Thou, Montesquieu, Louis-Sebastian de Tillemont, and Racine (I.86); they are often 
anxious of failure, like Charles James Fox, John Curran, Rousseau, Edward Gibbon, 
Robert Burns, Alexander Pope, and George Romney (I.168-69); they are often 
gripped by a sublime enthusiasm when they compose their great works, as De Thou, 
Franz Haydn, Thomas Gray and Horatio Nelson all attest (II.24-25); they are often 
impractical, like Montesquieu, Bacon, Buffon and Edward Young (II.113-14); they 
always breath the spirit of their own nation—witness Spain’s Lope de Vega, Felipe 
Calderón and Miguel de Cervantes; France’s Pierre Corneille, Racine and François 
Rabelais; Italy’s Petrarch, Torquato Tasso and Giovanni Boccaccio; and the master-
genius of England, William Shakespeare! (II.299-300) The names come thick-and-
fast, printed in emphatic small caps. D’Israeli’s learning was joyous and eccentric, 
and Moore was evidently inspired not only by his ideas but by his method. 
Moore refers five times to Literary Character (I.42, 255, 262, 595, II.86), and 
once to another of D’Israeli’s tomes (II.543), Curiosities of Literature (1791). His 
first footnote to D’Israeli is the most important, because there Moore engages in 
detail with D’Israeli’s methods and concepts. Moore is discussing Byron’s claim to 
be a fine sportsman and fighter at Harrow: 
 ‡ Mr. D’Israeli, in his ingenious work “on the Literary Character,” has given it as his 
opinion, that a disinclination to athletic sports end exercises will be, in general, found 
among the peculiarities which mark a youth of genius. In support of this notion he 
quotes Beattie, … [and] Milton … 
Such general rules, however, are as little applicable to the dispositions of men of 
genius as to their powers. … many others may be cited in which the directly opposite 
propensity was remarkable. In war, the most turbulent of exercises, Æschylus, Dante, 
Camoens, and a long list of other poets distinguished themselves; and, though it may 
be granted that Horace was a bad rider, and Virgil no tennis-player, yet, on the other 
hand, Dante was, we know, a falconer as well as swordsman; Tasso, expert both as 
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swordsman and dancer; Alfieri, a great rider; Klopstock, a skaiter; Cowper, famous, 
in his youth, at cricket and foot-ball; and Lord Byron pre-eminent in all sorts of 
exercises. (I.42-3) 
Moore uses D’Israeli’s name-dropping method to criticise D’Israeli’s own claims. 
Moore drops names throughout the biography to support his analysis of genius, 
particularly in the crucial passage where he explains the breakup of Byron’s 
marriage (see §4.2, below). But this footnote points to a deeper and more important 
difference between Moore and D’Israeli. D’Israeli argued that all geniuses were 
fundamentally the same: “the literary character has ever preserved among its 
followers the most striking family resemblance” (Literary Character, I.6). Some 
argue that this was Moore’s opinion too.56 But here we find Moore disputing the idea 
that there are any “general rules” about the personality of genius. Moore’s analysis 
of Byron’s self-deformation is thus fraught with tension. To some extent, he argues 
that geniuses have certain qualities in common—such as versatility and precocity—
but he also argues that a person’s “genius” is unique and individual. Meanwhile, as 
we have already seen, he argues that Byron’s “character” obeyed the immutable laws 
of human nature that bind us all.  
From Hume and D’Israeli, Moore derived both the method and the key 
concepts of his biography. The method was inductive. The key principles were 
Hume’s theory of the conflicting passions and the formation of durable character, 
and D’Israeli’s conception of the genius as a person born with deep and lofty 
qualities of mind, setting them apart from others. Hume and D’Israeli were not the 
only writers Moore quoted, of course, and they were far from the only empiricists to 
consider the questions of human character or genius in the long eighteenth century. 
Moore cites dozens of people, including Samuel Johnson, William Cowper, 
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Alexander Pope, Vittorio Alfieri, Antonio Canova, Edward Gibbon, John Gibson 
Lockhart, Adam Ferguson, William Wordsworth and Dr John Reid. But the two 
pillars of his theory of self-deformation are the concepts of “character” and “genius,” 
which Hume and D’Israeli in particular help him to explain. 
On this theory, what would it mean to deform yourself? For Moore, formation 
does not mean the formation of a single unitary self, but the formation of each 
separate component of a person: 
It is, indeed, remarkable that, essentially as his genius seemed connected with, and, as 
it were, springing out of his character, the developement of the one should so long 
have preceded the full maturity of the resources of the other.  ... the gloom, the 
grandeur, the tenderness of his nature, all were left without a voice, till his mighty 
genius, at last, awakened in its strength. (I.175) 
The character and the genius of a person are “connected,” but distinct. They develop 
at different speeds, they develop in different ways, and when they develop, they have 
different implications for the person. Moore carefully distinguishes these two 
processes: Byron’s character undergoes “developement,” while his genius slowly 
reaches the “full maturity of its resources.” There is a fundamental distinction in 
Moore’s narrative between character, which is composite, unstable and formed by 
circumstances, and genius, which is innate, individual and self-realising. 
 This theory permeates Moore’s language whenever he describes Byron’s 
character or genius. He frequently dwells on the “formation” of Byron’s character 
(1.122, 252, 255). Byron’s experiences often had an “influence” on his character 
(I.25, 53), or “causes … worked a change” in it (I.177), or a new feeling “settled … 
deeply” into it (I.182). Great experiences caused a “revolution” in it (I.186), while 
others merely left “traces” (I.185) or “affected” it (I.251). His alienation “added to the 
vigour” of it, even though it was “fatal” to his “enthusiasm” (I.392). New experiences 
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would bring about “new phenomena” in it (I.395). His character also had durable 
elements. Some of his “characteristics” were “preserved unaltered” in his life (I.67). 
Some were “imbedded” by “nature” (I.185). One of these characteristics, indeed, 
itself prevented him from changing: his “tenaciousness of early opinions and 
impressions” (II.312). Nonetheless, his “ever-shifting character” (II.268) might also 
display temporary changes, such as the “evident increase of intellectual vigour” he 
displayed in Venice (II.181). To throw these developments into relief, Moore 
occasionally imagines how Byron’s character “might have been, under more 
favourable circumstances” (I.323). The entire analysis culminates in the biography’s 
final pages, when Moore attempts to synthesise his observations into a single, 
coherent portrait of his friend, and finds the task nearly impossible (II.781-807). 
Moore’s understanding of Byron’s genius is different. Byron’s character is 
made up of innumerable traits, some innate and some acquired, which shift and 
combine in myriad ways. Genius, by contrast, is a natural faculty, which cannot 
change, but only reveal or hide itself. Moore describes Byron’s genius as deep and 
hidden. It is “volcanic” (I.89), a “rich mine” (I.175), it is “diamond quarries” which 
must be “worked and brought to light” (I.253). He describes it as a living, self-acting 
thing. It is “brought … into action” (I.124). It produces “natural effusions” (I.143). It 
is a “vital principle” (I.148), a “power” (I.326, 591) and an “instinct” (I.592). It 
“unfold[s] itself” (II.648). It is an “all-absorbing flame” (II.762). He describes how 
Byron’s genius was revealed. At first, it was “an undiscovered world” (I.278). During 
its “first steps,” Byron felt a “growing consciousness of his own power” (I.254). Its 
“energies” were “forced out” (II.2). And when the time came, he “arrived at the full 
consciousness of his genius” (I.593), and it finally “awakened in its strength” (I.175). 
Moore describes genius as a gift of nature, but it is not intrinsically good: “… it was 
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out of the struggle between the good and evil principles of his nature that his mighty 
genius drew its strength” (I.323-24). It is a sad thing to see evil in a friend, even if it 
is the price of something beautiful. For Moore, character is complex, a tapestry of 
different traits woven by circumstance. But genius is simple and undetermined. It is 
“infinite” (II.670). 
On this theory, Byron could have deformed himself in two main ways. He 
could have failed to form an adequate character, and he could have failed to realise 
the potential of his genius. He has frequently been accused of both faults, not least 
by D’Israeli, who, as we saw above, claimed that Byron had died before “the 
complete development” of his genius and the “perfection formation of his 
character.” As we will see, Moore held there was a close and tragic relationship 
between Byron’s genius and character. He held, unlike Hazlitt, Arnold and D’Israeli, 
that Byron’s genius did reveal itself in all its power and versatility, but this was only 
possible at the price of his moral character, which was deformed by a long course of 
melancholy and alienation. In the following two sections, we will see how Moore 
structured his narrative to portray this complex and contradictory self. 
4.2 The Plot of Byron’s Life (1): The Dual Structure 
All biographies have a shape, or should do. As the biographer comes to know their 
subject, says Backscheider, they “construct a shape and trajectory for the life,” like 
the plot of a novel.57 They sit down at their writing desk, with piles of letters and 
newspaper cuttings and notes, and find a pattern that brings the whole together. 
“Every life takes its own form,” argues Edel, “and a biographer must find the ideal 
and unique literary form that will express it.”58 Edel’s lofty goal of the unique 
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biography is inspiring, but impossible. The biographer inevitably brings their own 
ideas about human life to the book, as well as their conception of biography as a 
literary form. Accordingly, the life-shapes of biography are partly conventional. As 
Joseph Reed puts it: 
When criticizing Cavendish’s Wolsey, the critic cannot attack the fallacies of the wheel 
of fortune, to assert instead that Carlyle’s nineteenth-century formulation of the battle 
of life ... or twentieth-century psychological assumptions are fairer, more appropriate, 
or more realistic.59 
We have seen the stock of conventions Moore drew upon to understand Byron’s life. 
The question is how he used these conventions to shape the raw mass of Byron’s 
literary remains into a coherent narrative or life-shape.  
The problem is that for the last 50 years, scholars have generally found 
Moore’s Byron to have no shape at all. “Moore’s prefabricated formula for genius 
simply did not fit Byron,” argues Reed,60 and the book is accordingly “a sprawling, 
unselective agglomeration.”61 Later scholars have not fundamentally challenged 
Reed’s interpretation. North and Darcy both agree with Reed that Moore was trying 
to impose this formula on Byron’s life, but neither is particularly interested in 
whether he succeeded.62 Vail shifts between two positions. He argues that Moore 
actually applies his theory of genius “systematically” and therefore effectively.63 He 
then goes on to argue that the book’s “lack of an ‘organizing structure’ of the kind 
Reed expects … is really a triumph of Moore’s realism,” because it expresses the 
disorder of Byron’s life.64 Disorder is indeed a crucial feature of Moore’s theory of 
human nature and of Byron’s personality, as we have already seen. But this does not 
                                                   
59 Reed, Early Nineteenth-Century Biography, 157. 
60 Ibid., 122. 
61 Ibid., 102. 
62 North, Domestication of Genius, 74; Darcy, Melancholy and Liteary Biography, 207. 
63 Vail, Literary Relationship, 169. 
64 Ibid., 181. 
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mean his book lacks organising principles. There is a dialectic between Byron’s 
gradually forming character and his suddenly exploding genius. As Moore traces 
these two principles through Byron’s life, he gives the narrative a coherent two-part 
structure. 
To reveal this structure, I rely on sentiment analysis, a new computerised 
method for studying plots. Sentiment analysis works by measuring the emotional 
positivity or negativity of sentences, which can then be used to graph the emotional 
ups and downs of a narrative over time. I use Matt Jockers’s SYUZHET package to 
perform the analysis.65 Jockers and his team hand-coded 165,000 sentences taken 
from a small corpus of contemporary novels. Each sentence was given an emotional 
value, and then the database of sentences was used to generate a dictionary, in which 
words are assigned an emotional value between -1 and 1. The software then splits 
the narrative into sentences, using the dictionary to calculate a sentiment score for 
each one: 
Score: 0 -0.75 -0.5 -0.75 0.5 -1 0 0.75 0.75 0.6 
Word: The foul stinking slug joyfully murdered the cute happy puppy. 
 
To find the overall score for the sentence, we simply add the scores for each word: 
the result is -0.4. As Jockers has shown on his blog, the method is remarkably 
robust. It produces very similar results to humans, when they tag a text by hand. It 
also works for Shakespeare, even though the dictionary was compiled from 
contemporary fiction.66 Jockers and his collaborator Jodie Archer have used the 
method to analyse bestselling novels, demonstrating in a remarkable recent study 
                                                   
65 Syuzhet Ver. 1.0.0, CRAN, Vienna. It is pronounced “SUE-jet,” and its name is derived from the 
syuzhet/fabula distinction popularised by the Russian formalists of the early twentieth century. 
66 Matthew Jockers, “That Sentimental Feeling,” MatthewJockers.net (blog), Dec 20, 2015, 
http://www.matthewjockers.net/2015/12/20/that-sentimental-feeling/; “More Syuzhet 
Validation,” ibid, Aug 11, 2016, http://www.matthewjockers.net/2016/08/11/more-syuzhet-
validation/ 
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that certain plot arcs are statistically more likely to sell.67 The fact that their model 
can accurately predict sales provides strong evidence that the method captures 
something fundamental about narrative: its ability to appeal to our emotions and 
drag us into the story. 
Moore’s book, with the lengthy narration interspersed between Byron’s 
letters and journals, can seem like a massive unstructured archive rather than a 
shapely story. Sentiment analysis reveals, however, that it has an elegant plot arc 
(Figure 4.2). Before we analyse the graph, it requires some qualifications. First, it 
only shows Moore’s Notices. Byron’s letters and journals were excluded because 
Moore simply printed them in chronological order, without imposing a shape upon 
them. Quotations woven through his Notices remain, however, since they are part 
of his rhetorical design. Second, the graph shows a rolling average, rather than the 
raw sentiment scores. Each point on the line represents the average of that sentence 
and the 125 sentences either side. The raw data is extremely noisy, and a rolling 
average allows us to actually see the twists and turns of the plot. The downside is 
that it cuts off 125 sentences at the beginning and at the end of the book. But this is 
a small price to pay in a book of about 6,500 sentences, especially when our main 
aim is to see the big movements of the story, rather than the particular emotions of 
the introduction and conclusion. The blue trend line is simply a visual aid. 
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Figure 4.2 Moore’s plot of Byron’s life 
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The two most striking turning points occur at the end of Volume 1, and at the 
end of Volume 2. These huge fluctuations indicate the two most dramatic events in 
Byron’s life, according to Moore’s interpretation. At the end of Volume 1, Byron 
marries Annabella Milbanke, and the mood crashes: “He had, in the course of one 
short year, gone through every variety of domestic misery …” (II.1). He sails to 
Ostend and exile. At the end of Volume 2, Byron sails again—for Greece, and 
freedom! He reaches the dizzying heights of real heroism: “His love of freedom, his 
generosity, his thirst for the new and adventurous,—all were re-awakened …” 
(II.669). But this moment is brief, and death comes quickly: 
It was but the other day that he had come among them, radiant with renown,—
inspiring faith, by his very name, in those miracles of success that were about to spring 
forth at the touch of his ever-powerful genius. All this had now vanished, like a short 
dream … (II.771) 
Byron’s death is the only event which takes the rolling average below zero in Moore’s 
biography. These turning-points reveal the organising principle of Moore’s plot: its 
masterly division into two volumes. Volume 1 is a failed courtship plot, an anti-
Bildungsroman describing Byron’s doomed attempt to make it in literary London. 
Volume 2 is a Smithian or Clarean record of exile, recording his lonely wanderings 
in search of what he finally found: glory and oblivion, “the harvest of such a life of 
fame” (II.771). This division into volumes was not merely a convenient halfway 
point.68 Moore’s two-volume structure divides Byron’s life into two clear phases 
culminating in two tragic dénouements; and as the curves of the graph indicate, the 
anti-Bildungsroman in Volume 1 is structured differently to the record of exile in 
Volume 2. 
                                                   
68 Though Moore had initially hoped to restrict the work to a single volume: see his journal for 16 
June 1829, Moore, The Journal of Thomas Moore, III.1229. 
LIFE: MOORE’S MULTIFORM BYRON 
207 
The first volume documents Byron’s failed quest for a conventional life. This 
may seem a strange claim. Byron was a rebel, a sexual non-conformist, a genius, not 
a slave to middle-class morality! But Moore does present him as a man in search of 
the usual domestic and professional comforts, and presents the years of his fame in 
London as the happiest of his life. Like Vivian, Adeline or the conventional hero of 
a Bildungsroman, Byron was reared in rural solitude, with an absent father and a 
flawed mother. From birth, he had both social and anti-social impulses: he was born 
with his “uncontrollable spirit” (I.8), and yet his “affectionate sweetness and 
playfulness” meant that he was “easily manageable, by those who loved and 
understood him …” (I.9) Which impulse would triumph? Events would decide in 
favour of rebellion, as early experience cut Byron off from his fellows. His title made 
him arrogant (I.20). His clubfoot “haunted him, like a curse” (I.94). His mother was 
weak and capricious (I.25), and was so foolish that Byron, far from loving her, felt 
not even a “sentiment of cordiality” towards her (I.273). By the time he arrived at 
Harrow, he was already a brooding outcast (I.52). By the time he reached 
Cambridge, he was boasting of rakishness (I.120), flirting with atheism (I.122ff.), 
infecting himself with the “dangerous spirit of ridicule” (I.130), and found that life 
had already “palled” (I.146). Strong forces were unleashing his uncontrollable spirit, 
while loneliness and licence were eating away his amiability. But his genius was 
growing of its own accord, demonstrating “how unhurt the vital principle of genius 
can preserve itself even in atmosphere apparently the most ungenial and noxious to 
it.” (I.148) And some elements of his amiable character remained, as proven by his 
“ardent” childhood friendships (I.44), and the ability of his tutor, Becher, to soften 
him (I.81). 
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With this mixture of social and antisocial qualities, Byron arrived on the stage 
of life. This is the point where Austen, Edgeworth, Opie or Scott usually begin their 
novels: with a protagonist fresh from childhood and youth, on the cusp of adulthood. 
For Moore, Byron’s debut in London was the first great failure of his life. The graph 
of the plot, with its gentle upward slope, plunges when Byron arrives “lone and 
unfriended” in the House of Lords (I.163). For Moore, this was a profound moment: 
probably no “youth of his high station had ever before been reduced” so low on their 
entry to the house, Byron “not having a single individual of his own class either to 
introduce him as a friend or receive him as an acquaintance” (ibid.). Galt scoffs at 
Moore’s explanation: Byron “was not so friendless nor unknown, but that he might 
have procured some peer to have gone with him,” though the affair did wound his 
youthful “self-importance” (56). For Moore, however, this moment was a symbol of 
Byron’s extreme isolation during his first years in London. Though English Bards 
and Scotch Reviewers (1809) was succeeding in the press, Byron’s love life was in 
tatters and his debts were mounting. His “thirst after affection was thwarted,” his 
ambition was “checked” and “mortified,” his entire situation was “galling” (I.181). 
This is, for Moore, the culmination of the first phase of Byron’s life. With melancholy 
“deeply settled into his character” (I.182), he fled England for the first time, making 
an “indefinite pilgrimage” to the East (I.186). 
As should be apparent, Moore tells a dynamic and melodramatic story of 
Byron’s life. A combination of nature and nurture conspire to deform his character, 
as loneliness and failure suppress his natural amiability and exacerbate his natural 
misanthropy, even while his genius unfolds. It is a life of dramatic turning points, 
such as his lonely appearance in the House of Lords or his wild journey east. Moore’s 
dynamism and melodrama comes out clearly by contrast with Galt. For Moore, 
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Byron’s journey east was a first exile. For Galt, Byron went east simply because he 
thought “all men should in some period of their lives travel,” and it might help his 
political career (55). Galt’s Byron is relatively mundane. Moore’s Byron, as North 
rightly points out, leads a complex life of “problematic oppositions.”69 
Despite these setbacks and crises, the overall movement of Volume 1 is 
upward. Byron’s journey east cures his self-obsession by expanding the “circle of his 
sympathies” (I.256). He returns full of melancholy (note the dip at the end of the 
voyage), but the publication of Childe Harold brings about his halcyon days. Moore 
presents Byron’s glittering years in London as his most sustained period of 
happiness. This was when he met Byron and knew him best, and the acquaintance 
convinced him that Byron was amiable despite his faults: “Such did I find Lord 
Byron, on my first experience of him; and such,—so open and manly-minded,—did 
I find him to the last.” (I.314) Looking back in volume 2, Moore says that the 
clubbable Byron of the London years had “poetry of character” (II.390). Figure 4.2 
reveals how Moore wove this poetry of character into the emotional texture of his 
narration—this period has the most sustained positive sentiment scores. 
As in Vivian and Adeline Mowbray, a failed courtship perverts Byron’s self-
formation. This is the point of the biography which Reed and his followers have 
seized upon, to prove that Moore explained Byron’s life with a simplistic theory of 
genius. Reed argues that, for Moore, “The whole idea of marriage is anathema to the 
theoretical genius …”70 Byron must be forgiven his domestic failings, because genius 
and marriage don’t mix. Darcy also interprets Moore in this way.71 There is some 
evidence for this reading. In his longest discussion of Byron’s marriage, Moore does 
                                                   
69 North, Domestication of Genius, 74. 
70 Reed, Early Nineteenth-Century Biography, 119. 
71 Darcy, Melancholy and Literary Biography, 207. 
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claim that “rarely, if ever, have men of the higher order of genius shown themselves 
fitted for the calm affections and comforts that form the cement of domestic life.” 
(I.589) Geniuses are constantly drawn back “into the lonely laboratory of the Self,” 
and may be too solipsistic to form part of a functioning household (I.592). This is, 
however, only one of the arguments Moore makes about Byron’s marriage, and Reed 
and Darcy are wrong to single it out as the principal one. 
In the first case, Moore’s Byron is no solipsist, however solipsistic genius is. 
We have already seen how thoroughly Moore vindicates the sociable aspects of 
Byron’s personality—and both Moore and Figure 4.2 insist that the 300 pages of 
Byron’s social life in London are the happiest in the book. Moreover, we have seen 
how Moore attributes Byron’s misanthropy not only to his genius but to his early 
education and experiences of alienation. In the second case, Moore’s opponents pay 
too little heed to the speculative and tentative way Moore makes his arguments 
about Byron’s character. We have already seen how analytic and inquiring his prose 
style is. When he reaches the end of his argument that genius and marriage are often 
incompatible (I.595), he enjoins the reader to consult Chapter 18 of D’Israeli’s 
Literary Character. In this chapter, D’Israeli contradicts Moore’s theory: “It is not 
an axiom that literary characters must necessarily institute a new order of celibacy.” 
(II.149, my emphasis) Moore did indeed argue that Byron’s genius perhaps made 
him unfit for marriage, but this was not a simplistic argument, and it was not the 
only argument he made. Indeed, at the time he had entertained “sanguine hopes” 
that Byron’s marriage would “[win] him over to the brighter and better side of life” 
(I.589), and we will see how, in Volume 2, he represents Byron’s liaison with Teresa 
Guiccioli as a successful marriage, though unlawful and tainted by melancholy. 
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All this points to a deeper fact about Moore’s biography that his critics 
sometimes overlook: its interest in chance and contingency. When Moore does tell 
the story of how Lord and Lady Byron separated, he carefully describes all the 
particular details that contributed to cause events. There was a “general 
incompatibility” in their characters (I.652), aggravated by an “ill-starred 
concurrence of circumstances” (I.651). Of course he only writes in a very general way 
about Byron’s alleged abuses as a husband, and does not mention the (correct) 
rumours of his incestuous liaison with Augusta Leigh at all. Having described what 
circumstances he can, however, Moore goes on to suggest that things may have 
turned out differently if only a few variables were changed. Byron “was, to the last, 
disposed to reconciliation” (I.652). Had he not been continually dunned by 
creditors, perhaps “time” and “tolerance” might have wrought a miracle (I.650). In 
the end, it was not to be, but Moore is neither a fatalist nor a teller of fables. Aristotle 
long ago distinguished poetry from history by observing that the poet “utters 
universal truths,” describing “the kind of thing that would happen,” while the 
historian utters “particular statements,” telling “what actually happened.”72 Adeline 
Mowbray suggests that an enthusiastic feminist would almost inevitably be crushed 
by Opie’s prejudiced society. Moore marshals much philosophy to try and explain 
Byron’s life, but he is telling the story of an historical self in historical time, and 
rather than converting Byron into a fictional character like Adeline, he reveals the 
chance and contingent elements of Byron’s self. Like Smith or Clare, Moore is always 
drawn into the particulars. 
Volume 2 has a different structure and purpose to Volume 1. Volume 1 is 
designed to reveal how Byron’s character was deformed and his conventional life 
                                                   
72 Aristotle, Poetics, trans. Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 28. 
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ruined during his time in England, and accordingly takes on the tragic structure of 
the anti-Bildungsroman. Volume 2 is the tale of Byron’s afterlife once his character 
was deformed, as his “grand but disturbing powers” were at their full strength, and 
his “moral derangement” was at its height (II.52). It was a time of deep melancholy, 
and the troughs of the graph plunge lower than at any time in Volume 1. His life and 
work were in tune. For most of these years, Byron was writing Don Juan, “and never 
did pages more faithfully and, in many respects, lamentably reflect every variety of 
feeling, and whim, and passion that, like the rack of autumn, swept across the 
author’s mind in writing them.” (II.189) Moore’s language highlights the two 
emotional keynotes of Volume 2: the pervasive melancholy, the “rack of autumn,” 
and the explosive mood swings, “every variety of feeling.” The average sentiment 
score in this volume is considerably lower, and the range of scores considerably 
wider. 
Despite the pervasive melancholy, there are three great upswings in Volume 
2, each of which represents a moment when Byron repeats, in an idealised though 
tainted form, one of the major events of Volume 1. The first upswing represents his 
“marriage” to Teresa Guiccioli, the second his political career with the Carbonari, 
and the third his mighty sacrifice on the shores of Greece. The biography has a 
typological structure, like the Bible. The events of Volume 1 prefigure the events of 
Volume 2, much as the Old Testament prefigures the New.73 But the Bible is a 
transcendental comedy in which the New Testament fulfils or completes the Old, 
whereas Moore’s Byron follows the sad logic of Karl Marx: first tragedy, then farce. 
                                                   
73 See Northrop Frye, The Great Code: The Bible and Literature (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 
chap. 4; Erich Auerbach, “Figura,” in Selected Essays: Time, History and Literature, trans. Jane O. 
Newman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 65-113. 
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Moore turns these first two upswings into symbols of the irreversibility of 
time and the unreality of social life, echoing the themes we encountered in 
Edgeworth and Opie. On the one hand, he suggests that Byron’s achievements in 
exile were greater than during his earlier life. Though his love for Teresa Guiccioli 
was adulterous, and was therefore “much to be reprehended,” Moore argues that 
their relationship “had in it all of marriage that his real marriage wanted, [and] 
seemed to place, at length, within reach of his affectionate spirit that union and 
sympathy for which, through life, it had thirsted.” (II.393) Though the Carbonari 
failed to liberate Italy, they relit the coals of Byron’s ashen heart, and proved just 
“how deep, how earnest, and expansive was his zeal in that great, general cause of 
Political Freedom” (II.389). On the other hand, though these events awoke Byron’s 
lust for life, they could not reverse the erosions of Volume 1. His relationship with 
Guiccioli was imperfect, because “the pure poetry of the feeling had vanished” 
(II.393). The Carbonari might have given him that active role he had sought for and 
missed in the House of Lords, but he now lacked “those fresh, unworldly feelings” 
that “may be said to constitute the poetry of character” (II.390). Nonetheless, Moore 
claims, Byron’s genius was vastly more powerful in his exile, “a difference, in point 
of force and grandeur, between the two explosions, almost as great as between the 
out-breaks of a firework and a volcano.” (II.392-3) There is a strange double 
movement in Moore’s biography. Byron was “unworldly” in his youth, but therefore 
happier in the world, and weaker in his poetry. As he became more worldly, he began 
paradoxically to recede from the world on a personal level, even as his explosive 
poetry encompassed the world on the imaginative plane. Moore uses the double 
structure of his biography, in which the second volume reflects the first, to 
emphasise this double movement of time. 
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The final upswing of Volume 2 is somewhat different. Moore sees Byron’s 
final voyage to Greece as the fulfilment of his first quest to that benighted land. 
Byron had departed in 1809 to try and cure his melancholy. His eternal departure 
on the coast of the Adriatic would cure it forever, and shroud him in a glory more 
permanent than the effervescent fame he had once enjoyed in London. In Volume 1, 
Moore foreshadows this terrible fulfilment: 
Could some spirit have here revealed to him the events of that interval,—have shown 
him, on the one side, the triumphs that awaited him, the power his varied genius 
would acquire over all hearts, alike to elevate or depress, to darken or illuminate 
them,—and then place, on the other side, all the penalties of this gift, the waste and 
wear of the heart through the imagination, the havoc of that perpetual fire within, 
which, while it dazzles others, consumes the possessor,—the invidiousness of such 
an elevation in the eyes of mankind, and the revenge they take on him who compels 
them to look up to it,—would he, it may be asked, have welcomed glory on such 
conditions? (I.211) 
Moore depicts Byron as an Achilles, a hero who must choose between happiness and 
glory. There is the crucial difference, however, that Achilles is a legend while Byron 
was a man. Achilles knows he will die at Troy, for the gods have told him so. Byron 
lived in the real world, and there was in fact no “spirit” who could tell him his 
destiny. Achilles’ only real opponents are the gods and his own rage. Byron had to 
suffer all the petty contingencies of an actual person. Like all the fulfilments of 
Volume 2, Byron’s glorious sacrifice is tarnished by his self-deformation. A 
combination of “hereditary defect in his organization” and the “slow corrosion” of 
the years have prematurely aged him by the time he arrives in Greece (II.762), and 
he is snatched away before any of his great schemes for the country’s liberation can 
be enacted. Time is irreversible, and the world is somehow less real than poetry. 
Sentiment analysis has helped us to grasp the dual structure of Moore’s 
Byron. We have seen how Moore shaped each half of Byron’s life, and bolted them 
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together with a revisionary or typological structure. “Revision” is often seen as a key 
trope of Romantic literature, and is usually interpreted as a symbol of self-
formation.74 When Wordsworth revises his earlier memories in “Tintern Abbey” 
(1798) or the “Intimations Ode” (1807), or when Emma reflects on her behaviour at 
Box Hill, they come to a deeper sense of their authentic being. In Moore’s narrative 
of self-deformation, revision has a more fraught and complex meaning. The 
formation of Byron’s character and the unfolding of his genius are complex, 
opposed, and intertwined processes, which Moore does not suppose he can fully 
explain. They are contingent processes, the prey of circumstance. As Volume 1 
explains Byron’s maturation, Moore weighs a whole host of possible causes and 
possible effects. As Volume 2 glances back at Volume 1, Moore finds complex layers 
of clashing meaning in Byron’s life. Perhaps, if biographies were more prominent in 
our histories of Romanticism, we would be more attuned to the chancy elements of 
Romantic selfhood, since biographies inevitably portray an imperfect interpretation 
of a real self. We will see in the next section, however, that Moore’s dual structure, 
which stresses contingency and complexity, is quite distinctive even among 
Romantic biographies. 
4.3 The Plot of Byron’s Life (2): A Comparative Perspective 
We have encountered various kinds of time so far in this study: the social time of 
Vivian and Adeline Mowbray, which wraps itself slowly around the poor 
protagonists, and the cyclical time of Smith and Clare’s sonnets, which constantly 
rejuvenates nature while alienating Smith’s self and abolishing Clare’s. At certain 
points, Moore’s narrative recalls these paradigms, but we have also seen that 
biography takes place in a third time, the time of history. We have seen how this 
                                                   
74 See, for example, Siskin, Historicity, 104. 
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introduces an element of chance and doubt into the narrative, but it also introduces 
another problem, of intentionality. To what extent is Moore’s narrative structure the 
result of his conscious art, and to what extent is it the result of the actual structure 
of Byron’s life? We have encountered a problem like this already, when we 
considered the autobiographical nature of Smith’s sonnets. But Moore’s biography 
presents a different challenge. There is no doubt that Smith’s sonnets are artificial. 
She could invent events to write sonnets about—like seeing a nightjar in November—
and even when she wrote about real experiences, it was her choice which ones would 
become sonnets and enter the sequence of her life. Moore had less power to shape 
Byron’s life because it was a matter of public record. If he fabricated events, he might 
be found out, and if he omitted too many, it would open his book to attack. To really 
assess the narrative structure of Moore’s book, we must try to disentangle Moore’s 
intentional design from the inevitable structure of any Byron biography. 
To do this, Figure 4.3 puts Moore in comparative perspective, showing 
Moore’s plot arc alongside those of three other biographies: Galt’s Byron, Robert 
Southey’s The Life of Nelson (1813), and Elizabeth Gaskell’s The Life of Charlotte 
Brontë (1857). The red lines are linear trend lines, generated using the “least-
squares regression” method.75 The figure displays two salient patterns: the negative 
slope of both Byron biographies compared to the others, and the enormous 
emotional range of Moore’s compared to the other three. 
The Byron biographies have a downward slope because in both of them time 
is an erosive force. As time passes, the mood darkens. We can measure the size of 
this effect using the “coefficient of determination,” which tells us how much a 
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squares” because it measures the gap between the trend line and the curve by the distance squared. 
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particular variable can account for an observed change. The coefficients of 
determination are 0.11 for Moore, and 0.26 for Galt (rounded to two decimal places), 
meaning that the mere passage of time can explain 11% of the changes in mood in 
Moore’s book, and more than a quarter of the changes in Galt’s. In Gaskell and 
Southey, time has no such effect. Both have a shallow positive slope, but the 
coefficient of determination is less than 0.01. Both Moore and Galt seem to have 
taken a hint from Byron’s own poetry, and see time as a force that robs and rages, 
though the effect is harsher in Galt’s dismal narrative of decline. 
Figure 4.3 
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unquenchable hope persist through all his sufferings and setbacks. Having already 
lost an eye in 1794, Nelson lost his arm at Tenerife in 1797. In Southey’s brisk 
narration of this incident, this terrible injury has only transient consequences. In 
one paragraph, we learn that Nelson’s “sufferings from the lost limb were long and 
painful.”76 In the next paragraph, three months have passed, the pains cease, and 
“From that time it began to heal” (111). In the third paragraph, the last of the chapter, 
Nelson is joking with a bureaucrat about whether he needs to prove his arm is really 
gone in order to obtain compensation (111-2). Nelson strides through time in 
Southey’s biography, time which cures all ills and takes people when it is ready. The 
situation is different for Byron. His club foot, for example, does not dissipate like 
Nelson’s arm, but is only aggravated by the passage of time. Right at the beginning, 
Moore tells us of Byron’s “peculiar sensitiveness” about his foot (I.10), the 
“humiliation” of which he never forgot (I.25-6). Whenever the foot recurs in the 
biography, it is accompanied by this Smithian sense of painful consciousness. In his 
characteristic way, Galt copies Moore’s analysis, but makes it harsher. Byron’s 
“greatest weakness … was a morbid sensibility to his lameness,” an “unmanly and 
excessive” feeling which he “always retained” (25); it was “strange” that such a 
“trifling deformity” could have “haunted him like a curse” (345). In the world 
Southey conjures, time can heal even an amputated arm. In the world of Moore and 
Galt, it only rankles. 
Time has a different significance again in Gaskell’s Brontë. Charlotte Brontë 
led a monotonous life of seclusion, death and endurance. Gaskell strikes this 
melancholy chord in Chapter 1, which culminates in a description of the family 
memorial at Haworth, listing the deaths of Mrs Brontë (1821), Maria (1825), 
                                                   
76 Robert Southey, The Life of Nelson, ed. Richard Holmes (London: Harper Perennial, 2004), 110. 
Future references indicated parenthetically. 
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Elizabeth (1825), Branwell (1848), Emily (1848), and Anne (1849), followed by 
Charlotte’s own in 1855.77 Brontë is rooted in Haworth, a place Gaskell turns into a 
symbol of everlasting sameness: 
All round the horizon there is this same line of sinuous wave-like hills; the scoops 
into which they fall only revealing other hills beyond, of similar colour and shape, 
crowned with wild, bleak moors—grand, from the ideas of solitude and loneliness 
which they suggest, or oppressive from the feeling which they give of being pent-up 
by some monotonous and illimitable barrier, according to the mood of mind in which 
the spectator may be. (12-13) 
“Same,” “similar,” “solitude,” “loneliness,” “monotonous,” “illimitable”—these 
words set the tone of Brontë’s quiet and imaginative life. The moors are always 
looming around her, awaiting her when she returns from school or Brussels, 
accompanying her in her greatest sorrows, and finally killing her after a “long walk 
over damp ground in thin shoes” strikes her with deadly fever (425). Her personality 
is as resilient as her stony hometown. She is a dutiful daughter, and time cannot rob 
her of her staunch Toryism. She “worship[s]” the Duke of Wellington as a child (80), 
writes an exercise about him when studying in Brussels (191), and is still admiring 
his picture on her wall in 1853 (402). She carries through life a certain “absence of 
hope” (91), with which she surmounts each of the Parsonage’s calamities, and which 
she retains even after her great literary and social successes in the 1850s. André 
Maurois once wrote that the pleasure of a good biography is to see “the successive 
deposits of ideas left by Time on the central kernel constituted by heredity, 
environment, and childhood.”78 For Gaskell, Brontë’s central kernel is a deep old 
diamond, and Time can deposit nothing that will scratch it. 
                                                   
77 Elizabeth Gaskell, The Life of Charlotte Brontë, ed. Elizabeth Jay (London: Penguin, 1998), 15-16. 
All future references in the body of the text. 
78 Quoted in James Clifford, ed. Biography as an Art: Selected Criticism, 1560-1960 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1962), 172. 
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Moore’s Byron does not have this stony endurance or strong sense of place. 
Gaskell’s Brontë is always a Christian, a daughter, a Yorkshirewoman and a Tory. 
Moore’s Byron cannot even hold onto his Englishness. Moore lionises “the social, 
practical-minded and, with all his faults and eccentricities, English Lord Byron” 
(II.331), but suggests that time weakens even this enduring element of his character. 
Once in exile, Byron can maintain his “wonderful purity of English” only in his 
poetry—in his letters, “Italianisms” start to proliferate (II.523-4). When he is finally 
called on to make use of his Englishman’s “practical good sense” in Greece (II.678, 
730), it is essentially useless. Brontë’s rough Yorkshire fatalism carries her through 
disappointment after disappointment with grace and strength. Byron’s English 
practicality is as chaff before the wind in the fraught circumstances of the Greek 
revolution, baffled by “every possible variety of obstruction and distraction …” 
(II.761). But enduring things like Byron’s Englishness or clubfoot are rare in Moore’s 
biography. The poetical Lord’s two key qualities, says Moore, were his “susceptibility 
to new impressions and impulses,” and his “uncontrolled impetuosity” (II.785). 
Byron was so changeable—or to use MacCarthy’s word, “rootless”79—that time could 
erode everything but his most painful memories and dearest friendships. Galt again 
takes up this idea and gives it a harsher meaning. Byron was changeable because his 
attitudes were essentially just “pretensions” he adopted at will (e.g. 51, 54, 153, 350). 
These four biographies have different perceptions of time. Nelson and Brontë 
embody different kinds of endurance, while Moore’s Byron and Galt’s embody 
different kinds of changeability, with Galt telling a far harsher tale of pretension and 
decline. Table 4.1 quantifies some of these differences between the biographies, and 
allows us to see just how distinctive the dual structure of Moore’s plot really is. 
                                                   
79 MacCarthy, Byron, 71. 
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Table 4.1 
Emotional structure of the four biographies by sentiment score (3 d.p.) 
Text Mean Range 
Mean Absolute 
Difference 
Moore’s Byron 0.573 1.326 0.206 
Volume 1 0.675 0.888 0.155 
Volume 2 0.459 1.326 0.211 
Change -32% +49% +36% 
    
Galt’s Byron 0.382 0.876 0.160 
Chapters 1-30 0.430 0.674 0.145 
Chapters 31-49 0.314 0.801 0.181 
Change -27% +19% +26% 
    
Gaskell’s Brontë 0.348 0.935 0.143 
Volume 1 0.330 0.859 0.130 
Volume 2 0.366 0.935 o.156 
Change +11% +9% +20% 
    
Southey’s Nelson 0.186 0.719 0.124 
No structural 
division 
NA NA NA 
 
The mean is simply the average sentiment score for all sentences. The mean 
score drops in both Moore and Galt after Byron’s exile, though the drop is larger in 
Moore’s case.80 No such change occurs at all in Gaskell’s biography. This statistic 
also shows the emotional effect of Moore’s effusive style and long sentences, which 
result in more positive sentiment scores than Galt’s terse, dismissive prose or 
Southey’s manly and violent narrative of war. The range and mean absolute 
difference measure how much the sentiment scores vary. The range is the difference 
between the highest and lowest scores. The mean absolute difference is a more 
complicated statistic, which measures the average distance between each point on 
                                                   
80 Galt’s biography is only in one volume, so I have split it at chapter 31, when Byron leaves England 
for good, for comparison.  
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the graph and the mean. Both these statistics reveal how Moore’s sense of Byron’s 
extreme “variety” is woven into the fabric of his prose and encoded in the dual 
structure of his narrative. Moore’s sentiment scores vary far more widely than those 
of any of the other biographers throughout his work, and there is an enormous 
difference in the variation between the two volumes. We have seen already how 
Moore layers the meaning in Volume 2, drawing a stark contrast between Byron’s 
loss of the “poetry of character,” and his glory as a poet and man of action. Sentiment 
analysis suggests that this was a distinctive feature of Moore’s biographical art. 
 Moore’s Byron is an encyclopaedia of self-deformation. Its plot incorporates 
many of the themes we have already encountered in Edgeworth, Opie, Smith and 
Clare. Sentiment analysis has allowed us to uncover crucial features of its design. 
Using SYUZHET to guide us through the unfolding plot, we discovered the complex 
interplay of opposed forces that degraded Byron’s character even as it unleashed his 
genius. Comparing the four graphs clarified what makes Moore’s shaping of Byron’s 
life distinctive: his gentler sense of time’s corrosive power, compared to Galt, and 
his greater sense of the variety of emotion and experience, compared to Galt or 
Gaskell or Southey. The book is a philosophical investigation into Byron’s life, in 
which Moore carefully considers all the elements that contributed to make Byron 
and his poetry what they were. Though he succeeded in giving a coherent shape to 
Byron’s life, the shape he discovered was huge and complicated. As Moore 
considered the changeability of Byron’s character, he came to doubt the stability and 
coherence of the self—as we will see in the final section of the chapter.  
4.4 Moore’s Quest 
All biographies contain an element of autobiography. As Wolfgang Hildesheimer 
puts it in his biography of Sir Andrew Marbot:  
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Der typische Biograph ist derjenige, der nicht nur seinen Helden wählt, sondern 
der—wie Freud sagt—auf eigentümliche Weise an ihn fixiert ist, und zwar—ich 
ergänze—auf eine solche Weise, daß er zunehmend der Idee verfällt, von seinem 
Helden gewählt zu sein.81 
The biographer sets out to find their subject’s identity, but in doing so they inevitably 
reflect upon their own. The reader becomes aware of the biographer’s presence, 
ordering and explaining the subject’s life, and part of the drama of any great 
biography is the slow unveiling of this relationship between biographer and subject. 
 Moore is omnipresent in his Byron. He is the addressee of many of the letters 
printed in the biography, was the custodian of Byron’s journals, and personally 
witnessed Byron’s life in England (1812-16) and Venice (1819). Moore is both 
character and narrator, and in the process of understanding Byron he is compelled 
to try and understand himself. In the end, he claims to have identified himself and 
his biases, and to have controlled for them: “Of any partiality, however, beyond what 
our mutual friendship accounts for and justifies, I am by no means conscious …” 
(II.807). There is a note of insecurity in this statement, however, as Moore leaves 
open the possibility that he has unconscious partialities beyond his knowledge or 
control. This points towards a deeper scepticism in Moore’s notion of the self. 
Like Barbauld or Coleridge, Moore finally concludes that self-knowledge is 
difficult, even frightening: “Who is there, indeed, that could bear to be judged by 
even the best of those unnumbered thoughts that course each other, like waves of 
the sea, through our minds, passing away unuttered and, for the most part, even 
unowned by ourselves?” (II.792) There is a rich and complex thought behind this 
                                                   
81 “The typical biographer is one who not only chooses their hero, but—as Freud says—is fixated on 
them in a mysterious way, and indeed—I would add—in such a way, that they increasingly fall prey 
to the notion that it’s their hero who’s chosen them.” Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Marbot: Eine 
Biographie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981), 189. Some have doubted Sir Andrew’s existence, 
but Hildesheimer’s evidence seems to me conclusive. 
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question. When others judge us, they identify and define us. When they hold us 
responsible for a thought or deed, they decide what we are: a criminal, a hero, a 
misogynist, a pedant or a lover. Edgeworth and Opie knew the psychological cost of 
judgment, as society makes Vivian and Adeline feel the weight of their own 
existence. Moore agrees that it is hard to “bear” this weight, but his anxiety is 
different. Vivian and Adeline are judged for their actions. Moore fears being judged 
for the “unowned” and “unuttered” things in the mind, the thoughts and feelings we 
neither enact nor avow. Prying into Byron’s mind has made him realise how 
mysterious we are even to ourselves, and more than that, it has made him uncertain 
where the boundaries of the self really lie. Moore imagines that the mind is full of 
“unowned” thoughts, which do not belong to us and yet which may condemn us. 
“Evil into the mind of god or man | May come and go, so unapproved, and leave | 
No spot or blame behind,” says Milton’s Adam.82 Moore is less certain of his soul’s 
integrity. 
His metaphor of the sea suggests other features of these hidden thoughts and 
feelings. Like waves of the sea, they are “numberless” and vast. The sea is stronger 
than our will and deeper than our comprehension. In Childe Harold it is “boundless, 
endless, and sublime, | The image of eternity, the throne | Of the invisible.” (BW, 
251) For Germaine de Staël, it is “l’image de cet infini qui attire sans cesse la pensée, 
et dans lequel sans cesse elle va se perdre.”83 If the mind is a sea, then the self is 
either a little boat rocked by forces it cannot control, or it is a wide formless plain 
whose principles of organisation lie hidden in unsearchable depths. In Moore, we 
                                                   
82 John Milton, Paradise Lost, ed. John Leonard (London: Penguin, 2003), 104. 
83 “… the image of that infinite that ceaselessly draws thought in, and in which [thought] ceaselessly 
loses itself.” Germaine de Staël, Corinne; ou l’Italie, ed. Simone Ballayé (Paris: Honoré Champion, 
2000), 4. 
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can see Hume’s idea resurface, that the mind is a flood of impressions, and the self 
at best a fiction. 
This realisation sets Moore apart from many canonical Romantic 
autobiographers. Jean-Jacques Rousseau begins his Confessions (1782) in perfect 
faith that when all is revealed, his particularity will be confirmed: “Si je ne vaux pas 
mieux, au moins je suis autre.”84 Unlike Moore, he is not afraid to lay himself bare. 
“J’ai dit la vérité,” he exclaims to his audience after reading the Confessions to 
them—though their sleepy reaction to this cry does leave him perturbed.85 Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe ends Dichtung und Wahrheit (1811-33) with a quotation from 
his own play, Egmont (1788): 
Kind, Kind! nicht weiter! Wie von unsichtbaren Geistern gepeitscht, gehen die 
Sonnenpferde der Zeit mit unsers Schicksals leichtem Wagen durch, und uns bleibt 
nichts, als mutig gefaßt die Zügel fest zu halten und bald rechts, bald links, vom Steine 
hier, vom Sturze da, die Räder abzulenken. Wohin es geht, wer weiß es? Erinnert er 
sich doch kaum, woher er kam!86 
Goethe is not ignorant of himself but of his destiny. His mind is not a great sea but 
a brave hero who grasps the reins of life. William Wordsworth ends The Prelude in 
the firm faith that time will only perfect him: “the mind of man becomes | A 
thousand times more beautiful than the earth | On which he dwells” (WW, 588). 
Mary Wollstonecraft ends her Scandinavian Letters on a similar note of self-
certainty: 
Adieu! My spirit of observation seems to be fled—and I have been wandering round 
this dirty place, literally speaking, to kill time; though the thoughts, I would fain fly 
                                                   
84 “If I’m not worthier, at least I’m different.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Œuvres Complètes, ed. 
Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond, 5 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1959), I.5. 
85 “I have said the truth.” Ibid., I.656. 
86 “Child! Child! no further! As if whipped by invisible ghosts, the sun-horses of time run away with 
the light chariot of our destiny, and nothing remains for us but to bravely grab the reins and hang on, 
turning the wheels left and right, away from rocks here and ravines there. Where it’s going—who 
knows? He hardly remembers where he came from!” Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Werke, ed. Erich 
Trunz, 14 vols (Munich: Beck, 1981), X.187. 
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from, lie too close to my heart to be easily shook off, or even beguiled, by any 
employment, except that of preparing for my journey to London.—God bless you!87 
Upon arriving in Dover, her “spirit of observation” disappears, and she is drawn 
back to the firm pillars of her identity: heart, home, and family. In his Interesting 
Narrative (1789), Olaudah Equiano finds that his selfhood is rooted in his 
Christianity. Having developed the habit of seeing “the hand of God in the minutest 
occurrence,” he can account for “every circumstance” of his life.88 Everything fits 
into a grand and meaningful whole. In their different ways, Rousseau, Goethe, 
Wordsworth, Wollstonecraft and Equiano form a stable sense of identity. Moore, it 
appears, does not. 
Moore applies this sceptical and uncertain sense of identity to his friend. 
Byron lacked a central “pivot of character” (II.782). The lordly poet was “multiform” 
(II.783), a boat tossed on the sea of thought and circumstance. This leads Moore to 
judge Byron’s moral derangement indulgently—“knowledge is ever the parent of 
tolerance”—and Moore finds himself unable to condemn a man whose deep inner 
chaos he has come to understand (II.806). Like Clare, Moore’s Byron has no single 
identity. As we saw in §4.1, Hume had held that a person could only be judged on 
the basis of a stable character. Moore discovers that Byron has no such identifiable 
character, and so rescues his tempestuous friend from damnation. Galt thinks that 
the austere and melancholy Manfred is Byron’s central poem. Moore thinks it is the 
expansive and digressive Don Juan. Richard Altick praises Moore for producing a 
                                                   
87 Wollstonecraft, Scandinavian Letters, 262. 
88 Olaudah Equiano, The Interesting Narrative and Other Writings, ed. Vincent Caretta (London: 
Penguin, 2003), 236. 
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“masterly portrait of a complex personality.”89 It would be almost more accurate to 
call it a masterly portrait of a person too complex to have a personality. 
We have seen in previous chapters how texts of self-deformation have a 
strange way of undoing themselves, and Moore’s multiform Byron is no different. 
There is deep tension in his analysis. On the one hand, he adopted the “Life and 
Letters” format in order to root his analysis in Byron’s own words: “the Life should 
consist, as much as possible, of extracts from Byron’s Letters & Journals, making 
him tell his own story …”90 But on the other hand, Moore insists that Byron’s own 
accounts of himself cannot be trusted. As he put it in Rhymes on the Road (1819): 
This gifted Being wraps himself in night; 
 And keeping all that softens, and adorns, 
And gilds his social nature hid from sight, 
 Turns but its darkness on a world he scorns.91 
Byron liked to play up to the dark rumours about him, and shifted or concealed his 
character out of a “fancy for self-defamation” (II.790). He presented a “double 
aspect” to the world (I.393). At times, Moore suggests that Byron had a true, amiable 
self lurking beneath the darkness and scorn. In London, he could see Byron’s “true 
colours,” and easily discovered that the delightful, friendly lord had little of the 
“fierce gloom and sternness” of his fictional creations (ibid.). But this argument 
would seem to undermine the reliability of the letters and journals on which the 
biography is based, and would seem also to undermine Moore’s own argument that 
Byron had no “true” or single character. 
                                                   
89 Richard Altick, Lives and Letters: A History of Literary Biography in England and America (New 
York: Knopf, 1965), 231. 
90 28 May 1826. Moore, The Journal of Thomas Moore, III.939. See also Moore, Byron, II.647. 
91 Moore, Poetical Works, ed. A. D. Godley (London: Oxford University Press, 1910), 514. 
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At other times, Moore is less certain about the distinction between Byron’s 
private and public selves: “It seemed as if, with the power of painting fierce and 
gloomy personages, he had also the ambition to be, himself, the dark ‘sublime he 
drew’ …” (I.302) Byron may have falsified his amiable traits when he pretended to 
be mad, bad and dangerous to know, but by aspiring to match his reputation he may 
also have altered himself. The shaping power of self-image is a fiendishly difficult 
topic for the biographer, one that few biographers really tackle, according to 
Backscheider.92 Moore grapples with this problem throughout the biography, and is 
not always consistent on the point. But in the end, he concludes that Byron was 
capable of “chameleon-like changes” (II.648). Byron could adopt new poses almost 
at will, making experiments with himself, and though many of these poses were 
mere acting, it is ultimately impossible to find the one single true Byron among 
them. 
Moore’s sceptical sense of selfhood makes his prose tense and thought-
provoking. The meanings of words become as difficult to pin down as Byron’s 
personality, and no word more so than “self:” “It is, indeed, in the very nature and 
essence of genius to be for ever occupied intensely with Self, as the great centre and 
source of its strength.” (I.591) Nearly every time Moore uses the term he capitalises 
it like this. And he never uses a determiner—it is always Self, never “the Self,” “a 
Self” or “one’s Self.” Self is not an individual personality, but rather a “source” or 
“centre” of the mind’s power. This quaint way of using the term is consistent with 
Moore’s sense of the mind as a sea of thoughts and feelings, of the personality as 
something that can shift and change, of the individual as something chancy and 
contingent, which is impossible to pin down—especially in the case of Byron, who 
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was in touch with the deepest “source” of Self, and destroyed his own individuality. 
Moore’s quest for Self ends in paradox, as Moore doubts his own integrity, and 
brings all the evidence on which he has based his narration into question. It is this 
very doubt, however, which gives his biography its great dynamism and humanity. 
*** 
Moore’s Byron describes a person deformed in body and mind, a man whose bodily 
“lameness” haunted him through life, and whose “moral derangement” nearly cost 
him his fame. To save his friend from calumny, Moore set out to prove that Byron 
was not malformed but formless. His genius was so powerful, his sensibility so 
quick, his personality so chameleon, that there was no single Lord Byron whom the 
reader could submit to moral judgement. To make this case, Moore drew on Hume, 
for whom the self was an illusion, and D’Israeli, for whom genius was a power not 
to be reckoned with. To buttress his theory, he developed an effusive, intellectual 
prose style and a scientific approach to psychological analysis. He told an epic tale 
of extraordinary emotional fluctuation and decline, in which Byron was denied the 
possibly of a harmonious self-formation by the combined forces of nature, society, 
and circumstance, and was thrust into an exile that hurled him from self to self. In 
his search for his friend, Moore found that “Self” was a mysterious realm, and 
became sceptical that any of us have a coherent or knowable form. 
Biography offers us a different view of the Romantic self, because it is 
historically particular. More than other writers, Moore saw the self as contingent 
and difficult to understand. Galt and Southey wrote in a concise and confident style 
very different to Moore’s humble and speculative one. But it is nonetheless the case 
that all biographies describe historical individuals, whose minds are inaccessible 
and whose lives are always open to another interpretation. Autobiographers have 
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the power to shape their own lives, and are themselves shaped by the 
autobiographies in which they create a new self-image to live by. Biographies are 
rarely so self-reflexive and self-authorising,93 and the biographer’s subject is always 
just beyond the horizon. A powerful biography like Moore’s can put the Romantic 
self in historical time, where things happen once and are borne away irretrievably. 
No self has a fixed or final form in biography, because no biography is the last. 
There was one element of Byron’s character, his sexuality, that Moore could 
not include in his decorous prose biography. Gothic themes of incest and bisexuality 
could have no place in a non-fiction narrative designed to resuscitate his friend’s 
reputation—not to mention Moore’s own reputation as a gentleman author. But in 
his Gothic poem, The Loves of the Angels (1823), Moore found a way to describe this 
darker and more sublime aspect of Byron’s soul. One of the characters, Rubi, is 
Byron, and his tale of forbidden love is an allegory of Byron’s liaison with Augusta.94 
Moore suggests that Byron often concealed his true self out of vanity, but in this 
poem, Moore suggests Byron may have had a different motive for self-falsification: 
    I felt 
That every spark of that pure flame— 
 Pure, while among the stars I dwelt— 
Was now, by my transgression, turn’d 
Into gross, earthly fire, which burn’d, 
Burn’d all it touched, as fast as eye 
 Could follow the fierce, ravening flashes … (555, ll. 1380-6) 
Revealing his angelic form to Lilis kills her and effects Rubi’s banishment from 
heaven. He is scarred by the final kiss she gives him, carrying the ashen imprint of 
her lips on his brow for eternity. But his self-revelation was not purely wrong. 
                                                   
93 Boswell’s Johnson is perhaps an exception, since Boswell took it upon himself to shape the life of 
the man whose biography he wrote, taking Johnson to the Hebrides or asking him clever questions 
to “draw him out.” But this also makes it a one-sided and eccentric—if delightful—book.  
94 Vail, Literary Relationship, 149-52. 
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Indeed, its great sublimity is evidence of Rubi’s supremacy among all the angels, 
“Second alone to Him, whose light | Was, ev’n to theirs, as day to night …” (543, ll. 
448-9). And although Rubi seems convinced it was wrong to reveal himself, in the 
end the effects of his sin are good, because it gives God an opportunity to 
demonstrate his mercy: 
  … if Mercy did not hear [Rubi’s repentance], 
Oh, God would not be what this bright 
 And glorious universe of His, 
This world of beauty, goodness, light, 
 And endless love, proclaims He is! (556, ll. 1484-8) 
In poetry, Moore could indulge his Gothic imagination. He could explore the darkest 
and most sublime aspects of Byron’s character. Byron’s erotic attachment to his half-
sister could become a divine passion and an opportunity for cosmic repentance. But 
even in such a concealed, allegorical form, Moore found it was difficult to contain 
Byron in print. The Loves of the Angels was condemned for its bold treatment of 
religion and morality, and Moore was forced to orientalise later editions, replacing 
God with Allah to allay the conservative backlash.95 
The Loves of the Angels reveals the Gothic strain that has thrummed through 
all our examples of self-deformation. Vivian’s foolish attempt to Gothicise his family 
home precipitates the debt that enslaves him. Adeline is as harried as one of Ann 
Radcliffe’s gothic heroines. Smith’s sonnets muse on the moonlit graveyards and 
fruitless remorse of Gothic romance, and both she and Clare describe life as a 
dungeon. Lurking beneath Moore’s biography is Byron’s sublime passion, too 
frighteningly destructive to deal with fully in the text. In the following chapter, we 
will consider texts that bring these weird and frightening aspects of Romantic self-
deformation to the fore: the Gothic tragedies of Joanna Baillie and Charles Harpur. 
                                                   





DRAMA: THE HIDEOUS SOULS OF 
JOANNA BAILLIE AND CHARLES 
HARPUR 
 
Les passions n’y sont présentées aux yeux que pour montrer tout le désordre dont 
elles sont cause: et le vice y est peint partout avec des couleurs qui en font connaître 
et haïr la difformité.1 
HE DISORDER of passion, and the deformity of vice—for Jean Racine, the 
very essence of tragedy was self-deformation. Phèdre’s incestuous love 
for her stepson wrecks the state and destroys her life. Her lust is a 
deformity as hideous as Philoctetes’ foot, Richard III’s hunchback, the eyeless 
sockets of Oedipus, Gloucester, and Samson, or the spiritual blindness of Hedda 
Gabler and Willy Loman. Physical and moral deformity is an enduring theme in 
Western tragic drama—perhaps the most enduring theme. Except in the case of 
Clare’s unformed nature sonnets or Thomas Moore’s “multiform” Byron, there has 
been something tragic about all the deformed selves we have so far encountered. 
Tragedy is necessarily bleak, and is probably the hardest of all genres to 
square with traditional, optimistic definitions of Romanticism. Romantic tragedy 
has accordingly inspired some of the most trenchant criticism ever penned. The 
most famous book on the topic is George Steiner’s The Death of Tragedy (1961), in 
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which we learn that the Romantics slammed shut the “gates of hell,” advocated a 
“non-tragic” vision of life, and therefore killed tragedy for the modern world.2 He 
concedes that nearly every British Romantic of note wrote tragedies—he mentions 
William Blake, Walter Scott, Robert Southey, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Walter 
Savage Landor, Leigh Hunt, Lord Byron, John Keats, and Thomas Lovell Beddoes. 
He might also have mentioned Frances Burney, Felicia Hemans, Mary Robinson, 
Ann Yearsley, Elizabeth Inchbald, Harriet Lee, Joanna Baillie, Catherine Gore and 
Mary Russell Mitford. The fact that so many Romantic writers were interested in 
tragedy might suggest that the Romantic vision of life was not utterly “non-tragic.” 
Indeed, Stendhal thought tragedy to be the very essence of Romanticism and 
therefore of modern literature: 
Quel est l’ouvrage littéraire qui a le plus réussi en France depuis dix ans? 
Les romans de Walter Scott.  
Qu’est-ce que les romans de Walter Scott? 
De la tragédie romantique, entremêlée de longues descriptions.3 
But Romantic tragedies all have a problem, argues Steiner: they are “dismally bad.”4 
When faced with an incontestably brilliant Romantic tragedy, Goethe’s Faust (1806-
32), he has another argument: it might be a brilliant play, but its redemptive ending 
means it isn’t much of a tragedy.5 
Steiner should not be judged too harshly, because he is only repeating the 
views of many of the Romantics themselves. William Wordsworth, author of The 
Borderers (1797), called the German tragedies sweeping the British stage “sickly and 
stupid” (WW, 735). Coleridge, translator of Schiller and author of the immensely 
                                                   
2 George Steiner, The Death of Tragedy (London: Faber, 1995), 127-28. 
3 “Which literary works have had the greatest success in France for the last ten years? | The novels of 
Walter Scott. | What are the novels of Walter Scott? | Romantic tragedies, interspersed with long 
descriptions.” Stendhal, Racine et Shakespeare, 17. 
4 Steiner, Death of Tragedy, 122. 
5 Ibid., 127. 
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successful tragedy Remorse (1813), thought Charles Maturin’s Bertram (1816) a 
sorry piece of “jacobinical” dross (CW, VII.221). Sheridan, who produced the Gothic 
spectacular Pizarro (1799) to rave reviews and bumper crowds, parodied modern 
tragedy in The Critic (1779) and scornfully told Matthew Lewis that The Castle 
Spectre (1797) wasn’t worth a sous.6 Lecturing in Berlin, Hegel thought that the 
recent efforts of Heinrich von Kleist and August von Kotzebue were miserable 
things, ruined by the “wretched coherence” of the heroes, with their “duality, 
raggedness, and lack of harmony.”7 Even those Romantics who thought it was still 
possible to write a great tragedy could take a dismal view of contemporary theatre. 
Joanna Baillie blamed the renovations at Drury Lane and Covent Garden for her 
plays’ lack of success on the stage.8 In such massive theatres, how could the audience 
be expected to hear good dialogue, and understand the minds of complex 
characters?9 
In the twentieth century, while literary critics were busy ignoring Romantic 
tragedy in English, theatre historians were busy proving its lack of literary or 
dramatic merit. According to Allardyce Nicoll, the Romantics tried too hard to 
imitate Shakespeare, and the “dead hand of Elizabethanism” strangled their 
efforts.10 They were also too theoretical, writing tragedies to a preconceived mould 
rather than creating living works of dramatic art.11 Michael Booth’s classic study of 
                                                   
6 Jeffrey Cox, “Introduction,” in Jeffrey N. Cox, ed. Seven Gothic Dramas, 1789-1825 (Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 1992), 2.  
7 Georg Friedrich Hegel, On Tragedy, ed. Anne and Henry Paolucci (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 
1975), 208. 
8 “There are, I am told, who sharply criticise | Our modern theatres’ unwieldy size.” Charles Lamb, 
“Prologue,” in Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Remorse (London: Pople, 1813), ix.  
9 She makes this argument in her 1812 preface “To The Reader,” in the third instalment of Plays on 
the Passions: reprinted in Joanna Baillie, The Dramatic and Poetical Works (London: Longman, 
1851), 231. Unless otherwise noted, all references to Baillie’s writings will be to this edition, indicated 
by the JW and page number. 
10 Allardyce Nicoll, A History of English Drama 1660-1900, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970), IV.162. 
11 Ibid., IV.156. 
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English melodrama is full of enthusiasm for the spectacle and vim of the Romantic 
stage, but even he claims that “When the romantic poets did attempt the drama, 
their plays were either so untheatrical as to be unactable, or else theatrical success 
was due to melodramatic content and spectacular production.”12 Raymond Williams 
praises the Romantics for bringing a new “exploring energy” to the writing of 
tragedy, but genially admits the “failures” of their actual plays.13 It is no wonder, 
given this tide of criticism, that not a single British tragedy between Shakespeare 
and Shaw has survived as a part of the standard repertoire. 
From a European perspective, this situation is bizarre. In nearly every other 
country in Europe, Romantic tragedy lies at the heart of the national theatre. In 
Germany, Goethe and Friedrich von Schiller are seen as the pinnacle of national 
playwriting, and the plays of Heinrich von Kleist and Georg Büchner endure in the 
playhouse. In Poland, Adam Mickiewicz and Juilusz Słowacki still command the 
stage—indeed, playing Konrad in Miekiewicz’s Dziady (1823, 1833) is as much a rite 
of passage for young Polish actors as playing Hamlet is for British ones.14 In 
Moscow, theatregoers see masterpieces of Russian drama performed in a theatre 
named after Alexander Pushkin—who himself wrote five plays, all of them tragedies. 
In Italy, Vittorio Alfieri is on the school curriculum, and the Romantic operas of 
Giuseppe Verdi, with tragic plots culled from Scott, Schiller, Byron and Victor Hugo, 
are at the heart of the national theatre. Even in France, where the early modern 
tragedies of Racine and Pierre Corneille overshadow their Romantic successors, the 
tragedies of Hugo and Alfred de Musset continue to be widely read, staged and 
                                                   
12 Michael Booth, English Melodrama (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1965), 47. 
13 Raymond Williams, Modern Tragedy (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966), 94. 
14 Charles S. Kraszewski, “Introduction,” in Adam Mickiewicz, Forefather's Eve, trans. Charles S. 
Kraszewski (London: Glgoslav, 2016), Kindle edition. 
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studied. The poor British—and as we will see, Australian—playwrights of the period 
have not been so lucky. 
Like the other genres we have examined, British Romantic tragedy has 
enjoyed a revival of academic interest since the 1980s. Four major anthologies of 
Romantic drama have been published, most of whose plays are tragedies,15 along 
with several massive databases of playscripts. Starting with Jeffrey Cox’s In the 
Shadows of Romance (1987), monographs, edited collections and academic articles 
have started to flow, vindicating the literary qualities of these neglected texts. Cox, 
however, argues that this scholarship is yet to mature. He had set out to illuminate 
“the Romantic redefinition of tragedy,” but what “happen[ed] was that a wide range 
of scholars turned to the playwrights of the period in an act of recovery.”16 Through 
this process, Baillie has emerged as scholars’ favourite playwright of the period—an 
opinion they share with a large number of Baillie’s contemporaries. Anna Barbauld 
imagined that Baillie’s drama would live long after Britain fell: 
Then, loved Joanna, to admiring eyes 
Thy storied groups in scenic pomp shall rise; 
Their high-souled strains and Shakespeare’s noble rage 
Shall with alternate passion shake the stage.17 
John Stuart Mill, meanwhile, thought Constantine Paleologus (1810) was the most 
powerful play since Macbeth.18 Like Barbauld and Mill, scholars today usually prefer 
Baillie’s tragedies to her comedies and melodramas. 
                                                   
15 Cox, Seven Gothic Dramas; John Franceschina, ed. Sisters of Gore: Seven Gothic Melodramas by 
Women, 1790-1843 (New York and London: Garland, 1997); Paul Baines and Edward Burns, eds., 
Five Romantic Plays, 1768-1821 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Jeffrey N. Cox and 
Michael Gamer, eds., The Broadview Anthology of Romantic Drama (Peterborough: Broadview, 
2003). 
16 Jeffrey N. Cox, “Running in the Shadows: Revisiting In the Shadows of Romance: Romantic Tragic 
Drama in Germany, England, and France,” European Romantic Review 23, no. 3 (2012): 281. 
17 Barbauld, Works, I.237. 
18 John Stuart Mill, Autobiography, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1873), 15. 
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In her most famous works, the Plays on the Passions (1798-1836), Baillie set 
out to portray self-deformation in all its grisly detail. As she explained in her 
celebrated “Introductory Discourse,” her tragedies would “delineate the progress of 
the higher passions,” as they “brood within the breast, till all the better dispositions, 
all the fair gifts of nature, are borne down before them” (10). She would distinguish 
each passion’s “different stages of progression” (16), and reveal the “misery that 
ensures” when they seize control of the mind (11). Her protagonists are torn apart 
by their own inner energies. In De Monfort (1798), the hero drops dead from the 
power of his own hatred. In Ethwald (1802), ambition destroys the eponymous 
usurper, while Romiero (1836) is a latter-day Othello tortured to death by his 
jealousy. Meanwhile Orra (1812) and her counterpart Count Osterloo in The Dream 
(1812) are both destroyed by their fear of the dead (as we will see in §5.2). Baillie 
drew on the melodramatic Gothic conventions of contemporary theatre to highlight 
the agony of her protagonists. 19 Her characters are medieval aristocrats, imprisoned 
in gloomy castles, forests and monasteries, weakened by their old-fashioned 
superstitions about aristocratic honour and the existence of the supernatural. 
While Baillie was in Hampstead, finishing her series exploring the effects of 
passion on the human mind, another poet on the edge of the British world was 
taking the tradition of Gothic tragedy in a different direction. The young Australian 
poet, Charles Harpur, the son of an Irish highwayman and an English thief, was 
inspired by his older Romantic contemporaries to try and found the literature of his 
country. His first great attempt was The Tragedy of Donohoe (1835), in which he 
turned the real bushranger John Donohoe into a tragic hero and Gothic villain. 
Where Baillie argued that it was “passion” that deformed the tragic hero, Harpur 
                                                   
19 See Paul Ranger, “Terror and Pity Reign in Every Breast:” Gothic Drama in the London Patent 
Theatres, 1750-1820 (London: Society for Theatre Research, 1991), 98-103. 
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suggested it was society. Donohoe, a convict, is abused by the man assigned to be 
his master in the penal settlement, who flings insults at his new charge. Suffering 
the “scorn and oppression of his fellow-man,” Donohoe flees into the bush and 
finally commits a terrible murder.20 Baillie’s plays are mostly medieval, but 
Donohoe lives in the present day, among the wattles and stringybark of the Blue 
Mountains, on the edge of the growing urban society of which Harpur was a part. 
Donohoe’s claims against Harpur’s society are supported by the comic ineptitude 
and dull brutality of the play’s magistrates and policemen. 
Self-deformation is the central concern of these plays. Scholars have been 
turned off by their Gothic trappings: the effusive language, extravagant emotions 
and Shakespearean echoes. These aesthetic deformities, however, are essential to 
the plays’ exploration of the self’s hideous and explosive dimensions. Though Gothic 
conventions are present in both Baillie and Harpur, they draw on different parts of 
the tradition. Baillie is of Ann Radcliffe’s school, with her literary sophistication, 
medieval setting, atmospheric effects and intense interest in characters’ states of 
feeling. Harpur is in the more marginal and radical tradition of William Godwin, 
with his present-day setting and overt political message. If Baillie’s tragic heroes 
resemble Victor Frankenstein, driven to madness and folly by quixotic desires, 
Harpur’s tragic hero resembles Frankenstein’s monster, parentless, degraded and 
despised until he lashes out in pain. Comparing these two playwrights, we can see 
the range of ways Romantic playwrights adapted tragic and Gothic traditions to 
portray self-deformation on stage. 
                                                   
20 Charles Harpur, Stalwart the Bushranger, with The Tragedy of Donohoe, ed. Elizabeth Perkins 
(Sydney: Currency Press, 1987), 94. 
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The textual history of Harpur’s play is complicated, and requires a brief 
introduction. He wrote the first version of the play in 1833 and ’34. Hoping to get 
the play produced, he presented his neatly-written manuscript to Edward Smith 
Hall, who published substantial excerpts of it in his newspaper, The Sydney 
Monitor, in February 1835. These excerpts are all that remain of the original 
Tragedy of Donohoe. Harpur substantially reworked the play through the ’30s 
and ’40s, publishing a revised version in 1853 under the new title The Bushrangers; 
a Play in Five Acts.21 The protagonist, named Donohoe in the original play, was 
renamed Stalwart (several other characters were also renamed), and while the plot 
remained mostly the same, many of the scenes were rewritten. He continued to 
tinker with the play up to his death in 1867, leaving a “final version” in manuscript 
among his papers.22 In this version, entitled Stalwart the Bushranger, the plot is 
identical to the 1853, but Harpur versified the play’s several prose speeches, and 
made some changes to its imagery and philosophy. As we will see in §5.3, these 
changes were not for the best. In what follows I refer mainly to the 1853 version, the 
earliest complete version and aesthetically the most satisfying one.  
My discussion falls into three sections. In §5.1, I demonstrate that self-
deformation was the salient theme of Romantic tragedy. Statistical analysis of the 
John Larpent Collection shows the rise of melodrama transformed the drama at the 
end of the eighteenth century. Romantic playwrights from across Europe seized on 
melodramatic conventions to make their tragedies more extravagant and 
psychological. For these playwrights, self-deformation was the very essence of the 
                                                   
21 Harpur, The Bushrangers. All references to the 1853 version will be to this edition, indicated by 
year and page number. 
22 The 1867 version is available in Perkins’s edition, n. 20, which also includes the surviving 
newspaper fragments of The Tragedy of Donohoe in the appendix. All references to these versions 
will be to this edition, indicated by the year of the version and page number. 
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tragic. Their protagonists are tragic because they deform their own souls and find 
themselves hideous. In §5.2, I turn to Baillie and Harpur specifically, comparing 
how this hideousness of soul comes about in their plays. Critics like Steiner and 
Eagleton claim that in Romantic tragedies, the protagonist’s downfall is typically 
society’s fault, rather than the protagonist’s.23 We have seen already that Baillie 
blamed passion instead. To address this debate, I use the popular digital technique 
of character network analysis to compare the plot structures of The Bushrangers, 
Orra and The Dream. While at first glance it seems that Harpur blames society, and 
Baillie the passions, for their characters’ tragic fates, on closer inspection the social 
world of Harpur’s play is more psychological than it first seems, and the 
psychological worlds of Baillie’s plays are more social. In §5.3, I consider what 
Harpur and Baillie add to our philosophical understanding of the Romantic self. 
Since Hegel, it has been common to argue that Romantic tragedy depicts a 
“contingent” universe where actions are inherently meaningless.24 Hegel makes an 
acute observation—God is silent in Harpur and Baillie’s frightening plays. But in 
their most forceful and poetic moments, they have a vision of a mysterious and 
meaningful universe, a vision that retains its power in our secular and scientific age. 
5.1 Romantic Catastrophe 
What makes a tragedy “Romantic”? Baillie and Harpur were writing at a 
revolutionary period in the history of English drama. Huge renovations to the patent 
theatres of London and the proliferation of unlicensed venues meant that the British 
theatre was rapidly expanding,25 while in Harpur’s New South Wales, a transition 
                                                   
23 Steiner, Death of Tragedy, 127; Terry Eagleton, Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic (Malden: 
Blackwell, 2003), 204-5. 
24 Hegel, On Tragedy, 84. 
25 See Jane Moody, “The Theatrical Revolution, 1776–1843,” in The Cambridge History of British 
Theatre, ed. Joseph Donohue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), esp. 199-208. 
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was underway from the amateur convict theatre of the early colony to the growing 
professional theatre of the mid-nineteenth century.26 As the theatre industry 
transformed to encompass a new, more popular audience, the genre-system of 
English drama transformed along with it, as shown in Figure 5.1: 
Figure 5.1 
Number of Plays Submitted for Inspection, 1737-1823 
 
Percentage of Submitted Plays in Each Category, 1737-1823 
 
Drama was becoming “Romantic” in a literal sense. These graphs show the 
number of plays in three main genres submitted to the Inspector of Plays between 
                                                   
26 See Robert Jordan, The Convict Theatres of Early Australia, 1788-1840 (Hatfield: University of 
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1737 and 1823.27 I have not classified the plays into genres, but relied on the 
playwrights’ own classifications in their titles or subtitles. The most striking pattern 
in the graphs is the explosion of new generic designations in the 1790s. While 
“tragedies” continued to be submitted to the inspector as often (or as seldom) as 
ever, “comedies” starkly declined, and were replaced by a chaos of new and exciting-
sounding genres, including “dramatic romances,” “musical dramas,” “operatic 
romances,” “grand romantic melodramas” and “dramatic legends,” as well as more 
vaguely entitled “dramas” or “plays.” This third category is usually referred to today 
as “melodrama.” This new kind of play had two key features that influenced literary 
tragedy of the period: (1) mixture of themes and genres; and (2) heightened 
subjectivity.28 
(1) Mixture of genres. The great number of different names Romantic 
playwrights used for melodrama indicates how many different conventions they 
mixed. They combined wild adventure with family values, terrible violence with 
sentimental love.29 This probably explains why they pushed comedy off the stage, 
though tragedy remained. A literary tragedy like De Monfort could draw on the 
Gothic elements of melodramas like The Kentish Barons (1791) or The Miller and 
his Men (1813) without compromising its serious tone or tragic conventions. But 
there is no room for a gloomy dungeon or capricious Oriental despot on the sunlit 
Bath streets of The Rivals (1775). When the conventions of gothic melodrama and 
                                                   
27 The data comes from the catalogue for the John Larpent collection, held at the Huntington Library, 
San Marino, CA (MS number: mssLA 1-2503). The collection comprises the plays submitted for 
clearance by the Inspector of Plays between 1737 and 1823. It thus gives a good picture of what plays 
were actually being produced in British theatres of the period. The data is available here: “Eighteenth 
Century Drama | Key Data,” Eighteenth Century Drama, Adam Matthew Digital, accessed 16 August 
2017, http://www.amdigital.co.uk/m-products/product/eighteenth-century-drama/key-data/ 
28 It must be admitted that a great student of English melodrama, Michael Booth, disagrees with both 
these points, arguing that melodrama has a small and coherent set of conventions, and is primarily 
interested in “externals” rather than psychology: Booth, English Melodrama, chap. 1 and 14-15. 
29 As Moody puts it, “Dramatic genres … are rarely pure or unadulterated in the early nineteenth-
century theatre.” Moody, “Theatrical Revolution,” 213. 
DRAMA: THE HIDEOUS SOULS OF BAILLIE AND HARPUR 
243 
comedy do intersect, the result is usually parody, as in The Rovers (1799) or 
Northanger Abbey (1817), or the comedy metamorphoses into a romantic tale of 
growth and adventure—i.e. a melodrama—as in Maria Edgeworth’s marvellous 
Whim for Whim (1798). This is the truth behind Frye’s claim that the Romantics 
rarely wrote “pure comedy.”30 Melodrama enriched tragedy with new tropes and 
images, putting stories of quest and rebellion at the centre of the drama. But these 
same tropes and images seem to have killed eighteenth-century society comedy. 
(2) Heightened subjectivity. The new melodramas were also intense and 
brooding plays. The very term melodrama, Ranger observes, means “musical 
drama,” and directors used the musical accompaniment of the action to make “overt 
statement[s] about the inner lives of the characters.”31 The most popular 
melodramas of the Romantic period were Gothic or Oriental, and their villains 
tended to indulge in “gloomy meditation,” revealing the “agony” of their tortured 
souls. 32 These remorseful, self-obsessed Gothic antiheroes also found a home in 
literary tragedies of the period. From Goethe’s Faust and Mickiewicz’s Konrad to 
Hemans’ di Procida and Gore’s Falkenstiern, most of the heroes of Romantic tragedy 
are brooding Gothic introverts. This Gothic subjectivity has long been recognised as 
a central component of Romantic tragedy. Northrop Frye argues that Romantic 
tragedy is the “tragedy of self-awareness,” in which the protagonist falls away from 
nature to become an “isolated and subjective consciousness.”33 Cox agrees: the 
                                                   
30 Frye, A Study of English Romanticism, 45. He is quite wrong to conclude, however, that Austen’s 
novels are “pure comedy” of the kind he describes. We have learnt to recognise the romance and 
adventure of her heroines’ stories.  
31 Ranger, Terror and Pity, 89. Booth disagrees, saying melodrama is usually more interested in 
“externals:” English Melodrama, 14-15. 
32 Booth, English Melodrama, 80. 
33 Frye, A Study of English Romanticism, 40. 
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Romantic tragic hero is a quester who tries “to break through to the open world of 
the romantic imagination,” but fails.34 
When Romantic playwrights combined the old tradition of tragedy with the 
new tradition of Gothic melodrama, they developed a new sense of what it means 
for something to be “tragic.” Steiner argues that tragedy is always rooted in some 
notion of “catastrophe:” “Tragedies end badly.”35 We usually describe something as 
tragic when it is the worst it can possibly be, when it is worse than merely sad or 
disappointing. In the remainder of this section, I consider the catastrophes of a 
number of Romantic plays, some of which their authors labelled “tragedies,” some 
of which they did not. When we compare these different plays, it becomes apparent 
that self-deformation, or to be more precise, hideousness of soul, was a defining 
feature of the tragic for the Romantics. The worst thing that can happen in these 
plays is not death or dishonour, but the perversion of one’s inward self. 
Tragedy is relative. What may seem a terrible end by one standard of human 
achievement may seem holy and beautiful by another. To a certain kind of atheist, 
the death of an early Christian at the hands of the Romans may seem a squalid affair, 
the victory of tyranny over delusion. In Baillie’s play The Martyr (1826), by contrast, 
Cordenius’s death is a moment of cosmic bliss: 
O, Thou, who didst upon the cross for us  
A willing suff’rer die, receive my soul!  
Almighty God and Sire, supreme o’er all,  
Pardon my sins and take me to Thyself!  
Accept the last words of my earthly lips:  
High hallelujah to Thy holy name! (527) 
                                                   
34 Cox, In the Shadows of Romance, 3. 
35 Steiner, Death of Tragedy, 8. 
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Baillie gives us no reason to doubt the salvation of Cordenius’s soul. He calls on 
heaven to receive him, having committed no wrongs himself, absolutely certain of 
the nature, integrity and salvation of his soul. Despite its grisly end, Baillie called 
this play not a tragedy, but a “Drama.” Cordenius’s religious optimism takes the 
tragic sting out of his death. The situation is similar in Schiller’s Maid of Orleans 
(1804). Like Cordenius, Johanna dies in a state of bliss, having undergone a similar 
spiritual transformation and discovered the virtue of mercy. Schiller called this 
ambiguously hopeful piece a “Romantic Tragedy.” His Maria Stuart (1800) depicts 
martyrdom in a more negative light. It ends with the execution of Mary Queen of 
Scots, of whose Catholic devotion the play leaves us in no doubt. Unlike Cordenius 
or Johanna, however, she dies offstage, and her departure from the world reveals 
little but the pettiness of human motive. Her final speech is a jealous curse, spat in 
Leicester’s face: 
Kniet zu den Füßen der Elisabeth! 
Mög’ Euer Lohn nicht Eure Strafe werden! 
Lebt wohl! – Jetzt hab ich nichts mehr auf der Erden!36 
Leicester is rooted to the spot as she is executed in the next room. He watches her 
pray and take confession, and it horrifies him: “Sie geht dahin, ein schon verklärter 
Geist, | Und mir bleibt die Verzweiflung der Verdammten.”37 Back in London, 
Queen Elizabeth finds that her foe’s execution, which was supposed to secure her 
legitimacy, has alienated her dearest advisors. “Ich habe deinen edlern Teil | Nicht 
retten können,” says Shrewsbury, forsaking her service.38 Leicester has already 
                                                   
36 “Kneel at the feet of Elisabeth! | May your prize not become your punishment! | Farewell! – Now 
I have nothing more on earth!” Friedrich von Schiller, Sämtliche Werke, ed. Gerhard Fricke and 
Herbert G. Göpfert, 5 vols (Munich: Hanser Verlag, 1962), II.678. 
37 “She goes within, an already transfigured soul, | And to me remain the doubts of the damned.” 
Ibid. 
38 “I could not save your nobler part.” Ibid, II.685. 
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departed for France, and the queen broods alone as the curtains fall. Schiller minced 
no words in his subtitle: Maria Stuart is a “Tragedy.” 
It is sometimes said that the problem with Romantic tragedy is that it lacks a 
cosmic scale of values by which people’s actions can be judged. This is not the case 
with these three plays. Baillie and Schiller share a set of values: martyrdom is noble, 
freedom is beautiful, tyranny is dreadful, and it is wrong for these protagonists to 
die. And yet despite this common set of values, there is an important difference 
between Maria Stuart and the other two examples. The key ingredient is self-
deformation. Cox identifies Schiller as the paradigmatic Romantic tragedian, and 
identifies “frustrated development” as his key theme: “For [his] characters, the 
world is a place of frustrations, of limitations that prevent them from fulfilling 
themselves.”39 When they fail to realise their ideals in the world, they make a false 
bargain with it—as when Elizabeth chooses to execute Maria to uphold her own 
sovereignty. It is the “bad faith” and “self-falsification” of this false bargain that 
makes their downfall catastrophic.40 Maria holds herself to be above earthly things, 
and is bitter in defeat. Elizabeth holds herself to be a just monarch, but falsifies 
herself by executing her kinswoman without trial. The lonely, silent queen finds her 
own soul hideous. 
The importance of this ingredient was visible from the great distance of 
colonial Sydney. At the conclusion of Harpur’s tragedy,41 his antihero imagines the 
ghosts of his victims flocking round him, and vaunts his defiance of them: 
                                                   
39 Cox, In the Shadows of Romance, 61. 
40 Ibid. 
41 The history of Harpur’s titles should give us some caution. The first version of his play was called 
a “Tragedy,” the second simply a “Play,” and the last had no label at all. But he never changed the 
ending. 
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    Hah, hah! 
Well may you triumph now! Guilty! Yes, Guilty! 
I did not plead Not Guilty! Mercy! (1853, 59) 
There is a maniacal pessimism to these lines that is genuinely impressive. Like 
Schiller’s Leicester or Elizabeth, Stalwart is consumed by self-loathing. He is in the 
grips of an identity crisis, in which he feels his guilt, but cannot accept that it is a 
part of his identity. He obsessively repeats the word “Guilty,” turning a terrible and 
meaningful word of moral opprobrium into a mere sound. He scorns his victims 
when he says they “triumph” over him, implying that their rightful claims on his 
conscience are just an egotistical display. Of course, these victims are figments of 
his own fervid imagination. His final word, “Mercy!” transforms the gallant outlaw 
and Byronic scoffer into a pitiful weakling, contradicting his own name, “Stalwart.” 
In the 1867 version of this speech, Stalwart cries “The play is over!” before delivering 
his self-lacerating monologue (1867, 82). Like Vivian, he concludes his sorry life 
with a keen sense of the self’s artificiality. Harpur’s obvious models for Stalwart, 
Shakespeare’s Macbeth and Richard III, suffer no such identity crisis. In their final 
speeches, they accept who they are and what will happen to them. “I will not yield | 
To kiss the ground before young Malcolm’s feet,” cries Macbeth.42 “I have set my life 
upon a cast, | And I will stand the hazard of the die,” cries Richard.43 The deformed 
Stalwart, by contrast, minces his words, forsakes himself, and disintegrates. 
In this way, The Bushrangers resembles Percy Shelley’s The Cenci (1819). 
Like Stalwart, Beatrice finally recognises her guilt (she has murdered her cruel 
father), but defies the law as Stalwart defies heaven. At the highpoint of her trial for 
murder, she cross-examines a witness brought against her: 
                                                   
42 William Shakespeare, Complete Works, ed. Johnathan Bate and Eric Rasmussen (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 2007), 1914. 
43 Ibid, 1379. 
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BEATRICE.   Think  
What ’tis to blot with infamy and blood  
All that which shows like innocence, and is,  
Hear me, great God! I swear, most innocent, … 
… Am I, or am I not  
A parricide?  
MARZIO.  Thou art not! (SW, 326) 
This is bad faith in the narrow sense of lying. However noble her motives, she killed 
her father, and there is no other definition of “parricide.” This is not her only attempt 
to twist out of her identity in the play. This is one of the five times in the play that 
she asks “Am I?” No other character asks this question so often. After she is raped 
by her father, she wonders “what thing am I?” (297) When Lucretia questions her 
more closely, she repeats the question: “Am I not innocent?” “Oh, what am I?” (298) 
Her father’s rape is driving her “mad,” she says, but killing him would restore her 
identity, making her “still and calm.” (ibid.) Her prediction is only partly right. In 
the courtroom, she is heroically calm, and as we have seen, dishonest. But in her cell 
before her execution, she lurches between an intense loss of self—“What? Oh, where 
am I? Let me not got mad!” (332)—and sublime self-assurance: “I, | Though 
wrapped in a strange cloud of crime and shame, | Lived ever holy and unstained.” 
(334) She can only find stillness by forsaking the world: “How tedious, false and cold 
seem all things.” (332) Both Stalwart and Beatrice are murderers whose souls are 
riven by self-contradiction, convinced of their fundamental innocence, yet horrified 
by their own bloody deeds. 
Riven souls also plague most of the protagonists in the 15 plays Baillie called 
“tragedies.”44 It is difficult to generalise about Baillie’s remarkably various plays. 
She wrote eight comedies and two stately “musical dramas” in addition to her 
                                                   
44 I have counted Ethwald Part First and Part Second as two separate plays. 
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tragedies, and her tragedies are themselves so different from one another that some 
push against any reasonable definition of the form. At the end of Rayner (1804), for 
instance, the innocent hero appears to be executed for a murder he did not commit, 
but then is saved at the last minute. He is ecstatic to be among the world of the living 
once more: “Surely ’tis a kind world I have return’d to; | There’s sympathy and love 
in ev’ry heart.” (418). Rayner’s wrongful imprisonment, tortured conscience and 
threatened execution could be the stuff of tragedy, but his moral simplicity and the 
happy ending convert the whole into a typical Gothic melodrama. A mist of warm 
sentiment descends, and Rayner finds “the fulfilment and satisfaction found only in 
dreams.”45 The effect is similar in The Family Legend (1810). Maclean’s death, in 
full consciousness that he was “A poor, irresolute, and nerveless wretch” (506), is 
certainly tragic. But again, the focus on the play is more on his wife, Helen, and her 
heroic lover, Grey, who are free to marry once Maclean dies, and the play ends as a 
sentimental melodrama. Constantine Palaeologus is a different case. It is certainly 
tragic, but is in the Shakespearean mode, and at the moments of their death both 
Constantine and his wife Valeria are true to their natures.  As Constantinople falls 
to the Ottomans, Constantine realises his “task is closed,” throws off “the imperial 
purple” and dies “A noble soldier’s death” (473). His wife Valeria heroically commits 
suicide to avoid becoming part of the sultan’s harem. Rayner and The Family 
Legend are not particularly tragic; Constantine Palaeologus contradicts the idea of 
tragedy we have encountered in Schiller, Harpur and Shelley. 
The tragedies in Plays on the Passions, however, all contain the crucial 
element of self-deformation. When the ambitious tyrant Ethwald dies at the end of 
Ethwald Part Second (1802), he has no last words. Instead one of his slayers 
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describes him: “… he dies sullenly, and to the wall | Turns his writh’d form and 
death-distorted visage.” (197) Ethwald is weak, ill and bitter when the rebels storm 
into his bedroom to end his despotic rule. But his death brings no peace, and the 
rebels engage in the same kind of sordid politicking that mars Elizabeth’s court in 
Maria Stuart. In all the tragedies on the passions, the protagonist is deformed by a 
ruling passion like Ethwald’s ambition. In three of them, Basil, Henriquez and 
Romiero, passion drives the hero to suicide. In De Monfort, hatred drives him to 
murder, and grief makes him spontaneously drop dead. The two most interesting 
plays explore the passion of fear. In The Dream, Osterloo’s fear gives him a lethal 
heart attack, while in Orra, the heroine’s fear drives her mad, and she loses her grip 
on herself and the world. 
In Baillie’s plays, the self-deformation of passion almost always leads to 
intense self-loathing. When Basil, Henriquez, Romiero or De Monfort look within 
themselves, they see a hateful realm of dire passion, and they find the sight of 
themselves hideous: 
DE MONFORT. … I now am nothing.  
I am a man of holy claims bereft;  
Out of the pale of social kindred cast;  
Nameless and horrible. (99) 
In her “Introductory Discourse,” Baillie claims that “it is the passion and not the 
man which is held up to our execration” in her tragedies (16), but this is not how 
characters like De Monfort think. In their extreme self-loathing, they identify 
themselves with their fatal passion, and can see no way of destroying it but by 
destroying themselves. 
We can see how important this element of self-loathing is to the tragic effect 
of Baillie’s Plays on the Passions by comparing her Henriquez to Kleist’s Prinz 
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Friedrich von Homburg (1821). These plays have strikingly similar plots. Both 
Henriquez and Homburg are correctly found guilty of a crime and sentenced to 
death. Both inspire pity in the hearts of all the other characters. Both are offered 
pardons—and refuse to accept them. Their refusals are very different, however. 
When the Elector gives Homburg the choice whether to accept his pardon, he feels 
he has no right to accept. It is not for a subject to evade the laws: the Elector “handle, 
wie er darf; | Mir ziemt’s hier zu verfahren, wie ich soll!”46 He tells his fellow soldiers 
that the law is paramount: 
Ruhig! Es ist mein unbeugsamer Wille! 
Ich will das heilige Gesetz des Kriegs, 
Das ich verletzt’ im Angesicht des Heers, 
Durch einen freien Tod verherrlichen!47 
Like Adeline, Homburg internalises society’s laws, but he does so freely and finds it 
uplifting. He is brave, and in a certain way, unrepentant. He says his crime was 
merely that he served his monarch “Mit übereiltem Eifer,” but that the law matters 
more than the individual.48 Throughout the play, his optimism rarely fails him, 
though he quakes at the thought of death. 
Baillie’s Henriquez, by contrast, is no dreamy youth. He commits murder in 
a jealous rage at the end of Act 1, and spends Acts 2, 3 and 4 brooding remorsefully, 
snapping at his friends, and allowing the innocent Antonio to take the rap for his 
crime. He loathes himself so much he comes to doubt the very possibility of having 
an authentic identity: “We are all masquers.” (367) Homburg is sure of his heart’s 
calling, but Henriqeuz feels only an incurable self-gnawing in his breast: 
                                                   
46 “He acts as he may, | It suits me to proceed, as I must!”  Heinrich von Kleist, Sämtliche Werke 
(Munich and Zurich: Droemer, 1965), 556. 
47 “Quiet! It is my unbendable will! | I want to ennoble the holy law of battle, | Which I injured in 
sight of the army, | Through a free death.” Ibid., 567. 
48 “With excessively hasty eagerness.” Ibid. 
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No; what can corporeal pain or penance do?  
That which inflicts the mental wound, which rends  
The hold of pride, wrenching the bent of nature;  
’Tis that alone hath power. Yet from the effort  
Nature starts back; my mind, stunn’d at the thought,  
Loses the use of thought. (377) 
The contradiction is clear: to satisfy his remorse, he must admit his guilt, and this 
means death. Homburg desires “einen freien Tod,” a “free death.”49 Henriquez is not 
free, but the slave of internal forces. He realises that he can only atone through 
death, and makes the King swear not to pardon the murderer before confessing it is 
he. Had he clung to life, says Henriquez, he would “have shrunk aside, and been on 
earth | A sullen secret thing of wretchedness.” (380) But death restores his self-
respect. This is the element of the play Carney misses when he interprets Henriquez 
as a Christian martyr on a quest for absolution, who “becomes more than he was 
before” in the moment of his death.50 Time does not perfect Henriquez’s soul as the 
play progresses, turning him into the perfect Christian like Cordenius in The 
Martyr. Instead time deforms him, making his existence a burden. 
Death is the only way Henriquez can see to resolve his self-contradictions. 
There is a happier and more obvious solution to the contradictions of Homburg’s 
situation. In the end, the Elector actually orders him to accept the pardon, which 
resolves the youth’s enthusiastic scruples about being an obedient subject: “Ist es 
ein Traum?”51 This option is not open to Henriquez, as his wife finds when she begs 
the King to pardon him: 
LEONORA. A king, and not obey’d! deceitful shadow!  
Doth not thy power o’er all things reign supreme? 
 
                                                   
49 This is a play on “Freitod,” the German for “suicide.” 
50 Sean Carney, “The Passion of Joanna Baillie: Playwright as Martyr,” Theatre Journal 52, no. 2 
(2000): 249. 
51 Kleist, Werke, 571. 
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KING. Not o’er men’s wills.— 
This is a power heaven to itself retains,  
And ne’er did delegate to mortal being. (381) 
The King’s law follows the logic of Henriquez’s self-loathing, which can only be 
satisfied by self-destruction. Freedom in this dark play means death. Baillie called 
this terrible story of rage and remorse a “Tragedy.” Kleist called his play in which 
the heart, the law, grace, justice, youth and age mystically converge in the very teeth 
of tragedy a “Schauspiel” (“Play”). 
Romantic tragedies drew on the quest-narratives and psychological themes 
of popular melodramas, twisting them into terrible tales of self-loathing and self-
destruction. The tragic heroes of Harpur, Baillie, Shelley and Schiller become 
progressively more deformed, and they become progressively more conscious of 
their deformity. In many of these plays, this deformity drives the hero to murder: 
Stalwart and most of Baillie’s protagonists become butchers of human flesh, as do 
for instance Goethe’s Faust and Büchner’s Woyzeck (1837). In other plays, 
essentially innocent characters are deformed into madness or death: Baillie’s Orra 
and Count Osterloo are characters of this type, as is Byron’s Manfred. The 
catastrophe of these plays comes when the hero looks into their own soul, and sees 
a vision of horror. In a moment of intense alienation, they find themselves hideous, 
killing themselves like Baillie’s Count Basil, throwing themselves heedlessly into 
their final battle like Stalwart, or dying under the pure force of their own passion, 
like Orra or Osterloo. These heroes suffer terrible identity crises, whose only 
solution is oblivion. 
It is often said that the Romantics aped Shakespeare, but his tragic heroes 
are normally much surer of their identities than their deformed Romantic 
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successors. Lear is “every inch a king.”52 Hamlet has “that within which passeth 
show.”53 Cleopatra is “fire, and air: my other elements | I give to baser life.”54 The 
tragic heroes of Romanticism can rarely define themselves so clearly. De Musset’s 
Lorenzaccio (1834) achieves the height of glory when he slays a tyrant. But his 
violence and deceit fill him with uncertainty: 
Par le ciel! quel homme de cire suis-je donc! Le Vice, comme la robe de Déjanire, 
s’est-il si profondément incorporé à mes fibres, que je ne puisse plus répondre de ma 
langue, et que l’air qui sort de mes lèvres se fasse ruffian malgré moi?55 
It was just such men of “wax” that Hegel objected to, when he complained of the 
“raggedness” of Romantic characterisation.56 In his ideal tragedy, characters should 
conflict with one another, not with themselves; each character should embody a 
different force, so that the dialogue and actions of the characters can portray the 
collision of different forces in the world—but many of the most fascinating Romantic 
protagonists are so twisted by inward contradictions that they cannot clearly 
embody a single force. 
It is not obvious why this view of life is “non-tragic,” as Steiner suggests. It 
may be that Romantic tragedy is not tragic in the manner of Sophocles, Shakespeare 
or Racine. But there is something terrible in the destinies of characters like Harpur’s 
and Baillie’s. It is the catastrophe of non-existence. If you look within yourself, and 
see something you can only loathe or misunderstand, then in a sense you are already 
dead. We have seen how novelists, poets and biographers of the period explored this 
terrible condition. In the following two sections, we will see how Baillie and Harpur 
                                                   
52 Shakespeare, Works, 2058. 
53 Ibid, 1929. 
54 Ibid, 2236. 
55 “By heaven! what a man of wax am I, then! Has Vice, like the robe of Deianira, so deeply 
incorporated itself in the fibres of my being, that I can’t answer for my own tongue, and that the air 
leaving my lips becomes a pimp despite me?” Alfred de Musset, Lorenzaccio (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1941), 91. 
56 See above, note 7. 
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explored it, by pitching their protagonists against society (§5.2) and introducing new 
metaphysical depths to the issue of self-deformation (§5.3). 
5.2 Individual and Society 
Aristotle had rooted tragedy in hubris and harmatia, in human pride and the dire 
deeds to which it drives us. Steiner argues that under the influence of Rousseau, the 
Romantics began to blame society for all the protagonist’s wrongs instead.57 
Eagleton agrees: “… on the whole [the Romantics] would prefer to blame ruin and 
affliction on the powers which oppress the human subject, rather than contemplate 
any central flaw in that subject’s constitution.”58 Eagleton cites Manfred as an 
example, but it is a strange choice. Manfred insists that he “was [his] own destroyer,” 
not society, and is oppressed by nothing but his own guilty conscience (BW, 406). 
In her “Introductory Discourse,” Baillie also contradicts Steiner and Eagleton: 
It is a characteristick of the more powerful passions that they will encrease and 
nourish themselves on very slender aliment; it is from within that they are chiefly 
supplied with what they feed on; and it is in contending with opposite passions and 
affections of the mind that we least discover their strength, not with events. (10) 
She claims that her tragic protagonists are deformed by inner forces. Society and 
oppression are at best a “slender aliment” for the passions that derange them. In 
The Dream, the good Count Osterloo may be imprisoned by the tyrannical Prior, but 
he drops dead of his own fear before the Prior’s executioners can behead him. 
There are plays, however, which do seem to fit Eagleton’s description—like 
The Bushrangers. Stalwart admits he is “the accursed slave | Of lawless passion,” 
much like Baillie’s characters (1853, 28). But he blames society for this slavery: 
                                                   
57 Steiner, Death of Tragedy, 127. 
58 Eagleton, Sweet Violence, 204-5. Williams calls this “liberal tragedy,” and agrees that it had its 
roots in Romanticism: Williams, Modern Tragedy, chap. 1. 
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   I, even I, am more 
Unfortunate than guilty. Hear my story. 
A villain’s dupe at first, I found myself 
An exile, and a tyrant’s bondman;—one, 
Who for some reason I could never learn, 
Both feared and hated me;—and who, with all 
The petty fretfulness of power so placed, 
Was wont to solace the meanness of his hate, 
And mask its utter cowardice, the while, 
With hourly hurling the opprobrious term 
Of convict in my teeth! I sought redress, 
In vain! the Law was an oppressor too! 
I murmured—and was scourged! Oh! ’twas too much! 
Wrath thundered in my heart! Their bonds enringed 
My limbs as with intolerable fire!— 
I cast them off! I cursed my kind—and fled, 
Outlawed but free, into the woods: where now 
My name, notorious from my having baffled 
The vigilance of the Police so long, 
Is daily debited with such crimes as I 
Nor do, nor would commit. (20) 
Baillie’s characters live in a mythic Gothic past of gloomy castles and deep, lonely 
woods. Stalwart describes the penal system of Harpur’s own New South Wales, in 
which transported convicts were assigned to a master for a term of years, and could 
be punished severely for any infractions. The “tyrant,” the “bondman,” and the 
“convict” would have been members of Harpur’s audience, had he managed to get 
the play produced in 1835. Stalwart’s critique of this social order is rooted in the 
philosophy we encountered in Chapter 1. Mary Wollstonecraft, we saw, blamed the 
“very constitution of civil society” for the degradation of women. She also blamed it 
for the violence of criminals like Stalwart: 
In fact, from what I saw, in the fortresses of Norway, I am more and more convinced 
that the same energy of character, which renders a man a daring villain, would have 
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rendered him useful to society, had that society been well organized. When a strong 
mind is not disciplined by cultivation, it is a sense of injustice that renders it unjust.59 
Stalwart seems to fit the mould described by Steiner and Eagleton. He is a radical 
Rousseauan, who excoriates the society of Harpur and his readers, and argues that 
evil has a social rather than a metaphysical cause.  
 Stalwart is not the first Romantic bandit to rebel against society in this way, 
but it is remarkable that he is lower-class. Harpur based Stalwart on John Donohoe, 
a real bushranger active in New South Wales from 1828 to 1830, who was not only 
lower-class, but Irish.60 The importance of Stalwart’s social status is clear if we 
compare him to Victor Hugo’s great bandit leader in Hernani (1829): 
Je suis Jean d’Aragon, grand-maître d’Avis, né 
Dans l’exil, fils proscrit d’un père assassiné 
Par sentence du tien, roi Carlos de Castille! 
Le meurtre est entre nous affaire de famille. 
Vous avez l’échafaud, nous avons le poignard. 
Donc le ciel m’a fait duc et l’exil montagnard.61 
Both Hernani and Stalwart blame their exile for making them violent, both see the 
law as a mere tool of power, and both feel stripped of honour and dignity. But 
Hernani’s honour is not the same as Stalwart’s. Hugo described his play as the poetic 
expression of “liberalism,”62 but his bandit hero seems to care more about 
aristocracy than equality. Hernani looks back to his birth and parentage to define 
himself. Stalwart looks back only to his fall into crime: “at first” he was “a villain’s 
dupe.” Hernani complains he has lost noble titles, Stalwart only that he has lost his 
                                                   
59 Wollstonecraft, Scandinavian Letters, 208-09. 
60 See Elizabeth Perkins, “Introduction,” Harpur, Stalwart the Bushranger, with the Tragedy of 
Donohoe, xxiii-xxvii. 
61 “I am Juan of Aragon, Grandmaster of Aviz, born | In exile, outlawed son of a father assassinated 
| Under your sentence, King Carlos de Castile! | Murder, between us, is a family matter. | You have 
the scaffold, we have the sword. | So heaven made me a duke, and exile a mountain-dweller.” Victor 
Hugo, Hernani, ed. Yves Gohin (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), 160. 
62 Ibid., 32. 
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Christian name. Only a few of Hugo’s readers share Hernani’s aristocratic status. 
Every reader shares Stalwart’s creaturely dignity. 
Stalwart’s class makes The Bushrangers strikingly innovative. Most 
canonical Gothic bandits are aristocrats: consider Karl Moor in Die Räuber (1782), 
Montoni in The Mysteries of Udolpho (1796), Leonardo in Zofloya, or The Moor 
(1804), Lanfranco in The Old Oak Chest (1816), or Franko, in Baillie’s Orra. Stalwart 
belongs partly to a different tradition. During his brief and ignominious stint at 
Sydney’s new Theatre Royal in the 1830s, Harpur seems to have acted in two 
melodramas, The Miller and his Men and Mutiny at the Nore (1830), whose villains 
are lower-class rebels.63 Like Mary Shelley in Frankenstein or Georg Büchner in 
Woyzeck, Harpur took this figure of the lower-class villain and turned them into the 
hero. It is quite possible that The Tragedy of Donohoe was the first literary tragedy 
in English with a lower-class protagonist.64 
It is easy to read Stalwart’s speech as a left-wing revolt, the voice of Harpur, 
the “currency lad” of convict parentage crying out against the prejudices of an 
increasingly snobbish New South Wales.65 Its satire seems even more cutting if we 
consider how Australian theatre had changed in Harpur’s time. Theatre in the early 
colony had been largely a convict affair. Free settlers may have stumped up the cash, 
but most of the cast and crew were the scum of the earth. When Sydney got its first 
patent theatre in 1833, however, convicts were banished from the stage, even if they 
                                                   
63 The “Mr Harpur” listed in the relevant documents could possibly be his brother, however: 
“Biography,” The Charles Harpur Critical Archive, ed. Paul Eggert, Sydney University Press, 
accessed 16 August, 2017, http://charlesharpur.org/harpur/tabs?tabset=biography&docid=english 
/harpur 
64 Veronica Kelly, “The Melodrama of Defeat: Political Patterns in Some Colonial and Contemporary 
Australian Plays,” Southerly 50, no. 2 (1990), ¶6. 
65 By 1834, when Harpur presented his play to the Monitor, 19.3% of the European population were 
free settlers, up from 6.5% in 1820, and they were coming to dominate colonial society: Noel Butlin, 
Forming a Colonial Economy, Australia 1810-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
37. 
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held a “ticket-of-leave” allowing them to work.66 Harpur created his tortured convict 
antihero at just the moment when convicts ceased to be actors in Australia. This was 
perhaps one reason Harpur could never get the play produced. It is delightful to 
imagine the scandal that may have ensued, had the good burghers of Sydney been 
presented with this play about a Byronic convict murdering an innocent man and 
blaming free settlers for the crime. 
At first glance, The Bushrangers seems to confirm Steiner and Eagleton’s 
theory. By contrast, Baillie’s two great plays on fear, Orra and The Dream, seem at 
first to contradict it utterly. In both these plays, the passion of fear seems to be self-
acting and oblivious to external circumstances, in just the manner Baillie describes 
in her “Introductory Discourse.” Orra is addicted to ghost stories, and once she 
begins to sup of their horrors, she finds it hard to stop: 
Yea, when the cold blood shoots through every vein:  
When every pore upon my shrunken skin  
A knotted knoll becomes, and to mine ears  
Strange inward sounds awake, and to mine eyes  
Rush stranger tears, there is a joy in fear. (242) 
Orra’s fear is so powerful it alienates her from her own body: her ears pick up 
“strange” sounds, the tears that fill her eyes are “strangers.” It takes her out of herself 
and the world, and yet delights her. Osterloo is also a fearful addict of ghost stories. 
When a monk dreams of a murdered man, and Osterloo recognises it as Montera, 
whom he murdered himself years before, his guilty conscience awakes his fear: 
That this smothered horror should burst upon me at last! And there be really such 
things as the darkened fancy imageth to itself, when the busy day is stilled.—An 
unseen world surrounds us: spirits and powers, and the invisible dead hover near us; 
while we in unconscious security— … Am I truly awake? (268) 
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Osterloo is imprisoned in his own mind’s “darkened fancy,” and can no longer 
distinguish reality from thought. In both Orra and The Dream, passion alienates 
the protagonist from the material world of the body and of things, haunting them 
with images of death. They enter an “unseen world” apart from society, and rational 
characters like Theobald or Benedict are unable to call them back. 
It seems that Harpur and Baillie represent two very different kinds of 
Romantic self-deformation. Stalwart is deformed by society, Orra and Osterloo by 
the energies of their own minds. As we consider the plays more closely, however, the 
picture becomes more complex. It is true that Stalwart blames society for his 
misdeeds, but there are reasons to doubt his sincerity. When he gives his great 
speech, he is wounded and on the run, and is trying to persuade the virtuous Ada to 
give him shelter. He lies to her, claiming to be no murderer, though he later admits 
to his friend Macblood that he has killed before (45). When he finishes his speech, 
he promises Ada he will forsake bushranging, find a “cave” and embrace “Solitude” 
like a hermit (21). He never does any of these things. His speech is certainly a 
revolutionary manifesto, but it is also a self-serving monologue marred by his own 
dire passions.  
Similarly, it becomes apparent that Orra and Osterloo’s fears have a basis in 
the social order. Cathrina feeds Orra’s addiction by telling her ghost stories. She is 
being blackmailed to do so by Rudigere, an illegitimate son itching for Orra’s 
inheritance. Orra finally goes mad when she thinks she sees a ghost—but her belief 
is well-founded. She is in Brunier’s tower at midnight on Michelmas, the very place 
and time where one of Cathrina’s ghosts is supposed to appear, when Theobald 
bursts in to rescue her disguised as the very ghost from the story. Orra is only in the 
tower because she is an orphan, and 14th-century laws allow her uncle to imprison 
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her. She only believes in ghosts, points out Baillie in her preface to the play, because 
she is a medieval woman without the benefit of modern education (228). Thus a 
whole range of social factors conspire to evoke her fear: women’s honour, 
inheritance laws, patriarchal authority, and pervasive medieval superstitions. 
Osterloo is a celebrated general, but he too is society’s victim. The Prior 
abuses his clerical authority to imprison and summarily sentence Osterloo for 
Montera’s murder. He intensifies Osterloo’s fear of hell by giving him no time to 
repent. The other gloomy monks only make the situation worse by telling Osterloo 
about the perils of damnation. Even the monk Benedict, a sceptical humanist like 
Umberto Eco’s William of Baskerville, is forced to conclude that hellfire does await 
the unabsolved: “Nature teaches this as well as revelation: we must believe it” (267). 
Osterloo’s fear may come from his own mind, but it is nourished by the social order 
of the medieval monastery, in the broader context of the Holy Roman Empire. 
Baillie may have claimed that the passions feed on “slender aliment” in her plays, 
but both Orra and Osterloo apparently have good reason to be scared. 
 These plays are challenging to interpret, because there is a tension between 
their language and plot. Stalwart says he is society’s victim, but the plot lays some 
of the fault at his door. Orra and Osterloo say they are trapped inside their own 
minds, but the plot traps them in the tyrannical order of feudal Europe. To unpick 
the complicated relationship between dialogue and plot in these novels, I use 
character network analysis. Network analysis is a mathematical method for 
modelling the interactions between entities. You can model anything as a network, 
provided you can define the “nodes,” and the “edges” that join them.67 Here, the 
                                                   
67 These definitions are inevitably difficult and contestable in literary applications. They inevitably 
involve “questionable decisions:” Franco Moretti, “Network Theory, Plot Analysis,” New Left Review 
68 (2011), 81. I address this problem in Michael Falk, “Making Connections: Network Analysis, the 
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nodes are characters, and the edges between them represent their dialogue with one 
another (Figures 5.2-4).68 
Figure 5.2 
The Bushrangers (1853) 
 
Figure 5.2 is the “graph” or network diagram of The Bushrangers. It shows a 
few key features of the model. The colour of the nodes indicates the gender of the 
character, defined as either “male,” “female” or “group.”69 The thickness of the 
“edges” between the nodes represents the number of words spoken by the characters 
to one another, and the arrows indicate in which direction the dialogue is addressed. 
Stalwart says 1169 words to his accomplice Macblood, for instance, while Macblood 
says 264 words in return. Unfortunately this means that the arrow from Macblood 
                                                   
Bildungsroman, and the World of the Absentee,” Journal of Language, Literature and Culture 63, 
no. 2-3 (2016), 111-12. 
68 Data analysis was does using iGraph: Gabor Csardi, iGraph Package: Network Analysis and 
Visualization, Ver. 1.0.1, CRAN, Vienna. The images were produced in Gephi: M Bastian, S Heymann, 
and M Jacomy, “Gephi: An Open Source Software for Exploring and Manipulating Networks,” in 3rd 
International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media (San Jose, California, 2009). 
69 “Group” characters are those who are never referred to individually. They either act and speak en 
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back to Stalwart is completely obscured—it is impossible to represent all the 
information modelled by the network elegantly in a single graphic. Finally, the size 
of the nodes is relative to each characters’ “betweenness” score. Betweenness is a 
common “centrality” measure in network analysis, which measures how important 
each node is for connecting other nodes to one another in the network.70 To calculate 
betweenness, you find the shortest paths between each node and every other, 
accounting for the “weight” or thickness of the edges. The more of these shortest 
paths a particular node lies on, the higher its betweenness. Franco Moretti has 
suggested characters with higher betweenness tend to be more powerful.71 Certainly 
the potent Stalwart and his adversary Dreadnought are the play’s most powerful 
figures. 
When we compare the graph of The Bushrangers to Orra and The Dream 
(Figures 5.4-5), two key contrasts emerge. The first key is that Baillie’s plays are 
smaller and more unified, with a few key relationships dominating the structure. A 
tight network of four principal characters interact intensely, with a looser network 
of minor characters on the periphery. The Dream is anchored in the four-way 
relationship between Osterloo, Jerome, Benedict and the Prior. Orra is anchored in 
the four-way relationship between Orra, Rudigere, Hughobert and Cathrina. 
Harpur’s play, by contrast, is split into two barely connected worlds. On the left of 
the graph is the Windsor township, with its judge (Tunbelly), police (Bomebard, 
Cant) and townsfolk (Tailor, Shoemaker, Farmer). On the right is the bush, with its 
band of bushrangers (Macblood, Filch, Desperate, Rackroad), innkeepers 
(Landlady, the Fences) and idyllic foresters (Ada, Abel, Lucy Grey). Stalwart and 
                                                   
70 See Linton C Freeman, “A Set of Measures of Centrality Based on Betweenness,” Sociometry 40, 
no. 1 (1977). 
71 Franco Moretti, “‘Operationalizing’: Or, the Function of Measurement in Modern Literary Theory,” 
New Left Review 84 (2013): 109. 
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Dreadnought’s slender relationship is the main bridge between these two worlds, 
and they only say 141 words to each other. The world of Harpur’s play is as fractured 
as Baillie’s are intense. 
The second key contrast is more specific. In the bottom-right corner of Figure 
5.2 there is a densely connected web of characters, Stalwart’s band of bushrangers. 
There is no such web in either of Baillie’s plays, nor elsewhere on Harpur’s graph. 
We will see how this web represents a special kind of dialogue and characterisation, 


























Baillie aspired for her plays to have a “simpler construction” (10), and 
network analysis reveals in what way she made them simpler. Neither her 
psychologically deep characters nor her twisting and turning plots are simple. What 
is simpler about these plays is their unified character-systems.72 Key characters are 
introduced early, and their unfolding relationships in a few key locations dominate 
the entire plot. Harpur takes a different approach. His play sprawls, constantly 
introducing new characters who do not know one another, and new settings 
separated in place and time. Table 5.1 puts these differences between Harpur and 
Baillie’s plays in comparative perspective. 
                                                   
72 I take this term from Alex Woloch, The One Vs. The Many: Minor Characters and the Space of the 
Protagonist in the Novel (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003). See especially 
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Table 5.1 
Network structure: Baillie and Harpur compared  
 Unification  Modularity 
 Nodes Mean 
degree* 
Density†  Classes Score* 
Baillie, Orra 17 9.53 60%  2 0.22 
Baillie, The Dream 20 7.40 39%  6 0.22 
Harpur, The Bushrangers 
 
27 6.59 25%  6 0.41 
Shakespeare, Macbeth 42 5.48 13%  8 0.40 
Racine, Iphigénie 11 5.27 53%  4 0.23 
Coleridge, Remorse 16 4.75 32%  9 0.28 
Hemans, Vespers of Palermo 20 6.10 32%  13 0.15 
*2 d.p., †0 d.p. 
These statistics measure the size and structure of Baillie’s and Harpur’s 
fictional worlds. “Nodes” is simply the number of characters—though group 
characters, like the “peasants” of The Dream or Vespers of Palermo and the 
“bushrangers” of The Bushrangers, are treated as a single node for this analysis. 
“Mean degree” measures how many other characters each character interacts with. 
Each character in Remorse, for instance, speaks to or is spoken to by 4.75 other 
characters on average. “Density” measures how many of the possible connections in 
the network are actually present. If a network had only two nodes, A and B, then the 
density would be 100% if either A spoke to B (A à B) and/or B spoke to A (B à A). 
If neither spoke to the other, the density would be 0%. A play with fewer characters 
and higher mean degree and density can be said to have a more unified structure. 
The characters are tightly connected by webs of acquaintance, and will tend to form 
part of a single social world. The second group of statistics measures the 
“modularity” of each play. Using a “walktrap” algorithm, the computer sorts all the 
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characters of each play into “communities” of closely-related nodes.73 “Classes” is 
the number of communities the algorithm discovered; the modularity score 
measures how distinct the communities are from one another. If the characters in 
the play tend to talk mostly to members of their own community, then the score will 
be higher. If the community structure of the play is more fluid, and the characters 
tend to interact outside their group, the score will be lower. In the divided world of 
Harpur’s play, the modularity is nearly twice as high as in the more unified worlds 
of Baillie’s. 
 It is often observed that the Romantics based their plays on Shakespeare’s 
models, rejecting the neoclassicism popular in the eighteenth century. We have 
already encountered Nicoll’s derisive reference to the “dead hand of 
Elizabethanism.”74 During the period too, writers were highly aware of 
Shakespeare’s resurgent influence. When Harpur and his hero Keats turned their 
mind to the theatre, Shakespeare was their almost exclusive study.75 Across the 
channel, les classiques sparred with les romantiques. We must reject Shakespeare 
and his “drames monstrueux,” his “compositions désordonnées et gigantesques,” 
fumed the Academie Française. Shakespeare was the product of “un siècle de 
barbarie”!76 Not so, cried the young Romantics o77f Paris—this is an age of 
revolution, and playwrights should follow the Englishman’s example, smashing the 
old rules of neoclassical decorum. One playwright who dissented from this hot 
                                                   
73 To do this, the computer treats the network like a map, and randomly “walks” from node to node. 
The algorithm prefers to walk along the weightier edges. The idea is that short random walks should 
end up in the same community where they began. See Pascal Pons and Matthieu Latapy, "Computing 
Communities in Large Networks Using Random Walks," Journal of Graph Algorithms and 
Applications 10, no. 2 (2006). 
74 Above, p. 234. 
75 Aileen Ward, John Keats: The Making of a Poet (London: Secker and Warburg, 1963), 151; J. 
Normington-Rawling, Charles Harpur: An Australian (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1962), 44.  
76 “… monstrous dramas … oversized and disordered compositions … a century of barbarism!” M. 
Auger, “Manifest contre le romantisme,” quoted in Stendhal, Racine et Shakespeare, 113. 
77  
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debate was Joanna Baillie. When she moved to Hampstead, she took advantage of 
the British Museum, reading both the Elizabethans and the great neoclassical 
playwrights of seventeenth-century France. She claimed, in a typically Romantic 
way, that she preferred nature to any of these literary models: “I did not find much 
in our old plays to interest me ... I proceeded in my work, following simply my own 
notions of real nature, I began to feel imaginary scenes & Theatrical 
representation.”78 But the influence of both Shakespeare and Racine on her drama 
is obvious. She combines Shakespeare’s large casts and copious blank verse with 
Racine’s high density, low modularity, and constriction to a smaller range of 
locations—we will see, too, how much her idea of passion resembles Racine’s (§5.3). 
Harpur, meanwhile, was more determinedly Shakespearean than most. The 
cast of The Bushrangers is large by the standards of Romantic tragedy, the density 
low and the modularity high. The pattern of characters’ interactions is 
fundamentally different in Harpur and Baillie. Harpur’s play is a chain of islands. 
Most of the characters barely interact with anyone outside their little circle of 
acquaintance. The successive scenes of the play lurch between these different 
worlds. In one scene, we might see Stalwart braving the wilds with his men, and in 
the next, see blustering Ned Bomebard big-note himself to the Windsor 
constabulary. Kelly describes this as “symmetrical character patterning.”79  Baillie’s 
plays, by contrast, are as tight and claustrophobic as Racine’s, despite her large 
casts. She achieves this by throwing her characters together onstage (Racine prefers 
offstage action), and her characters thus all have a large circle of acquaintance 
relative to the size of the world in which they live. 
                                                   
78 Quoted in Judith Slagle, Joanna Baillie: A Literary Life (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University 
Press, 2002), 67. 
79 Kelly, “The Melodrama of Defeat,” ¶4. 
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These different plot structures result in different approaches to dialogue. In 
Harpur’s expansive world, characters tend to speak a sociolect, the language of their 
class or occupation. In Baillie’s claustrophobic worlds, characters tend to speak an 
idiolect, the language of their individual personality or psychology. We can see how 
differently Harpur and Baillie handle dialogue by examining the most distinctive 
words in each character’s vocabulary.80 Table 5.2 displays the 10 most distinctive 
words for the 5 most talkative characters in each play: 
Table 5.2 
Most distinctive words (tf-idf) by play and character 
Play Character 
Words 
Spoken Most Distinctive Words 
Orra Orra 4216 awake sounds awful dreadful earth air 
dark beneath its past 
 Rudigere 2627 hour never agent price rigid thee here 
this blood will 
 Hughobert 1629 son blind boy consequence dolt father’s 
flatterers parts plighted stubborn 
 Theobald 1542 none captain devoted Hartman 
honour’d ever sight crave devotion 
guarded 
 Cathrina 1164 set story hide bed eve Michael’s run 
since ancestor clotted 
The Dream Osterloo 2233 loved thou Albert art before thank did 
awake midnight your 
 Jerome 1986 son Paul thy form imagination retire 
said frame satisfied thou 
 Prior 1986 order your compelled die draw whole 
heaven thou lives halt 
 Benedict 1113 fears brother thou guilty Jerome moved 
his most agitated confessed 
 Leonora 1062 Agnes Benedict thou thy Osterloo his 
marriage rise didst door 
                                                   
80 For tf-idf, see above, p. 7, n. 11. Moretti uses a similar approach, though he does not specify the 
particular algorithm: Moretti, “Operationalizing,” 10-11. 




Spoken Most Distinctive Words 
    
The 
Bushrangers 
Stalwart 3897 horrible Mary her would maiden scorn 
she shame that blood 
 Ada 1765 Abel not his wind promise heart you 
could fear indeed 
 Bomebard 1665 says does jist waliant Windsor ill Cant 
off yous here 
 Tunbelly 1365 respect sir Ned mark you answer never 
chosen robberies rotundity 
 Abel 1227 thy Ada sweet dark love how less just 
breathing dream 
 
In her “Introductory Discourse,” Baillie argues that plays should be written 
in “the language of the agitated soul, which every age and nation understand” (3), 
anticipating Wordsworth’s famous claim that the language of Lyrical Ballads (1798) 
expressed the “elementary feelings” of humankind (WW, 735). To portray the 
“agitated soul,” Baillie brings characters together whose aims and aspirations clash. 
In both Orra and The Dream, four of the five most talkative characters live together 
(the exceptions are Theobald and Leonora). They share a social situation. What 
differentiates the characters are their personalities and their position in the web of 
personal relationships. The bastard Rudigere fiercely desires legitimacy, and is 
driven to scheming, bribery and blackmail to improve his position: distinctive words 
include “blood,” “price” and “agent.” The tyrannical Prior rules the monastery with 
an iron fist, and is driven to execute Osterloo by an overwhelming desire for 
vengeance: “order,” “compelled” and “die” are distinctive words. Both Orra and 
Osterloo suffer the passion of fear, and the same word, “awake,” testifies to their 
shared symptom of insomnia. 
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Contemporaries found Baillie’s language powerful and emotional: “It was yet 
interesting to find the meagre dialogue and feeble characters, which had so long 
shadowed the stage, suddenly invaded by bold diction and personages of muscular, 
if of unnatural proportions,” recalled one reviewer in 1821.81 Her verse is usually 
fluid and exuberant: 
HUGHOBERT.   Art thou bewitch’d?  
Is he not young, well featured and well form’d?  
And dost thou put him in thy estimation  
With bones and sheeted clay?  
Beyond endurance is thy stubborn spirit.  
Right well thy father knew that all thy sex  
Stubborn and headstrong are; therefore, in wisdom,  
He vested me with power that might compel thee  
To what he will’d should be. (245) 
Like Falkland in Caleb Williams (1793), Hughobert is a conservative aristocrat with 
a keen sense of honour. By refusing to marry his son Glottenbal, Orra succeeds in 
raising his passion, which he expresses in a tide of rhetorical questions, parallelisms, 
alliteration, inversions and lurid imagery of the human body (probably betraying 
the influence of Baillie’s famous medical relatives, the Hunters). The other 
characters of the play speak in a similar style whenever they are impassioned. But 
they are impassioned by different situations for and for different reasons. 
Hughobert is incensed by his “stubborn” niece and “dolt” of a son, Theobald by his 
“devoted” love for Orra. 
In The Dream, the monastery becomes a metaphor for the mind itself. The 
Prior is the rampant superego, obsessed with the moral law; Jerome is the mystical, 
dreaming spokesperson for our unconscious life; and Benedict is the rational 
                                                   
81 “Drury Lane,” The European magazine, and London review 80 (1821): 567. 
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representative of the ego. These characters speak in prose, but their prose is as bold 
and copious as Orra’s verse: 
BENEDICT. … But for the love of our holy saint, bethink you, ere it be too late, that 
though we may be saved from the pestilence by this bloody sacrifice, what will rescue 
our throats from the swords of Osterloo’s soldiers, when they shall return, as they 
have threatened, to demand from us their General? (269) 
This is Baillie’s idea of the voice of reason, full of “holy saints,” “pestilence,” “bloody 
sacrifice” and “throats” cut by the swords of throning soldiers. Benedict is an 
enthusiastic rationalist. In the tense, psychological world of Baillie’s plays, language 
pours from the soul, in a cascade of ever more gorgeous imagery. In this context, the 
protagonist’s deformation can seem an essentially private and mental affair. 
The fabric of Harpur’s language is utterly different. The five most talkative 
characters in The Bushrangers inhabit different worlds and speak different dialects. 
Tunbelly and Bomebard are part of the Windsor establishment, Ada and Abel live in 
the forest, and Stalwart lives nowhere. Tunbelly with his “Sir” and “respect” and 
“rotundity” lives in a different linguistic universe to Ada and Abel with their intimate 
speech and natural imagery. But the best example of Harpur’s socially inflected 
dialogue is Ned Bomebard, the cowardly constable: 
My wife says, Glory’s the foolishistus thing in all the wide world round, and that my 
fondness for it ’ill get me a death soonerer or laterer, and leave her a weeping widder 
without a dump! But she ’ticulates blasphybious words, and ought to lose her mortal 
tongue in consekence. And besides, amn’t I the Waliant Dog? Yes I am — there! (11) 
Bomebard’s loose syntax, faulty logic and misuse of words come straight out of 
Shakespeare. Here is the Australian successor to Dogberry or Elbow. Harpur’s 
interest is different to Shakespeare’s, however. Shakespeare’s idiotic constables are 
images of mere stupidity, introduced for comic relief. Bomebard represents the 
hollowness of the social order. His bragging and brownnosing have made him the 
most respected policeman in Windsor. His best friend is the aptly-named Cant, a 
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fanatical Methodist who crudely applies pulpit language to every situation. 
Bomebard’s entire identity is built on what others—like his wife—say about him: his 
most distinctive word is “says.” Like Edgeworth and Opie, Harpur has a sense of the 
shared and social elements of language. Stalwart lives in a socially stratified world. 
When he complains of the “petty fretfulness” of the powerful, he brings the anxious 
and loquacious Bomebard to mind. 
Language and plot structure work together in Baillie and Harpur’s plays. 
Baillie’s smaller, denser plots and expressive language confine us within the mind. 
Harpur’s larger, looser plot and social language brings an entire social and political 
order into the frame. Nonetheless, network analysis reveals how Baillie also wove a 
social dimension into her plays, using similar methods to Harpur.  
The walktrap algorithm is remarkably good at detecting the social divisions 
of The Bushrangers (Table 5.3). Group 1 is Windsor, Group 2 is the bush, Group 3 
are the bushrangers and the innkeepers who host them and Group 4 are Windsor’s 
government officials. It is not surprising that these social divisions should be so 
marked in Harpur’s highly fragmented play. What is surprising is how effectively 
the algorithm detects social classes in Baillie’s plays (Tables 5.4-5). 
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Table 5.3 
Modularity classes, The Bushrangers 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Groups 5, 6 
Bomebard Abel Bushrangers Doorkeeper Old Shepherd 
Cant Ada Desperate Tunbelly Townsfolk of 
Windsor Constables Lucy Grey Filch Woolsack 
Dreadnought Mrs Leslie Landlady   
Farmer  Macblood   
Shoemaker  Mary Fence   
Tailor  Mrs Fence   
  Old Fence   
  Rackroad   
  Stalwart   
  Walmer   
 
Table 5.4 
Modularity Classes, Orra 
Group 1 Group 2 
Alice Attendants Cathrina Franko 
Eleanora Glottenbal Hughobert Hartman 
Maurice Orra Rudigere Outlaws 
Servants Soliders  Urston Theobald 
 Vassals   
 
Table 5.5 
Modularity classes, The Dream 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Groups 4,5,6 
Benedict Ambassador Agnes Ambassador’s  
Jerome Monks Leonora Gentlemen 
Lay Brother Morand  Executioners 
Osterloo Peasants  Servants 
Osterloo’s Officers Prior’s Soldiers   
Osterloo’s Soldiers Sexton   
Paul Wovelreid   
Prior    
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The algorithm correctly detects Orra’s simple social structure (Table 5.4): all 
the characters in Group 1 are members of Hughobert’s household. Group 2 
comprises the bourgeois characters and their rough allies, as the snobbish 
Hughobert makes clear: 
HUGHOBERT. (impatiently)  Proceed, I beg.  
When burghers gentle courtesy affect,  
It chafes me more than all their sturdy boasting. 
HARTMAN. Then with a burgher’s plainness, Hughobert,  
I'll try my tale to tell— (257) 
Baillie is a typical Romantic liberal. In Orra, the forces of the new urban modernity 
are repressed, forced by an arrogant aristocracy to take shelter in nature and 
outlawry. The situation is similar in The Dream (Table 5.5). Osterloo is caught up in 
Group 1, the monastery, and the play’s zone of death. Group 2 are the wider world 
outside the monastery: the local residents, the soldiery, the Empire. Group 3 
represents a form of society so repressed in the play’s social vision that it barely 
exists: the domestic society of women. Again, as in The Dream, it is the forces of 
bourgeois modernity that represent the play’s moral centre: the state (Ambassador) 
and the private sphere (Leonora). The rational Benedict is the only monk who 
interacts with Leonora, and the Ambassador names him the new prior of the 
monastery in the play’s final scene. 
If Baillie’s plays have a subtle social dimension, it is also the case the Harpur’s 
play contains pockets of expressive language and deep psychology. One of these 
pockets is the band of bushrangers, who have an especially tight web of interactions 
between them, as we saw in Figure 5.2. Within this web, the bushrangers speak a 
special kind of communal, truthful language, the very opposite of Bomebard’s: 
RACKROAD. … Our life is the devil without a leader that all rely on: and he had no 
fellow in the profession. 
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FILCH. Not in open scrimmage and road-work: it was only in finger business and 
house-prigging work that he wasn’t so gifted as some others be. 
DESPERATE. Well, I care not an’ I were with him, wherever he is: above or below. 
1ST BUSHRANGER. We begin sorely to miss him already. 
MACBLOOD. Well, lads, we must even do the best we may. … (1853, 21-22) 
Discussing Stalwart’s disappearance, the bushrangers speak using a precise, shared 
vocabulary. They lose their individuality, and their conversation becomes a chorus 
rather than a dialogue: we could reassign the lines between characters with altering 
or losing the meaning. Stalwart finds a kind of acceptance in this community, but in 
the end his dark passions alienate him from them, either by raising him above them: 
FILCH.   So!——Well, after all, 
He has that hold of me I cannot but follow. (55) 
or by banishing him from their presence: 
STALWART. Damn them!  (Exit 
RACKROAD. Why, he’s gone? 
MACBLOOD. Only, I suppose, to enjoy, undisturbed and alone, the pleasures of 
imagination. (48) 
Stalwart speaks a language of agitated soul and elementary feelings, but his feelings, 
like Orra and Osterloo’s, are of a different and dangerous kind. 
Baillie and Harpur emphasise different aspects of the process of self-
deformation in their tragedies. Baillie uses Gothic settings and tightly wound plots 
to emphasise the internal, psychological aspects of self-deformation; Harpur a 
contemporary setting and sprawling plot to emphasise the social and political 
aspects. In both, however, the basic process is the same. Deep passions are thwarted 
by society, and the conflict between them destroys the humans caught in the middle. 
This is a more complex situation than Eagleton or Steiner suggest. Raymond 
Williams gets closer to the mark: in Romantic tragedy, “[t]he desires of man are 
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again intense and imperative; they reach out and test the universe itself. Society is 
identified as convention, and convention as the enemy of desire.”82 We have seen 
how Harpur and Baillie weave the intensity of passion into their plays, and how they 
represent oppressive social conventions. Williams points to another thread of these 
plays we have yet to examine: their metaphysical dimension, the testing of the 
universe itself. It is to this we now turn.  
5.3 The Metaphysics of Passion 
From Hegel to the present, scholars have agreed that Romantic tragedy is highly 
subjective. For Hegel, Romantic tragedy reflected a fundamental shift in Western 
culture. In the classical world, “universal” concepts like truth and justice were seen 
as part of a “pre-existing reality.” We moderns see such universal concepts as ideas 
in the human mind.83 In classical tragedy, each character represented a different 
force in the order of the universe, and their downfall was the result of some 
insuperable contradiction in that order. In Romantic tragedy, each character 
represents the force of their own personality, and their downfall is the result of “a 
growth of the soul, a development of the character itself in its headlong movement, 
its running wild, its shattering in pieces or exhaustion.”84 We have indeed seen how 
the tragic heroes of Romanticism shatter when the force of their personality collides 
with the stone wall of the world.  
For some scholars, this subjectivity is the crucial flaw of Romantic tragedy. 
The beauty of real tragedy, says Steiner, is the way “Man is ennobled by the vengeful 
spite or injustice of the gods.”85 This is why the Romantics killed tragedy when they 
                                                   
82 Williams, Modern Tragedy, 94. 
83 Hegel, On Tragedy, 190-91. 
84 Ibid., 208. 
85 Steiner, Death of Tragedy, 10. 
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shut the gates of hell. They replaced the spiteful gods with human passions, and the 
real objective hell with an unreal subjective hell of remorse. No longer could humans 
be ennobled by contact with something greater than them. 
Steiner’s attack on Romantic tragedy has recently been renewed, in Hans-
Thies Lehmann’s magisterial history of Tragedy and Dramatic Theatre (2016). For 
him, Romantic tragedy was the tragedy of “pure consciousness,”86 and it was this 
interest in pure consciousness that made tragedy “impossible” in the period.87 The 
problem was a mismatch between theme and technique. The major theme of 
tragedy, claims Lehmann, is transgression: the tragic hero embodies a 
“transgressive energy” that drives them to “self-endangerment” or “annihilation.”88 
The conventional technique of the Romantic stage, he continues, was “dramatic,”89 
meaning that Romantic plays portrayed realistic human characters in realistic 
human settings, addressing realistic dialogue to one another.90 This created a 
contradiction, because purely subjective transgression could not be portrayed 
effectively in the form of intersubjective dialogue. In previous periods of “dramatic” 
tragedy, the transgressor’s dialogue might express a concrete ideal. But Romantic 
transgression is merely an “extreme subjectivity which exalts itself so much that it 
loses its personal quality and any accountable telos;” as a result, characters’ 
speeches devolve into meaningless “streams of affect.”91 This is why Schiller’s plays 
are so childishly enthusiastic, and why the dialogue of Kleist and of Friedrich 
Hölderlin is so full of “fragments, doubt, ambiguity, gutted syntax, broken reflection 
                                                   
86 Hans-Thies Lehmann, Tragedy and Dramatic Theatre, trans. Eric Butler (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2016), 304. 
87 Ibid., 304. 
88 Ibid., 61. 
89 As opposed to the “pre-dramatic” theatre of antiquity or the “post-dramatic” theatre of our 
contemporary avant-garde. He describes this distinction in detail in ibid., 210-28. 
90 He seems to ignore the development of mythological or allegorical drama in the period, of the kind 
represented by Faust, Dziady or Percy Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound (1820). 
91 Ibid., 315. 
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and synthesis deferred.”92 Lehmann does not agree with Steiner that tragedy died 
altogether in the Romantic period, but argues that “dramatic” tragedy certainly did. 
Steiner and Lehmann hit upon a crucial problem, which has worried theorists 
of tragedy from Aristotle to the present. Tragedies depict awful human suffering. 
How can we watch and take pleasure in them without being evil or perverted?93 
Kierkegaard argues that the tragic hero always acts in the service of some “higher 
expression of the ethical,” which in some measure excuses their terrible deeds.94 But 
Steiner and Lehmann deny there is any higher ethical realm that gives meaning to 
the rage and violence of Romantic tragedy. Baillie and Harpur may seem to agree 
with these critics, since they largely banish the supernatural from their plays, and 
explain their characters’ actions socially and psychologically. I hope to show, 
however, that their concept of passion, though certainly subjective, was not for that 
reason meaningless. 
Their solution to the problem of meaning was to develop a metaphysics of 
passion, whose roots in Western drama go at least as far back as Racine. Racine was 
on the threshold of a more subjective tragedy. His plays often feature supernatural 
events, or prophecies and auguries that ascribe objective meaning to human actions. 
But these supernatural elements can seem to be elements of the characters 
themselves: “Je reconnus Vénus, et ses feux redoutables, | D’un sang qu’elle 
poursuit tourments inévitables,” says Phèdre when she lusts for her son-in-law.95 
Phèdre might say that she and her bloodline are “pursued” by a vengeful deity, but 
                                                   
92 Ibid., 318. 
93 For an amusing list of different answers presented down the ages, see Eagleton, Sweet Violence, 
169. 
94 Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin, 1985), 87. 
95 “I recognise Venus, and her dreadful fires, | Inevitable torments in blood she pursues.” Racine, 
Phèdre, 48. 
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this “Venus” is equally Phèdre’s own godlike lust, pulsing in her own human veins. 
Auerbach argues that Racine brought about a revolution in the literature of passion: 
Die irdische Begierde, ... ist zum Range eines selbständigen, prinzipellen und 
autonomen Seeleninhalts, zu etwas an sich Bewunderungswürdigem und Erhabenen 
aufgestiegen und droht an die Stelle des Christentums und überhaupt jeder frommen 
Demut eine Art Metaphysik der Leidenschaften zu setzen.96 
Passion in Racine is neither religious nor ethical. Instead it is the “Kennzeichen 
höchster und sublimiertester Menschlichkeit,” an expression of the “vitality” and 
“instincts” of the human frame.97 Baillie, Harpur and their contemporaries 
developed this metaphysics of passion, further stripping away the supernatural 
elements and introducing a harsh modern irony. Subjective passion is meaningful 
in their plays because it symbolises the grandeur of human nature; it is frightening 
and ironic because it is mysterious and uncontrollable. 
Both Harpur and Baillie longed to include a supernatural element in their 
drama but found it almost impossible. Baillie addressed the problem directly in her 
preface to volume 3 of Plays on the Passions: 
The first of these plays [Orra] is a Tragedy of five acts, the principal character of 
which is a woman, under the dominion of Superstitious Fear; and that particular 
species of it, (the fear of ghosts, or the returning dead,) which is so universal and 
inherent in our nature, that it can never be eradicated from the mind, let the progress 
of reason or philosophy be what it may. A brave and wise man of the nineteenth 
century, were he lodged for the night in a lone apartment where murder has been 
committed, would not so easily believe, as a brave and wise man of the fourteenth 
century, that the restless spirit from its grave might stalk around his bed and open his 
curtains in the stillness of midnight: but should circumstances arise to impress him 
with such a belief, he would feel the emotions of Fear as intensely, though firmly 
persuaded that such beings have no power to injure him. (228) 
                                                   
96 “Earthly desire … is raised to the rank of an independent, primary and autonomous component of 
the soul, to something wondrous and sublime, and threatens to set in the place of Christianity and 
indeed every devout kind of humility a kind of metaphysic of the passions.” Erich Auerbach, 
Gesammelte Aufsätze Zur Romanischen Philologie (Bern und Munich: Francke, 1967), 199.  
97 “… sign of the highest and most sublimated humanity …” ibid., 200. 
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Baillie struggles in this preface with two opposed impulses: her desire to appeal to 
our “inherent” belief in the supernatural and her sense that “the progress of reason 
or philosophy” has muted this belief. She struggles with this tension in the play itself, 
going to great lengths to prove that Orra’s fear is reasonable, even though we know 
there is really no ghost in Brunier’s tower. Some argue that Baillie tries to make us 
sympathise with her protagonists,98 but in Orra, our perspective is sharply divided 
from the heroine’s. When she sees a ghost, we see Theobald in a costume. This scene 
would surely be unbearably comic in performance, vindicating those who find that 
Romantic subjectivity makes Romantic tragedy impossible. 
Harpur had a similar embarrassment with the metaphysical aspects of The 
Bushrangers. In the 1835 version, three Furies appear and pass judgment on 
Donohoe’s foul deeds: 
ALL. A maiden’s curse hath pierc’d heaven’s ear; 
’Twas deeply wail’d o’er a murder’d man’s bier; 
And we’re free with might and main, 
To impress with the seal of Cain, 
The brow of the murderer! (1835, 107) 
They are a strange presence in the play, which is otherwise realistic. Since the 1835 
version exists only in extracts, it is not certain whether the Furies had any other 
scenes. It would seem, however, that unlike the Weird Sisters of Macbeth, Harpur’s 
Furies never interact with any of the human characters and play no role in the 
unfolding of the plot. Harpur obviously came to feel they were an extraneous 
element, and cut them from later versions of the play.  
                                                   
98 See, for instance, Melissa M. Whalen, “The Suffering Stage: Joanna Baillie, Spectacle, and 
Sympathetic Education,” European Romantic Review 24, no. 6 (2013), esp. 665-66. 
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As Michael Ackland has shown, Harpur found better ways to weave religion 
through his drama.99 The first major change was to the names of the characters: 
Donohoe becomes “Stalwart,” William (his victim) becomes “Abel,” and Mary 
(Abel’s  fiancée) becomes “Ada.” The new names point to the universal significance 
of the drama. “Stalwart” is no longer a particular Irish convict, but represents the 
sublime of human nature. Similarly, “Abel” is no longer a particular victim, but a 
brother in the human race. It is no longer necessary for the Furies to swoop down 
and tell us that Stalwart is Cain. Harpur also modified the dialogue to draw out the 
metaphysical implications of Stalwart’s deeds. In the 1835 version, Stalwart explains 
his building passions thus: 
She’s given me health; but with the gift inspir’d 
A thousand rash desires, which goad me on 
Toward a foul deed … (1835, 95)  
In the 1853, he gives a fuller explanation: 
   But I ever was, 
And ever shall be, the accused slave 
Of lawless passion!—She has given me health 
And liberty, but with those gifts evoked 
Desires iniquitous, that from their dark 
Impulsive depths, like monstrous sea-swells, keep 
Blindly upworking … (1853, 28) 
The new imagery is tense and powerful, recalling the sea-imagery we encountered 
in Moore and Byron. Stalwart’s vision of sublime nature roaring in the depths of his 
frame contrasts with Abel’s more tranquil imagery from two scenes before: 
Now let us wander by the shining river, 
And I will sing you there, aided by Echo, 
A loving ditty of the olden time … 
We’ll mark the spangled fishes throng about 
                                                   
99 See Michael Ackland, “Plot and Counter-Plot in Charles Harpur’s ‘The Bushrangers’,” Australasian 
Drama Studies 0, no. 8 (1986), 53-55; That Shining Band: A Study of the Australian Colonial Verse 
Tradition (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1994), 57-63. 
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In happy revel, and compare them well 
To swarms of brilliant love-lights flashing through 
The silver vision of some glorious Bard, 
When, flowing forth in everlasting verse, 
It greens the course of Time. (1853, 24) 
In The Bushrangers, the world is ruled by obscure natural forces, lying at the edge 
of consciousness. Nature is the sea, blind and lawless, bearing us on waves of 
passion to evil deeds and self-destruction. Or it is the river, green and shining, 
bearing us on the scales of fish to a vision of peace and brotherhood. There is a 
mysterious order that gives meaning to Stalwart’s degradation. His deformity is not 
merely a mental illness or a social problem, but an expression of “man’s 
uncontrolled, instinctual nature.”100 Elsewhere in his poetry, Harpur refers to this 
other realm as “Ideality,” exploring it in visionary poems of startling power, like 
“The World and the Soul,” The Tower of the Dream (1865) and his neglected epic, 
The Witch of Hebron: A Rabbinical Legend (1867). Stalwart glimpses Ideality, if 
mainly in its terrible aspect, and this is what raises him above the “Vermin that 
harbour in the sweaty wig | Of belly-swol’n Legality!” (53-4) The empty blusterers, 
Tunbelly and Bomebard, cannot judge Stalwart’s crime. Only the idealists, Ada and 
Abel, have the right, and it is they whom Stalwart sees as he dies. 
In the 1867 version, Harpur further amplified the metaphysical elements of 
the dialogue. The results are unfortunately rather strained. Ada, now called “Linda,” 
interprets Abel’s murder for us: 
  Alas, they shouldn’t have killed him! 
But ’twas the Furies did it. Men, who all 
Are Adam’s sons – they never slew a brother 
So young and hopeful! No; I’ll not believe it! 
No, ’twas the Furies! (1867, 69) 
                                                   
100 Ackland, That Shining Band, 59. 
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There are two unfortunate aspects of this speech. First, the Furies are nowhere to be 
seen in the play, and it is difficult to take this nineteenth-century girl seriously when 
she talks about them. Second, the claim that “Adam’s sons … never slew a brother” 
is patently absurd, especially in a play whose main murder victim is called “Abel.” It 
is true that Ada/Linda is mad in this scene, but her sudden partial amnesia of the 
Bible and semi-conversion to Greek paganism are not very believable symptoms. 
Harpur did not believe in the Furies, any more than Baillie believed in ghosts. Like 
her, his metaphysical vision is far more compelling when it is rooted in natural 
imagery and an uncanny plot. 
In Orra, as we saw, Baillie goes to great lengths to explain—even apologise 
for—Orra’s superstition. The situation is different in The Dream. In this uncanny 
play, none of the coincidences or ironies of the plot are ever explained. The “dream” 
of a title is a vision that occurs to the monk Jerome. He dreams of a murdered man, 
dreams that an imperial legion will shortly pass the monastery, and dreams that if 
one of the legion does a night’s penance for the murder in the monastery, then the 
pestilence currently gripping the district will end. As it happens, Osterloo’s legion 
does pass by, Osterloo did kill the very man in Jerome’s dream, and when they draw 
lots to see who will do the penance, Osterloo draws the black scroll from the vase. 
Despite all this, Benedict is sceptical: “had the hermit Baldwick never made his 
deathbed confession to thee, thou wouldst never have had such a dream to reveal,” 
he tells Jerome, accusing him of having “secret intelligence” of the legion’s arrival 
(266). The Sexton later confirms that Baldwick did indeed know the whole story of 
the murder. A second monk, Paul, who also had a vision, turns out to have dreamt 
something different. We never learn if Osterloo’s death ends the pestilence, or 
whether the lots were somehow rigged. 
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The uncanny atmosphere of The Dream envelops the characters’ words and 
deeds in terrifying ambiguity, but such ambiguity is rare in Baillie’s plays. In 
Ethwald she also experiments with ambiguous supernatural signs, though the 
ambiguity is less woven into the fabric of the plot. Her two “musical dramas,” The 
Beacon (1812) and The Phantom (1836) also make wonderful use of mystery and 
coincidence. But in Orra and her other tragedies, supernatural occurrences are 
explained in advance. There is thus some truth to Michael Gamer’s claim that 
Baillie’s characters are usually “haunt[ed]” by nothing but “their own minds.”101  
Even in Orra, however, Baillie manages to reveal a terrible world of dark 
forces that lie beyond ordinary reality. The speeches of Orra’s madness seem to be 
more than mere ravings, and they contain some of Baillie’s most powerful poetry: 
Take it away! It was the swathed dead!  
I know its clammy, chill, and bony touch. 
 [Fixing her eyes fiercely on Eleanora. 
Come not again; I’m strong and terrible now:  
Mine eyes have look’d upon all dreadful things;  
And when the earth yawns, and the hell-blast sounds,  
I’ll ’bide the trooping of unearthly steps  
With stiff-clench’d, terrible strength. 
 [Holding her clenched hands over her head with an air of grandeur and defiance. (258) 
This ecstasy could be interpreted simply as the symptom of a mental illness. But that 
would not do justice to the power of Orra’s words. She speaks coherently and 
powerfully in the face of her visions, even if those visions are hallucinations. When 
Ophelia goes mad in Hamlet, she speaks pretty nonsense. When Büchner’s Woyzeck 
reaches his lowest point, his speech flits illogically from topic to topic: 
(Er tanzt.) So Käthe! setz dich! Ich hab heiß! heiß, (er zieht den Rock aus) es ist einmal 
so, der Teufel holt die eine und lässt die andre laufen. Käthe du bist heiß! Warum 
                                                   
101 Gamer, Romanticism and the Gothic, 138. 
DRAMA: THE HIDEOUS SOULS OF BAILLIE AND HARPUR 
286 
denn Käthe? Du wirst auch noch kalt werden. Sei vernünftig. Kannst du nicht 
singe?102 
Orra’s words, by contrast, have the stamp of truth. If her mind is deranged, it is 
deranged by real and powerful forces. She might misrecognise them, thinking the 
“dreadful things” she sees are in the material rather than the spiritual realm, but she 
correctly recognises their incredible strength. As Brewer observes, these final 
speeches of Orra darkly echo her speeches earlier in the play, where she uses the 
power of her mind to imagine a more beautiful social order:103 
In short, I would, without another’s leave,  
Improve the low condition of my peasants,  
And cherish them in peace. E’en now, methinks,  
Each little cottage of my native vale  
Swells out its earthen sides, up-heaves its roof,  
Like to a hillock mov’d by lab’ring mole,  
And with green trail-weeds clamb’ring up its walls,  
Roses and ev’ry gay and fragrant plant,  
Before my fancy stands, a fairy bower:  
Ay, and within it too do fairies dwell. (241-2) 
Listening to her description, Theobald says he can picture it “Distinctly; and most 
beautiful the sight!” (242) Just as in The Bushrangers, in Orra there are two forces 
which fill the minds of the great with power: the beautiful, harmonising force of the 
river or fairy bower, and the sublime, destructive force of the sea or of hell. Their 
imagery recalls Moore’s analysis of Byron, when he describes the struggle between 
the good and evil aspects of the poetical Lord’s nature. In the uncanny world of The 
Dream, these otherworldly forces seem to enter the material world in the form of 
                                                   
102 “(He dances.) So Kathy! Sit down! I’m hot! hot, (he takes his coat off) it’s even so, the devil takes 
one and lets the other go. Kathy you’re hot! Why then Kathy? You’ll be cold too one day. Be 
reasonable. Can’t you sing?” Georg Büchner, Werke Der Freiheit: Woyzeck, Lenz, Danton's Tod, 
Leonce Und Lena (Wiesbaden: Marix Verlag, 2013), 189. 
103 William D. Brewer, “The Liberating and Debilitating Imagination in Joanna Baillie’s Orra and the 
Dream,”  Romantic Circles Praxis Series (July 2008), https://www.rc.umd.edu/praxis/utopia/ 
index.html 
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pestilence, exhumed bodies and strange coincidence. In Orra and The Bushrangers, 
these forces flow through the imagery of the dialogue. 
I have been arguing that these forces are in some sense “metaphysical,” that 
in Baillie’s and Harpur’s plays, “passion” is not simply a part of the mind, but forms 
a part of some mysterious wider reality.104 From Judith Wright to the present, critics 
have observed this mystical element in Harpur’s poetry.105 But it is not common to 
interpret Baillie this way. Though some readers find mysticism or paradox in 
Baillie’s plays,106 it is more common to see her as a rational empiricist, a reader of 
Adam Smith, a materialist philosopher who saw “passion” as a mere emotion or 
biological fact.107 Baillie herself encouraged such an interpretation of her plays. Her 
“Introductory Discourse” is written in the language of empiricist philosophy, and 
the original subtitle of Plays on the Passions claimed their aim was to “delineate the 
stronger passions of the mind” (my emphasis). Nonetheless, G. Wilson Knight 
suggests that there is no contradiction between the scientific and religious 
interpretations of Baillie’s plays. He praises her “diagnostic and scientific” style, but 
also argues that “[h]er avoidance of actual ghosts … marks no disbelief in the other 
world but rather a reluctance to commit herself to any superstitious forms.”108 
                                                   
104 I thus side with those critics who, as Cox puts it, “[see] the Gothic as unveiling or recovering some 
unmediated absolute that stands outside the boundaries of the natural and social orders …” 
“Introduction,” in Cox, Seven Gothic Dramas, 7. 
105 See Judith Wright, Preoccupations in Australian Poetry (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
1965), 17-18. It helps that “mystic” is one of Harpur’s favourite words. 
106 See, for example, Carney,  242-3; Julie Murray, “At the Surface of Romantic Interiority: Joanna 
Baillie’s Orra,” Romanticism and Victorianism on the Net 56 (2009). 
107 Karen Dwyer says Baillie’s approach is “clinical” and “natural-historical:” “Joanna Baillie’s Plays 
on the Passions and the Spectacle of Medical Science,” Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture 29, 
no. 1 (2000), 23. Julie Murray argues that Baillie describes “economic man:” “Governing Economic 
Man: Joanna Baillie’s Theatre of Utililty,” ELH (2003), 1044. See also Whalen, “The Suffering Stage,” 
669-71. 
108 G. Wilson Knight, The Golden Labyrinth: A Study of British Drama (London: Phoenix House, 
1962), 210. 
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The final proof that Baillie and Harpur share a metaphysical vision lies in 
their complex use of the words “mind” and “soul.” Like Moore with his “character” 
and “genius,” Baillie and Harpur use these terms together to express multiple 
perspectives on conscious experience and the self. As we might expect, they tend to 
use “mind” to refer to characters’ thoughts and feelings, and “soul” to refer to their 
immortal part. At certain points, however, both Baillie and Harpur suggest that the 
soul is a higher form of consciousness with a complicated relationship to the mind. 
In The Dream, Osterloo’s deadly fear is explained in different ways. Osterloo tells 
the Prior that “the guilt of murder” is on his “soul,” which therefore “recoils with 
unutterable horror” from the thought of death (269). When he drops dead on the 
scaffold in the play’s final scene, the Prior offers a different interpretation: “No 
sorcery hath been practised on the deceased: his own mind has dealt with him alone, 
and produced the effects you behold.” (276) There is a strange swirl of ideas: 
Osterloo’s soul recoils from death, yet his mind hurtles him into it. The situation in 
Orra is similarly complex: 
HARTMAN. She is not dead!  
THEOBALD.          Oh, no! it is not death!  
HARTMAN. What meanst thou? Is she well?  
THEOBALD.         Her body is.  
HARTMAN. And not her mind?—Oh! direst wreck of all! (258) 
Losing your mind is like death, only worse. Theobald struggles to comprehend 
Orra’s madness. He addresses her as “poor troubled soul,” and tries to call her back 
to sanity by recalling her utopian visions from Act I (259). But in the end he despairs 
of communicating with her soul: “Her mind within itself holds a dark world | Of 
dismal phantasies and horrid forms!” (260) As in The Dream, it is unclear exactly 
how the wrecked mind and the troubled soul are related to one another. It is in these 
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final moments of Orra that Baillie achieves the uncanny ambiguity that makes The 
Dream so impressive. Has Orra’s soul already crossed to the other side? Does she 
really gaze on hell? Or are the horrors she describes the fantasies of a diseased mind? 
Harpur’s treatment of soul and mind is more explicit. After Abel’s death, Ada 
also goes mad, though her madness is quieter than Orra’s:  
   Yes—I know you, 
Your name is Lucy, and mine’s Ada: nay, 
My memory is good. And I remember, too, 
The feast we had, under yon willow tree, 
The day I promised to be Abel’s bride. 
They say I wept that day—and, if I did, 
I now know why. (1853, 51) 
Indeed, she claims she is not mad: 
  I’m only a little strange, 
Having some living creature in my brain 
That was not always there;—something that gnaws it. (50) 
Theobald struggled to interpret Orra’s madness, but Lucy is able to expound a 
comprehensive philosophy that explains her friend’s mental condition: 
    Yet is she not 
Quite mad, or in the way that most are mad, 
Seeing her feelings, though distempered, keep 
The old track still;—nay, even her reason trades 
In sad realities, though lifted up 
Into the cloudier region of her soul 
By a wild-drifting fancy. (49) 
The mind—“reason” and “feelings”—is just an earthly aspect of the soul. Ada’s 
madness is not a derangement of the mind, but a retreat from the earthly realm into 
the soul’s “cloudier regions.” She has become, Lucy says, “An emblem of herself” 
(52). Harpur suggests that we live in two realms simultaneously. Death is a retreat 
from the soul’s lower realms to its higher. For the deformed Stalwart, this may be a 
terrifying prospect. For the miserable Ada, it is a gentle movement. 
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Baillie’s conception of the self is different. Orra’s madness is not a gentle 
movement between realms of the soul, but a violent tear from the world of 
everything she knows. It fills her with power, but also with horror. Likewise, when 
Osterloo contemplates death, it does not take him into cloudier regions where he 
was already wont to dwell; instead, his soul recoils as his mind drags it into the next 
world. In Baillie’s frightening vision of the universe, the self is a mystery, and terrible 
passions can set the mind and soul at war. The only end to such a war is ecstasy, 
paradox, the most horrific kind of deformity. 
*** 
Of all the genres we have considered, Gothic tragedy portrays self-deformation most 
spectacularly. Vivian’s and Adeline’s sufferings are largely confined to the world of 
morality and social interaction. They are deformed by vice, as it pollutes their minds 
or provokes them to a dangerous quixotism. Smith’s and Clare’s disintegration takes 
place in the natural world. They are deformed by perception, as it draws them out 
into a shimmering reality of myriad things. Byron’s derangement takes place on the 
lofty stage of history. This great and lonely man is deformed by melancholy, the 
product of his social isolation and explosive talent. Baillie and Harpur put their 
characters on an even loftier stage. There are vast forces at work. These forces 
ennoble characters like Stalwart, Ada, Orra and Osterloo. They reveal the paltriness 
of the social order, and its tyranny. But they also tear the self to pieces, sending 
Stalwart, Ada, Orra and Osterloo into the other world before their time. They try to 
be true to their impulses, and falsify or hate themselves. They rebel against the social 
order, and lose their freedom. 
Self-deformation was the key to the Romantic redefinition of tragedy. 
Williams argues that “in Romantic tragedy man is guilty of the ultimate and 
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nameless crime of being himself,”109 but it seems truer to say that the tragic heroes 
of Romanticism commit the crime of not being themselves. De Musset’s Lorenzaccio 
achieves a bloody eminence, only to find he is a man of wax. Hemans’ di Procida 
achieves the freedom of his people, but ends the play a miserable “dark soul,” 
holding his son’s blasted corpse.110 Stalwart, Orra and Osterloo are lifted above their 
peers by the sublimity of their passions. Like Adeline Mowbary or Moore’s Byron, 
they express the higher possibilities, even the divinity, of human nature. But in 
expressing this possibility, they pervert, destroy or deform themselves.  
Their perversion is not merely the product of a faulty society, though most 
tragic heroes of the Romantic period are rebels against an unjust order. Baillie and 
Harpur have a complex moral vision. Blame is hard to apportion, because self-
deformation is an unpredictable and uncontrollable process. We are trapped in 
social structures we have little power to alter, and our passions are beyond our ken. 
These are tense and thought-provoking plays. If they seem overblown, this probably 
has more to do with our theatrical tastes than with the plays’ inherent merits, in an 
age when the Anglo-American stage is neatly divided between traditionalist 
Ibsenian naturalism and post-dramatic experimentalism. One would think, 
however, that the new age of experimentalism would open new possibilities for 
staging these often enormous and extravagent plays. Faust was finally performed in 
its entirety only in 2000, and the four parts of Dziady only in 2015. We can only 
await the first immersive, site-specific, professional performance of The 
Bushrangers or Prometheus Unbound. Paul Ranger found it possible to stage The 
Castle Spectre and Pizarro successfully in the twentieth century.111 Marjean 
                                                   
109 Williams, Modern Tragedy, 94 
110 Hemans, Works, V.109. 
111 Ranger, Terror and Pity, 106. 
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Purinton has found Baillie’s plays receive an enthusiastic response from a small, 
intimate audience—just as Baillie predicted.112 It would be the ultimate vindication 
of the Romanticism of self-deformation if the disappointed literary playwrights of 
the British Romantic stage finally had their day behind the curtain, like their 
continental counterparts. 
When the curtain rises on these plays, audiences will be confronted with a 
frightening vision of human nature in an arid modern world. To this frightening 
vision, the Gothic playwrights of the Romantic period offered the consolation of 
religion. Harpur’s enlightened Christianity resembles that of Faust, Manfred or The 
Maid of Orleans, and has something in common with the spiritualised atheism of 
Prometheus Unbound. Baillie’s mysterious, uncanny Christianity resembles the 
frightening atheism of Büchner’s Dantons Tod (1835), the weird folk Catholicism of 
Dziady, or Hemans’ vision of “another and more fearful world” in Vespers of 
Palermo.113 In the end, however, these playwrights lacked faith in their own religious 
nostrums. They could give the self a place in the universe, but they were finally 
convinced of little but its fragility, malignity and mystery: 
That man was never born whose secret soul,  
With all its motley treasure of dark thoughts,  
Foul fantasies, vain musings, and wild dreams,  
Was ever open’d to another’s scan. (Baillie, De Monfort, 81) 
Aber, (er deutet ihr auf Stirn und Augen) da da, was liegt hinter dem? Geh, wir haben 
grobe Sinne. Einander kennen? Wir müssten uns die Schädeldecken aufbrechen und 
die Gedanken einander aus den Hirnfasern zerren.114 
                                                   
112 Marjean D. Purinton, “Pedagogy and the Passions: Teaching Joanna Baillie’s Dramas,” in Joanna 
Baillie: Romantic Dramatist, ed. Thomas C. Chronchunis (London: Routledge, 2004), 234-37. See 
also Isabella Imperiali, “From Darkness to Light: Science and Religion on Joanna Baillie’s Stage,” in 
Women’s Romantic Theatre and Drama: History, Agency, and Performativity, ed. Lilla Maria 
Crisafulli and Keir Elam (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 228. 
113 Hemans, Works, V.25. 
114 “But (pointing at her forehead and eyes) there there, what lies behind there? Go on, we have crude 
senses. Know each other? We’d have to crack our skulls open and rip each other’s thoughts from the 
fibres of the brain.” Büchner, Dantons Tod, in Büchner, 9. 
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VER FIVE chapters we have searched for the Romantic self, and 
discovered a strange and turbulent realm of drifting thoughts, volcanic 
passions and mystifying uncertainty. These selves have the wrong form, 
or have no form at all, and the texts that describe them are involuted and self-
defeating in intriguing and beautiful ways. Their authors are sceptical of the “stable 
inner core of selfhood” that Dror Wahrman claims is the mainstay of Romantic 
culture.1 Maria Edgeworth and John Clare are sceptical we have any such inner core. 
Charles Harpur and Joanna Baillie are sure we do, but it is unstable, made of 
magma, capable like the earth of both generation and destruction. These writers are 
also sceptical of Michel Foucault’s concept of “discipline,” the ethical principle of the 
well-formed self.2 Amelia Opie and Charlotte Smith reveal the terrible costs of public 
surveillance, law and moral judgment. Thomas Moore suggests that self-discipline 
can falsify the highest energies of the human frame. Wherever we seek the self in 
these texts, it shrinks, recedes or explodes. 
 We are not the first seekers to fail in this way. In his brilliant memoir, 
Footsteps (1995), biographer Richard Holmes describes his own quest for the 
Romantic self. He first appears in 1964, at the age of eighteen, pursuing Robert 
Louis Stevenson through the mountain paths of Les Cevennes, hoping to “catch” this 
elusive identity from the past.3 In the next chapter he appears in Paris in 1968, 
                                                   
1 See above, p. 23. 
2 See above, p. 24. 
3 Richard Holmes, Footsteps: Adventures of a Romantic Biographer (London: Flamingo, 1995), 25. 
O 
CONCLUSION: THE CHALLENGE 
294 
running after Mary Wollstonecraft in an attempt to understand his own 
revolutionary situation. Next he is in Italy. It is 1972, and he is tracking the Shelleys, 
researching the book that will make him as a writer: Shelley: The Pursuit (1974). 
His years in the footsteps of the Romantics have taught him a valuable lesson, that 
there is such a thing as “the integrity of human character.”4 Each of us does have a 
self, this self does have a form, and the biographer is able, however imperfectly, to 
discover this integral character and portray it in a book. At this point, it appears that 
Holmes has discovered the stable inner core of selfhood and the discipline that holds 
it together, and has arrived at a thoroughly conventional concept of Romantic 
culture. 
But there is a twist in the tale. In the fourth and final chapter, Holmes is back 
in Paris, this time in the footsteps of Gérard de Nerval. Things are not going well. 
Holmes is in a strange headspace, and his friends are becoming concerned. He is 
trying to write a novel, but his inspiration vanishes. More and more obsessed with 
Nerval, he is drawn into a weird world that challenges both his sense of self and his 
sense of the biographer’s art: 
Here at last began for me too the overflowing of irrational into the normal forms of 
biography. All the logical and traditional structures that I had learned so 
painstakingly—the chronology, the development of character, the structure of 
friendships, the sense of trust and the subject’s inner identity—began to twist and 
dissolve. It was becoming more and more difficult to tell, or to account for, Nerval’s 
life in the ordinary narrative, linear way. Sometimes it seemed that those haunting 
Tarot cards—La Lune, L’Etoile, La Tour—expressed much more about him than 
any critical commentary.5 
Nerval was a Byronic shapeshifter, who wrote under numerous pseudonyms and 
whose writings are a disconcerting blend of fiction and autobiography. In the 
                                                   
4 Ibid., 174. 
5 Ibid., 249. 
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attempt to find him, Holmes lost his own moorings. His Nerval book—entitled A 
Dream Biography—was “confused” and he could never get it published.6 He would 
eventually return to conventional biography, but also began to write enchantingly 
sceptical books, like Dr Johnson & Mr Savage (1993) and Footsteps itself, books 
that describe the elusiveness of the self, and which are as “confused” or deformed in 
their structure as the Romantic-era texts we have considered in this study. 
Holmes reveals why texts of self-deformation have historically been 
marginalised in Romantic scholarship. They are challenging texts, that threaten to 
undo the work of the critic. A self-reflexive text like The Prelude interprets itself, 
and the critic can rest their assessment of its value on the poet’s own sense of 
achievement. A certain kind of formalist can argue that the text guarantees its own 
aesthetic value through this self-reflection. A certain kind of historicist can claim 
that such a text embodies a coherent ideology which can be contextualised, and then 
praised or debunked. But the texts considered in this thesis resist these easy kinds 
of interpretation. Their form is deliberately incoherent. Their moral is deliberately 
self-contradictory. It is difficult to collect them into a canon representing a singular 
ideal of selfhood or a singular conception of literary form. In their contradictions 
and uncertainties, they challenge us to recognise that literature is “an intricate, 
diverse, stressful community, not a bland monolith.”7 They challenge us to answer 
Marilyn Butler’s call for a more “open literary history.”8 
We can rise to meet this challenge. It is not necessary to jettison the concept 
of Romanticism, nor to stop studying literary periods, as some argue we should. The 
writers of the Romantic period may not form a school or movement, with a singular 
                                                   
6 Ibid., 275. 
7 Butler, “Repossessing the Past,” 69. 
8 See above, p. 6. 
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and explicit set of ideals and aspirations, but they did form a remarkably small and 
coherent social network. All the writers we have considered knew one another or 
had mutual acquaintances—even Harpur, 17,000 kilometres away on the edge of the 
British world, was personally connected to the heart of literary London by friends 
like Nicol Drysdale Stenhouse (De Quincey’s secretary) and Henry Parkes (who 
hobnobbed with Tennyson and the Brownings). These writers responded to the 
same public events, read books from the same emerging canon, and circulated their 
ideas in the same print and manuscript cultures. 
The Romantics may not have shared the same solutions, but they certainly 
shared the same problems. There were the scars of secularisation, and the modern 
mind’s increasing alienation from the world. Smith stared at nature and found it 
implacable. Baillie and Harpur trapped their protagonists in a frightening and 
uncanny universe. William Wordsworth, even in his most ringingly optimistic 
poems, had the sense that it is not now as it hath been of yore. There were the 
pressures of the new mass culture, the dissemination of print and the endless 
surveillance. Edgeworth’s Vivian, Opie’s Adeline and Moore’s Byron all find 
themselves written down against their will. Their private identities are torn out and 
strewn about the world in letters, magazines and books. Even in their private closet, 
or in the depths of smoky Cumberland, or on the shores of Greece, they find it 
impossible to detach themselves from the sticky web of society. In Persuasion, Sir 
Walter Elliot can only know himself in the pages of the Baronetage, and even his 
self-aware daughter Anne defines herself by reading sermons instead of Byron—or 
by telling others that she does so. These were common anxieties rooted in common 
experiences of war, globalisation, the march of science and industry, and the 
continued explosion of print. Some writers, like Clare, Moore and Smith, longed to 
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be rid of the burden of self-consciousness in this new world. Others, like Edgeworth, 
Opie, Baillie and Harpur, longed for a self-integrity they feared was impossible. The 
Wordsworthian or Austenian solution, of a stable identity rooted in deep facts of 
human nature and a small, knowable community, was another response. Our 
authors promoted this solution as well from time to time, as evidenced by 
Edgeworth’s Ormond (1817), Smith’s The Old Manor House (1793) or the tempting 
possibility Moore holds out that Byron may have, in different circumstances, 
achieved domestic happiness. 
Despite the wide variety of their responses to these pressures, these writers 
agreed that there were two main processes of self-deformation. There was the threat 
of self-deformation from within, and there was the threat of self-deformation from 
without. From within, there was the terrible mysterious energy of humanity, 
whether in the form of Adeline’s heroic “enthusiasm,” Smith’s titanic “sorrow,” 
Moore’s rippling “principle of Self” or the molten “passions” of Stalwart, Osterloo 
and Orra. Perhaps in a previous age, these could have been understood as the 
visitations of Satan, the curse of original sin, or the depravity of a transient earthly 
world. But these explanations did not appeal to our secularised writers, who 
believed these energies were rooted in our biological or instinctual nature, and who 
felt that however dangerous or self-destructive the passions were, they were not 
merely depraved, but also expressed our most sublime capabilities. Adeline hurtles 
enthusiastically towards renunciation and death, but she, like the other enthusiasts 
we have considered, is superior to the supposedly well-formed people around her. 
Where her enthusiasm comes from we never learn. It is simply who she is, and if we 
try to find its mysterious source, Moore and Harpur suggest, we will encounter 
nothing but the sea of our own ignorance. On this view, the self is indeed deep and 
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natural, but it is dualistic, containing powerful good and evil principles that are in 
practice hard to distinguish. 
From without, there was the threat of the teeming world, flooding in through 
the senses and filling the mind with foreign matter. Clare embraced this kind of self-
deformity in hundreds of his most beautiful poems. But what drowns the self in his 
poems is cyclical nature. Vivian, by contrast, drowns in the “conventional language” 
of “what is called the WORLD,” a fate courted by Moore’s Byron, when he acts out the 
scandals and rumours and absurd heroics of the press. Vivian is drowned, and Byron 
swims, in the flood of the external world. Adeline, Smith and Stalwart are battered 
by it, tortured into self-destruction by the inescapable judgements of a totalitarian 
social system. On this view, the self is contingent, and each of us must try as we can 
to establish our own foundations in the stream of perception. 
The small body of authors discussed in this thesis thus display great variety 
and great uniformity in their approaches to self-deformation. On the one hand, they 
agree that our sense of self rests on two foundations: on our deep, mysterious and 
spontaneous nature, and on the society that shapes our self-conceptions. On the 
other hand, they explore the deformation of this self in a wide variety of contexts, 
and take various attitudes towards it. The shallow Vivian is deformed in the most 
mundane way by a fashionably vicious society, while the mighty Orra is dragged into 
fiery ecstasy by the gravest tyranny and ignorance. Much of this difference comes 
down to genre. These novels put people in society, the poems put them in nature, 
the biographies in history, and the tragedies in the universe, in each case giving a 
different cast to the deformation of the self. But we have seen how even within a 
single genre, these same anxieties and conflicts can play out in very different ways. 
This variety should put paid to the notion, promoted by critics from T.E. Hulme to 
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Terry Eagleton, that the Romantics had simplistic Rousseauan theory of self-
deformation, and blamed all human depravity on society. We have seen how often 
in these texts the very distinction between individual and society collapses. 
These are profoundly “romantic” ideas about the self, in the sense the 
Romantics themselves would have used the word, to mean idealistic, extreme or 
extraordinary. Either the self is borne aloft by its own sublime energies, or it is a 
consciousness capacious enough to absorb the whole world. These anxieties about 
self-deformation have deep roots in eighteenth-century thought, which developed 
the crucial concepts of consciousness, of human nature, and of our earthly or secular 
destiny. There is nothing “secondary,” “negative” or “Gothic” (in the sense of un- or 
anti-Romantic) about these anxieties. They are present in the first edition of Smith’s 
Elegiac Sonnets in 1784, and they are present in the final works of Clare, Edgeworth 
and Harpur in the late 1840s, ’50s and ’60s. And most importantly, they are present 
even in Wordsworth and Austen, disproving forever to the idea promoted by certain 
New Historicists and certain New Formalists alike that Austen, Wordsworth and 
their ilk avoided difficult ideological conflicts by enclosing them in the safe realm of 
private life and the human mind. Wordsworth’s cosmic marriage of mind and 
nature, and Austen’s more quotidian marriages of heart and head, are riven by these 
same anxieties of inner and outer deformity, however well they may seem on 
occasion to overcome them. 
Once we recognise the centrality of these anxieties, we need to reconsider 
how we define the major genres of Romantic literature. The familiar notion that 
Romantic novels were manuals of self-improvement terminating in happy 
marriages is false. Vivian and Adeline Mowbray demonstrate that the 
Bildungsroman is characterised by a central theme—the perfection or imperfection 
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of the will in society—rather than by a central plot—the gradual maturation of the 
protagonist, ending with a happy marriage. Likewise, the classic notion of the 
Romantic lyric, in which the poet’s mind is “intervolved” with the external world, is 
rendered more complex by Smith and Clare. Smith records her utter alienation from 
the external world, while Clare often eliminates the poet’s mind from his sonnets 
altogether. Again a central theme—consciousness in nature—captures the main 
features of Romantic lyric better than a central plot—the internal quest leading 
upwards from raw experience to self-realisation. There is no need to re-define 
Romantic tragedy or biography, since they have so rarely been defined.9 It has been 
more common simply to dismiss these genres as failures, or to describe them 
according to more familiar concepts derived from the study of Romantic fiction or 
poetry. But in the wider context of Romantic self-deformation, the value of these 
texts becomes clearer. Moore’s vast book explores the dynamics of the historical self, 
and the Romantic tragedies of Baillie and Harpur draw on the ancient traditions of 
tragic drama to add philosophical depth to Romantic debates about the self. 
These texts challenge us to rethink what it means for a writer or their work to 
be “central” to a period. The case could be made that all of these authors were 
marginal writers. Edgeworth was an Anglo-Irish spinster in Catholic Ireland, and 
Moore a Catholic Irish nationalist in Protestant London. Clare was labouring-class, 
Smith an impoverished gentlewoman, and Harpur the son of criminals, living in a 
violent frontier society that was struggling to decide whether it was a British prison 
or a free commonwealth. Baillie and Opie had less parlous social identities, perhaps, 
but Baillie was a Scotswoman in Hampstead, and Opie transformed through life 
from a young Jacobin into an austere Quaker. Both were also, of course, women. 
                                                   
9 Though it must also be said that Jeffrey Cox has already provided a powerful definition of Romantic 
tragedy. See above, §5.1. 
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These writers expressed their marginality in various ways, and it is tempting to 
argue that the vexed, debatable structure of their books are the direct result of their 
vexed, debatable positions in society. 
But however marginal these writers were in society, they should not be 
marginal in our accounts of the period. Their anxieties were shared by the five 
gentlemen and one artisan who have traditionally formed the core of the British 
Romantic canon, and by the well-connected, self-certain titans of European 
Romanticism, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Germaine Necker de Staël. Their 
experiments with form and their profound exploration of subjectivity give their 
work great aesthetic merit. Their engagements with contemporary political, social, 
cultural, scientific and philosophical issues give their work great historical interest. 
It is worth remembering that even the most apparently privileged of all the British 
Romantics, Lord Byron, was himself a radical bisexual with a physical deformity 
who was hounded into exile. It is worth remembering too that Romanticism has at 
various times, both then and since, been defined as a literature of revolt, and revolt 
can surely come only from the margins. It is probably best to set aside the question 
of centrality and marginality altogether. The best literary histories already describe 
British Romanticism as a pulsing nebula of interacting particles, rather than as a 
system of planets orbiting around the bright composite sun of Wordsworth and 
Austen.10 
Digital methods and book history give us a new opportunity to write this kind 
of literary history. We have seen how digital methods can help us to cut through our 
preconceptions of literature. Data is a mute provocateur. Numbers and graphs 
                                                   
10 Two particularly fine examples are Butler, Romantics, Rebels, and Reactionaries, and William St 
Clair, The Reading Nation in the Romantic Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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demand explanation. Turning literature into data estranges it and forces us test our 
definitions. A computer does not care if a text is canonical or marginal, primary or 
secondary, Romantic or Gothic. It will process the text and demand its human user 
to think. Digital methods also allow us to scale up our analysis, even in the confines 
of a single-authored study like this one. These were small corpora by the standards 
of “distant reading” or “macroanalysis:” 56 novels, 1,245 sonnets, four biographies 
and seven plays. But they were large corpora by the standards of close reading, and 
enabled us to dissolve the texts into the flow of language from which they came, 
distilling hitherto unrecognised patterns from them. There is still some 
consternation in academic circles about the advent of digital humanities, provoked 
largely by Franco Moretti’s call to give close reading a rest and read “distantly” 
instead. “Partly,” he insists, “this was meant as a joke.”11 There is really no debate to 
be had between “close” and “distant” reading. Digital methods are simply new ways 
of shuffling between texts and archives, between individual examples and broad 
generalisations. The scholar can observe how a word is used in one sentence, and 
wonder how it is used elsewhere. They can observe the plot structure of one 
narrative, and wonder how it compares to others. Scholars have always performed 
tasks like this, but digital methods will allow us to perform them ever more 
powerfully, as book historians deliver us ever more complete and accurate 
bibliographical information, and as editors produce ever more accessible and richly-
annotated digital texts. 
I called this study Frankenstein’s Siblings, because each of the figures we 
have encountered seemed related somehow to the two main characters of Mary 
Shelley’s masterpiece. Some were inwardly malformed like her mad scientist; others 
                                                   
11 Moretti, Distant Reading, 44. 
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were creaturely victims overcome by the external world. Frankenstein and his 
creature madly love and madly hate one another, and the centuries-old confusion 
over which character is called “Frankenstein” is telling—Shelley’s two characters 
really are one another. In the first part of Faust, Mephistopheles and God meet in 
heaven, something that tickles Mephistopheles’ fancy: 
Von Zeit zu Zeit seh ich den Alten gern 
Und hüte mich, mit ihm zu brechen.ġ
Es ist gar hübsch von einem großen Herrn, 
So menschlich mit dem Teufel selbst zu sprechen.12 
The two great forces of Faust’s destiny, the mighty God that uplifts him, and the 
pestilential demon that deforms him, are oddly at home with one another, chatting, 
joking and laying wagers over the fate of men’s souls. 
In the end, it is this uncertainty about the deep foundations of identity that 
makes Romantic texts of self-deformation so fascinating. Identity, a Pakistani friend 
once told me, is what people will kill and die for.13 It is foolish to suppose that 
discussing 200-year-old books about rebellious aristocrats or women with common 
law spouses could be the solution to the terrible hatreds and resentments that divide 
us today. And yet these writers nonetheless model a gentler and more humane 
inquiry into the nature of our being.14 These texts can be dense and confused. They 
curl back on themselves. They refuse to give answers about who or what or why we 
are. Their words twist and shatter to the touch. The people they describe are 
burdened by life. “[J]e suis embarquée dans la vie sans mon consentement,” cried 
                                                   
12 “From time to time I gladly see the oldie | And take care not break off our relations. | It is so sweet 
of such a mighty Lord | To talk so nicely with the very Devil.” Goethe, Werke, III.19 
13 See the masterly analysis in Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (Allen 
Lane: London, 2006). 
14 Ros Ballaster has recently called for a “new aesthetic turn” in feminist literary studies, on the basis 
that early women-authored texts about “suffering and oppression” can give us a new sense of our 
“being-in-the-world:” “Passing Judgement: The Place of the Aesthetic in Feminist Literary History,” 
in Women’s Writing, 1660-1830: Feminisms and Futures, ed. Jennie Batchelor and Gillian Dow 
(London: Palgrave, 2016), 29. I heartily agree. 
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Madame de Sévigné.15 We are still thrust upon life unwillingly, and many of us are 
cast upon rocks in the squall. Our understanding of this condition may have changed 
over the last 200 years, but these texts retain the power to question, dazzle and 




                                                   
15 “I was launched upon life without my consent.” Madame de Sévigné, Receuil des Lettres de 
Madame la Marquise de Sévigné, à Madame La Comtesse de Grignon, sa fille, 4 vols. (Leiden: 
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